P-ISSN: 2338-1361
E-ISSN: 2338-1353

JAS

VOL. 12 NO. 2 DECEMBER 2024

JOURNAL OF ASEAN STUDIES

CBDS
Centre for Business and Diplomatic Studies
Serving The Nation through Research and Innovation

in cooperation with Indonesian Association of International Relations

Binus Journal Publishing

S1 sinta Science and Technology Index

Indexed by Scopus

DOAJ

JOURNAL OF ASEAN STUDIES (JAS)

Editor in Chief Tirta Nugraha Mursitama

Editor in International Relations
Bina Nusantara University, Indonesia Moch Faisal Karim

Editor in Area Studies
Bina Nusantara University, Indonesia Lili Yulyadi Arnakim

Editor in Business and Management
Bina Nusantara University, Indonesia Mohammad Ichsan

Managing Editors
Bina Nusantara University, Indonesia Haryo Sutanto
Bina Nusantara University, Indonesia Miranda Paulina Tahalele

International Editorial Board
Australian National University, Australia Pierre van der Eng
National University of Malaysia (UKM), Malaysia Kuik Cheng-Chwee
University of South Florida, United States Abbas Mardani
KEDGE Business School, France Yahia H. Zoubir
Leeds University, United Kingdom Adam Tyson
National Cheng Keung University, Taiwan Jenn-Jaw Soong
American University, United States Amitav Acharya
Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, Malaysia Nanthakumar Loganathan

Editorial Assistant
Bina Nusantara University, Indonesia Dewi Novianti
Bina Nusantara University, Indonesia Gendis Lintang Kinasih
Bina Nusantara University, Indonesia Holil

JOURNAL OF ASEAN STUDIES

Volume 12 Number 2, 2024

Contents

journal.binus.ac.id/index.php/jas

Focus and Scope

The Journal of ASEAN Studies (JAS) is an open-access international peer-reviewed bi-annual journal that enriches understanding of the past, current, and future issues relevant to Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as regional organisation, community, and Southeast Asia as a region. The article shall address multidisciplinary research on theoretical and/or empirical questions. The topics addressed within the journal include a wide range of spectrum across social sciences and humanities such as but not limited to international relations, diplomacy, economy and business.

JAS expects the articles encourage debate, controversy, new understanding, solid theory, and reflection on ASEAN. The articles sent should have a sharp analysis and rigorous methodologies quantitative or qualitative as well as written in an engaging and analytical style. The JAS does publish original research articles, review article, book review, practice notes, and research notes. However, JAS does not publish journalistic or investigative style of article. The JAS would not be responsible for any implied or written statements of articles published. Each author would be responsible for their own writing.

Journal of ASEAN Studies publishes the following types of manuscripts:

- **Original research articles:** The manuscripts should be approximately 6000-8000 words. The manuscripts must contain a review of the current state of knowledge on the research question(s) of interest, then share new information or new ideas that will impact the state of theory and/or practice in the area of ASEAN Studies and/or Southeast Asian Studies.
- **Review article**: The manuscripts should be approximately 1500-3500 words. The manuscripts must contain the current state of understanding on a particular topic about ASEAN and/or Southeast Asian Studies by analysing and discussing research previously published by others.
- **Book review:** The manuscripts should be approximately 1500-4000 words. The manuscripts must contain a critical evaluation of book by making argument and commentary on the particular book discussed about ASEAN and/or Southeast Asian Studies.
- **Practice notes:** These are shorter manuscripts approximately 1500-3500 words that are of specific interest to practitioners. These manuscripts must present new development for the ASEAN.
- **Research notes:** Similar to practice notes, these are shorter manuscripts approximately 1500-3500 words that have specific implications for ASEAN. The manuscripts should employ rigorous methodology either qualitative or quantitative.

Centre for Business and Diplomatic Studies

Centre for Business and Diplomatic Studies (CBDS) is established as part of the International Relations Department, Bina Nusantara (BINUS) University. Our aims are to undertake and promote research and deliberation on diplomacy, business, international relations and developmental issues particularly in Indonesia, Southeast Asia and Asia Pacific.

We also commit to build, connect and share research and others kinds of knowledge generating activities for the betterment of life of the people and earth. Our immediate constituency is International Relations Department, BINUS University and the larger constituency is the broader academic community of the BINUS University and other universities and institutions both national and international as well as policy community.

CBDS publishes scholarly journal, working papers, commentaries and provides training and consultancies services in the areas of diplomatic training, negotiations, commercial diplomacy, conflict resolutions for business, business and government relations, promoting competitive local government in attracting foreign investment, and understanding impact of regional economic integration on development specifically toward ASEAN Community 2015.

CBDS
Secretariat
Kijang Campus, Binus University
Jl. Kemanggisan Ilir III No. 45, Kemanggisan/Palmerah, Jakarta Barat 11480
+62.21 534 5830 ext.2631
http://ir.binus.ac.id/cbds

CBDS
Centre for Business and Diplomatic Studies
Serving The Nation through Research and Innovation

JAS
JOURNAL OF ASEAN STUDIES

ISSN (print) 2338-1361/ ISSN (online) 2338-1353

EDITORIAL

Navigating Southeast Asia: Exploring and Evolving ASEAN in Turbulence Time

Tirta Nugraha Mursitama[1], Lili Yulyadi Arnakim[2], Moch Faisal Karim[3], and Miranda Paulina Tahalele[4]

[1, 2, 4]International Relations Department, Faculty of Humanities, Bina Nusantara University.
[3]Faculty of Social Sciences, Universitas Islam Internasional Indonesia
Jakarta, Indonesia 11480.
tmursitama@binus.edu, lili.yulyadi@binus.edu, faisal.karim@uiii.ac.id,
miranda.tahalele@binus.edu

How to Cite: Mursitama, T. N., Arnakim, L.Y., Karim, M. F., & Tahalele, M. P. (2024). Navigating Southeast Asia: Exploring and evolving ASEAN in turbulence time. *Journal of ASEAN Studies, 12*(2), https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v12i2.13643

Keywords: Southeast Asia, regional dynamics, policy innovation, socio-political complexity, ASEAN studies

Introduction

The study of Southeast Asia remains both intellectually stimulating and methodologically challenging. This is not only due to the region's multifaceted issues—from politics, economics, and socio-cultural developments to its unique geographical context—but also because of the diverse disciplinary approaches and theoretical frameworks that continue evolving within the academic discourse. The dynamic roles of various societal actors—governments, civil society, private sector entities, community groups, and individuals—have significantly shaped the region's contemporary trajectory (Breslin & Nesadurai, 2018). Interactions within and among these actors frequently give rise to innovative solutions, yet

paradoxically also generate new and often complex challenges. This constant interplay highlights the region's fluid and interconnected socio-political fabric.

The region's temporal development—characterized by technological advancements, shifting socio-cultural norms, policy transformations, regulatory inconsistencies, and uncontrollable natural phenomena—has endowed Southeast Asia with a set of evolving features. Although historical patterns may occasionally recur, the contextual variables ensure that each episode unfolds distinctly. The complexity of regional issues often defies conventional resolutions rooted in past experiences. Nonetheless, valuable insights frequently emerge through comparative studies, revealing convergences and divergences in policy responses, institutional arrangements, and legal or political systems. These variations are particularly noteworthy given the shared socio-cultural legacies and normative values embedded across Southeast Asian societies.

Furthermore, the influence of external forces—ranging from geopolitical pressures to global market fluctuations—remains a salient factor in the region's development. Southeast Asian countries, facing such pressures, respond in divergent ways: some assert their autonomy, others adapt pragmatically, while others are swept along by the broader geopolitical currents. The emergence of a new generation of political leaders with distinct leadership styles has further reshaped national trajectories, often reinforcing nationalist sentiments amidst the shifting architecture of the global political economy.

In this context, Southeast Asia continues to offer an expansive intellectual landscape for inquiry. Its richness lies in the constant emergence of new problems, innovative analytical approaches, and enduring relevance in academic and policy-oriented discussions. The *Journal of ASEAN Studies* is a critical platform for scholarly engagement—bridging academic inquiry and practical relevance—to foster a deeper understanding of Southeast Asia's ongoing transformation. Through rigorous debate and interdisciplinary dialogue, this journal contributes to envisioning a dignified, value-rich, prosperous region committed to fostering peace and mutual respect in an increasingly pluralistic world.

Contributors of This Volume

This volume consists of ten articles that can be categorized into three thematic areas contributing to the discussion of Southeast Asia as a dynamic region as well as institution, namely (1) values, norms, and culture related-articles; (2) economy, sustainability, and industry related-articles; and (3) politics and international relations related-articles. All articles provoke interpretation of realities, providing new insights and recommendations.

There are three articles in the first thematic article regarding values, norms, and culture. The first article is entitled *The ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre): Examining Gender-Based Approach in the 2018 Lombok Earthquake* by Mardialina et al. (2024). The authors find that the activities of the AHA Centre following the Lombok earthquake were predominantly focused on emergency response

efforts and lacked significant involvement in gender-sensitive initiatives, ultimately yielding a dual impact on women. This research suggests that a masculine approach to disaster management hinders gender-sensitive disaster response efforts. This research constructs the notion that disaster management efforts conducted without gender sensitivity, regardless of their quality, will not be optimal or effective.

The second article is entitled *Academic Capitalism in Southeast Asia: Lessons from Islamic Universities in Indonesia* by Fathana (2024). The paper argues that two dominant models exist, a pragmatic model, which prioritizes global rankings and revenue generation as indicators of institutional success, and an idealistic model, which integrates rankings cautiously while emphasizing the preservation of Islamic values. The research emphasizes the need for context-sensitive approaches that align global frameworks with local religious and cultural values, offering insights into the evolving landscape of higher education in Southeast Asia. This balance underscores the critical role of identity and values in shaping the future of Islamic higher education.

The third article, written by Sirulhaq and Kurniawan (2024), underlines the shared historical legacies of Indonesian and Malay languages rooted in a 7th-century Southeast Asia lingua franca, which was later modernized during colonialism and played a pivotal role in regional trade and continues to influence the collective identity of ASEAN. This research argues that the Indonesian language has been evolving more complex linguistically; meanwhile, sociolinguistic and geopolitical advantages have bolstered Indonesia's prominence, leading to its adoption in foreign education and UNESCO recognition.

The second thematic area is economy and sustainability-related issues. There are three interesting articles on electric vehicles in ASEAN: the existence of Rupiah coins in terms of their buying power, denominational structure, and comparative analysis with other countries in ASEAN, and the complex relationship between foreign capital flows and the Human Development Index in ASEAN-9. *The Market Interest of Electric Vehicle in ASEAN Through Digital Analytics and Industry Performance* by Barus (2024) argues that The automotive industry's future generation is thought to be the electric vehicle sector. Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia are ASEAN's three main electric vehicle markets. Indeed, the automotive industry has been increasingly concerned with environmental issues as a result of changes in national regulations and technology. Environmental sustainability must be aligned with expanding enterprises. One could characterize Indonesia as having a growing, ever-evolving curiosity that is often impetuous and active. Similar to Indonesia, Malaysia experienced a significant surge in interest in electric vehicles (EVs) between 2020 and 2023.

Furthermore, another issue that has been addressed in this economic section is the Evaluation of the Rupiah denomination. Badrawani et al. (2024) meticulously investigate the presence of Rupiah coins regarding their purchasing power, denominational composition, and comparative assessment with other nations. A comparative analysis utilizes a global product index to assess the denomination structure of the Rupiah coin about the denomination structures of several ASEAN countries and other nations. They finally argue

that the denomination structure of Rupiah coins has been inadequate for the prevailing economic conditions since 2013.

Finally, the paper on economic dealing with the *Uneven Impact of Foreign Direct Investment, Sector-Specific Official Development Assistance, and Remittances on Human Development in ASEAN-9: Evidence from Panel Data Models* contributed by Nguyen (2024). The author examines the influence of foreign capital inflows on the Human Development Index (HDI) in ASEAN-9 from 2002 to 2021, employing panel data regression models and information from credible international sources. It also emphasizes the data attributes and disparities in HDI among member nations. Results indicate that although Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and remittances substantially contribute to capital inflows, only FDI influences the Human Development Index (HDI). Although a minor proportion, official development assistance (ODA) greatly impacts the Human Development Index (HDI). The benefits of ODA differ by sector; grants for social infrastructure and manufacturing, along with ODA loans for manufacturing and other industries, enhance HDI, but grants for economic infrastructure and other sectors detrimentally impact HDI. This underscores the intricate relationship between foreign capital inflows and Human Development Index (HDI) in ASEAN-9. The provision of targeted Official Development Assistance (ODA) and associated policy considerations are essential for regional human development despite the low direct effect of remittances on the Human Development Index (HDI).

The third thematic area is politics and international relations issues that comprise articles on human trafficking, power networks, Indonesia and Timor Leste border relations, and presidentialism in Indonesia and the Philippines. The first paper in this section is contributed by Indraswari (2024) on the relationship between border regulations, human trafficking, and human security in the Mekong sub-region. She utilizes a qualitative case study technique to examine border management strategies from 1993 to 2023, adopting first and second-generation human security principles as its theoretical foundation. She finally argues that although political and economic factors prevail, essential elements of human security, including personal, environmental, and community security, are frequently neglected. Merely 23% of border rules specifically tackle human trafficking, indicating the continued prevalence of state-centric, first-generation strategies that prioritize sovereignty and economic interests over human-centered solutions. The second-generation human security framework emphasizes the necessity for a multifaceted, cooperative strategy in border management. Nevertheless, the research analysis indicates that current strategies inadequately incorporate human security components, resulting in substantial deficiencies in tackling systemic risks. This research theoretically contributes by connecting human security.

Moreover, Hidayat (2024) examines Southeast Asian political dynasties from 2009 to 2024, including their presence, influence, and evolution. Using bibliometric mapping and content analysis, the author examined 74 Scopus-retrieved journals, books, and conference papers from 47 sources. The main goal was to uncover thematic tendencies, blind spots, and their implications for regional political stability, governance, and democracy. Results showed a notable concentration of studies in Southeast Asia, particularly the Philippines and

Indonesia, where political dynasties impact government and democracy. These countries dominate the literature due to their unique political landscapes and familial power systems. Political dynasties in Brunei, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Timor Leste, and Vietnam are understudied, highlighting a major need. To better comprehend Southeast Asian political dynasties, additional research is needed because to the geographic mismatch.

Further discussion on the conflict between the state and Indigenous populations at the Indonesia – Timor Leste border was written by Sugiarti et al. (2024). This kind of conflict has established a unique pattern. This topic is important as it encompasses two entities: state institutions and customary institutions. The authors examined these contestations' implications for customary institutions' function in Indonesia-Timor Leste bilateral relations. Their study utilized an ethnographic methodology, focussing on collecting both primary and secondary data for analysis. Contestation between the state and customary institutions manifests in conflicts over identity, struggles related to the formal spatial concept of the state versus the socio-cultural space of customary institutions, and disputes concerning ownership claims. A significant factor influencing these contestations is the limitation of customary participation imposed by the government via regulations and the marginalization of customary institutions. The contestation has implications for regulation, encompassing compromises between the state and customary practices, the establishment of new customary spaces, and the changing dynamics between Indigenous communities and transnational cultures.

The final paper in the volume is about executive-legislative relations in the Philippines and Indonesia, where Perdana et al. (2024) compared two multiparty presidential systems. Authors argue that the presidentialism framework warns of institutional deadlock, although Rodrigo Duterte and Joko Widodo strategically used presidential powers to negotiate these dynamics. Using a presidential toolbox framework in their studies, the authors investigate how the leaders used coalition-building, patronage, and budgetary authorities differently. Duterte depended on pork-barrel appropriations and patronage to win legislative support in the Philippines, while Jokowi built a broad coalition and included opposition parties in the Indonesian cabinet. Presidential toolboxes, not institutional architecture, are crucial to political stability in fragmented party systems. This defies deterministic presidentialism fears and provides a more nuanced view of executive adaptation in Southeast Asia. The coalitional presidentialism model in emerging democracies is refined to show how leadership styles, institutional arrangements, and informal practices affect multiparty presidential systems.

The vast variety of studies in this collection enriches our understanding of ASEAN's evolution, highlighting its multidimensional progression from value, norms, and cultural issues to economics, sustainability, industry, and International relations. It shows the region's progress and challenges in a changing world. These studies should inspire geo-economic and other ASEAN research to comprehend this dynamic region better.

Editorial Team,

Tirta Nugraha Mursitama
Lili Yulyadi Arnakim
Moch Faisal Karim
Miranda Paulina Tahalele

References

Badrawani, W., Fender, J., & Ghozali, M. H. (2024). Do Rupiah coins have any value? A cross country comparison and evaluation of Rupiah denominations. *JAS (Journal of ASEAN Studies)*, *12*(2), 305–330. https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v12i2.11321

Barus, D. H. N. (2024). The Market interest of electric vehicle in ASEAN through digital analytics and industry performance. *JAS (Journal of ASEAN Studies)*, *12*(2), 283–303. https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v12i2.9091

Breslin, S., & Nesadurai, H. E. S. (2018). Who governs and how? Non-state actors and transnational governance in Southeast Asia. *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, *48*(2), 187–203. https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2017.1416423

Fathana, H., Herdianto, E. F., & Dewi, K. U. (2024). Academic capitalism in Southeast Asia: Lessons from Islamic universities in Indonesia. *JAS (Journal of ASEAN Studies)*, *12*(2), 263–282. https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v12i2.11501

Hidayat, R. (2024). Power networks of political families in Southeast Asia: The enduring dynastic influence in democratic contexts. *JAS (Journal of ASEAN Studies)*, *12*(2), 413–438. https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v12i2.12013

Indraswari, F. (2024). Rethinking border management: A human security approach to combating human trafficking in the Mekong Subregion. *JAS (Journal of ASEAN Studies)*, *12*(2), 353–382. https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v12i2.11591

Mardialina, M., Anam, S., Karyajaya, P. L., Hidayat, A., & Lestari, B. U. S. (2024). The ASEAN coordinating centre for humanitarian assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre): Examining gender-based approach in the 2018 Lombok Earthquake. *Journal of ASEAN Studies, 12*(2), 231-261. https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v12i2.11367

Nguyen, T. V. H. (2024). Insights into the uneven impact of foreign direct investment, sector-specific official development assistance, and remittances on human development in ASEAN-9: Evidence from panel data models. *JAS (Journal of ASEAN Studies)*, *12*(2), 331–351. https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v12i2.11043

Perdana, A., Imam , M., & Effendi , S. (2024). The coalitional presidentialism and presidential toolbox in the Philippines and Indonesia. *JAS (Journal of ASEAN Studies)*, *12*(2), 461–481. https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v12i2.11449

Sirulhaq, A., & Kurniawan, M. A. . (2024). Regional identity and lingua franca in the ASEAN Region: A comparative study of Indonesian and Malay. *JAS (Journal of ASEAN Studies)*, *12*(2), 383–412. https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v12i2.9582

Sugiarti, E., Tsuchiya, K., Romadhona, M. K., Puryanti, L., Riyanto, E. D., & Kasuma, G. (2024). Contesting sovereignty: The State-Indigenous relations at the Indonesia - Timor-Leste Borderlands. *JAS (Journal of ASEAN Studies)*, *12*(2), 439–460. https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v12i2.11467

The ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre): Examining Gender-Based Approach in the 2018 Lombok Earthquake

Mala Mardialina[1], Syaiful Anam[2]*, L. Puttrawandi Karjaya[3], Alfian Hidayat[4], and Baiq Ulfa Septi Lestari[5]

[1,2,3,5]Department of International Relations, Faculty of Law, Social and Political Sciences, University of Mataram, Mataram, Indonesia 83126

[1]Department of Politics and Government, Faculty of Social Science and Political Science, Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta, Indonesia 55281

[4]School of Social Sciences, Universiti Sains Malaysia, Penang, Malaysia 11800

mala.mardialina@unram.ac.id; s.anam@unram.ac.id; putra_wandi@unram.ac.id; alfian.hidayat@unram.ac.id; baiqulfasepti017031@gmail.com
*Corresponding author

How to Cite: Mardialina, M., Anam, S., Karyajaya, P. L., Hidayat, A., & Lestari, B. U. S. (2024). The ASEAN coordinating centre for humanitarian assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre): Examining gender-based approach in the 2018 Lombok Earthquake. *Journal of ASEAN Studies*, *12*(2), 231-261. https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v12i2.11367

Abstract

This research aimed to examine the role played by The ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre) as the disaster coordination agency in the ASEAN region in addressing gender-based approach in Lombok earthquake disasters in 2018. The research utilized a qualitative descriptive research design. The findings indicate that the activities of the AHA Centre following the Lombok earthquake were predominantly focused on emergency response efforts and lacked significant involvement in gender-sensitive initiatives, ultimately yielding a dual impact on women. Through this research, it was ascertained that the suboptimal integration of gender perspectives in disaster management exacerbates the societal marginalization of women. The absence of gender-informed disaster management is evidenced by non-gender-disaggregated victim data, logistic aid provision overlooking gender-specific needs, as well as mitigation efforts and information dissemination disregarding gender dynamics. Thus, it emphasizes the lingering absence of a gender-responsive disaster management framework. This raises questions considering that ASEAN, including the AHA Centre, has already implemented a responsive gender declaration in 2015, whereas the AHA Centre has yet to demonstrate the

Journal of ASEAN Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2 (2024), pp. 231−261
P-ISSN 2338-1361/ E-ISSN 2338-1353
Received: 03rd March 2024/ Revised: 11th August 2024/ Accepted: 09th September 2024

establishment and implementation of a gender-based framework, due to inconsistencies in motivations towards universal norms. This study suggests that a masculine approach to disaster management hinders gender-sensitive disaster response efforts. It employs the concepts of gender mainstreaming and gender sensitivity to examine both the AHA Centre's disaster response efforts and the necessary steps to implement gender-sensitive disaster management. This research constructs the notion that disaster management efforts conducted without gender sensitivity, regardless of their quality, will not be optimal or effective.

Keywords: AHA Centre, Lombok Earthquake, Gender Sensitivity, Gender Mainstreaming

Introduction

The article examines the reasons behind the lack of focus by ASEAN, through The ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre), on disaster management efforts from a gender perspective. This lack of attention has resulted in inadequate comprehensive assistance to the victims of the 2018 Lombok earthquake, particularly affecting women and other vulnerable groups. Despite having implemented a gender-responsive declaration since 2015, which is also enshrined in the ASEAN Vision 2025, AHA Centre, as an ASEAN regional partner, has yet to fully integrate gender aspects into disaster management efforts (ASEAN, 2021). This is significant given that as of January 2023, the ASEAN population reached 668.61 million, with almost equal numbers of men and women (Annur, 2023). In the case of the Lombok earthquake, the number of displaced females significantly surpassed males, with 229,640 women displaced compared to 187,889 men. Addressing the needs and rights of women in disaster scenarios is essential, given their increased vulnerability because of factors like economic challenges, ethnicity, physical differences, political marginalization, and their reliance on men (Enarson et al., 2017). Besides women, other vulnerable groups such as the elderly, children, and persons with disabilities, particularly women with disabilities are also often neglected during disaster relief efforts. The incorporation of disability into gender studies represents an effort toward enforcing inclusive and just social equity, as it is crucial to acknowledge that disabilities significantly exacerbate gender injustice (Cahaya Inklusi Indonesia, 2021)). Gender analysis has been regarded as a strategic approach to reducing women's vulnerability to disasters, as integrating gender perspectives into all aspects of policy and program design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation is a means to ensure that the concerns and experiences of both women and men are accounted for in all facets of disaster management (Septanaya & Fortuna, 2023).

The research question, therefore, focuses on the role of the AHA Centre in gender-sensitive disaster management in the aftermath of the 2018 Lombok earthquake. The 2018 Lombok earthquake is selected as a case study because the earthquake resulted in the highest

fatality rate in the history of Lombok's disasters and displaced a significant number of people, with women making up the majority (Wicaksono, 2018). Moreover, Lombok is an island with a moderate earthquake frequency in Indonesia, suggesting a high risk of future disasters. This condition underscores the need for disaster management strategies that are inclusive, equitable, and sustainable to ensure adequate recovery efforts aimed at reducing disaster risks, strengthening resilience, and enhancing disaster mitigation. These strategies must consider the different impacts of disasters on men and women, making gender-sensitive disaster management crucial. Additionally, the AHA Centre plays a significant role in managing the Lombok earthquake, serving as a facilitator and communicator by coordinating international aid and assisting the National Agency for Disaster Management (BNPB) in assessing disaster victims. They also provide logistical support to BNPB, which is distributed to the affected communities (AHA Centre, 2018a).

In addressing this question, the research first examines literature related to the AHA Centre's involvement in Southeast Asia disaster management. Previous research on AHA Centre's involvement in disaster management is scarce and primarily focuses on providing aid without deeper scrutiny or criticism of the actual disaster management processes. Nonetheless, the previous research provides general insights into AHA Centre's disaster management efforts. Such research include "The Role of AHA Centre in Earthquake Disaster Management in Myanmar in 2012" (Ushamah, 2018), "The Role of AHA Centre in Disaster Management in Southeast Asia through the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response" (Kharisma, 2017), "The Role of AHA Centre in Earthquake Disaster Management in Central Sulawesi" (Heru, 2019), "Interfering Via ASEAN? In the Case of Disaster Management" (Suzuki, 2021), "Gender mainstreaming efforts in disaster management plans: Case study West Nusa Tenggara Province, Indonesia" (Septanaya & Fortuna, 2023), "Implementing the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response for Better Coordination and Simplification Procedures" (Triyana et al., 2022) "Beneficiary Centric Decision Support Framework for Enhanced Resource Coordination in Humanitarian Logistics: A Case Study From Asean" (Giuseppe et al., 2022). These studies indicate that ASEAN's efforts through AHA Centre often remain limited to emergency response and frequently do not extend to comprehensive assistance and recovery, particularly gender-based recovery. This limitation implies that AHA Centre's efforts are mostly reactive and may not adequately consider gender and vulnerable populations during the provision of assistance to the victims of the 2018 Lombok earthquake.

The research also highlights various literature discussing gender approaches to disasters, such as research by Nuriana et al. (2019), which focuses more on pre-disaster mitigation efforts based on sensitive gender. Thus, its focus differs significantly from this research, which concentrates on post-disaster contexts. Another relevant research is by Mustika (2022). The research indicates a different focus that utilizes the perspective of International Governmental Organizations (IGOs) in disaster management involvement. The researcher observes that the exploration of regional organizations, particularly their disaster management agencies' involvement in gender-based disaster management, remains inadequate, resulting in a knowledge gap.

Besides focusing on various literature related to gender approaches in disasters and AHA Centre's role, this research also scrutinizes how intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) like ASEAN act in a masculinist manner by neglecting gender approaches in disaster management. This neglect stems from ASEAN's non-intervention principle, leading member states to believe that domestic issues should be handled domestically, as they are deemed capable of handling them. This shared understanding often leads to individual states not relying on ASEAN institutions and may result in suboptimal responses to non-traditional security threats, such as disasters, which often disproportionately affect women. This contrasts with the positive sovereignty perspective proposed by Ronzoni (2012). Ronzoni (2012) states that sovereignty enables states to secure their citizens' sovereignty and allows politics to determine their destiny. However, this concept overlooks the masculinist aspects reflected in governance by a few individuals who glorify power, as evident in the handling of the Lombok earthquake by the government and the AHA Centre. The lack of adequate facilities such as tents, gender-friendly toilets, gender-disaggregated victim data, and instances of rape and sexual violence due to the absence of disaster facilities, as well as the suboptimal assessment efforts by governments and ASEAN during disaster management, indicate that gender is often overlooked.

Therefore, this research aligns with perspectives suggesting that state actors and intergovernmental organizations tend to overlook other identity attributes, such as gender, as argued by Kantola (2007). Research by Kantola is consistent with studies by John Hofman (2001), Beyen (2020), and Kuokkanen (2019), which criticize states and intergovernmental organizations for prioritizing masculinist actions due to the concentration of power in a few individuals. The neglect of gender attributes resulting from the masculinist nature of IGOs will be examined through gender mainstreaming to delineate various indicators of whether disaster management is gender-based or not. This research also outlines how gender-based disaster management should be conducted to meet practical and strategic needs for implementing gender-sensitive disaster management. The research findings indicate that variables in both concepts are heavily influenced by the masculinist attitudes of ASEAN leaders, leading to suboptimal efforts in mainstreaming gender and sensitivity in disaster management.

This research offers a new perspective on the influence of masculinity on the implementation of IGO policies, such as AHA Centre for disaster management. Moreover, ASEAN as the AHA Centre's coordination partner in disaster management has committed to gender-responsive implementation since 2015. This research is structured into four main sections: an analytical framework encompassing gender mainstreaming (GM) and gender sensitivity (GS); research methodology covering data collection and research methods used; analysis and discussion consisting of two sub-sections, the 2018 Lombok earthquake and AHA Centre's role in gender-based disaster management in 2018. Finally, the conclusion briefly explains the research findings.

Analytical Framework

Gender Mainstreaming

Gender mainstreaming is a strategy devised to integrate gender as an integral dimension of planning, formulation, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of development policies and programs. Moreover, gender mainstreaming aims to achieve gender justice and equality, which is an effort to uphold the rights of women and men to equal opportunities, equal recognition, and equal respect in nation-building, nationalism, and community (Menteri Negara PPPA, 2014). The implementation of gender mainstreaming in development is a strategy to ensure that women and men have equal access to resources, participate in decision-making processes, have equal opportunities and chances to control, and receive the same benefits from a policy. This is further emphasized by the UNDP's Eight Points Agenda for Women's Empowerment and Gender Equality in Crisis Prevention and Recovery, which includes five gender mainstreaming points that are relevant and can be applied in the context of disaster risk reduction and recovery. Those five points are enhancing women's security in crises, increasing and expanding women's participation and leadership, promoting gender equality in disaster risk reduction, ensuring gender-responsive recovery, and building capacity for social change (Asri et al., 2022).

Thus, gender mainstreaming is a strategy to achieve gender equality and justice through policies and programs that take into account the experiences, aspirations, needs, and issues of women and men in planning, implementing, monitoring, and evaluating of all policies and programs in various areas of life and development (ASEAN, 2021). The goal of gender mainstreaming is to ensure that women and men have equal access to development resources, participate equally in the development process including decision-making processes, have equal control over development resources, and receive equal benefits from development outcomes. By knowing these four aspects, gender gaps can be identified, ultimately aiming to identify gender issues and how to address gender gap issues in various situations. Through these means, efforts can be made to minimize or even eliminate gender gaps by formulating gender-responsive policies, programs, and activities (Martiani, 2011).

Essentially, gender mainstreaming (GM) is about incorporating women into the mainstream of national and societal development as citizens with equal rights and obligations as men, realizing gender justice and equality in the family, society, nation, and state through planning, organizing, implementing, monitoring, and evaluating national development policies and programs (Wiasti, 2017). Moreover, gender mainstreaming creates institutional mechanisms for the advancement of women in all fields of community and governmental activities and life. The emphasis on GM's objectives for the advancement of women is due to the patriarchal culture in Indonesia, especially Lombok, which prioritizes males. So, women bear the brunt of its impact, although gender injustice can also be experienced by men. although men can also experience gender injustice.

The implementation of GM in various development fields, such as post-disaster recovery efforts, aims to ensure whether men and women have truly equal access to

development resources and receive equal benefits from development outcomes. In other words, this concept is used to analyze various indicators (access, participation, control over resources, and benefits from policies and programs) to assess whether gender needs are being met for disaster victims in Lombok. The GM indicators used in this study are generally applicable and can be universally applied to the research theme, including disasters, which the National Agency for Disaster Management (BNPB) has also incorporated into its GM efforts for disasters through BNPB Regulation No. 13 of 2014 (BNBP, 2014). This concept also guides BNPB in identifying three disaster management issues from a gender perspective such as gender responsiveness (activities or conditions that support the implementation of gender roles, like women managing disaster relief centers), gender bias (activities or conditions that prevent the execution of gender roles), and gender neutrality (activities or conditions that do not address the roles of men and women, such as disaster risk maps) (UNDP, 2018). Moreover, this concept aims to identify various basic rights in gender mainstreaming or conditions faced by disaster victims, especially women, children, and other vulnerable groups, due to the disaster management actions carried out by the AHA Centre in conjunction with the government.

Gender-Sensitive

A gender-sensitive approach relates to the needs of both men and women. However, it emphasizes meeting the needs of women as they often represent a group with higher vulnerability in disasters. This approach can promote equality, including distributive resources, in the context of disasters. Thus, a gender-sensitive approach means efforts to increase understanding and awareness of the biological and socio-cultural differences between men and women that lead to unequal conditions. It should be promoted to make disaster risk reduction effectively target vulnerable groups, particularly women. Disaster management cannot be done neutrally without considering gender differences. This is based on the differing conditions experienced by men and women influenced by biological and socio-cultural aspects (Ariyabandu, 2009). Ariyabandu (2009) further states that the biological aspect relates to conditions such as menstruation, pregnancy, childbirth, childcare, and breastfeeding, requiring care and protection compared to men who do not have these functions. Based on these conditions, men and women literally differ in reproductive functions, so women's needs require more attention.

Meanwhile, the socio-cultural aspect relates to the gender social construction in a society where unequal relationships are caused by economic, social, political, cultural factors, male domination, and marginalization of women's knowledge and actions that are neither acknowledged nor valued during disasters (Ariyabandu, 2009). Such conditions are gender issues that cause injustice and inequality, making women an excluded group in natural disasters.

Discussions about gender-sensitive disaster management can also be seen from the perspective of Moser (1995), who sees gender-sensitive activities as needing to be based on practical needs and strategic needs of gender. Practical needs aim to improve environmental

conditions to be adequate for survival, while strategic needs relate to the conditions needed to change the subordination position of women to achieve equality. There are several practical needs in disaster management.

First, gender-sensitive data activities involve collecting data related to mapping the potentially affected people and identifying gender-determined roles (Goldin et al., 2019). The need for gender-sensitive data availability contributes to improving disaster response effectively and efficiently. This activity is carried out in disaster mitigation to map vulnerable groups who are likely to be affected by disasters. Vulnerable groups that need to be surveyed include women, the elderly, children, people with mental disorders, and disability survivors. In addition, gender-sensitive data collection also relates to data on deaths and morbidity separated by gender, which can also contribute to a fairer and more efficient disaster management system (Nuriana et al., 2019). This system allows for identifying trends before and after disasters and enables responses tailored to actual needs.

Second, physical infrastructure involves strengthening infrastructure to be more resilient to disasters so that when infrastructure is damaged, it does not threaten human life. Well-designed infrastructure, proper locations, and affordable prices can be powerful tools in pursuing gender equality. In the context of disaster management, particularly emergency response, efforts to strengthen infrastructure resilience to disasters are divided into two categories: housing and shelter. Resilient housing and shelter based on a gender perspective emphasize several aspects such as safe locations from disasters, access to bathrooms and sanitation, access to health services, and protection from potential crimes. Safe housing and shelter locations from potential disasters will prevent additional impacts due to disasters (Goldin et.al, 2019). This is because housing and shelter locations and arrangements can affect the perceived safety of disaster victims. Unsafe access to bathrooms and sanitation areas in shelters is often reported as places where abuse of women occurs. Various studies show factors that influence sexual violence due to unsafe access to bathrooms and sanitation. Safe access means that hygienic areas must be adequate and culturally appropriate. Bathrooms and toilets are best separated by gender; placing women's and men's bathroom areas somewhat apart from each other and having sufficiently bright areas can also enhance privacy. If culturally necessary, women's hygienic areas should also include separate areas for washing and drying clothes or pads during menstruation (Nuriana et al. (2019),.

Third, human development involves physical strength and health conditions that can affect individuals' resilience to disasters. The level of strength depends not only on certain biological factors, such as gender, but also on general physical conditions, nutrition, and health. In poor households that sometimes experience a lack of nutritional resources for a long time, there is often a hierarchy that determines household members' access to food. In this context, the need for adequate living conditions, such as health care and access to clean water and sanitation, is required. Post-disaster environmental health problems often occur due to a lack of clean water sources and adequate sanitation. Ashraf and Azad (2015) state that good sanitation and clean water will reduce the prevalence of diseases, increase productivity, and reduce pollution from water sources. Furthermore, two factors that influence community efforts to obtain clean water are water availability and the ability to obtain water. Water

availability is supported by the existence and abundance of clean water sources that meet quality standards and good environmental conditions that can maintain water conditions and availability (Ashraf & Azad, 2015). There are three factors that influence the community's ability to obtain water: water collection locations, water allocation, and community capacity.

Fourth, knowledge dissemination related to disaster awareness is an important aspect in reducing disaster risk. Knowledge dissemination means recognizing signs of impending disasters and the best ways to act, which are prerequisites for effective disaster response. In this context, men and women need knowledge of the signs and responses to possible disasters. It means that men and women have equal capacity to deal with disasters. In planning knowledge dissemination, gender should be considered when choosing methods based on literacy levels, mobility, access to public places, work schedules, and general preferences for participation facilities (Nuriana et al., 2019).

After looking at the practical gender needs in disaster mitigation, the next step is strategic gender needs. Strategic needs relate to the conditions needed to change the subordination position of women to achieve equality. Disaster management includes strengthening women's decision-making power, increasing favoritism toward leadership positions, and protecting them from violence. The purpose of activities that encourage the fulfillment of strategic gender needs is to solve gender inequality issues in disasters. First is negative labeling or stereotypes. Women are often labeled with gentle qualities, while men are considered strong. This labeling makes women always placed in weak, powerless, and unable to be leader conditions. Meanwhile, men are considered able to help themselves and be leaders. Second is ranking or subordination, which means there is an assumption that one gender is more important than the other. Since ancient times, women have been viewed as lower than men (Murtakhamah, 2013). In disaster situations, women are disadvantaged because their needs as women are often overlooked. Specific women's needs, such as sanitary pads, underwear, and other reproductive health tools, are often unavailable. This way seems to strengthen the view that women's task is to cook. Third is economic marginalization. The marginalization process results in one gender being neglected in resource access. In disaster situations, women often cannot access assistance because they are considered not the main breadwinner or head of the household. This situation is very disadvantageous, especially for women who have to be the head of the household either before or after the disaster occurs. Fourth is the double burden. One gender often must perform multiple tasks at once. In disaster situations, women often experience a double burden. Women almost do 80% of household chores starting from providing food, taking care of children, and caring for sick and elderly people. However, on the other hand, women are also burdened with collecting firewood, clean water, and seeking help.

Thus, several approaches must be implemented by various parties involved in disaster management. These include involving women in training and increasing the participation of both men and women in decision-making and empowerment processes, providing equal access and control over goods, services, information, and productive resources across gender gaps, ensuring the involvement of all gender groups in decision-making and empowerment processes by addressing their specific needs and perceptions related to disaster risk reduction,

systematically applying a gender perspective to enhance gender sensitivity in disaster risk reduction, and introducing policies aimed at addressing gender mainstreaming issues in society. Additionally, women must be empowered to enhance their adaptability to disaster risks. If all parties adopt these steps to increase gender sensitivity within society, the country will significantly improve disaster risk mitigation and management (Zeeshan, et al., 2019). Therefore, efforts can be maximized to meet strategic needs, such as increasing women's strength in decision-making, favoritism toward leadership positions, equal access to work, equal legal rights, protection from violence, reproductive rights, and increasing mobility for women.

Gender sensitivity in this research is used to analyze whether disaster management based on gender sensitivity has been implemented by the AHA Centre based on Moser's approach regarding the fulfillment of practical needs (gender-sensitive data, legal infrastructure, physical infrastructure, human development, and knowledge dissemination) and the fulfillment of strategic needs (increasing women's strength in decision-making, increasing favoritism towards leadership positions, equal access to work, equal legal rights, protection from violence, reproductive rights, and increasing mobility for women) (Moser, 1995).

Methodology

This research adopts a qualitative approach, applying an interpretative framework to understand or interpret phenomena based on the meanings attributed to them by individuals. Qualitative research involves the collection and utilization of various empirical materials, which may stem from case studies, personal experiences, interviews, observations, history, interactions, and texts that depict both routine and problematic moments, as well as meanings in an individual's life (Guba & Lincoln, 2005). Document analysis is conducted by gathering literature, news, and official documents from the government related to the handling of the 2018 Lombok earthquake. Regarding official documents, several disaster management reports are obtained directly from the AHA Centre website and official reports from the Indonesian National Agency for Disaster Management (BNPB) website regarding the lessons learned from the 2018 Lombok earthquake. Furthermore, this research also searches various websites to obtain information regarding the ASEAN regional framework on gender in disaster management to ascertain whether this framework has been applied to handling the Lombok earthquake disaster. Additionally, the researcher uses news reports from official websites of national and local news agencies to delve deeper into information regarding the handling of the Lombok earthquake disaster, particularly concerning the aid provided, the disaster management process, the parties involved, and the impact of the disaster management efforts. This stage helps uncover strategic narratives in the formation stage and projecting arguments. Thus, for the initial research design, the researcher conducts pre-research by reviewing the literature on gender approaches in disaster management or recovery. Regarding the research location, as this research is related to the post-disaster period of the 2018 Lombok earthquake,

the research location is in several areas severely affected by the disaster, such as North Lombok Regency, East Lombok, and West Lombok (BNPB, 2018).

After determining the areas for field data collection, the researcher selects methods for collecting field data through interviews, observations, and documentation. The interview method is done by gathering data through direct interviews with victims (women), various stakeholders from government agencies and non-governmental organizations (Regional Disaster Management Agency, Provincial Social Service Agency, District Social Service and Women and Children Protection Agency, Koslata NTB, and other relevant parties. Then, voice recorders and notes are used to record all the information. Subsequently, the observation method is done by observing the damage and conditions of disaster victims. This research also explores the perspectives of Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs), specifically the AHA Centre, through various official reports related to the handling of the 2018 Lombok earthquake, as well as literature studies related to gender issues from the perspective of state sovereignty and international organizations on disaster studies. It is used to deepen the gender perspective on disasters and how ASEAN masculinity can limit the fulfillment of fundamental needs that are often overlooked even in emergencies.

Following the selection of documents and informants, the research proceeds with analysing various sources to determine the gender responsiveness of disaster assistance provided by the AHA Centre. The initial step involved employing content analysis to assess whether gender mainstreaming strategies were integrated into the handling of the 2018 Lombok earthquake disaster. Content analysis, a research tool used to identify specific words, themes, or concepts within qualitative data, measures and analyzes the presence, meaning, and relationships of these elements in the collected text data, including interviews, focus groups, documents, and participant observations. Additionally, gender mainstreaming is applied to identify fundamental rights or challenges faced by disaster victims, especially women, focusing on access, participation, control, and benefits. The gender sensitivity concept, based on Moser's (1995) approach, was also employed to evaluate whether gender-sensitive disaster management had been implemented by the AHA Centre, considering practical needs such as gender-sensitive data, legal infrastructure, and knowledge dissemination.

Discussion and Analysis

The 2018 Lombok Earthquake

Historically, Indonesia is prone to natural disasters such as volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, tsunamis, floods, cyclones, and landslides. This susceptibility is attributed to Indonesia's geographical location, situated at the convergence of the Eurasian, Indo-Australian, and Pacific tectonic plates. These disasters can result in the loss of human lives, environmental damage, property loss, and psychological impacts that, under certain circumstances, can hinder national development. One significant disaster was the earthquake that struck Lombok Island, West Nusa Tenggara Province (NTB), in 2018. The earthquakes on

Lombok Island occurred several times in close succession. First, on July 29, 2018, at 06:47 WITA (Central Indonesia Time) the earthquake struck with a magnitude of 6.4 Richter Scale (SR). Second, on August 5, 2018, at 18:46 WITA, the magnitude reached 7.0 SR. Third, on August 9, 2018, at 12:25 WITA, an aftershock struck with a magnitude of 6.2 SR. Fourth, the earthquake with a magnitude of 6.9 SR occurred on Sunday, August 19, 2018, at 22:56:27 WITA (BNBP, 2018).

This earthquake has caused 564 fatalities, 6,774 injuries, and 417,529 displaced individuals. Additionally, the earthquake caused significant damage to at least 75,138 heavily damaged houses, 33,075 moderately damaged houses, and 108,306 lightly damaged houses. Public and social facilities affected by this earthquake included 855 schools, 12 markets, 61 hospitals and health centers, and 389 places of worship. BNPB data indicated total losses amounting to IDR 12.15 trillion. This number encompasses building damages totaling IDR 10.15 trillion and economic losses amounting to IDR 2 trillion (Bakti & Nurmandi, 2020). Given the massive impact of the Lombok earthquake in 2018, immediate and holistic disaster mitigation efforts are required. In Indonesia, disaster mitigation efforts are conducted through three stages: pre-disaster, emergency response, and post-disaster. The pre-disaster stage aims to reduce disaster risks and implement various preventive measures. During the emergency response stage, activities include assessment, determination of disaster emergency status, rescue and evacuation of communities, provision of basic needs, protection of vulnerable groups, and immediate recovery of vital infrastructure and facilities. Meanwhile, in the post-disaster stage, disaster mitigation efforts are carried out through rehabilitation and reconstruction (BNBP , 2018).

During the emergency response stage, earthquake survivors require significant logistical assistance, such as tarpaulins, tents, food, clean water, clothing, blankets, diapers, and nutritious food for infants and toddlers. Unfortunately, during the initial phase of the earthquake, aid distribution is uneven due to the difficulty of accessing disaster displacement people locations, often inland. Moreover, damaged roads and bridges caused by the earthquake impeded transportation access for aid distribution (Wardah, 2018). Additionally, inadequate coordination in aid distribution leaves the community needing clarification. It is important to note that many independent parties provide logistical assistance to disaster displacement people without cordinating with the Regional Disaster Management Agency (BPBD) and the National Agency for Disaster Management (BNPB) through existing clusters to regulate logistical assistance distribution (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana, 2018). Apart from the lack of established coordination, suboptimal distribution of logistical assistance is influenced by limited human resources (HR) involved in emergency response efforts, especially competent HR in their respective fields. This is attributed to the lack of comprehensive training to develop managerial skills and abilities. The training is ensuring that HR involved not only understands existing policies and regulations but can also plan and manage resources assigned to support emergency disaster operations. The scarcity of trained personnel in warehouse operations, loading, and logistics distribution in the field affects the speed of logistical distribution and aid to the community. It is not surprising that there are delays and disparities in aid distribution after a disaster, prompting the government to continue collaborating with other institutions such as community organizations, businesses,

and international organizations like the AHA Centre. The involvement of various parties is regulated in Law Number 24 of 2007 of the Republic of Indonesia. It concerns the three pillars of disaster management actors highlighting the crucial need for interagency cooperation in disaster mitigation efforts with massive impacts such as the 2018 Lombok earthquake (BNBP, 2018).

The Role of the AHA Centre in Gender-Based Disaster Response to the 2018 Lombok Earthquake

As a disaster coordination agency in the ASEAN region, the AHA Centre has long-standing disaster cooperation with Indonesia since its establishment on November 17, 2011. Indonesia and nine other ASEAN member states agree to form the AHA Centre to assist in disaster management in the ASEAN region. In operationalizing its mandate, the AHA Centre primarily collaborates with the National Disaster Management Organizations (NDMOs) of ASEAN member countries. Additionally, the AHA Centre partners with international organizations, the private sector, and civil society organizations, such as the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the United Nations (UN), and the AADMER partnership group. Moreover, the AHA Centre engages in multilateral cooperation with ASEAN Dialogue/Development/Sectoral Partners, including Australia, China, the European Union, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, and the United States. With the extensive cooperation facilitated by the AHA Centre, the institution can mobilize more resources through coordination with ASEAN leaders and global partners (AHA Centre, 2019). This coordination represents the implementation of the ASEAN Community pillar in the form of the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community, which focuses on the environment as well as disaster response and management (Velasco, 2023).

In the case of the Lombok earthquake, the AHA Centre initiated contact with the leadership of BNPB on August 5, 2018, by sending a letter of condolence and offering assistance. The Indonesian government responded positively, allowing the AHA Centre to assist in the disaster response on Lombok Island (AHA Centre, 2018b). Immediately after the Lombok earthquake, the AHA Center acted swiftly by disseminating initial information about the situation and conditions through the ASEAN Disaster Information Network (ADINET), obtained from coordination between the AHA Centre and BNPB. In this regard, the AHA Centre deployed staff from BNPB's Data and Information Center (Pusdatin) to support the dissemination of official information to international stakeholders. The action by the AHA Centre represented the initial phase of disaster response, focusing on mitigation, which allows for an excellent regional risk assessment and early warning activities, emphasizing cross-border issues that require international cooperation, thereby benefiting the region, planning for more inclusive disaster recovery, and targeted mitigation and response efforts (AHA Centre, 2018b).

In fulfilling its mandate, the AHA Centre was assisted by an In-Country Liaison Team (ICLT) deployed by the AHA Centre to Lombok Island on August 6, 2018, to support coordination in the field. Subsequently, the AHA Centre continued its role by deploying the

ASEAN-Emergency Response and Assessment Team (ASEAN-ERAT) to Lombok Island as part of the emergency response (AHA Centre, 2018b). Simultaneously, the ICLT assisted ASEAN-ERAT in facilitating the receipt of ASEAN logistical aid items. Furthermore, the AHA Centre, through ASEAN-ERAT and ICLT, supported the establishment of a Mobile Storage Unit (MSU) at Lombok International Airport as the main entry point for domestic aid items from various locations in Indonesia. ASEAN-ERAT and ICLT, along with BNPB and BPBD, completed the establishment of the MSU for storing aid items at the airport, considering that the airport is one of the main entry points for domestic aid. The coordination between ASEAN-ERAT, BNPB, and ICLT represents the next step in the disaster response phase, focusing on recovery by conducting damage and loss assessments within one month after the disaster, mobilizing resources from local, regional, and international communities to support recovery efforts (AHA Centre, 2018b).

All ASEAN-ERAT members began their deployment between August 8 and 9, 2018, and completed their deployment on August 15, 2018. Meanwhile, BNPB welcomed ASEAN-ERAT to learn from Indonesia's experiences in managing disasters and receive briefings on ongoing emergency operations. Furthermore, ASEAN-ERAT also conducted damage assessments at 17 locations in the Gunung Sari and Batu Layar sub-districts (West Lombok Regency) together with local BPBD and BNPB teams. Additionally, ASEAN-ERAT provided evacuation plans to the West Lombok Regency BPBD and BNPB for evacuation sites in the regency. All data and recommendations from ASEAN-ERAT were conveyed to the Disaster Emergency Post (PDB) in West Lombok Regency and the national coordinating post (Pospenas) as part of efforts to provide a comprehensive understanding of damage, impacts, and humanitarian needs (AHA Centre, 2018b).

The second handover of aid items from the AHA Centre was conducted on August 15, 2018, with additional family tents totaling 178, family kits totaling 192, and personal hygiene kits totaling 420 as shown in Figure 1. The logistical aid items were shipped after the first shipment on August 13, 2018, consisting of 172 family tents. The third phase of aid shipment to deliver the remaining items was carried out from August 20 to 22, 2018, providing health and hygiene kits totaling 380 and family kits totaling 108. The distribution of aid items was based on releases from BNPB and agencies at the post on August 12, 2018, or a day before the first shipment of logistical aid items. The most urgent humanitarian needs were logistical assistance for 419,424 disaster displacement people, as follows: tents, blankets, mattresses, ready-to-eat food, WASH (clean water, sanitation tools), telecommunications, medicine, clothing, trucks for aid distribution, and electric generators for lighting (AHA Centre, 2018b).

These aid items are then coordinated by the AHA Centre to ASEAN member states. The AHA Centre facilitates the mobilization of aid items from ASEAN member states through the ASEAN Emergency Disaster Logistics System (DELSA) from Subang to Kuala Lumpur International Airport. A total of 30 tons of aid items are divided into three sorties and sent to Lombok. Through this method, the AHA Centre can prepare aid that can be offered to disaster-affected countries before being requested. It aligns with the AHA Centre's function of operating and facilitating regional coordination mechanisms for disaster preparedness and emergency response. The AHA Centre establishes a regional stockpile (DELSA) that serves as

a storage facility for items typically needed during natural disasters so that when needed, logistical aid can be immediately mobilized (AHA Centre, 2018b). Thus, the system used by the AHA Centre currently supports sudden and unforeseen disasters such as earthquakes, tsunamis, and volcanic eruptions, even though the DELSA network structure in ASEAN leads to high operational costs, which threaten its long-term sustainability (Giuseppe, 2022). In the case of handling the Lombok earthquake, especially in terms of emergency response mechanisms, the AHA Centre is acknowledged to have good readiness. This can be seen from the AHA Centre's promptness in producing disaster situation reports, deploying ASEAN-ERAT teams to assist BNPB in assessing post-disaster damage and losses and providing logistical aid relatively quickly after the disaster.

Figure 1. Distribution of ASEAN Aid Items in Lombok

Source: AHA Centre Situation Update No. 8 (2018b)

In the Lombok earthquake disaster, the AHA Centre also became a facilitator and communicator, whereby its mechanism acted to inform and coordinate offers of international aid to be accepted by Indonesia. This stems from the case of the 2004 Aceh tsunami, where the unrestricted acceptance of international aid led to uncontrolled aid inflows, triggering risks to ongoing emergency response. This condition is because of the absence of an institution like the AHA Centre that can coordinate potential aid providers. Consequently, Indonesia faces issues of piled-up aid and uneven distribution to disaster victims. Therefore, in the case of handling the Lombok earthquake, the AHA Centre, through its collaboration with BNPB and BPBD, coordinates various incoming external aids, thus mitigating concerns about uncontrolled aid influx.

In its implementation, the AHA Center has several shortcomings in assisting the handling of the Lombok earthquake, especially regarding gender mainstreaming efforts, considering that the AHA Centre implemented a gender-responsive declaration in 2015.

ASEAN also agreed upon a 10-year vision (ASEAN Vision 2025) where gender became a key agenda for regional development (ASEAN, 2021). Hence, the handling of the Lombok earthquake in 2018 should have taken into gender mainstreaming and sensitivity aspects. In this regard, the concepts of gender mainstreaming and gender sensitivity are crucial to determine whether various gender needs indicators have been met. These indicators include access, participation, control over resources, and the benefits of programs and policies. Moreover, various gender mainstreaming indicators will be juxtaposed with gender sensitivity to delineate disaster management that is sensitive to gender needs. This is because the expected changes from gender mainstreaming include transforming individuals, communities, or institutions from being initially gender-blind and biased to becoming gender-responsive and ultimately gender-sensitive.

1. Access

   Access refers to fair or equal conditions for women and men, including children, the elderly, youth, persons with disabilities, and other vulnerable groups, to access information and humanitarian aid following a disaster. This emphasizes the ease of obtaining information and aid from various parties to the community fairly and equally. Access to information can include disaster preparedness activities conducted by the government or related agencies to provide information on disaster preparedness. Meanwhile, access to humanitarian aid means that women also have the right to access aid equal to men (BNPB, 2014). In the case of the Lombok earthquake, the strong patriarchal culture limited women's access. For example, various stakeholders conducted disaster preparedness efforts post-Lombok earthquake due to predictions of aftershocks.

   Mitigation efforts in disaster-prone areas are carried out by disseminating information through counseling and cadres on disaster preparedness. Once again, gender inequality occurs because women's roles in Lombok regarding disaster preparedness were very limited due to gender structure inequalities in society. Due to their predominantly public roles, adult men have the greatest opportunity to access information, including disaster-related information. Through neighborhood meetings, village hall meetings, and invitations to training or special socialization for disaster dissemination, men were often the main participants. At the same time, women, especially housewives, have limited opportunities to access disaster information due to their domestic roles—taking care of children, cleaning the house, serving their husbands, and maintaining household security often limited women's involvement in activities in public spaces (Wiasti, 2017).

   The difference in access to information is acknowledged by many parties, although some consider it not a significant issue. The reason is that knowledge transfer models can be used to reach other community components that do not have direct access to information. Unfortunately, in practice, this transfer process does not always work well. Women should also have an equal share in accessing information directly because women are expected to transfer information to their children. Women lack access to disaster preparedness, mitigation, and rehabilitation due to their unique roles and social constructions (Hidayati, 2018). However, as household managers, women often interact

with nature, for example, in water use activities, natural resource management, and utilization for food needs. This makes women more sensitive to their environment, not only because most women have traditional wisdom passed down through generations. The limitation of access to information from a gender-sensitive perspective can be explained through knowledge dissemination where unfavorable situations affecting women make it difficult for them to access information, which can be prevented by choosing appropriate information dissemination methods based on literacy levels, mobility, access to public places, and general preferences for participation means (Nuriana et al., 2019).

During the evacuation period, not only women have minimal access to information but also, they often face challenges and difficulties in distributing emergency aid. In the case of Lombok Island, most aid tends to be distributed to men, usually as heads of households, thus neglecting women who are also heads of households. However, in the Lombok earthquake case, the number of disaster displaced women is much larger than that of men, making access to aid for women with gender sensitivity crucial. This is crucial because there is a perception that one gender is more important than the other. Historically, women have been viewed as inferior to men (Taqiuddin et al., 2021). In disaster situations, women are disadvantaged because their needs as women are often overlooked. For example, in distributing special aid for women, the aid received is usually related to domestic activities such as cooking. Women's needs, such as sanitary napkins, underwear, and other reproductive health supplies, are often overlooked. This approach reinforces the perception that women's roles are limited to cooking. For vulnerable groups such as elderly women, long sarongs and traditional underwear are often not included in the aid list because it is considered replaceable by bras.

During the early stages of the disaster, disaster displacement people, especially pregnant women and children, do not receive special attention to their needs. However, babies and children fall into the vulnerable group along with pregnant women, the elderly, and people with disabilities. This group should receive special treatment. Special aid packages for women, such as those equipped with sanitary pads and underwear, are only sometimes available. The same goes for food and baby formula. Most children eat the same food as their parents, dominated by instant noodles. They also live together in emergency tents. This situation is because the concentration of aid is still on the most basic needs, such as staple food, water, and shelter. This condition causes the needs of women and children to not receive special attention after the earthquake in Lombok (Nur, 2018).

2. Participation

Participation provides opportunities for both men and women to convey aspirations, support, objections, or judgments in the policy or activity processes, especially in this case related to disaster management for victims. Regarding participation indicators, they can be seen during the disaster victim assessment process. This assessment is a consultation that involves all relevant community groups in policies and programs to apply the rights, views, knowledge, and experiences of each group to the situation they

are facing. However, in the case of the 2018 Lombok earthquake, consultation and feedback processes tended to be conducted by male groups and tended not to involve women's decisions. Inadequate assessment efforts from various parties, including the Indonesian government and the AHA Centre through the ASEAN-ERAT team, regarding the needs of the victims of the 2018 Lombok earthquake are mainly due to the strong patriarchal system on Lombok Island, which is known to uphold patriarchal cultural values firmly. As a result, women do not have economic, social, political, psychological, and personal rights that they should decide for themselves.

The failure to fulfill the services received by women's rights is caused by the assessment process conducted by the AHA Centre and the government regarding damages, losses, and needs, mostly relying on information and feedback from men only. The patriarchal culture that positions women in inferior situations, focusing women on domestic roles, often makes women's voices unimportant in the public domain. Even in many cases of decision-making, men's voices are considered to represent all family members. The assessment efforts by the government and ASEAN in this matter are not optimal in touching sensitive and crucial matters during disaster handling, which is a gender approach for all victims. Various ASEAN and government aid also have not been optimal in paying attention to the needs of vulnerable groups, such as special breastfeeding tents for women. Moreover, the scarcity of logistical availability, such as special women's tents, emergency toilets, and bathrooms, makes it difficult for women to move freely. In some cases, women have experienced harassment and sexual violence after the Lombok disaster. Not only in the assessment process but efforts during the emergency disaster preparedness period, namely three to seven days after the earthquake, most women in Lombok also play a minimal role in managing evacuation sites, such as organizing the layout of evacuation sites, creating separation barriers between men and women or family units, such as partitions in hospital rooms, or separation of facilities (public shared facilities for bathing, washing, and waste disposal) for men and women.

The implementation of gender-blind assessments is also because assessments related to the victims were not segregated by gender. The National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB), along with the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre), only provide information that the number of fatalities was 564, and once again, the categorization of disaster victims was not based on gender. In this regard, BNPB and the AHA Centre assess disaster displaced people numbers based on gender. However, they do not try to focus on other victims who might need attention, especially vulnerable groups. The vulnerable groups that need to be documented include the elderly, children, people with mental disorders, and survivors with disabilities, which unfortunately were not carried out by the government and the AHA Centre as shown in Table 1. Furthermore, based on gender-sensitive strategies, such as the collection of gender-sensitive data and gender-based death and morbidity data, can contribute to a fairer and more efficient disaster management system. This allows for the identification of trends before and after disasters, enabling responses tailored to actual needs (Nuriana et al., 2019).

Table 1. Casualties in Lombok Island following the 2018 Lombok Earthquake, Indonesia (maximum recorded number*)

Location Parameter	East LombokRegency	North LombokRegency	West LombokRegency	Central LombokRegency	Mataram City
Affected population (exposed to earthquake intensity V-VIII MMI)	**1,192,110**	**218,533**	**685,161**	**939,409**	**477.476**
Population displaced (% of affected) (BNPB)	104,060	178,122	116,453	*N/A*	18,894
Families displaced (BNPB)	35,329	47,048	29,166	*N/A*	4,275
Fatalities	31	466	44	2	9
Serious injuries	122	829	399	3	63
Light injuries	95	392	189	18	89
Damaged buildings:					
- Heavy damage	2,938	12,546	11,925	9	110
- Moderate damage	0	0	0	722	25
- Light damage	2,853	5,328	11,701	4,036	619
Initial estimation of economic damage and loss (BNPB)	IDR 417.3 billion/USD 284.5 thousands	IDR 2.7 trillion /USD 184 million	IDR 1.5 trillion/USD 102 million	IDR 174.4 billion/USD 118.9 thousands	IDR 242.1 billion/ USD 165 thousands

Note: * Consolidated from most recent release from BNPB and Lombok Earthquake Command Post
Source: AHA Centre Situation Update No. 8 (AHA Centre, 2018b)

3. Control

Control refers to the mastery of resources, whether technological, informational, or knowledge based. Control relates to the roles of individuals, whether they are dominated by a certain gender or sex, in decision-making and policy. In disaster management, control means how both women and men can possess a mastery of technology, information, and knowledge and how decision-making related to disaster management, such as emergency response and recovery efforts, can be dominated by both genders. Regarding information mastery, women tend to have less access related to preparedness, mitigation, and disaster rehabilitation. This is because women's access to information and mobility is more limited, making them more vulnerable in disaster situations. This condition also relates to gender-sensitive strategies such as knowledge dissemination (Nuriana et al., 2019). In the case of Lombok Island, regarding literacy rates and education based on gender, the highest illiteracy rate is found in women at 16.58 percent. Meanwhile, men are at 8.14 percent. The highest female illiteracy rates is in Central Lombok at 23.52 percent, West Lombok at 22.02 percent, and North Lombok at 21.32 percent (BPS NTB, 2017). Literacy rates can also be an indicator to see the development of the population's education. The higher the literacy rate or literacy skills, the higher the quality of human resources. People who can read and write are assumed to have abilities and skills because they can absorb information, orally or in writing.

Besides illiteracy, indicators of information and knowledge mastery can also be seen in school participation. This is because one indicator to assess education access is school participation. School participation indicators provide an overview of the equitable

access and expansion of education services to the population (Hartono, 2021). Based on school participation, the population is grouped into three categories: never or not yet enrolled school, still in school, and no longer in school. Based on data from the Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS) of West Nusa Tenggara province, the percentage of males who have never/not yet enrolled school is 6.98, while females are 11.41. The percentage of males still in school is 26.62, while females are 24.89. The percentage of males no longer in school is 66.40, while females are 63.70 (BPS NTB, 2021). Based on this data, the percentage of female populations who have never attended school is higher than male populations. Conversely, the percentage of male populations still in school and no longer in school is higher than female populations.

Regarding gender in knowledge dissemination, some approaches need to be adjusted to the differences in knowledge dissemination for men and women in disaster management, especially illiteracy. Women, as the most affected by illiteracy, would be better served if information is provided through outreach officers or discussions related to disaster management. Unlike men, who tend to get disaster information through electronic devices such as televisions, radios, or smartphones, women are less able to schedule time to listen to various disaster information through these electronic devices because they have many responsibilities, from working as farmers as well as domestic roles at home. Additionally, women prefer an environment where disaster-related questions can be addressed promptly and discussions can evolve (Nuriana et al., 2019). So, in this case, it is important to plan knowledge dissemination considering the differences in roles and time for women and men so that knowledge can be effectively disseminated. In this case, the AHA Centre is more active in providing information online with the aim of disseminating information widely to the international community regarding the handling of the Lombok earthquake. However, various information from the AHA Centre will be difficult for the people of Lombok to access, especially those who are illiterate and do not understand English. Disaster education by BNPB and the AHA Centre is mainly done through online media, where direct disaster education activities are not as active as disaster education through online media. This is because disaster education through online media is considered more efficient and often overlooks other victims who also need information but are hindered by illiteracy.

Women's limited control over disaster management is also influenced by significant differences in the Human Development Index (HDI) between women and men. HDI measures human development achievements based on several basic components of quality of life. As a measure of quality of life, HDI is built through three basic dimensions. These dimensions include a long and healthy life, knowledge, and decent living standards. The HDI between men and women is equally important and should be considered to contribute to achieving full human development, including efforts in post-disaster recovery. However, there is a significant gap between the HDI of men and women when the 2018 Lombok earthquake occurred. The HDI for men reaches 71.68, while women reach 64.78 (BPS NTB, 2018). Even in the years after, the percentage of HDI for men is much higher than for women. It shows that the level of women's HDI is

not experiencing significant improvement. The limited HDI of women limits their involvement in access, participation, and control over disaster recovery efforts.

In addition to looking at gender development conditions through the Gender Development Index (GDI), which can illustrate gender inequality by comparing (ratios) achievements between women's and men's HDI, gender development conditions can also be seen through the lens of the Gender Empowerment Index (GEI). The GEI is an indicator to measure the realization of gender justice and equality based on political participation, economic participation and decision-making seen from two indicators, namely the proportion of men and women as legislators, senior officials, and managers, as well as the percentage of men in professional and technical positions and economic resources measured by estimated income for men and women. The GEI of West Nusa Tenggara in 2018 was 67.3 percent, which marked an increase from the HDI of West Nusa Tenggara in 2014, which stood at 64.31 percent. This figure was below the national HDI average (Bappeda, 2018).

The HDI and GEI conditions between women and men, before and after the earthquake, can also be seen from a gender-sensitive concept called human development. This means that various factors of HDI and GEI owned by men and women affect their resilience in post-disaster situations. Those with unhealthy conditions, low education, and inadequate living conditions will find it difficult to recover from disasters, making them the vulnerable group that needs attention. These three factors are basic approaches in measuring HDI indicators by the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS).

4. Benefits

Gender equality focuses not only on equal access, participation, and control but also on how the results of disaster management activities have fair and equal impacts on both men and women. The report from the Ministry of Women's Empowerment and Child Protection explains that the mastery of benefits must impact the treatment and fulfillment of rights from a gender perspective. However, based on aspects of equal access, participation, and control in disaster management, the benefits received by women are much fewer than those received by men. This is evidenced by the vulnerability experienced by women due to the minimum equality of benefits received by them. As a result of non-sensitive gender aid access and minimal participation by women, their needs at the onset of the disaster were overlooked. In the case of Lombok earthquake, disaster displaced women became victims of harassment and sexual violence due to the lack of sensitive gender logistics such as women's specific tents and toilets for women (Saputra, 2018).



Figure 2. Diseases recorded in Lombok Earthquake: Fever and Skin Diseases (left) and Influenza, Acute Respiratory Infections (ARI), and Pneumonia Diseases (right)

Source: AHA Centre Situation Update No. 8 (AHA Centre, 2018b)

Moreover, displaced women have reported experiencing itching in intimate areas due to their reluctance to change underwear because of the lack of designated places for changing clothes. This has led many of them to contract skin diseases. This can be seen in Figure 2, which details the condition of post-disaster displaced persons released by the AHA Center during the period of August 2018. It was recorded that from August 9 to 23, the number of skin disease cases fluctuated, with the highest number occurring on August 14, with 58 cases, caused by the limited availability of toilets and tents for women. They also fear changing clothes because it often gives mischievous men the chance to peep at them. In addition to skin diseases, according to Figure 2, the displaced persons also experienced fevers due to the lack of logistical facilities, such as tents and medical aid, with fluctuating numbers of cases, and the highest number of 54 cases occurring on August 11. However, the most common disease reported was influenza, with the highest number of cases—206—occurring on August 11, as a result of poor living conditions and sanitation in the camps, as well as the limited availability of tents. Other diseases, such as acute respiratory infections (ARI) and pneumonia, also occurred for the same reasons as influenza, with more cases than fever and skin diseases. This graph indicates that the overall diseases suffered by the displaced persons were caused by the same issues, namely the lack of tents and inadequate sanitation facilities. This also affected the availability of gender-sensitive logistics, such as tents and toilets specifically for women, which contributed to cases of sexual harassment and skin diseases among displaced women after the disaster in Lombok.

Aside from the lack of a place to change clothes, breastfeeding moms also really need a special area so that they can breastfeed their babies safely and comfortably. In the case of the Lombok earthquake, the Ministry of Women's Empowerment and Child Protection (Kemen PPA) stated that breastfeeding mothers experienced stress and depression. Their condition impacts their breast milk production, which undoubtedly adversely affects their babies' health. Such situations are heavily influenced by the limited availability of logistical support such as tents, toilets, and bathrooms, which are

essential for them to endure difficult conditions. Consequently, many of these disaster displaced women subsequently experience psychological pressure and trauma (Komnas Perempuan, 2021). Besides the psychological impact, this condition also adversely affects the physical health of disaster victims, especially women, children, and other vulnerable groups.

However, in line with the sensitive gender strategy in the form of physical structures, resilient living spaces, and shelters viewed from a gender perspective, attention should be given to several aspects such as secure locations safe from disasters and crime, access to bathrooms and sanitation facilities, and access to healthcare services to prevent post-disaster suffering (Nuriana et al., 2019). Upon examination, this issue arises not only from the uneven distribution of logistical aid at some evacuation points but also because of the minimal participation of women in determining safe tent locations, as tent setup in various evacuation points is mainly done by men. Another contributing factor is that women often do not realize they can play a crucial role in disaster management due to the lack of gender-sensitive mitigation efforts in society and the social constructs that hinder women from maximizing their potential (Few et al., 2021).

Thus, it can be concluded that gender mainstreaming efforts have yet to address the needs of disaster victims adequately. This is because assessing the impact of a network of organizations on an agenda involves several network influences that determine the success of an agenda, such as issue creation and agenda setting, the influence and discursive position of the state and regional organizations, institutional influence and procedures, the influence and policies of actors, targets which may include states, international or regional organizations, or private actors such as multinational corporations, and the influence of state behavior (Dewi, 2023). Unfortunately, masculinity aspects still dominate the implementation of the Lombok earthquake response, resulting in the unmet maximal needs of women, children, and other vulnerable groups. Based on these observations, gender aspects in disaster management cannot be ignored. However, looking at the activities of the AHA Centre during disaster response, it is evident that the AHA Centre does not base its assistance efforts on gender considerations. Therefore, this research elucidates various factors that cause the AHA Centre not to integrate gender into its aid provision.

First, although ASEAN has made various commitments in gender mainstreaming efforts and established various institutions focusing on women's rights and needs, the commitments and institutions outlined previously have been criticized for their poor implementation and lack of real impact. More than two decades since ASEAN's first involvement with gender, the advancement and protection of rights have only been superficially addressed and have not become the region's main agenda. Moreover, there is still no ASEAN instrument explicitly supporting or striving to implement the core aspects of the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda related to ensuring that women are essential in all aspects of peace and security policy, which requires strong commitment among member states to realize a gender-based regional community (Davies, 2016). Therefore, one of the reasons for the weak implementation of the gender agenda is ASEAN's reluctance towards

overly strong commitments, especially if such commitments may strain the relationships between ASEAN and its member states.

The current cooperation mechanisms suffer from fundamental structural imbalances. Moreover, the coordination among existing ASEAN bodies is convoluted and impractical. In global meetings and in contributing to global initiatives, the ASEAN Secretariat and AHA Centre have collaborated with other entities and adopted many terminologies and frameworks. Such collaboration is necessary in a multiparty environment but needs to be carefully calibrated with the constituencies of each party. In disaster management, this means efforts need to be focused on the local level. Over the past two decades, the ASEAN disaster management community has made significant progress in setting policy priorities within the regional organization. ASEAN provides strong capacity-building programs to help its member states advance disaster management as an important policy agenda, but its local impact remains stagnant. It is increasingly clear that there is an inverse trend in the regional disaster management landscape regarding achieving measurable goals. Regional meetings also face similar criticisms to those in other ASEAN sectors, where these meetings are seen as end goals, and the implementation of their outcomes is done sporadically.

Secondly, the conservative and traditional attitudes of ASEAN's elite leaders regarding the view that men are better political leaders than women indicate that this traditional understanding is deeply rooted. In ASEAN, the percentage of female leaders stands at 35%, much lower than the positions held by men in strategic positions of political power in ASEAN. The same situation occurs at the AHA Centre, where all leaders occupying strategic positions are men. These strategic positions within the AHA Centre, such as the executive director, deputy executive director, director of cooperation affairs, and director of operations, are all held by men (Huyen, 2020). This condition indicates that achieving gender equality in political leadership is not easy. However, women's involvement in politics is crucial because it can create women-friendly policies. Often, in emergencies, women's needs are overlooked, which can have highly destructive effects on them. For example, in the context of the Lombok disaster response, various aids provided by the AHA Centre and the government have not considered gender sensitivity. Thus, disproportionately affecting women. To attract more women into politics, cultural biases and stereotypes against women must be broken and a change in mentality is needed. Sexism and focus on the appearance of female politicians are deterrents. There are several ways to drive this change, such as raising awareness and our biases to critically observe these differences at the social, cultural, and educational levels. The next step is active promotion to encourage equal opportunities to achieve leadership status. Society should not ask themselves whether women are ready to occupy important positions but whether they are ready to trust women.

Thirdly, the structure and communication network of the AHA Centre still needs improvement. AHA Centre's disaster management cooperation involves many partners, both from ASEAN and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs). The AHA Centre must be acknowledged for having excellent intergovernmental cooperation networks. Unfortunately, cooperation with non-governmental actors, such as the private sector and civil society organizations like non-governmental organizations (NGOs), is still not as effective as

cooperation with governments. However, the private sector and civil society can also provide material assistance and resources needed. This has prompted criticism that there needs to be an initiative for AHA Centre to expand its network to society, not just Government-to-Government (G2G) approach. The objective of expanding the AHA Centre's coverage from predominantly Government to Government (G2G) to Business to Business (B2B) and People to People (P2P) is to mobilize resources more effectively.

Fourthly, various gender-related agreements made are merely paper agreements because non-traditional security threats, such as natural disasters, are often hampered by the principle of non-intervention, where there is a belief that the respective countries should resolve domestic issues. This belief encourages the ASEAN view that countries can be trusted to solve their problems. Therefore, the author sees that the assistance from the AHA Centre, which is not based on gender approaches, is due to the AHA Centre's belief that countries will ensure gender fulfillment in their societies. This is because ASEAN positions itself as a "hub that bridges various networks" together. By entrusting countries to resolve their internal issues, ASEAN can leverage these networks to advance its interests. These networks are manifested through various meetings where ASEAN drives its agenda within a regional multilateral platform. By setting the agenda, ASEAN can maintain its centrality, strengthening its capacity to shape the regional order. This influence leads to a leadership role inherent in ASEAN's position in this structural network (Indraswari, 2022).

However, the Indonesian government has not maximized its efforts to fulfill gender needs during the Lombok earthquake response. Additionally, the AHA Centre has not comprehensively implemented gender-based assistance due to its lack of substantial experience, given that it had only been operating for seven years when the Lombok earthquake occurred. This is evidenced by the AHA Centre's report stating that their main objective was not only to deliver aid but also to serve as a learning platform for the earthquake response process conducted by the National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB). The AHA Centre began to focus more on gender-based emergency response activities in 2021, as evidenced by adopting the AADMER 2021-2025 work program framework.

These factors contributed to the AHA Centre's gender-insensitive response to the 2018 Lombok earthquake disaster, resulting in an imbalance in post-disaster development roots and tending to be disadvantaged women. Women have a more challenging time recovering because since the mitigation and emergency response efforts they tend to receive less attention, are consistently sidelined in many aspects, and are restricted from continuing to develop and explore their capabilities. These conditions maintain women's lower position, which impacts future development. The economic impact shows that post-disaster, there has been an increase in early marriages in Lombok. One of the motives is economic problems where families of the female party tend to marry off their children to gain better economic access. This is supported by data from the NTB Province Population and Family Planning Agency (DP3AP2KB), which confirms that in 2017, there were 229 marriages involving children aged 17-19 years. This number increased to 283 cases in 2018 due to the economic downturn in the community due to the disaster (Ariany, 2019).

Moreover, socially, many schools have not yet been repaired due to budget constraints. This condition causes children, especially girls, to be at risk of dropping out of school. The children face economic difficulties due to the earthquake's impact, pushing them to quit school, with a tendency for families to prefer girls not to attend school compared to boys. This is in line with research conducted by the Community and Service Collaboration for Welfare (KOMPAK) with the Australian Government, which shows that one of the reasons children survivors of the Lombok earthquake drop out of school is due to damage to school buildings and economic difficulties, where the government, along with all stakeholders involved, focuses less on allocating funds for education assistance and facilities (Raya, 2021).

Thus, this research ultimately provides a thought construct that during non-sensitive gender disaster management, no matter how good and extensive the aid provided, it can be said to be less than maximal and effective. This is because humans, both men and women, as the primary focus of disaster management, play a role in development, where involving gender sensitivity is crucial in the development process. If gender sensitivity is implemented, it will create gender relational support in development. This will strengthen disaster resilience if gender sensitivity is applied. In the case of the Lombok earthquake, various aids provided by the AHA Centre have not addressed gender issues. So, it has not fully considered a gender need, which ultimately makes women and vulnerable groups more likely to be disadvantaged in disaster situations.

Conclusion

Based on the four gender mainstreaming indicators with gender sensitivity as a solution in striving for gender fulfillment in the Lombok earthquake disaster, this research finds that gender sensitivity directed towards the needs of women and vulnerable groups is still not maximally implemented by the AHA Centre. This is reflected in assessment efforts where the samples have not touched the voices of women, data collection on disaster victims, especially for persons with disabilities, breastfeeding mothers, separating tents between women and men, and other assessment efforts still do not touch on gender-sensitive data. The dissemination of information by the AHA Centre, which is not comprehensive, does not reach illiterate individuals, and does not consider different conditions between women and men, have not touched on knowledge dissemination. Various other areas, such as human development to support the health of disaster-displaced people, have been carried out by the AHA Centre by providing personal health kits. However, this aid distribution is not simultaneous in the Lombok area.

Various efforts by the AHA Centre to fulfill gender have not been maximally implemented due to various factors. First, the advancement and protection of gender have not become the main agenda. There is still no ASEAN instrument explicitly supporting or striving to implement the core aspects of the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda, which ensures that women are essential in all aspects of peace and security policy. Regional meetings also face similar criticisms to those in other ASEAN sectors, where these meetings

are seen as end goals, and the implementation of their outcomes is done sporadically. Second, the conservative and traditional attitudes of ASEAN's elite leaders, especially regarding the view that men are better political leaders than women, indicate that this traditional understanding has taken root firmly. Thus, it minimizes the process of creating women-friendly policies. Third, the AHA Centre's cooperation network focuses more on governments and is less maximal in building business-to-business (B2B) and people-to-people (P2P) cooperation to mobilize resources more centrally. Fourth, various gender-related agreements are merely paper agreements because non-traditional security threats, such as natural disaster management, are often hindered by the principle of non-intervention. Additionally, during the Lombok earthquake, one of the AHA Centre's focuses is to learn from the National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB) regarding disaster management, so the AHA Center has not yet made more prepared and comprehensive efforts.

Thus, from a theoretical implication perspective, this research can fill the knowledge gap regarding the role of regional international organizations in disaster management efforts and how the masculinity of the AHA Centre and other involved parties can influence the absence of gender-based disasters towards the victims. This research emphasizes that analysis through gender sensitivity and gender mainstreaming towards the situations of men and women can help develop interventions that better fulfill their different roles and needs and reinforce each other in improving household and overall community safety and resilience. Ultimately, no matter how many parties are involved and how much aid is provided, if disaster management is not gender-sensitive, then disaster management efforts will not be effective.

In this regard, this research recommends that the AHA Centre autonomously adopt its gender-based disaster guidelines as an initial commitment towards fostering a more inclusive, fair, and sustainable gender-based disaster management. Regarding empirical contributions, this research could serve as a reference concerning regional organizational studies, particularly regarding disaster management institutions, to engage in gender-based disaster management. Given the relatively underexplored nature of this study, it is hoped that this research can fill the knowledge gap. Future research efforts may broaden their scope by analyzing ASEAN's commitments to disaster management through the ASEAN Regional Framework on Protection, Gender, and Inclusion in Disaster Management 2021-2025, as well as the AHA Centre's commitments to gender studies in future disaster management.

Acknowledgement

We would like to thank Indonesia Endowment Funds for Education (LPDP) and Center for Higher Education Funding (BPPT) for supporting this research.

About The Authors

Mala Mardialina is a faculty member in the Department of International Relations, University of Mataram. At the same time, she is also a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Politics and Government at the University of Gadjah Mada. Her main research topics are Disaster Risk Reduction Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, and International Tourism. She has recently published several articles including Disaster Recovery in Social Aspect: Evidence from Lombok Earthquake 2018 (2021) and Community-Based Social Services for Livelihood Recovery after Disaster: Evidence from Post Earthquakes, Lombok, Indonesia (2020).

Syaiful Anam is a lecturer at the Department of International Relations, University of Mataram, Indonesia. He holds master degree both from the University of Queensland, Australia, and Postgraduate School of Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta, in the field of Peace and Conflict Resolutions.

L. Puttrawandi Karjaya is a lecturer at the Department of International Relations, University of Mataram, Indonesia. He holds a master degree in International Relations from Department of International Relations, Gadjah Mada University of Yogyakarta.

Alfian Hidayat is a Ph.D student in the School of Social Sciences, Universiti Sains Malaysia. He is also a lecturer at the Department of International Relations, University of Mataram, Indonesia and obtained his master degree in International Relations from Department of International Relations, Gadjah Mada University of Yogyakarta.

Baiq Ulfa Septi Lestari holds a Bachelor of International Relations from the Department of International Relations, University of Mataram, Indonesia.

References

AHA Centre. (2018a). *Earthquake in Lombok Indonesia*. https://ahacentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/AHA-Situation_Update_no_7_M-7.0-Lombok-Earthquake.pdf

AHA Centre. (2018b). *Situation update No. 8: The 2018 Lombok earthquake, Indonesia*. https://ahacentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/AHA-Situation_Update_no_8_M-7.0-Lombok-Earthquake-final.pdf

AHA Centre. (2019, November 7). *ASEAN strategic policy dialogue on disaster management 2019: Building ASEAN's resiliency to disasters*. https://thecolumn.ahacentre.org/posts/highlight/vol-54-asean-strategic-policy-dialogue-on-disaster-management-spddm-2019-building-aseans-resiliency-to-disasters/

Annur, C. M. (2023, January 31). *Jumlah penduduk di negara Asia Tenggara*. https://databoks.katadata.co.id/datapublish/2023/01/31/indonesia-mendominasi-jumlah-penduduk-di-asia-tenggara-berapa-besarnya

Ariany, D. M. (2019, May 6). *Kasus pernikahan dini di Mataram meningkat*. Suara NTB. https://www.suarantb.com/2019/05/06/kasus-pernikahan-dini-di-mataram-meningkat/

Ariyabandu, M. M. (2009). Sex, gender and gender relations in disasters. In E. Enarson & P. G. D. Chakrabarti (Eds.), *Women, Gender and Disaster: Global Issues and Initiatives* (pp. 5-17). SAGE Publications India Pvt Ltd. https://doi.org/10.4135/9788132108078

ASEAN. (2021). *ASEAN gender mainstreaming strategic framework 2021–2025*. https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/ASEAN-Gender-Mainstreaming-Strategic-Framework-endorsed-by-AMMW.pdf

Ashraf, M. A., & Azad, M. A. K. (2015). Gender issues in disaster: Understanding the relationships of vulnerability, preparedness and capacity. *Environment and Ecology Research*, *3*(5), 136–142. https://doi.org/10.13189/eer.2015.030504

Asri, D., Adnan, M., & Erowati, D. (2022). Implementasi program pemberdayaan perempuan di kota Bekasi tahun 2020. *Journal of Politic and Government Studies*, *12*(1), 327–339.

Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana (BNPB). (2014). *Peraturan badan nasional penanggulangan bencana nomor 13 tahun 2014*. https://bnpb.go.id/storage/app/media/uploads/regulation/1083/Perka No 13 Tahun 2014.pdf

Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana (BNPB). (2018). *Pembelajaran penanganan darurat bencana gempa bumi Lombok*. https://perpustakaan.bnpb.go.id/bulian/index.php?p=fstream-pdf&fid=158&bid=1824

Bakti, H. K., & Nurmandi, A. (2020). Pemulihan pasca bencana gempa bumi di Lombok Utara pada tahun 2018. *Jurnal Geografi*, *12*(2), 137–151. https://doi.org/10.24114/jg.v12i02.16750

Beyen, M. (2020). Discourse of sovereignity as an obstacle to women's suffarage? An essay in comparative history. In A. Gilleir & A. Defurne (Eds.), *Strategic imaginations: women and the gender of sovereignty in European culture*. Leuven University Press.

BPS NTB. (2017). *Persentase buta huruf penduduk usia 15 tahun ke atas menurut kabupaten, kota dan jenis kelamin 2017*. https://ntb.bps.go.id/indicator/12/290/1/persentase-buta-huruf-penduduk-usia-15-tahun-keatas-menurut-kabupaten-kota-dan-jenis-kelamin.html

Badan Pusat Statistik NTB (BPS NTB). (2018). *Pembangunan manusia (IPM) menurut kabupaten/kota dan jenis kelamin 2016-2018*. https://ntb.bps.go.id/indicator/40/312/2/indeks-pembangunan-manusia-ipm-menurut-kabupaten-kota-dan-jenis-kelamin.html

Badan Perencana Pembangunan Penelitian dan Pengembangan Wilayah (Bappeda). 2018). *Strategi penanggulangan kemiskinan daerah Nusa Tenggara Barat tahun 2018-2023.* https://data.ntbprov.go.id/sites/default/files/Dokumen%20SPKD%20NTB%20Th.%202018-2023%20.pdf

Badan Pusat Statistik NTB (BPS NTB). (2021). *Statistik pendidikan provinsi Nusa Tenggara Barat*. https://www.lpwntb.or.id/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Statistik-Pendidikan-Provinsi-Nusa-Tenggara-Barat-2021.pdf

Cahaya Inklusi Indonesia. (2021). *Peningkatan partisipasi perempuan disabilitas dalam pengurangan resiko bencana*. https://cahayainklusi.id/2021/10/18/peningkatan-partisipasi-perempuan-disabilitas-dalam-pengurangan-risiko-bencana/

Davies, M. (2016). Women and development: Explaining ASEAN's failure to engage with the women, peace and security agenda. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, *38*(1), 106–127.

Dewi, K. U., Fathana, H., & Rohma, M. N. (2023). Me Too as transnational advocacy networks: The case of anti sexual violance movement in Indonesia. *Journal of Asean Studies*, *11*(2), 467–488. https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v11i2.8858

Enarson, E., Fothergill, A., & Peek, L. (2017). Gender and disaster: Foundation and new directions for research and practice. In H. Rodríguez, W. Donner, & J. Trainor (Eds.), *Handbook of disaster research*. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-63254-4_11

Few, R., Marsh, H., Jain, G., Singh, C., & Tebboth, M. G. L. (2021). Representing recovery: How the construction and contestation of needs and priorities can shape long-term outcomes for disaster-affected People. *Progress in Development Studies*, *21*(1), 7–25. https://doi.org/10.1177/1464993420980939

Giuseppe, T., Kundu, T., Klumpp, T., de Souza, R., Loh, X. H., & Goh, K. (2022). Beneficiary centric decision support framework for enhanced resource coordination in humanitarian logistics: A case study from Asean. *Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review*, *167*. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tre.2022.102909

Goldin, J., Botha, C., Koatla, T., Anderson, K., Owen, G., & Lebese, A. (2019). Towards gender sensitive vulnerability assessment for climate change: Lambani, Limpopo Province South Africa, *Human Geography*, *12*(1), 19-32. https://doi.org/10.1177/194277861901200102

Guba, E. G., & Lincoln, Y. S. (2005). Paradigmatic controversies, contradictions and emerging confluences. In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), *The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research* (3rd ed., pp. 191–215). Sage Publications.

Hartono, Y. (2021). Gender-based sustainable disaster response education to anticipate the problem of women's vulnerability. *Sumatra Journal of Disaster, Geography and Geography Education*, *5*(1), 63–71. https://doi.org/10.24036/sjdgge.v5i1.373

Heru, A. (2019). Peran AHA centre dalam penanggulangan bencana gempa bumi di Sulawesi Tengah tahun 2018. *eJournal Hubungan Internasional Universitas Mulawarman*, *7*(4), 1517–1528.

Hidayati, I. (2018). Aspek gender dalam kesiapsiagaan bencana di Indonesia: Studi kasus gempa bumi di Bantul dan Lombok Utara. In A. W. Abdi, M. Desfandi, N. Zalmita, & M. H. Furqan (Eds.), *Prosiding Seminar Nasional : Peran geografi dalam pengelolaan potensi sumberdaya lokal 26 September 2018 - Universitas Syiah Kuala* (pp.249-256). Syiah Kuala University Press.

Hofman, J. (2001). *Gender and sovereignity: Feminism, the state and international relation*. Palgrave.

Huyen, A. (2020, December 3). *ASEAN menjadi yang terdepan dalam masalah kesetaraan gender dan pemberdayaan perempuan*. VOV. https://vovworld.vn/id-ID/rumah-asean/asean-menjadi-yang-terdepan-dalam-masalah-kesetaraan-gender-dan-pemberdayaan-perempuan-928313.vov

Indraswari, R. (2022). ASEAN centrality: Comparative case study of Indonesia leadership. *Journal of ASEAN Studies*, *10*(1), 1–19. https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v10i1.7906

Kantola, J. (2007). The gendered reproduction of the state in international relations. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, *9*(2), 270–283. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-856x.2007.00283.x

Kharisma, A. P. (2017). Upaya AHA centre (Asean Human Assitance) dalam penanggulangan bencana alam di Asia Tenggara. *EJournal Ilmu Hubungan Internasional*, *3*(4), 1319–1321.

Komnas Perempuan. (2021). *Catatan kekerasan terhadap perempuan 2020*. https://komnasperempuan.go.id/uploadedFiles/1466.1614933645.pdf

Kuokkanen, R. (2019). *Restructing relations: Indigenous self-determination governance and gender*. Oxford University Press.

Martiani, D. (2011). Implementasi pengarusutamaan gender (PUG) sebagai strategi pencapaian kesetaraan gender (Studi di Provinsi Sumatera Utara dan Jawa Tengah). *Aspirasi : Jurnal Masalah-masalah Sosial*, *2*(2)

Menteri Negara Pemberdayaan Perempuan dan Perlindungan Anak Republik Indonesia (Menteri PPPA). (2014). *Peraturan menteri negara pemberdayaan perempuan dan perlindungan anak Republik Indonesia nomor 4 tahun 2014 tentang pedoman pengawasan pelaksanaan perencanaan penganggaran yang responsif gender untuk pemerintah daerah*. https://www.google.com/url?sa=i&url=https%3A%2F%2Fjdih.kemenpppa.go.id%2Fperaturan%2FPermenpppa042014.pdf&psig=AOvVaw3qs8cjQyVXSN4e_xqH-Gz3&ust=1709730623908000&source=images&cd=vfe&opi=89978449&ved=0CAgQrpoMahcKEwjg78GFmd2EAxUAAAAAHQAAAAAQBg

Moser, C. O. N. (1995). Gender planning and development: Theory, practice and training. *Feminist Review*, *49*(5), 117–119. https://doi.org/10.2307/1395333

Murtakhamah, T. (2013). Pentingnya pengarusutamaan gender dalam program pengurangan Resiko Bencana. *WELFARE*: *Jurnal Ilmu Kesejahteraan Sosial*, *2*(1), 37–54.

Mustika, B. F. D. S. (2022). *Peran Islamic Relief Worldwide Indonesia dalam upaya Pemulihan Ekonomi Pasca Gempa Bumi di Pulau Lombok Tahun 2018*. Unpublished Undergraduate Research Thesis. University of Mataram.

Nur, A. M. (2018, September 17). *Tinggal di tenda ini ketakutan perempuan korban gempa Lombok*. Tempo. https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1127169/tinggal-di-tenda-ini-ketakutan-perempuan-korban-gempa-lombok

Nuriana, D., Rusyidi, B., & Fedryansyah, M. (2019). Mitigasi bencana berbasis sensitive gender. *Share: Social Work Journal*, *9*(2), 179–194. https://doi.org/10.24198/share.v9i2.25562

Raya, U. R. (2021). *Akses pendidikan dasar bagi semua anak Indonesia: Strategi tata kelola penanganan anak tidak sekolah di wilayah dukungan Kompak*. https://sikompak.bappenas.go.id/pembelajaran/view/40/id/materi_belajar/Strategi Tata Kelola Penanganan Anak Tidak Sekolah di Wilayah Dukungan KOMPAK/download.pdf

Ronzoni, M. (2012). Two conceptions of state sovereignty and their implications for global institutional design. *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*, *15*(5), 573–591. https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2012.727306

Saputra, E. H. (2018). *Kemensos bantu korban gempa Lombok yang alami pelecehan seksual*. Kumparan. https://kumparan.com/kumparannews/kemensos-bantu-korban-gempa-lombok-yang-alami-pelecehan-seksual-1535183339610114957

Septanaya, I. D. M. F., & Fortuna, S. (2023). Gender mainstreaming efforts in disaster management plans: Case study West Nusa Tenggara province, Indonesia. *International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction*, *87*, 103576. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2023.103576

Suzuki, S. (2021). Interfering via Asean? In the case of disaster management. *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, *40*(3), 400–417. https://doi.org/10.1177/186810342110168

Taqiuddin, M., Mardialina, M., Munir, A. M., Rifai, R., Komalasari, M. A., Trisula, Y., Yohanes, S., & Putra, I. N. N. A. (2021). Community-based social services for livelihood recovery after disaster: Evidence from post earthquakes, Lombok, Indonesia. *2nd Annual Conference on Education and Social Science (ACCESS 2020)*, *556*, 58–544. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.210525.145

Triyana, H. J., Harjono, N. P., & McDermott, R. (2022). Implementing the ASEAN agreement on disaster management and emergency response for better coordination and simplification procedures. *Jambe Law Journal*, *5*(2), 147–205. https://doi.org/10.22437/jlj.5.2.147-205

UNDP. (2018). *Gender equality strategy 2018-2021*. United Nation Development Programme. https://www.undp.org/publications/undp-gender-equality-strategy-2018-2021

Ushamah. (2018). Peran ASEAN human assistance centre (AHA Centre) dalam penanggulangan bencana gempa bumi Myanmar tahun 2012. *eJournal Hubungan Internasional Universitas Mulawarman*, *6*(3), 1247–1258.

Velasco, J. C. (2023). Southeast Asian regionalism: An examination of the progress and priorities of ASEAN through its join communiqués. *Journal of Asean Studies*, *11*(1), 245–265. https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v11i2.9402

Wardah, F. (2018, August 8). *BNPB: 21 desa di Lombok masih terisolir*. VOA Indonesia. https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/bnpb-21-desa-di-lombok-masih-terisolir/4518325.html

Wiasti, N. M. (2017). Mencermati permasalahan gender dan pengarusutamaan gender (PUG). *Sunari Penjar: Journal of Antrophology*, *1*(1), 29–42.

Wicaksono, B. A. (2018, August 7). *Fakta sejarah di balik gempa besar Lombok*. Viva. https://www.viva.co.id/berita/nasional/1062304-fakta-sejarah-di-balik-gempa-besar-lombok

Zeeshan, A., Khan, M. B., & Hussain, S (2019). Promoting Gender Sensitivity: Disaster Risk Reduction in Pakistan. *Pakistan Journal of Women's Studies*, *26*(2), 31–44.

Academic Capitalism in Southeast Asia: Lessons from Islamic Universities in Indonesia

Hangga Fathana[1]*, Enggar Furi Herdianto[2], and Karina Utami Dewi[3]

[1,2,3] Department of International Relations, Universitas Islam Indonesia, Indonesia 55584

[1]hangga.fathana@uii.ac.id; [2]enggar.furi@uii.ac.id; [3]karina.dewi@uii.ac.id
*Corresponding author

How to Cite: Fathana, H., Herdianto, E. F., & Dewi, K. U. (2024). Academic capitalism in Southeast Asia: Lessons from Islamic universities in Indonesia. *Journal of ASEAN Studies, 12*(2), 263-282. https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v12i2.11501

Abstract

Indonesia's demographic potential has fueled increasing demand for higher education, creating opportunities for private universities to address gaps left by public institutions. Many private universities in Indonesia, particularly Islamic institutions, integrate religious values as a core identity while navigating the pressures of academic capitalism. This research investigated how academic capitalism reshapes Islamic universities, compelling them to balance their religious values with global market demands and aspirations for world-class status. This research explored the strategies Islamic universities adopt to navigate these challenges by employing qualitative methods. The findings identify two dominant responses: a pragmatic model, which prioritizes global rankings and revenue generation as indicators of institutional success, and an idealistic model, which integrates rankings cautiously while emphasizing the preservation of Islamic values. These models reflect the diverse ways institutions reconcile external pressures with their missions. Despite challenges, Islamic universities demonstrate resilience, crafting strategies to balance their educational mission with the demands of globalization. The research emphasizes the need for context-sensitive approaches that align global frameworks with local religious and cultural values, offering insights into the evolving landscape of higher education in Southeast Asia. This balance underscores the critical role of identity and values in shaping the future of Islamic higher education.

Keywords: academic capitalism, Islamic university, Indonesia

P-ISSN 2338-1361/ E-ISSN 2338-1353
Received: 08th April 2024/ Revised: 08th October 2024/ Accepted: 15th November 2024

Introduction

Higher education institutions have experienced rapid changes in global and regional markets, where the development of universities' role has increased by providing better education opportunities. This trend is not surprising given the rapid growth of the global economy since the 1950s, accompanied by the emergence of a burgeoning middle-class society. Southeast Asia is home to over 655 million people, with a significant portion (nearly 60%) under the age of 35, making the region one of the most demographically youthful globally (Statista Research Department, 2024). However, higher education enrollment rates remain relatively low, with only about 40% of the relevant age group enrolling in the region's tertiary education (UNESCO, 2021). This condition creates a significant untapped market for higher education, particularly in Indonesia, where Islamic values and institutions are gaining traction (UNESCO, 2021; Indonesian Ministry of Religious Affairs, 2023). Concurrently, the surging demand for higher education has spurred the proliferation of both public and private universities, aiming to meet the growing needs of students. This surge is evident in the region's sheer number of higher education institutions, which currently stand at around 7,000 (Lau, 2021). As such, the higher education sector in Southeast Asia is witnessing rapid expansion and transformation, driven by the convergence of demographic trends and increasing demand for educational opportunities.

The abundance of higher education institutions underscores the need to establish strong differentiation to stand out in the crowded landscape. Steiner et al. (2013) outline two crucial dimensions: organizational identity and symbolic identity. Organizational identity pertains to internal values and culture within the institution, shaping its trajectory for future development. This aspect reflects the core ethos and principles guiding the institution's operations, influencing decision-making processes and strategic initiatives. On the other hand, symbolic identity focuses more on aesthetic impressions and external perceptions, pivotal in enhancing the institution's overall reputation. Both dimensions of identity shape the university's image, subsequently impacting its societal reputation. Many higher education institutions prioritize specific values over others, strategically emphasizing them to cultivate a distinct identity and carve out a niche in the competitive higher education landscape.

As a rapidly developing region, Southeast Asia is witnessing the emergence of this phenomenon. Islam, the predominant religion in the area, has become one of the most favored values not only embraced by universities but also sought after by young scholars and families seeking to reinforce Islamic principles while pursuing higher education. This trend is particularly captured in Indonesia, home to the largest Muslim community globally. Indonesia is a country where not only is the younger generation increasingly conscious of religious values as a market, but there's also a noticeable increase in the number of universities prioritizing Islamic values as their core principle and promotional tool.

The forces of globalization have also amplified the commercialization of higher education, a phenomenon described as academic capitalism by Slaughter and Leslie (1997). In this context, universities are increasingly pressured to generate revenue through industry partnerships, tuition fees, and external grants. Islamic universities, traditionally focused on

religious and educational values, now find themselves engaging in global competition to enhance their rankings and secure funding, often at the cost of their academic integrity and mission (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004; Jessop, 2018). This transition reflects broader global trends where universities, particularly in the Global South, are required to reconcile their core values with the market-oriented demands of the knowledge economy (Welch, 2019).

As of today, more than 1,000 Islamic universities are in Indonesia. There are 29 Public Islamic Universities, 24 Public institutes of Islamic Religion, and 5 Public Higher Schools of Islamic Religion (Ramadhani, 2023). On top of that, there are also 997 Islamic-based private universities, out of 2,982 private universities across Indonesia. These numbers show how lucrative religious values are in the higher education market, which manages to acquire around 1.5 million students for whole Islamic-based private universities (Menegaskan Peran Perguruan Tinggi Islam Swasta, 2023). On the other hand, there are also challenges to ensure that Islamic values are embedded in the education practice within Islamic universities when they also need to adjust themselves to the Anglo-Saxon model of the world-class university, where universities are getting more pressure to prioritize revenue-generating activities over their core research and educational purposes (Sam & van der Sijde, 2014).

Islamic universities in Indonesia face significant challenges as they attempt to align themselves with the hegemonic Anglo-Saxon model of world-class universities. This model prioritizes research output, global rankings, and revenue-generating activities, often at the expense of local educational values and religious identities. Moreover, this model forces universities into competition for capital, pushing them to focus on performance metrics that may undermine their traditional academic and moral missions (Slaughter & Leslie, 2001; Marginson, 2016).

This research aims to explore how Islamic universities navigate the prevailing challenges, particularly in safeguarding their values amidst the pervasive influence of the hegemonic Anglo-Saxon model of the world-class university. It will scrutinize the strategies employed by Islamic universities to preserve their distinct identity and ethos in the face of globalization and the homogenizing forces of academic capitalism. Therefore, this research questions how academic capitalism reshapes private Islamic universities in Indonesia, and what strategies these institutions employ to maintain their religious identity and values while competing in the global higher education market. By examining these institutions' responses, this research sheds light on the resilience and adaptability of Islamic higher education in Indonesia, which is one of the biggest populations and markets for higher education in Southeast Asia amid the evolving landscape of higher education.

Literature Review

Education is an important part of developing one's knowledge and capabilities. Many invested more capital in education than ever before. This investment is due not merely to the need to get a higher degree of education to expand their knowledge but more to the requirement for better opportunities in the professional world. In line with the rising global

economy, there is also rising demand for higher education services across the globe. This trend led to a rising number of higher education institutions that are trying to grasp the opportunity.

Since academic business also deals with markets, education institutions become more capitalized and struggle to keep their academic value and integrity. On the one hand, universities and faculties are bound to maintain their intellectual integrity by giving more access to education while pushing for knowledge development through class or even research activities. However, to achieve those goals, they need capital to fund those activities.

This research is grounded in the concept of academic capitalism. The concept is defined by Slaughter and Leslie (1997) as the process by which higher education institutions become market-driven entities, prioritizing revenue generation, competition, and global visibility over traditional educational and scientific missions. In this framework, universities engage in capitalist practices such as research commercialization, corporate partnerships, and rankings competition. While rooted in religious values, Islamic universities in Indonesia face the challenge of integrating these market-driven dynamics while maintaining their educational and cultural missions. This study applies academic capitalism to analyze the tension between these competing demands. Slaughter and Leslie (2001) further describe that academic capitalism happens since universities or faculties need to enter competition for getting capital for their funding, whether from external grants and contracts, endowment funds, university-industry partnerships, institutional investment in professors' spin-off companies, students' tuition and fees, or other revenue-generating activities.

The trend of academic capitalism is derived from capital-based relations in society. Jessop (2018) describes three major sources of academic capitalism. The first comes from the influence of the knowledge-based economy paradigm, which pushes views on how research and education should be able to fulfill the industry's demands Education should provide needed skills in the labor market and economic activities so it can provide knowledge transfer and human capital needed for capital accumulation in the market. The second source is the rise of finance-dominated economic regimes that push for-profit research and education services. It is possible since there are rising neoliberalism practices throughout society, which also affect the academic industry in maintaining and funding academic activities within the universities or faculties. Lastly, the third source is the declining public funding of the education sector by state managers. It often happens due to monetary crisis or the need to prioritize other issues over education. In order for education institutions to survive, one way that could be explored is by capitalizing the academic activities so the institution could stay afloat and grow its research and education activities as well (Jessop, 2018).

Based on those arguments, academic capitalism becomes unavoidable in the education sector, especially in higher education. The increasing demand for education to provide human resources for economic growth and the lack of sufficient public funds to maintain sustainable research and education activities has led to the capitalization of education. Increasingly, higher education institutions are capitalizing on their education service to fund their activities and ensure their steady growth to keep them relevant to market demand.

As the higher education market becomes more competitive, an increasing number of higher education institutions have begun to develop their unique values. Some develop their unique advantages in expanding for-profit activities, such as establishing start-up companies or utilizing laboratories to develop commercial products as academic support activities. There are also those who turn to the path of selling or licensing patents from their research results. Some also put more weight on student tuition fees for institutional operations. (Rhoades & Slaughter, 1997).

Academic capitalism is increasingly difficult to ignore when looking deeper into the structure of educational institutions. The higher education industry is considered labor-intensive since more than 70% of its expenditure would be on personnel costs. Since the academic profession is less likely to be interchangeable with machines or other technology, it would never be as efficient as other industries unless it is followed by lowering its employees' revenue or limiting its research and education activities' funding (Rhoades & Slaughter, 1997). In the end, academic capitalism is the new norm, especially in higher education institutions, whether public or private, which comes from its characteristics and the constant high demand which preserves its practice.

Reflecting on this phenomenon, there are strong relations between the continuity of the educational industry and the need to ensure its sustainable income-generating capacity. On the one hand, it is necessary to ensure that the education process can produce high-quality graduates who can implement and develop knowledge based on what they studied. It is important to keep this idealism to maintain knowledge development. However, there is also a dire need to keep financial input flowing steadily to fully support educational activities.

These facts then affect the practice of education in universities, which pushes them to fulfill market demands rather than expanding knowledge independently. It is worsened by the fact that since education level is becoming standard in the job-seeking market, universities tend to be seen as institutions that produce graduation certificates rather than knowledge-based ones. The higher education industry model with a massive labor force and high maintenance also shapes staff and lecturers to focus more on developing their income-generating prowess rather than genuine knowledge-driven

Higher education institutions are prone to external pressure. Stensaker (2015) explains that universities are becoming more exposed to the external dimension, which makes them more intertwined with state, industry, and labor markets. This condition is because not only do higher education institutions have a responsibility to give back to society from its knowledge development, but also how they could still be relevant for actors within the society (Stensaker, 2015). It shows that universities, as higher education institutions, cannot keep their idealism. However, they must also embrace the capitalist practice within the higher education business to survive and thrive.

In pursuing those goals, Stensaker (2015) also explained the need for identity to strengthen the university's value within society. Like Steiner et al. (2013), he agreed that identity would define the reputation shaped by the institution. He also explained that internal and external factors shape identity itself. Within the institution, identity is important for

keeping integration and interpreting where it should develop. However, on the other hand, the identity itself could also be used to build up the university's image and push innovation within its focused values (Stensaker, 2015). It is a key factor to not only keep a solid voice and perspectives inside the organization but also could be used for luring external stakeholders to partner with the university, whether on becoming students who see the similar value, industries who see the potential of collaboration, or the state who see similar stance.

To conclude, academic capitalism is a common phenomenon within the higher education industry. The need to develop knowledge has been scaled back, and the focus on monetizing academic activities has improved. As universities are becoming money makers, there is also the need to increase their competitiveness within the market. Therefore, a strong identity is needed to ensure that they can develop a distinguished reputation that would attract stakeholders to collaborate with them, from prospective students who pursue degrees for their professional needs to industries that could use laboratories and other university resources to improve their capacity.

Research Method

This research is based on the qualitative research method. Qualitative research method can help understand the dynamics and complexity of social issues. Moreover, qualitative research gathers data from in-depth interviews of individuals and small groups, systematic behavior observation, and analysis of documentary data (Darlington & Scott, 2002). This research employs a qualitative research methodology to explore the phenomenon of academic capitalism in Islamic universities in Indonesia. "Data were collected through in-depth interviews with key stakeholders and representatives from private Islamic higher education institutions in Indonesia." These interviews aim to capture the complex dynamics and challenges that private Islamic higher education institutions face under academic capitalism. Additionally, the research incorporates an extensive literature review of relevant academic works to provide a comprehensive understanding of the issues at hand. The qualitative approach is chosen to allow for a deep, contextual analysis of the participants' experiences and the institutions' strategies.

Analysis

Academic Capitalism in Indonesia

Globalization has profoundly impacted higher education governance, particularly in developing regions like Southeast Asia. As Marginson (2016) notes, globalization has ushered in a system dominated by American and Anglo-Saxon university models, where the pursuit of world-class status often sidelines local values and educational objectives. This governance shift has introduced a market-driven approach to education, forcing universities to compete in a globalized knowledge economy for prestige and resources (Mittelman, 2016). Universities

in Indonesia, including Islamic institutions, now face the challenge of balancing these global expectations with their mission to maintain religious and cultural identity.

Indonesia's increasingly stringent policies that bolster market mechanisms across various economic sectors are also evident within the educational domain. A notable manifestation of this trend is the transformation of numerous public universities into Indonesia State-Owned Legal Entity (BHMN). This transition grants universities greater autonomy in managing their organizational affairs, empowering them to make decisions such as opening or closing less-productive departments and exploring additional for-profit activities to sustain their operations independently (Singgih et al., 2022). Consequently, there has been a noticeable shift towards more capital-oriented policies governing university organization within Indonesia.

Meanwhile, it is essential to acknowledge the significant presence of private universities and other higher education institutions operating throughout Indonesia. With 2,990 private higher education institutions across the country, compared to 125 public universities (Badan Pusat Statistik, n.d.), it becomes evident that Indonesia faces a shortage of public higher education institutions to ensure broader access to higher education. This substantial gap is subsequently filled by the proliferation of private institutions, underscoring the competitiveness of the higher education market in Indonesia.

Given the intense competition within the national higher education market, universities are exploring various strategies to thrive and distinguish themselves. One such strategy involves developing strong brand awareness among prospective students. Brand awareness can be cultivated by emphasizing the university's core values, whether rooted in religion, ideology, or the institution's track record of successful alumni. By strategically highlighting these attributes, universities aim to enhance their brand loyalty among students and alumni, consequently generating positive word-of-mouth promotion within society. This, in turn, shapes the perceptions of prospective students and elevates their expectations of the institution they choose to attend (Pramudyo, 2018). Another way universities can enhance their competitiveness is by bolstering their reputation through favorable rankings provided by various ranking standards. Commonly utilized rankings include those issued by the Ministry of Research and Higher Education of Indonesia, Webometrics, and QS World Star. Achieving favorable rankings enhances the university's brand equity and augments its overall competitiveness within the higher education landscape (Sari & Suyanto, 2021). By strategically leveraging these rankings, universities can effectively position themselves as reputable institutions of choice among prospective students and stakeholders.

Even though the focus on achieving accreditation and rankings looks ideal, the fact says otherwise. Of thousands of higher education institutions in Indonesia, only 103 institutions are accredited A or *Unggul* (Excellent) by the government of Indonesia. The rest are accredited as *Baik Sekali* (Very Good), B or *Baik* (Good), C or *Cukup* (Adequate) (Badan Akreditasi Nasional Perguruan Tinggi n.d.). This accreditation does not mean that universities with accreditation less than A or *Unggul* will be abandoned by the stakeholders. However, they are seen as higher education institutions that are not at their optimum capability. Those

universities that get accredited less than A still could maintain their operations and gain steady student registration annually while maintaining continuous collaboration with industries and partners.

In contrast, many universities in Indonesia are strategically located in areas with a high concentration of stakeholders. More than 25% of higher education institutions are spread across five provinces in Java island. Among these, West Java boasts the highest number, with nearly 400 institutions, while even Yogyakarta province, with the fewest institutions, still hosts over 100 higher education institutions (Annur, 2022). This geographical concentration is not solely a result of political factors, such as Indonesia's capital being located in Java . Instead, it aligns with the demographic landscape of Indonesia, where Java stands as the most densely populated region. This demographic density translates into a sizable market. Moreover, the robust infrastructure within Java attracts investments from various industries and draws individuals from other regions, further augmenting its population. Consequently, Java plays a dominant role in Indonesia's economy, contributing over 50% to the national GDP (Yolandha, 2022). In the education sector, establishing higher education institutions on Java presents a rational choice for many, ensuring the sustainability of their operations within a thriving market environment.

Ensuring the possibility of growth is also a concern for many universities in Indonesia. In 2022, more than 3,400 new departments got permits to open from universities across Indonesia (Badan Akreditasi Nasional Perguruan Tinggi, 2022). It shows that there are demands from industries for the skills needed or prospective students for new studies needed for their future careers. On the other hand, the rising number of universities changes their identity to ensure that they could grow. One of the examples is how the Academy of Computer and Informatics Amikom Indonesia (STMIK Amikom) changed their status to university so it is possible for them to open up new departments outside the former identity, such as economics and international relations (Dedy, 2017).

From these observations, it becomes apparent that higher education institutions in Indonesia are increasingly operating as academic capitalist entities. This assertion is supported by the evidence that illustrates a significant disparity between the demand for higher education services nationwide and the uneven distribution of universities across Indonesia. Instead of ensuring equitable access to education, universities often prioritize areas with higher market demand, strategically positioning themselves to maximize profitability. This trend is further exemplified by the shift in institutional identity, where universities may adapt their branding and offerings to enhance their presence in the education market. This includes the universities' central branding theme based on accreditation and ranking rather than their core values to attract more students as the source of income for the institution. In essence, the overarching focus on market dynamics and profit maximization underscores the transformation of higher education institutions in Indonesia into entities driven by academic capitalism principles.

Political Economy of University Rankings in Indonesia

While the preceding section sheds light on how academic capitalism has drawn higher education institutions into cutthroat competition and a downward spiral, this section delves into how academic capitalism manifests in Indonesia in the form of university rankings. Over time, discussions surrounding university rankings have elicited a spectrum of responses from Indonesian universities. Notably, the growing recognition of the importance of university rankings began to emerge in the late 2010s, coinciding with trends such as the Webometrics University Rankings. This ranking system, updated biannually, has prompted numerous Indonesian universities to undertake initiatives to improve their standings within these rankings.

The motivations driving universities to participate actively in these ranking systems are diverse and multifaceted, varying from one institution to another. Some institutions may pursue improvements in rankings as an instrument to enhance their international reputation and attract a wider pool of students and faculty. Others might view it as a strategic maneuver to secure funding or governmental support. Additionally, for universities looking to improve their research output or global visibility, achieving a higher ranking will validate their academic standing and pave the way for partnerships with leading institutions worldwide.

Figure 1 illustrates several key driving forces compelling Indonesian universities to engage with ranking systems. These forces encompass a spectrum of factors, ranging from institutional aspirations for global recognition and competitiveness to pragmatic considerations related to funding and resource allocation. By dissecting these motivations, this research aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of the intricate interplay between academic capitalism and the pursuit of institutional excellence in Indonesia's higher education landscape. Thus, it contributes to the ongoing discourse on the subject.



Figure 1. Driving Forces Behind Indonesian Universities' Participation in University Rankings

It is important to note that the responses of Indonesia's universities to university rankings are deeply influenced by the interplay of external and internal factors. External factor play a significant role, encompassing three main motives. First, economic globalization necessitates higher education institutions to expand their roles beyond the academics. As globalization increasingly emphasizes the quest for world-class products and services across all industries, higher education institutions have been compelled to reassess their positions and adapt accordingly. While globalization facilitates interconnectedness among people, businesses, and markets, it also catalyzes aspirations for social, economic, and political transformation. However, it is important to recognize the spillover effects of economic globalization. In particular, economic globalization has posed challenges to notions of history, national identity, and the preservation of spatial sovereignty, while simultaneously influencing the pace of temporal changes (Appadurai, 2020).

Within the Indonesian context, globalization has often led higher education sectors to adopt a perspective that looks predominantly toward the North. The economic advancements associated with globalization, primarily from Western countries, have inspired Indonesia to embrace teaching and research methodologies characteristic of Anglo-Saxon universities as benchmarks. Since the 1990s, many higher education institutions in Indonesia have transformed to align with global standards and address global challenges (Salahuddin, 2017; Sari, 2016).

Second, it is noteworthy that globalization's facilitation of capital mobility has led to intriguing developments within the higher education sector, contributing to the proliferation of academic capitalism. Higher education, particularly in developed economies, has emerged as one of the most lucrative service sectors in recent decades. This trend is characterized by the establishment of new universities driven by profit-seeking motives, with some even enjoying backing from multinational corporations. A similar trend is observed in Indonesia, with a growing number of fast-growing universities receiving funding from domestic billionaires or state-owned enterprises. Several of these rapidly ascending universities have garnered significant attention, demonstrating marked improvements in academic performance and rankings over the past decade.

This phenomenon underscores the transformative impact of capital mobility on the higher education landscape as entrepreneurial ventures and investments reshape the sector's dynamics. The emergence of profit-driven universities and the influx of capital from diverse sources reflect a paradigm shift in the perception of higher education as not merely a public good but also a lucrative investment opportunity. Consequently, this dynamic interplay between globalization, capital mobility, and academic capitalism reshapes the higher education landscape in Indonesia, presenting both opportunities and challenges for institutions seeking to navigate this evolving landscape.

Lastly, the influences of economic globalization and academic capitalism have led to a notable shift in governmental policies. It is to foster greater global adaptability within the higher education sector. Recognizing the pivotal role of higher education institutions in enhancing national innovation globally, governments have begun to prioritize measures that

align with global standards. Criteria such as world-class research output, global mobility, patents, and industry linkages have become instrumental in assessing the quality of universities.

In Indonesia, the government embraces world university rankings as a key tool for evaluating higher education institutions. For instance, the QS World University Rankings is regarded as a benchmark by the Indonesian government, which aims to propel its top public universities into the top 100 rankings. This strategic preference signifies a significant policy shift over the past decade, transitioning from from focusing solely on internal quality assurance to emphasizing the development of a world-class university. Moreover, the Indonesian government has actively supported students' global mobility through generous scholarship provisions. These scholarships enable undergraduate students from Indonesian universities to pursue study abroad experiences at the world's top 100 universities. This initiative reflects the government's commitment to nurturing a globally competitive workforce equipped with diverse perspectives and experiences, thereby enhancing Indonesia's standing in the global knowledge economy.

These three motives are the external driving factors compelling Indonesian universities to engage with university rankings. However, these external factors intersects with internal factors within the universities, which encompass three distinct motives: values, quality assurance, and the imperative to enhance academic reputation.

First, Indonesian universities are established with diverse values. Some institutions are established with the explicit purpose of increasing national competitiveness, while others have been nurtured as institutions rooted in religious values. In a broader context, the governance typologies of Indonesian universities also align with existing categorizations, encompassing state-centered, market-oriented, academic self-governance, and hybrid models that combine elements of the first three approaches (Jarvis & Mok, 2019).

Second, the evolution of internal quality assurance within Indonesian universities reflects a significant shift in policy focus. While governmental directives emphasize internal quality assurance as a priority in the early 2000s, its integration into the fabric of university policies and practices has become more pronounced in recent years. This shift underscores a growing recognition among universities of the importance of self-regulation and continuous improvement processes to enhance educational standards and institutional effectiveness. The establishment of dedicated quality assurance units within universities serves as a tangible manifestation of this shift. These units play a pivotal role in providing conceptual frameworks and practical guidance to various departments and units within the university. By offering expertise and support, quality assurance units enable institutions to systematically evaluate and enhance the quality of their teaching, research, and services. Thus, it fosters an environment conducive to academic excellence and student success.

Moreover, the responsibilities of these quality assurance units often extend beyond internal processes to encompass compliance with national accreditation criteria. In aligning with governmental standards, universities strive to meet regulatory requirements and demonstrate their commitment to delivering high-quality education that meets established

benchmarks. Thus, the integration of internal quality assurance practices within Indonesian universities reflects a multifaceted approach aimed at ensuring accountability, fostering continuous improvement, and upholding the reputation of higher education institutions within the national and international spheres.

Third, the imperative to enhance universities' academic reputation is also driven, in part, by internal forces responding to world university rankings. With over 4,500 higher education institutions scattered across the archipelago, many aspire to achieve the esteemed status of world-class universities. The urgency for improvement is evident, underscored by universities' deliberate efforts to expand their global outreach. This includes initiatives to enhance research quality, facilitate student and faculty mobility, and amplify community engagement efforts.

In this context, university rankings serve as a potent metric akin to a new currency, shaping the strategies and priorities of institutions nationwide. Aware of the importance of these rankings as a benchmark of excellence, universities are increasingly investing to position themselves favorably in global rankings. Achieving higher rankings enhances an institution's prestige and serves as a gateway to fostering partnerships with overseas universities. The pursuit of improved academic reputation through rankings-driven initiatives underscores universities' aspirations to elevate their standing on the global stage. Indonesia's universities actively seek to enhance their international visibility and relevance by embracing actions aimed at improving research output, facilitating knowledge exchange through student and faculty mobility programs, and engaging in impactful community service efforts. In doing so, they seek to utilize university rankings as an instrument to establish collaborative partnerships and enhance their contribution to the global knowledge

Considering this scenario, it is prudent to consider that the convergence of driving forces propelling Indonesian universities' involvement in university rankings may overshadow the internal forces within these institutions. The pursuit of rankings has increasingly become a policy imperative for many universities, often at the expense of deeper values and a steadfast commitment to quality assurance. Consequently, academic reputation has been reduced to a pragmatic perspective, primarily focused on meeting ranking criteria and metrics.

Furthermore, the prominence of world university rankings has steered the governance of Indonesian universities towards a singular typology: the market-oriented model. As universities prioritize strategies to improve their rankings and align with global standards, there is a discernible shift towards governance practices that prioritize market competitiveness and performance metrics over other considerations.

This shift raises concerns about the potential erosion of core values and the diminishing emphasis on quality assurance within Indonesian universities. As institutions become increasingly fixated on climbing the ranks, there is a risk of overlooking broader educational objectives and losing sight of the intrinsic value of academic pursuits. Therefore, while participation in university rankings may offer opportunities for global recognition and

collaboration, it is essential to maintain a balanced approach that upholds the integrity of higher education institutions and safeguards their mission to serve society's broader needs.

Rankings: Lessons from Islamic Universities in Indonesia

In the context of the prospective market, Islamic universities in Indonesia held a unique position in serving the nation, owing to the demographic landscape where more than 80% of the population identifies as Muslim. This demographic profile underscores the significant role of identity in shaping the preferences of prospective students and their parents when selecting institutions for higher education. Consequently, Islamic universities benefit from having a strong foundation that allows academic capitalism to thrive.

In recent years, many Islamic universities in Indonesia have exhibited a heightened interest in participating in world university rankings. This trend reflects a strategic response to the evolving landscape of higher education, where global recognition and competitiveness play increasingly pivotal roles. In Indonesian context, Islamic universities' governance typologies can be broadly categorized into state-centered, market-oriented, and academic self-governance models.

Comprehensive research on this subject reveals that Islamic universities employ two distinct models in their approach to university rankings: pragmatic and idealistic. These models are shaped by various factors, including institutional priorities, resources, and strategic objectives. This research adopts a multifaceted approach incorporating qualitative measures to gain insights into the perspectives of Islamic universities in Indonesia regarding world rankings. By analyzing responses and policy views, this research delineates the underlying motivations and strategies adopted by Islamic universities in navigating the complexities of global rankings and enhancing their institutional profiles on the international stage.

Table 1 Views of Islamic Universities in Indonesia towards World University Rankings.

	Pragmatic model	**Idealistic model**
Responses	1. Rankings as a social capital to boost up students' admissions through promotional materials. 2. Rankings' methodology determines the criteria for faculty members' performance assessments.	1. Rankings' as one of indicators to measure performance. Critical views towards metric based systems. 2. Rankings' methodology does not determine the criteria for faculty members' performance assessments.
Policy views	1. Rankings as the final aim and instrument to boost up reputation at the international level. 2. Rankings' methodology is an absolute approach, universities must adapt to meet criteria.	1. Rankings as the result of internal quality assurance and deliberate commitment for continuous improvement. 2. Rankings' methodology should be treated with a cautious approach and should not neglect the values of the universities.

Table 1 shows the responses of Islamic universities in Indonesia towards world university rankings, which exhibit a spectrum of approaches. Within the pragmatic model, it is evident that this cohort of universities adopts reactive strategies in response to rankings. Global university rankings, such as QS and Webometrics, have become integral to higher education institutions worldwide, including Indonesia. These rankings help increase student enrollment and enhance institutional prestige on the global stage. Many Islamic universities have adopted these rankings as a tool for legitimacy, using them in promotional materials to attract prospective students (Sari & Suyanto, 2021; Indonesian Ministry of Research, Technology, and Higher Education, 2023)

As Welch (2019) argues, these rankings reflect the influence of global capital flows and the commodification of knowledge, positioning universities in a competitive, market-driven environment. While rooted in religious education, Islamic universities must now adapt to these global pressures, striving for improved rankings to attract students and secure funding. This shift can sometimes result in the prioritization of measurable outputs, such as research publications, over the preservation of core values (Goglio, 2016; Stack, 2021).

Moreover, it is noteworthy that this group of universities utilizes the methodologies employed by rankings to delineate assessment criteria for faculty members. Incentive structures within these institutions are often aligned with the weightage assigned to criteria in ranking methodologies. However, few universities are willing to critically review the methodologies underpinning university rankings. Despite potential methodological biases and philosophical concerns, the pursuit of rankings persists undeterred in the pursuit of perceived quality standards. Consequently, this policy orientation has engendered a transformation in the intrinsic motivations of faculty members, rendering them more materialistic and susceptible to external influences, particularly those associated with financial incentives (Fathana & Rachman, 2022). This shift underscores the complex interplay between institutional policies, external benchmarks, and individual motivations within the academic ecosystem of Islamic universities in Indonesia.

This condition shows how these Islamic universities focus more on capital-driven strategy than their fundamental value to gain more profit. Ranking is seen not as a way to enhance the practice of its value but rather as a tool to boost student enrollment. Their willingness to align themselves with accreditation and raking regimes without internal measurement on maintaining their core value also weakens their stance on holding the core Islamic value that once became the reason of the university's establishment.

Furthermore, Islamic universities in Indonesia face increasing pressure to adopt corporate-style management, focusing on revenue generation and global competitiveness. However, this approach can conflict with their mission of delivering value-based education. As F. Wahid (personal communication, November, 18, 2023) warns, this trap will unknowingly shift the mindset of universities, viewing them as corporations that provide research and teaching services rather than institutions focused on the scholarly pursuit of higher education. This 'trap' of neoliberalism can shift universities away from their scientific

and educational focus toward functioning as service providers, ultimately compromising their core values and mission.

On the flip side, it is noteworthy that the second group of universities adopts a contrasting approach towards university rankings. This idealistic model regards rankings as one of several indicators to measure university performance. Within this framework, there is a prevailing skepticism towards metric-based systems while still acknowledging the significance of university rankings. Moreover, this model contends that despite the plethora of methodologies and criteria, rankings often reflect a homogenized approach akin to what some scholars call *Harvardometers*. These rankings measure parameters heavily influenced by the Anglo-Saxon-style elite research university model, with Harvard University in the United States serving as the quintessential archetype (Goglio, 2016; Stack, 2021). In contrast to the pragmatic model, the idealistic model of universities does not advocate for using ranking methodologies in faculty members' performance assessments. This stance underscores a commitment to uphold academic integrity and resist the potential homogenization of academic standards driven by rankings-oriented approaches.

The contrasting difference between the pragmatic and idealistic model of Islamic universities in Indonesia in responding to world university rankings is also apparent in their policy views. This research reveals that the pragmatic model of Islamic universities perceives rankings as the ultimate benchmark of quality assurance, emphasizing the importance of enhancing global reputation. Moreover, this model views ranking methodologies as unquestionable, leading universities to conform to meet the established criteria. This perspective aligns with findings from other studies, which suggest that universities may be tempted to engage in data fabrication and manipulation to secure inclusion in rankings lists (Balatsky & Ekimova, 2012; Dearden et al., 2019). The allure of achieving higher rankings can incentivize institutions to prioritize short-term gains over long-term integrity, potentially compromising the credibility of academic standards.

In contrast, the idealistic model of Islamic universities adopts a more critical stance towards rankings, recognizing the limitations and biases inherent in ranking methodologies. Rather than viewing rankings as the sole arbiter of quality, this model emphasizes a broader and more nuanced understanding of academic excellence, encompassing other factors beyond those captured by rankings. Overall, the divergent policy views between the pragmatic and idealistic models underscore the complex interplay between institutional objectives, ethical considerations, and the pursuit of global recognition within the academic landscape of Islamic universities in Indonesia.

However, the findings of this research have also indicated that the idealistic model adopts a more tempered perspective towards rankings. Rankings are perceived as an outcome of internal quality assurance processes and a deliberate commitment to continuous improvement. This model emphasizes the importance of considering the specificity of each university when assessing their performance, recognizing that there is no one-size-fits-all methodology for university rankings. This specificity encompasses various dimensions, including space-based factors, time-based considerations, and discipline-based specificity

(Nemec et al., 2020). As such, the idealistic model approaches rankings methodologies with caution, recognizing the need to contextualize rankings within universities' broader mission and values. Rather than viewing rankings as the ultimate measure of success, this model places greater emphasis on intrinsic qualities such as academic excellence, institutional mission, and societal impact. By prioritizing these qualities, universities can maintain a sense of integrity and purpose, ensuring that ranking is a tool for improvement rather than an end.

The idealistic model shows the acknowledgment of accreditation and ranking as one of measurement to ensure continuous improvement, while also maintaining the core Islamic values of the university. It manages to find a balance between the need to fulfill the income-generating sector, especially in attracting new students, while also strongly maintaining the core value of the institution by contextualizing rankings not as the ultimate goal but rather as the impact of continuous improvement on holding the core Islamic values for perfecting the academic practices.

Conclusions

This research has explored how academic capitalism has reshaped Islamic higher education institutions in Indonesia, transforming them into aspiring world-class universities while upholding their values. By examining the responses of Indonesian universities to university rankings, this research has uncovered the nuanced interplay between external and internal forces shaping their strategies. Through careful observation of private and state-owned Islamic universities, two distinct models have emerged: pragmatic and idealistic. These models reflect varying approaches toward university rankings, with the pragmatic model prioritizing rankings as quality assurance indicators and the idealistic model taking a more critical and nuanced stance.

This research shed light on the complex dynamics within Islamic universities in Indonesia by measuring university responses to rankings and examining their policy views. Despite the pervasive influence of academic capitalism through rankings, these institutions have demonstrated deliberate approaches to navigating the landscape. Some adopt practical strategies to enhance global reputation, while others maintain a cautious and idealistic outlook, prioritizing internal quality assurance and values alignment. In essence, Islamic universities in Indonesia actively engage with the challenges posed by academic capitalism, leveraging rankings as tools for improvement while remaining steadfast in their commitment to uphold their values and mission. By embracing diverse approaches tailored to their unique contexts, these institutions are poised to navigate the evolving landscape of higher education with resilience and integrity.

Acknowledgement

This research was supported by funding from Universitas Islam Indonesia.

About The Authors

Hangga Fathana is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at Universitas Islam Indonesia, with more than 15 years of experience teaching Australian politics and foreign policy. In addition to his academic role, he serves as the Executive Secretary at the university. His research focuses on the political economy of higher education as a global public good and its influence on the wider global landscape. He has participated in programs such as the Australia Awards Short Course on Strategic Equilibrium in the Indo-Pacific and the Emerging Indo-Pacific Leaders Program hosted by the Perth USAsia Centre, reflecting his engagement with key issues in the region.

Enggar Furi Herdianto is a lecturer and an Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations in Universitas Islam Indonesia. He obtained his bachelor degree of Political Science from the Department of International Relations, Universitas Gadjah Mada. He also obtained his Master degree from the Department of International Relations, Universitas Gadjah Mada as well. His research interests are focused on Southeast Asian Studies, East Asian Studies, Global Political Economy, Automotive Industry Policy, and Public Diplomacy. His publications include a book on Indonesia's foreign policy and scopus-indexed journal article about trade negotiation in 2022, a book chapter regarding political economic dynamics on global semiconductor in 2023, and numbers of articles regarding global political economic issues.

Karina Utami Dewi is an associate professor and Head of Department of International Relations, Universitas Islam Indonesia, teaching and researching on gender and politics, politics of the United States, and peace and conflict studies. She earned her bachelor degree in Political Science as well Master of Arts in International Relations from Gadjah Mada University, Indonesia. In 2018, she was awarded as a scholar for Study in The United States Institute, Institute of Foreign Policy, by the U.S. Department of State. Her publications include a book on the United States Election and Political System in 2020, a scopus-indexed journal article about women's movement against sexual violence in Indonesia in 2023, a book chapter on women and development, published by Sejong Press, Korea in 2023, and numerous articles about women and marginalized groups in Indonesia and the US.

References

Annur, C. (2022, March 3). *Provinsi Dengan Perguruan Tinggi Terbanyak, Jawa Barat Teratas!* Katadata Media Network. https://databoks.katadata.co.id/datapublish/2022/03/11/provinsi-dengan-perguruan-tinggi-terbanyak-jawa-barat-teratas

Appadurai, A. (2020). Globalization and the Rush to History. *Global Perspectives 1*(1). https://doi.org/10.1525/001c.11656.

Badan Akreditasi Nasional Perguruan Tinggi. (n.d.). *Distribusi Peringkat*. Badan Akreditasi Nasional Perguruan Tinggi. https://www.banpt.or.id/?page_id=1903

Badan Akreditasi Nasional Perguruan Tinggi. (2022). *Prodi Baru*. https://www.banpt.or.id/direktori/prodi/prodi_baru.php

Badan Pusat Statistik. (n.d.). Badan Pusat Statistik

Balatsky, E., & Ekimova, N. (2012). The Global University Rankings: The Problem of Manipulation. *Journal of the New Economic Association, 13*(1), 126–46.

Darlington, Y., & Scott, D. (2002). *Qualitative Research in Practice: Stories from the Field* (1st edn.). Routledge.

Dearden, J. A., Grewal, R., & Lilien. G. L. (2019). Strategic Manipulation of University Rankings, the Prestige Effect, and Student University Choice. *Journal of Marketing Research, 56*(4), 691–707.

Dedy. (2017, February 17). *STMIK Amikom Jadi Universitas*. Media Indonesia. https://mediaindonesia.com/humaniora/92579/stmik-amikom-jadi-universitas

Fathana, H., & Rachman, A. A. (2022, March 26). *Pemeringkatan Kampus: Praktik Imperialisme Budaya Yang Menjebak Perguruan Tinggi Dalam Perlombaan Kosong*. The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/pemeringkatan-kampus-praktik-imperialisme-budaya-yang-menjebak-perguruan-tinggi-dalam-perlombaan-kosong-178536

Goglio, V. (2016). One size fits all? A different perspective on university rankings. *Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management, 38*(2), 212–226. https://doi.org/10.1080/1360080X.2016.1150553

Indonesian Ministry of Religious Affairs. (2023). Statistik pendidikan tinggi Islam. Ministry of Religious Affairs. https://diktis.kemenag.go.id/kelembagaan/nspti/

Indonesian Ministry of Research, Technology, and Higher Education. (2023). Data akreditasi dan peringkat universitas. https://siaga.kemdikbud.go.id/akreditasi/

Jarvis, D.S.L., & Mok, K.H. (2019). The Political Economy of Higher Education Governance in Asia: Challenges, Trends and Trajectories. In D. S. L., & K. H. Mok (Eds.), *Transformations in Higher Education Governance in Asia* (pp. 1-46). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9294-8_1

Jessop, B. (2018). On academic capitalism. Critical Policy Studies, 12(1), 104-109. https://doi.org/10.1080/19460171.2017.1403342

Lau, J. (2021, June 24). *Is South-East Asia higher education's next global hotspot?* Times Higher Education (THE). https://www.timeshighereducation.com/features/south-east-asia-higher-educations-next-global-hotspot

Marginson, S. (2016). *The dream is over: The crisis of Clark Kerr's California idea of higher education*. University of California Press.

Menegaskan Peran Perguruan Tinggi Islam Swasta. (2023, November 20). Universitas Islam Indonesia (UII). from https://www.uii.ac.id/menegaskan-peran-perguruan-tinggi-islam-swasta/

Mittelman, J. H. (2016). *Globalization and its critics: Perspectives from political economy*. Cambridge University Press.

Nemec, J., Wahid, F., Fathana, H., & Raharjo, W. (2020). *Assessing the impact and the quality of research: Manual and slected practice*. Printinghouse GUPRESS.

Pramudyo, A. (2018). Pengaruh Citra Merek Terhadap Loyalitas Melalui kepuasan Sebagai Intervening (Studi Pada Mahasiswa Perguruan Tinggi Swasta di Yogyakarta). Aktual: Jurnal Ilmu Ekonomi dan Sosial, 1(1), 1-16.

Ramadhani, Y. (2023, January 19). *58 PTN perguruan tinggi Islam negeri: UIN, STAIN, hingga IAIN*. Tirto. https://tirto.id/58-ptn-perguruan-tinggi-islam-negeri-uin-stain-hingga-iain-gBjc

Rhoades, G., & Slaughter, S. (1997). Academic Capitalism, Managed Professionals, and Supply-Side Higher Education. *Social Text*, *51*, 9-38.

Salahuddin, M. (2017). Model Pengembangan Pendidikan Tinggi Islam di Indonesia. *Ulumuna, 18*(1), 121–138. https://doi.org/10.20414/ujis.v18i1.155

Sam, C., & van der Sijde, P. (2014). Understanding the concept of the entrepreneurial university from the perspective of higher education models. *Higher Education, 68*, 891-908. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10734-014-9750-0

Sari, R. M., & Suyanto, B. (2021). Higher education accreditation in Indonesia: An analysis of the impact of university rankings. Jurnal Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 26(1), 47–55. https://doi.org/10.24832/jpnk.v26i1.12345

Sari, R. M. (2016). Perguruan tinggi Islam dan transformasi lembaga: Studi terhadap proses perubahan fungsi dan peran Iain Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta menjadi universitas Islam. *El -Hekam, 1*(1), 1–18.

Singgih, D. S., Suyanto B., & Ariadi, S. (2022). Higher Education Capitalism in Indonesia as a Social Problem: A Case Study in the Digital Age. *Jurnal Sosiologi Dialektika, 17*(1), 13–24. https://doi.org/10.20473/jsd.v17i1.2022.13-24

Slaughter, S., & Leslie, L. L. (2001). Expanding and elaborating the concept of academic capitalism. *Organization, 8*(2), 154–161. https://doi.org/10.1177/1350508401082003

Slaughter, S., & Leslie, L. L. (1997). *Academic capitalism: Politics, policies, and the entrepreneurial university*. Johns Hopkins University Press.

Slaughter, S., & Rhoades, G. (2004). Academic capitalism and the new economy: Markets, state, and higher education. Johns Hopkins University Press.

Stack, M. (2021). Global university rankings and the politics of knowledge. University of Toronto Press.

Statista Research Department. (2024, September 18). Population share of the ASEAN countries in 2022, by age. Statista. https://www.statista.com/statistics/1026696/asean-population-by-age/

Steiner, L., Sundström, A.C. & Sammalisto, K. (2013). An analytical model for university identity and reputation strategy work. *Higher Education, 65*, 401–415. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10734-012-9552-1

Stensaker, B. (2015). Organizational identity as a Concept for Understanding University Dynamics. *Higher Education, 69*(1), 103–115.

UNESCO Institute of Statistics. (2021). *Higher education figures at a glance*. https://uis.unesco.org/sites/default/files/documents/f_unesco1015_brochure_web_en.pdf

Welch, A. (2019). *Higher education in Southeast Asia: Blurring borders, changing balance*. Routledge.

Yolandha, F. (2022, August 5). *BPS: Ekonomi Indonesia Masih Terkonsentrasi di Pulau Jawa*. Republika Online. https://republika.co.id/share/rg4xav370

The Market Interest of Electric Vehicle in ASEAN Through Digital Analytics and Industry Performance

Dianta Hasri Natalius Barus

Doctoral Program in Economics, Universitas Katolik Parahyangan
Jawa Barat, Indonesia 40141
dianta.hasri@unpar.ac.id

How to Cite: Barus, D. H. N. (2024). The market interest of electric vehicle in ASEAN through digital analytics and industry performance. *Journal of ASEAN Studies*, *12*(2), 283-303.
https://doi.org/10.21512/ 10.21512/jas.v12i2.9091

Abstract

The electric vehicle industry is considered the next generation of the automotive sector. ASEAN, specifically, comprises three major electric vehicle markets: Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia. However, can this sector displace the fossil fuel automotive, which has dominated for many years? Changes in technology and policies across countries have pushed the automotive industry further towards environmental concerns. Growing businesses must be in line with environmental sustainability. Indonesia may be described as having a burgeoning and constantly changing curiosity that tends to be dynamic and impulsive. From 2020 to 2023, Malaysia saw a notable increase in interest in Electric Vehicle (EV), comparable to Indonesia. The examination of interest in Malaysia yields an overall index of 25.65. It is below Indonesia's rate of 32.76 but above Thailand's rate of 11.87. By analyzing the three trend graphs, it is clear that the interest in electric automobiles in Indonesia have experienced the most substantial increase, while Malaysia has shown the second highest level of interest. Indonesia encounters the lowest level of buying power in comparison to the remaining two countries. Thailand, being the foremost motor vehicle producer in Southeast Asia, is anticipated to see a decline in customer demand for EV. However, the growth and decline of market interest in the future will be driven by industry players and policy makers in each country, broadly in the ASEAN region.

Keywords: market interest, Electric Vehicle (EV), ASEAN, digital marketing, industry performance

Introduction

Technological development is an important part of human life. It also encourages humans to use certain technologies in development in the education and health sectors (Coban, 2022), further in the automotive sector.

As a regional organization, ASEAN has strengthened its standing in recent years by broadening the discussion of equal and pivotal status to include its external partners and the relationships among its member nations (Tahalele et al., 2022). A discussion of the prospective benefits and repercussions of an expanding EV market in ASEAN nations is the focus of the research.

There is a significant global commitment among governments, including those in ASEAN, to transition the automotive sector from fuel-powered vehicles to EV with the dual objectives of promoting economic efficiency and environmental sustainability (Wen et al., 2021). Particularly in Southeast Asia, as in other nations, a policy encouraging proactive decisions in meeting obligations associated with climate change that are now experiencing changes, minimizing pollution within urban areas, and, of course, ensuring the sustainability of energy accessibility is the transition from traditional to electric vehicle technology. In general, a number of Asian nations, including Japan, Indonesia, Thailand, and Korea, have established robust domestic automobile manufacturing sectors.

Indonesia has a distinct perspective on its position within the strategically significant Indo-Pacific region. Since Marty Natalegawa's speech at the Centre for Strategic and International Strategies (CSIS) in May 2013, the term "Indo-Pacific" has been included in Indonesian foreign policy discussions. The word is also a component of President Jokowi's Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) policy (Riyanto et al., 2023).

Meanwhile, Thailand, one of the most productive nations in ASEAN, is actively formulating policies to promote the expansion of EV. In fact, it offers special investment incentives to encourage such development (Frost & Sullivan, 2018). Thailand, which had already established an integrated road map, intended to increase annual production capacity by 1,000 electric buses and battery distribution systems by 2019. It aims to have 1.2 million occupant EV equipped with nationwide electric charging infrastructure in numerous locations by 2036. The contribution of developing countries to rising CO2 emissions is comparatively greater than developed countries. An instance that exemplifies this phenomenon is Thailand, whose emission levels escalated at a rate surpassing the global average. Particularly, pickup trucks, light passengers, and commercial vehicles are the largest emitters of CO2. In the future, road transport vehicles may contribute to approximately 20% of the total CO2 emissions associated with energy (Abeam Consulting, 2022).



Figure 1. ASEAN Automotive Sales in 2016-2020
Source: GAIKINDO (2020)

As illustrated in Figure 1, Vietnam experienced the least favorable growth during the previous pandemic, sales declining by approximately 32% to approximately 50,000 units. To stimulate automotive demand, the Vietnamese government, similar to that of Indonesia, implemented a fiscal stimulus for this sector by instituting a policy mandating a 50% reduction in vehicle acquisition costs through the conclusion of 2020. Automobile production in Thailand declined to its most minimal level in three decades. As a result of the decline in the purchasing power of individuals, automobile sales dropped 65%. Similarly, automobile exports fell by 67.7%.



Figure 2. Electric Vehicle (EV) Sales Among Conventional Cars Worldwide
Source: GAIKINDO (2020)

As opposed to the decline observed in the traditional automotive sector, the sales of electric vehicles in 2020 amounted to an estimated three million units, as shown in Figure 2.

China constituted the source of 40.5% of the total worldwide sales. Global conventional automobile sales decreased by 16% by the end of 2020, whereas the number of EV exceeded 10 million.

The purpose of the research is to formulate recommendations and analysis regarding the potential growth of EV industry in ASEAN, taking three countries as objects. They are the biggest EV market in ASEAN (Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia). The research also highlights opportunities that are pertinent to the development of strategies in related sectors. The researcher tries to learn how regulations developed by countries in ASEAN and the increasingly efficient EV industry from upstream to downstream can have an impact on the development of consumer interest in the region. Figure 3 shows the research framework used.



Figure 3. Research Framework

Literature Review

Car ownership encompasses several aspects, such as transportation, social status, environmental consciousness, and driving enjoyment (Chu et al., 2019). When considering customer satisfaction-oriented innovation, EV places emphasis on the attributes and provisions of its products and services (Zhang, 2021). Purchasing of an EV is determined by both cognitive and emotional connection between the prospective consumer and the brand. The relationship arises from the interplay of various factors, such as the marketing strategies employed by car manufacturers, the level of interest and cognitive effort exerted by clients, as well as the informational campaigns on environmentally friendly transportation conducted by legislators at both the national and local levels (Giansoldati et al., 2020). Upon the introduction of EV onto the market, the primary barrier hindering their widespread acceptance is the lack of familiarity among customers with these novel vehicles. Thus, it is imperative to promptly initiate a series of demonstration initiatives that offer customers the chance to experience EV firsthand to heighten their knowledge of EVs.

The promotion of public vehicles is given priority among other policy tools (Liu et al., 2021). Introducing financial incentives into the lease business model may significantly enhance the market share of electric vehicles compared to when they are solely offered for purchase. In light of this understanding, governments have the opportunity to expand their current or proposed incentives for EV purchases and also include them for leasing purposes (Liao et al., 2019). Interesting insight finds that renting an EV is correlated with more favorable

views towards EV, greater knowledge about EV, and a heightened sense of security when driving an EV (Langbroek et al., 2019). Furthermore, currently many companies are adapting green marketing strategies for the long-term growth of their business, this is in line with products such as EVs (Barus, 2024).

The growing popularity of EV today can be attributed not only to the cost-effectiveness and environmentally favorable operation but also to the practicality, quality, and convenience of the features, which influence consumers' intentions to purchase (Xiao & Zhang, 2021). Five distinct categories of innovation can provide insights into the primary determinants that consumers take into account when establishing distinctions in their intentions to make a purchase. Specifically, there are novel products, enhanced manufacturing processes, supplementary supply chains, expansion into untapped markets, and implementation of effective management strategies. The innovation has to be capable of being reduced to a market-comprehensible simplification despite the initial concept's complexity (Schumpeter, 1934). Concerning advancement in EV products, previous research conducted in Thailand reveals that approximately 75% of consumers have opted to purchase EV with electric power as the preferred energy source. This result encompasses factors such as cost effectiveness and novelty (Frost & Sullivan, 2018).



Figure 4. Consumers' Motivation Factors to Buy Electric Vehicle (EV)
Source: Frost & Sullivan (2018)

There are several main considerations for a consumer in making an EV purchase. As explained in Figure 4, the most important thing is the safety aspect of the vehicle, whether it has complied with the standards or not (61%). The next thing is the availability of charging stations at home or at work (55-56%). Charging speed is also a significant consideration for a consumer (48%), and the last is the tax incentives provided by regulators/governments in their country (49%).

Several causes are fueling the expansion of EV in ASEAN. The primary driver is the growing recognition of global warming and air pollution, which has compelled ASEAN

countries to establish aggressive goals for carbon emission reduction. EV is considered a solution to address environmental concerns. The utilization of electrical energy in transportation is expected to rise, but a significant quantity of traditional fuel is still utilized. ASEAN nations are also prioritizing the acceleration of technology adaption.

The significant and concerning growth in the number of ICEVs and the resulting increase in pollution levels in major cities compelled governments to prioritize the promotion of EV via the implementation of EV-specific laws (Krishnan & Koshy, 2021).

Every nation places significant emphasis on the adoption of electric cars inside their borders. Nevertheless, the growth of the sector is equally contingent upon market demand. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) contribution in ASEAN is mostly controlled by six nations. Indonesia has the highest GDP among ASEAN countries, accounting for 35% of the overall ASEAN GDP. Thailand comes next with a share of 16%, followed by the Vietnam, Malaysia, Philippines, and Singapore each contributing about 11−12%. However, when considering income per capita, the relative GDP size among these nations becomes insignificant. A significant disparity in income exists. For example, Indonesia, is the highest GDP among ASEAN countries, but has a per capita income lower than the average income of other members of ASEAN. Singapore holds the top position in ASEAN for having the highest per capita income, with a value of 1322% over the norm. Followed by Brunei (683%), Malaysia (239%), and Thailand (159%). The reason behind EV's growth is mostly focused on these four nations is not surprising (World Economic Outlook, 2021).

The per capita income will significantly impact the sales of items like EV due to the relatively high pricing now. It is hardly surprising that oil-powered cars continue to be quite prevalent in nations such as Indonesia, Myanmar, and Cambodia. Similar to Indonesia, whose economy has the highest GDP in Southeast Asia yet possesses a per capita income that falls beneath the average for the region, the government's first objective will be to prioritize enhancing welfare before embarking on efforts to augment the adoption of technological advancements such as EV. While absorption in the upper socioeconomic group is not feasible, it is much higher compared to other nations in ASEAN when computed and compared.

Table 1. Stock of Electric Vehicle (EV)

Country	2025	2030	2035
Indonesia	2,200		
Malaysia		100,000	
Thailand			1,200,000

Source: GAIKINDO (2020)

Based on Table 1, it can be seen that Thailand is still a key player in the production of 1.2 million EVs in ASEAN. Following second and third, Malaysia and Indonesia have a total of 122,000 vehicles. Of course, it will logically be a third-country target when assessed by the preparedness of the industrial and infrastructure aspects.

The EV industry across ASEAN has major significant obstacles. One challenge is the significant initial expenses associated with EV, despite the declining prices of batteries. In ASEAN nations, EV continues to be significantly costly compared to traditional vehicles. The difference in cost prevents the widespread use of electric vehicles in the area. Another obstacle to the adoption of EV in some ASEAN nations is the presence of regulatory hurdles. These barriers include import duties, levies, and local content requirements, which further hinder the widespread use of EV. Implementing regulatory simplification and providing incentives may effectively encourage using EV in the area. It is necessary to create promotional strategies that effectively convey EV advantages, specs, and availability to franchise dealerships (Sovacool et al., 2019).

In examining the condition of the electric car sector in ASEAN, it is essential to take a comprehensive and interconnected approach. One approach to viewing the conditions of industrial competition is the Five Forces concept (Porter, 1979). This tool encompasses five primary factors that aid in the analysis of industry rivalry. The first factor to consider is buyer power, which refers to the ability of buyers in Southeast Asia to negotiate and influence the market for EV goods. It is important to assess whether customers have sufficient alternatives and whether they can make informed decisions based on their specific demands and buying capacity. As the demand for EV increases and more companies offer electric car brands, buyers will have more negotiating power. Limited product options in the market may enhance the market position of a connected firm (Rajasekar & Al Raee, 2013). The concept of supplier power refers to the influence and leverage that raw material suppliers have on a firm or organization. According to Dobbs (2014), the more diversity of suppliers is controlled by a corporation, the stronger its ability is to negotiate favorable terms. The threat of new entrants is a useful tool for assessing the level of difficulty for rivals to join the same business. Brand position in the industry will be stronger if it faces more difficulties in entering a comparable sort of firm. It will help the brand maintain competition at a low level. The concept of the danger of substitutes refers to the extent to which customers are inclined to purchase other items in conjunction with the ones provided. Regarding EV, it is worth noting that fossil fuel vehicles are still available on the market. The presence of fossil fuel cars that are still available on the market is relevant to the sales of electric automobiles. The last aspect of the examination is competitive rivalry. It examines the level of rivalry within the industry. The presence of the traditional fossil fuel automobile industry will continue to provide a direct competitive challenge that requires careful consideration.

The governments in the ASEAN region will have a crucial role in enhancing the EV industry. The industry demands substantial investments, which necessitates stakeholders and shareholders to seek political certainty, legal protection, and domestic stability. An endeavor that is beyond the capacity of a single country needs dedication and consensus from nations within the ASEAN area. Widespread market accessibility throughout a nation will instill trust

in enterprises and customers to make purchases. Acquiring electric cars is a significant challenge for those belonging to the middle class. Advanced technology must have the capability to enhance manufacturing efficiency. A highly effective manufacturing system may naturally result in reduced selling prices. It will be crucial in enhancing consumer purchasing aspirations across Southeast Asia. There is a significant amount of strategic economic collaboration among member nations. For instance, the industrial and raw material sectors in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Indonesia exert significant influence. Market players often consider the level of political and economic stability when deciding where to manufacture.

Market is Evolving in Digital Media

Today, consumers are experiencing an evolution in the information age. Everything is digital, information is quickly obtained and distributed. Companies can no longer use the old way to win the competition, but they must further collaborate with media. This evolution drives changes in how companies communicate comprehensively to their target market. One framework that can describe the complexity of digital communication that must be carried out is through the RACE framework developed by Smart Insights, a start-up that focuses on creating online learning content in the fields of management and business. The framework describes four (4) stages that must be carried out in communicating with the current target market, namely through Reach, Act, Convert, and Engage. In the first stage in Reach, the company's focus is to reach as many people as possible to get communication about the offers they make.

The media used also tends to be paid media (advertising) in order to reach consumers widely in a short time. Entering the second stage, namely Act, at this level consumers have received information or initial knowledge about the offers given, then they will start to find out, compare through digital media that they can easily access and target to make purchases. The media used will focus on limited offers and product knowledge that provides a stimulus to consumers to make purchases in the near future. In the third stage, namely Convert. Companies begin to target consumers to make repeat purchases, of course the concept of content on the media used will also change, concepts such as remarketing and testimonials from influencers will be used to maintain consumer trust. In the final stage, Engage. Companies target consumers to be loyal to them through offers such as membership programs, prizes, and points.

These four stages will repeat in each cycle, meaning that consumers who are already loyal still need to be targeted at the Reach stage so that your brand remains Top of Mind, or at least remembered by consumers. On the other hand, consumer interaction will peak at the Convert stage, so that new intense and personal communication is needed to loyal consumers so that they will remain loyal to your brand in the long term. At least the framework above can describe how intense digital communication is today, because that is indeed the state of market competition today. The more information technology develops, the more strategic and tactical approaches are developed in targeting consumers.

Google in 2021 released research results on market characteristics in Southeast Asia, the results were three (3) interesting findings to note. It was found that consumers in Southeast Asia are quite influenced by the advertisements they find in digital media. The advertisement succeeded in creating initial perception and brand awareness which triggered them to enter the stage of interest in a product. So far, we think that recommendations from friends, family, or our community have the most important role, but from this research, digital advertising actually takes the most important portion in the initial stages of consumers considering a product. Second, it was found that consumers are highly influenced by reviews on websites and 54% said they would make a purchase when there is a promo given, such as a discount, points, and other loyalty programs. Third, most consumers (76%) agree that online shopping saves time and 65% say they get a more economical price (Google, 2021).

Digital Interest Become The Mental Model of Marketing

There are 88% of consumers doing personal research from around 10.4 different sources through their gadgets before they make a purchase on a particular product? Today's consumers are critical consumers, this is possible because of how easy it is to get information today, with one click on Google in a split second you will get thousands of search results related to it. The sophisticated internet technology today has changed consumer purchasing behavior. There is one concept of the consumer buying journey called the Mental Model of Marketing, consisting of 3 (three) main parts, namely: Stimulus, First Moment of Truth (FMOT), and Second Moment of Truth (SMOT). (Google, 2021).

This Mental Model describes how the consumer journey process from getting information to making a purchase and being loyal to a product. First is Stimulus; At this stage, marketers try to get attention from consumers by advertising that has a wide reach, such as television advertisements, news media, Google Ads, or Facebook Ads. Marketers try to provide stimulus to consumers so that their products/brands are known to consumers.

FMOT; The second stage, after consumers get information about the product at the Stimulus stage, then they come to the store/e-commerce that provides the product, here it is called the First Moment of Truth, the first moment consumers see the advertised product directly. If in an offline store, consumers will find the product in the display case or in e-commerce they see the web page that offers the product. Marketers at this stage will use media such as in-store marketing to entice consumers to make purchases immediately (promotion programs, bundling, rewards, and so on).

SMOT; After consumers make a purchase, consumers use the product. Here will be the Second Moment of Truth, the second momentum where consumers interact with the product. Consumers feel directly, whether they are satisfied or dissatisfied with the product. If they are satisfied, the brand will get positive reviews, recommendations from consumers. However, on the contrary, if they are not satisfied with the product, the brand will get complaints. Here marketers try to provide marketing materials in the form of member programs, good customer service to feedback on consumer experiences to be followed up so that consumers

become loyal. For decades, marketers have focused on these three variables, how a brand should be optimal at these three levels. However, changes in consumer behavior have changed the Mental Model. Based on research conducted by Google in 2011, it was found that there is one level before FMOT that plays an important role in influencing consumer decisions in purchasing, which they call Zero Moment of Truth (ZMOT).

The development of the ZMOT mental model also has an influence on consumer literacy related to the EV industry further in each country. Digital information will provide wider and more efficient access for the industry in increasing market interest to future potential.

Research Method

The research is grounded on a literature review and quantitative method, using a study of secondary data collected from various automotive businesses in ASEAN. It contains Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia. The researcher categorizes the study into two distinct levels of analysis. In the first stage, the analytical method relies on a theoretical framework derived from an extensive review of existing research and market release material. In the second stage, the research adopts an economic viewpoint to examine the policy, growth, and development obstacles faced by the EV sector in ASEAN. The acquired secondary data are quantitatively collected from Google Trends Analytic (weekly: 2020 until 2023). The data obtained from Google Analytics is data that shows the level of digital user interest volume on topics related to "Electrical Vehicle" in each country studied, each data obtained is an index that is in the range of 0-100 (the higher the more popular the topic is at a certain time). From the data obtained, the author describes it in the form of scattered graphics, it will help in seeing the volume of interest that occurs. The data does not show actual production/industry data, but helps to read and research public interest.

A comprehensive examination of market indicators derived from prior processing is conducted, focusing on the goals of ASEAN member nations in relation to the growth of the electric automobile sector and the potential for competitive advantage. There are 627 weekly data obtained from Google Analytics related to the level of interest of EV in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. All of the data is then processed into quarterly, semester and annual data which is accumulated in a scattered graph. From the graph, a trend line is drawn which is used as a basis for seeing the decline or increase in the trend that occurs. All Google Trend analytics data obtained and processed can be seen in the Appendix.

Analysis

The traditional car sector seems to have had a significant decline in growth after the recent epidemic. Figure 4 illustrates that the traditional automobile sector reached its highest point in 2019, before to the global impact of the Covid-19 epidemic. According to the

polynomial trend graph, there is a noticeable recurring decrease in the whole data. Between 2017 and 2019 there was a significant increase in sales, but that does not continue in 2020 This is due to two major factors, namely, the disruption of semiconductor supplies and the Covid-19 pandemic that has hit the world.



Figure 5. Conventional Automotive Market Sales in ASEAN
Source: GAIKINDO (2020)

Electric Vehicle Sales Are on the Rise

While conventional automobile sales decreased, EV saw a substantial rise in sales between 2019 and 2020, as seen in Figure 5. There was a significant rise in sales by about 170% (2020). In contrast, the GDP of the ASEAN had a decline of 4.7%, and sales of conventional cars declined by 29%. Indirectly, there is continuity in the decline in GDP and sales, which indicates that purchasing power related to conventional automotive is still quite dependent on GDP.



Figure 6. Electric Vehicle (EV) and Conventional Sales in ASEAN
Source: GAIKINDO (2020)

While there is a significant disparity in the number of electric versus conventional automobile sales, the increase or decrease in percentage is a crucial metric for assessing the overall market shrinkage across the Southeast Asia area. According to the Figure 6, changes in GDP, whether positive or negative, will have a similar effect on the sales of conventional automobiles. However, the impact on the sales of electric cars will be different. There is increasing customer interest in electric cars in Southeast Asia. This is the consumers segment that have not been negatively impacted by the recent epidemic.

Analysis using digital data will help in researching the interests that occur in a particular country in a certain period of time. Furthermore, digital analytics is a marketing tool that describes current market potential (Barus, 2022). The researcher examines the search phrases on Google that are associated with "Electric Vehicle" in each of the three primary Southeast Asian countries that have adopted EV: Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. Where these three countries are the highest EV producers in ASEAN currently, and have interesting demographic potential in the future. The acquired data is analytical and spans from 2020 to 2023.



Figure 7. Indonesia EV Interest Spectrum 2020-2023 (Google Analytic)



Figure 8. Indonesia Crossed EV Interest Spectrum 2020-2023 (Google Analytic)

Through Figures 7 and 8 it can be seen that interest in Indonesia related to EV between 2020 and 2023 experienced a significant increase, both from the monthly to annual data side. The trend line tends to rise, specifically from 2022 to 2023. From cross-analysis, the average index is 32.76 (blue line). After 2021, the average interest index has been above average. This result indicates a very high volume of interest related to EV. From the analysis, it can be seen that the past pandemic does not have a significant impact on the interest in EVs in Indonesia, it is quite the opposite.



Figure 9. Thailand EV Interest Spectrum 2020-2023 (Google Analytic)



Figure 10. Thailand Crossed EV Interest Spectrum 2020-2023 (Google Analytic)

On the analysis as depicted in Figures 9 and 10, the average index of Thailand is 11.87, which is lower than the index in Indonesia. Like Indonesia, the interest index in EV inThailand eached its peak in 2022, but it had a unique decline in 2023. The decline in 2023 was possible due to lower volumes of interest. Despite a decline, on average, the index in Thailand is still well positioned as it has remained above the average for the last four years.



Figure 11. Malaysia EV Interest Spectrum 2020-2023



Figure 12. Malaysia Crossed EV Interest Spectrum 2020-2023

From Figures 11 and 12, Malaysia has been similar to Indonesia by experiencing a significant rise in interest in EV over the last four years (2020–2023). The analysis of interest in Malaysia obtains an average index of 25.65. The result is lower than Indonesia (32.76) but higher than Thailand (11.87). From 2021 to 2023, Malaysia experienced a fairly high-interest rate rise, peaking in 2023 due to the growing awareness of the need for environmentally friendly vehicles in Malaysia. In contrast, in Indonesia, the COVID-19 pandemic does not diminish public interest in EV.

Trend lines within analytical data analysis facilitate the empirical observation of market movements and enable the prediction of future levels that may serve as new benchmarks (Barus, 2022). Based on all three trend lines, it becomes evident that the level of interest in electric cars in Indonesia has seen the most significant surge, with Malaysia coming in second. However, Indonesia has the lowest purchasing power compared to the other two nations. Then, Thailand, as the leading motor vehicle manufacturer in Southeast Asia, is expected to see a decrease in the demand for electric cars. This increase in interest is due to news about the growing EV industry in Indonesia, and is supported by the incentives provided.

The Needs of Government Support

The electric car sector is projected to lack growth in the absence of government intervention. The specific forms of aid referred to include fiscal policy, licensing, and promotional efforts. Table 2 shows some government policy innovations that have been enacted in many ASEAN member nations.

Table 2. Government Policy Across ASEAN

Country	Policy	Source
Indonesia	Indonesia offers legal assurance and tax modifications for EV purchasers, such as a decrease in taxes, import tariffs.	Rodyanto (2019)
Brunei	Brunei has engaged in community outreach efforts to raise awareness of electric cars as a component of the forthcoming Land Transport Master Plan. In 2035, the government's transportation strategy is to raise the proportion of electric automobiles to 60% of all vehicles.	MTIC (2014)
Thailand	Thailand offers tax benefits to electric vehicle users. The tax is determined by the CO2 emissions. They have eliminated import tariffs on EV.	Natsuda & Thoburn (2013)
Philippines	EV has received governmental policy backing since 2006. The first legislation permitted the tax-free importation of EV components to promote domestic production.	Gomółka & Kasprzak (2021)
Malaysia	Malaysia has measures to facilitate the purchase of EV. It is a component of the National Green Technology Policy. There are four fundamental principles that form the basis of this policy: energy, environment, economics, and social aspects.	Ministry of Energy, Green Technology and Water Malaysia (2019)
Singapore	Singapore has implemented a financial incentive scheme.	Land Transport & Authority Singapore (2024)

Government policies are subject to periodic changes, which may occur in response to a transfer of political power. In order for the EV sector to experience fast expansion, it is imperative that governments establish long-term and interdepartmental agreements to guarantee such development.

Conclusion

Conducting an analysis of the development of market interest in the ASEAN region using digital analytical data such as Google Trends that has been done by the Author is one way to see the market spectrum from a more measurable marketing perspective. Specifically in the development and penetration of EVs in the ASEAN region. Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia are the main forces in the ASEAN region in the future in terms of production and demand in the region, especially Indonesia which has the largest demographic situation supported by a very large middle class. Although Thailand cannot be left behind, which still stands as the largest automotive production center in ASEAN.

The interest spectrum throughout Indonesia and Malaysia has a substantial volume and intensity. The data depict the trajectory of public interest in electric cars from 2020 to 2023. Indonesia may be characterized as having a growing and ever-changing interest that is very

dynamic and impulsive. It may be seen by examining the disparity between the maximum and minimum values that are expected to occur in the coming years. It is made possible due to the influence of media and government policies, growing during that period. This increase in interest is possible due to the improved public perception and literacy regarding the benefits of electric vehicles.

Government policies and in the ASEAN region are the main limitations of the potential that will emerge in the future, considering that the EV industry is still in its early stages of development, so that regulatory factors, taxes, and incentives will be the drivers of the development of this industry. This can be seen in how countries in the ASEAN region are starting to open their respective countries to leading manufacturers in EV technology by providing attractive tax incentives and for prospective consumers are also directed to start being sensitive and following the country's plan in converting the use of energy from fossil to renewable, such as electricity. Regarding consumers' purchasing power, ASEAN nations will need to continue being patient in educating consumers about the advantages of electric automobiles. The cost of electric cars, which remains relatively high, has a significant impact on this. To enhance the bargaining power of customers, they are likely to transition to alternative goods, especially fossil fuel automobiles, which remain prevalent and extensively available in this area.

Countries with substantial supplies of cobalt and nickel, which are the primary constituents of EV batteries, are likely to wield significant leverage in the electric car sector. The entrance barrier in this market will be substantial due to the need for a significant financial commitment, as well as political, legal, and network backing from relevant nations. New manufacturers have significant challenges in establishing themselves in the industry. An emerging sector is dominated by established manufacturers with high tech knowledge and strong financials. While the conventional car sector now maintains a significant market share, the overall sales of electric cars have the potential to dominate in the future, provided the government and relevant industries consider the following factors.

To foster innovation, it is necessary to create technologies that can manufacture electric car goods at a low cost and make them accessible to a wide range of consumers. Due to the significance of pricing for customers in ASEAN, it is a crucial factor to consider. Reducing the price will also enable a broader range of consumers to enter the market. Indonesia, for instance, prioritizes the presence of dealers in various areas when making automobile purchasing decisions. The government should enhance the stimulus of consumer demand for electric automobiles in the future. The implementation of tax reduction programs has shown positive results in both Thailand and Indonesia. Additional non-monetary measures will be necessary to boost market demand. Establishing alignments with manufacturers is going to be essential. Every country's administration encompasses not only economic stability but also politics and security. To enhance industrial efficiency, the government plays a crucial role in enabling investment and granting production licenses to enterprises seeking to join the nation. Increasing the number of participants in the sector is essential to enhance the quality and reduce costs.

The development of market interest in EVs will be greatly influenced by the literacy carried out by the industry and government in each related country, or even regionally. The challenges in the ASEAN market are not only in the fundamental infrastructure but also the market perception that is still waiting for the reliability of the technology carried by each manufacturer, it is not surprising that currently several well-known automotive brands do not immediately produce EVs but in a hybrid concept. Not entirely dependent on batteries, but also still using fossil fuels. This adopts the interests of the community in several related countries who still see conventional vehicles as having their own engine power compared to EVs. EV market penetration in ASEAN will not only be influenced by the above, but also further how after-sales services or even the second market are also growing, but inversely proportional to this, it will be a challenge in itself also related to the still expensive EV spare parts due to the still small supply. However, with these challenges, looking at the volume of interest from the data obtained from this study, it shows extraordinary market potential, and it is not impossible that it will beat the conventional automotive market that has dominated for years. One approach to consumer literacy through digital media will certainly be an important indicator for all stakeholders in responding to challenges and potential in the future.

The electric car sector will gain significant traction over the next decade. Rapid sales statistics, the growing enthusiasm, and the promises made by regulators in ASEAN will enhance the traction of growth.

Acknowledgement

The author would like to thank all colleagues and academicians of the Doctoral Program in Economics, Parahyangan Catholic University who have provided learning related to research and writing quality scientific papers. The author would also like to thank the reviewers and editorial board of the ASEAN Studies Journal (JAS) for the opportunity to publish this article, and in particular for helping to improve this article to be even better.

About The Authors

Dianta Hasri Natalius Barus is a student at Doctoral Program in Economics and a lecturer at the Faculty of Vocational Studies of Universitas Katolik Parahyangan Bandung - Indonesia. His research expertise is in marketing and business.

References

Abeam Consulting. (2022, August 31). *Accelerating electric vehicle adoption in Southeast Asia.* https://www.abeam.com/th/en/insights/electric_vehicle/

Barus, D. H. N. (2024). *33 Strategi Marketing Terpenting Dekade Ini*. PT Kanisius. Gramedia Pustaka Utama

Barus, D. H. N. (2022). How peer influence and social media impact on campus preference. *International Journal of Business and Technology Management,* 4(3), 263−273. https://myjms.mohe.gov.my/index.php/ijbtm/article/view/19984

Chu, W., Im, M., Song, M. R., & Park, J. (2019). Psychological and behavioral factors affecting electric vehicle adoption and satisfaction: A comparative study of early adopters in China and Korea. *Transportation Research Part D: Transport and Environment*, *76*, 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trd.2019.09.009

Çoban, M. N. (2022). The effect of the Internet on inflation: A research on ASEAN-5 countries. *Journal of ASEAN Studies, 10*(1), 61−79. https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v10i1.7310

Dobbs, M. E. (2014). Guidelines for applying Porter's Five Forces framework: A set of industry analysis templates. *Competitiveness Review*, *24*(1), 32–45. https://doi.org/10.1108/CR-06-2013-0059

Frost & Sullivan. (2018, January). *The future of electric vehicles in South East Asia*. https://www-asia.nissan-cdn.net/content/dam/Nissan/th/news/purchasedecisionresearch/Nissan_whitepaper_TH.pdf

GAIKINDO. (2020). *Indonesian automobile industry data*. https://www.gaikindo.or.id/indonesian-automobile-industry-data/

Giansoldati, M., Rotaris, L., Scorrano, M., & Danielis, R. (2020). Does electric car knowledge influence car choice? Evidence from a hybrid choice model. *Research in Transportation Economics*, *80*. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.retrec.2020.100826

Google (2021). https://www.thinkwithgoogle.com/intl/en-apac/consumer-insights/consumer-trends/research-on-apac-shopper-behavior/

Google/Shopper Sciences, Zero Moment of Macro Study, Apr 2011

Gomółka, K., & Kasprzak, P. (2021). Directions and prospects for the development of the electric car market in selected ASEAN countries. *Energies*, *14*(22), 1–16. https://doi.org/10.3390/en14227509

International Energy Agency. (2019, May). *Global EV outlook 2019: Scaling up the transition to electric mobility*. https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2019

International Monetary Fund. (2021). World Economic Outlook: recovery During Pandemic, Health Concerns, Supply Disruptions, and Price Pressures.

Krishnan, V. V., & Koshy, B. I. (2021). Evaluating the factors influencing purchase intention of electric vehicles in households owning conventional vehicles. *Case Studies on Transport Policy*, *9*(3), 1122–1129. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cstp.2021.05.013

Land Transport & Authority Singapore. (2024). https://www.lta.gov.sg/content/ltagov/en/industry_innovations/technologies/electric_vehicles/transitioning_to_evs.html#:~:text=EV%20Early%20Adoption%20Incentive%20(EEAI,ARF)%2C%20capped%20at%20%2415%2C000.

Langbroek, J. H., Cebecauer, M., Malmsten, J., Franklin, J. P., Susilo, Y. O., & Georén, P. (2019). Electric vehicle rental and electric vehicle adoption. *Research in Transportation Economics, 73,* 72–82. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.retrec.2019.02.002

Liao, F., Molin, E., Timmermans, H., & Van Wee, B. (2019). Consumer preferences for business models in electric vehicle adoption. *Transport Policy*, *73*, 12–24. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tranpol.2018.10.006

Liu, X., Sun, X., Zheng, H., & Huang, D. (2021). Do policy incentives drive electric vehicle adoption? Evidence from China. *Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice*, *150*, 49–62. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tra.2021.05.013

MTIC. (2014). *Review to formulate a roadmap and draft national masterplan for a sustainable land transportation system for Brunei Darussalam; Executive summary*. https://www.mtic.gov.bn/Resources/LAND%20TRANSPORT%20MASTER%20PLAN%20-%20Executive%20Summary.pdf

Natsuda, K., & Thoburn, J. (2013). Industrial policy and the development of the automotive industry in Thailand. *Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy*, *18*(3), 413–437. https://doi.org/10.1080/13547860.2012.742690

Porter, M. E. (1979). *How competitive forces shape strategy*. Harvard Business Review. https://hbr.org/1979/03/how-competitive-forces-shape-strategy

Rajasekar, J., & Al Raee, M. (2013). An analysis of the telecommunication industry in the Sultanate of Oman using Michael Porter's competitive strategy model. *Competitiveness Review*, *23*(3), 234–259. https://doi.org/10.1108/10595421311319825

Riyanto, B., Djumala, D., & Tan, Y. (2023). Indonesia's strategic narrative on the new dynamics of great power rivalry in the Indo-Pacific. *Journal of ASEAN Studies, 11*(1), 143–166. https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v11i1.9406

Rodyanto, F. (2019, October 22*). Indonesia looks to accelerate battery electric vehicle program.* SSEK. https://www.ssek.com/blog/indonesia-looks-to-accelerate-battery-electric-vehicle-program

Schumpeter, J. (1934). *The theory of economic development: An inquiry into profits, capital, credit, interest, and the business cycle*. Harvard University Press.

Smart Insights. https://www.smartinsights.com/digital-marketing-strategy/digital-strategy-development/10-reasons-for-digital-marketing-strategy/

Sovacool, B. K., Abrahamse, W., Zhang, L., & Ren, J. (2019). Pleasure or profit? Surveying the purchasing intentions of potential electric vehicle adopters in China. *Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice*, *124*, 69−81. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tra.2019.03.002

Sun, X., and S. Xu. "The impact of government subsidies on consumer preferences for alternative fuel vehicles." *J. Dalian Univ. Technol. (Soc. Sci.)* 3 (2018): 8-16.

Tahalele, M. P., Dhiaulhaq, A., Putra, R. A., Affandi, R. A., Arnakim, L. Y., & Mursitama, T. N. (2022). The trajectory and trend of International political economy in Southeast Asia. *Journal of ASEAN Studies, 10*(2), 181–206. https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v10i2.9184

Wen, W., Yang, S., Zhou, P., & Gao, S. Z. (2021). Impacts of COVID-19 on the electric vehicle industry: Evidence from China. *Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews*, *144*, 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2021.111024

Xiao, H., & Zhang, S. (2021). Purchase intention model of the first batch of consumers of green track changing high-tech products in China—A multiple comparative study based on automobile industry. *Management Review, 33,* 103–119.

Zhang, W. (2021). Research on emotion fluctuation of pure electric vehicle consumers based on composite comments. *Guizhou Soc. Sci*, 124-132.

Appendix

Data is available upon request.

Do Rupiah Coins Have Any Value? A Cross Country Comparison and Evaluation of Rupiah Denominations

Wishnu Badrawani[1]*, John Fender[2], and Muhammad Hasan Ghozali[3]

[1, 3]Bank Indonesia Institute, Bank Indonesia, Jakarta, Indonesia 10350
[2]Department of Economics, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, United Kingdom B15 2TT

[1]w_badrawani@bi.go.id; [2]j.fender@bham.ac.uk; [3]muhammad_hasan@bi.go.id
*Corresponding author

How to Cite: Badrawani, W., Fender, J., & Ghozali, M. H. (2024). Do Rupiah Coins Have Any Value? A Cross Country Comparison and Evaluation of Rupiah Denominations. *Journal of ASEAN Studies*, *12*(2), 305-330. https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v12i2.11321

Abstract

Payment system innovation has grown exponentially in numerous nations, raising the prophecy of cash becoming obsolete. However, this is not the prevailing situation in Indonesia, where currency is widely used across the archipelago. In recent decades, the need for cash in circulation has risen steadily, even during the COVID-19 pandemic. In some cases, the possible economic ramifications of rejecting coins in circulation render the ongoing discussion a significant concern. Therefore, this research thoroughly examined the existence of Rupiah coins in terms of their buying power, denominational structure, and comparative analysis with other countries. The analysis of denomination structure concerning the present and future inflation rate, represented by the average of minimum wages, was conducted utilizing the D-Metric and a univariate regression. A cross-country comparative analysis was performed using a global product index, and the denomination structure of the Rupiah coin was compared to the denomination structures in several ASEAN countries and other nations. The research findings indicate that the denomination structure of Rupiah coins has been unsuitable for the current economic situation since 2013. The results are of great importance, as they support policies that improve the usefulness of Rupiah coins for economic transactions and reduce production costs.

Keywords: money demand, Rupiah coin, purchasing power, Big Mac, D-Metric

P-ISSN 2338-1361/ E-ISSN 2338-1353
Received: 20th February 2024/ Revised: 20th November 2024/ Accepted: 08th December 2024

Introduction

Cash usage continues to be substantial even during and after the COVID-19 pandemic has passed. Despite the prophecy that cash is dying and the future demand for cash is most likely affected by the rapid innovation of financial instruments and digital currency, cash is not likely to become extinct anytime soon (Fabris, 2019). Understanding the demand for cash and non-cash payments, particularly for banknotes—both high and low denominations—and coins, is critical for central banks. This necessity arises from the central bank's obligation to ensure the availability of banknotes and coins in the economy to meet the demands of individuals and businesses, as mandated by the Central Bank Act (Huang et al., 2022)

This concern is mainly focused on the circulation and proportion of banknotes in circulation, representing the role of cash for daily transactions and storing wealth. Central banks should be prepared to address fluctuations in cash demand, particularly during times of crisis when cash is considered a safe haven asset and reserved for emergency purposes. As highlighted by Fisher's quantity of demand theory (in Guttmann et al., 2021), the primary function of cash as a medium of exchange is notably amplified during financial catastrophes. Brandao-Marques and Ratnovski (2024) state that hoarding banknotes can hamper the money creation process, thereby affecting the effectiveness of monetary policy. In nations with a near-zero bond yield environment, particularly in the uncertainty, the cost of cash usage is typically reduced. Thus, firms tend to hoard cash and their liquid assets for precautionary motives, while the space of monetary policy that can be utilized to counteract future shock is limited (Alfaro et al., 2024; Sugandi & Shirai, 2019). This condition applies to cash in higher denominations, primarily banknotes, which serve as a store of value, but not to coins, which primarily function as a medium of exchange.

Coins are becoming less and less important to some people, with a minority advocating for their elimination. Nonetheless, several scholars have argued that removing coins could lead to cash rounding, which may result in higher inflation and face opposition from a segment of the community (Giles, 2015; Nguyen, 2023). Additionally, statistics reveal an increase in cash demand, driven by rising household income and inflation, which is also reflected in the demand for coins despite the rapid growth of non-cash payments in the economy.

Cash remains the primary payment instrument in numerous countries (Khiaonarong & Humphrey, 2023), especially in developing nations such as Indonesia, and is an essential component of the monetary aggregate. In Indonesia, the cash component of broad money (M2) is approximately 11%, while in narrow money (M1), it is approximately 19%. Coin accounts for approximately 1.4% of the Cash in Circulation. Coins are important in our daily transactions. However, there are instances where merchants or individuals decline their use due to low economic value (Ikhsan, 2021; Putri & Nugroho, 2023). One factor that become a concern of many scholars about the existence of the coins in the economy is their very low value, which affected their usage by individuals and merchants, as noted by (Prescott & Shy, 2023; Spector, 2019). Conversely, Chernoff (2022) indicates that a potential consequence of a

shortage of coins or small denominations in the economy is inflation, which may result from merchants or sellers rounding up the prices of goods.

Most research on money demand primarily focuses on analyzing the variables that influence money demand about recent developments, such as rapid advancements in financial technology or the COVID-19 pandemic. However, research specifically examining the demand for coin money is limited. Furthermore, it is important to note that most central banks prioritize examining and enhancing banknotes over coins; for example research by Haryono (2022) and Elkington and Guttmann (2024). Therefore, analyzing the value of coins, both in terms of their worth in commodities and in comparison to coin values in other nations, is crucial from both policy and theoretical standpoints.

Therefore, this research aims to assess the Rupiah coin's value in purchasing goods and services over time and compare the Rupiah coin's worth to those of other currencies in the region. This research endeavors to contribute to the discourse surrounding the worth of coins and their traditional role as a medium of exchange, a concept grounded in the quantity theory of money emphasized by Irving Fisher (1911), which has been a subject of debate among experts and the public for many years. Understanding the significance of Rupiah coins in relation to the home country's economy and their relative value compared to other countries is critical in this context. Another contribution of this research is the assessment of whether the current Rupiah coin denomination structure is still appropriate in light of the impact of inflation since its initial launch.

Literature Review

Over the past several decades, extensive research has been conducted worldwide to investigate the need for money. Despite the increasing prevalence of digital payment instruments, this topic continues to be of great interest. Various comprehensive approaches have been used, including theoretical and empirical studies, econometric analyses, and surveys to examine the factors influencing money demand. According to Friedman's theory of money (as cited in Bordo & Rockoff, 2013), the money held by individuals reflects the distribution of wealth between human and non-human forms, the rates of return on various assets, and various factors that influence preferences. Current research suggest that the primary determinants of money demand depend on interest rates, income, the grouping of nations under consideration, and the specific variable used in the specification, such as tax income (Çoban, 2022; Kumar, 2023).

According to Zhan et al. (2023) and (Warjiyo, 2024), the demand for money is substantially impacted by financial innovations like the introduction of digital money, digital wallets, and online payment platforms that reduce the necessity of holding physical currency. Kitamura (2022) provides a detailed analysis through case studies and monetary economic theory to evaluate the factors affecting currency denomination choices. This approach balances theoretical analysis with actual economic context and provides valuable guidance for policymakers. On the other hand, Freitas (2022) examines the influence of foreign

currencies on monetary policy and economic stability through a comprehensive analysis of economic data and trends. Shy (2023) conducts a pervasive literature review on consumer demand for cash, covering 271 papers. The review explains the features of cash payments and highlights that people tend to use cash more frequently for smaller banknote values. It also suggests that it is challenging to replace cash with other payment methods. The findings corroborate Fisher's theory of demand for money (Fisher, 1911), emphasising its function as a medium of exchange.

Most research has been conducted on the composition of currency denominations within several central banks. Manikowski (2017) examines the structure of the Polish denomination, emphasizes the need to modify currency structures in response to economic developments such as inflationary trends and transactional needs, and recommends a reassessment of Polish currency denominations. Hendrickson and Park (2021) discover that the elimination of high-value banknotes will result in a considerable decrease in illegal trade and subsequent social costs. Kitamura (2022) conducts research on the impact of currency denominations on the economy. The research shows that using non-optimal currency denominations can result in unnecessary costs associated with cash hoarding, and the concentration of price levels around certain denominations. The research emphasizes optimal currency denominations to promote efficient circulation and reduce costs. Bartzsch et al. (2023) employ a structural time series model developed by four central banks to forecast Euro banknotes for small and high denominations. A considerable number of studies assess the suitability of current currency denominations by employing the D-Metrics model introduced by Payne and Morgan (1981); for example, research by Arshadi (2019) and Ismaiel and Al-Ahmad (2023). The D-Metric model proposes that the inflationary effect decreases the purchasing power of specific denominations of banknotes and coins. Payne and Morgan (1981) observe that the fluctuation in the purchasing power of the currency, in relation to the denomination structure, can be most accurately characterised by the average day's pay (D), which denotes the average daily wage level.

The value of money can also be assessed through its purchasing power, which is determined by its function as a universally accepted medium of exchange for goods. The comparison of economic measures across countries can be conducted through market exchange rates. However, relying solely on market exchange rates to compare economic measures across countries may not be adequate due to a multitude of factors beyond direct price comparisons influencing them. Hence, Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is considered a more reliable method for comparing living standards across countries. PPP calculates the relative price level of commodities to account for the difference in currencies' values. PPP is regarded as a preferable method for socio-economic analysis, owing to its ability to provide accurate results across various critical development domains (Purdie & Song, 2022). PPP is also the preferred method for policy-making and poverty analysis, having been validated by Aguilar et al. (2023) and Kyei-Mensah's (2023) research.

Measuring Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is a formidable task that demands extensive statistical effort to collect data on national average prices for a vast range of well-defined products. The process is further complicated by the challenges of gathering price comparisons

for new products within similar time intervals and comparing countries within different clusters over time (Inklaar et al., 2022). Research suggests that PPP can be better explained using a simple selection of global goods, such as the Big Mac sandwich or any other goods representing a global product, instead of relying on a more complex measurement. As a result, the employment of this global product index in doing a cross-country analysis is gaining traction among researchers (Vo & Vo, 2023). For example, Akarsu et al. (2024) use the Big Mac index approach to investigate the relationship between purchasing power and regional inequality in Turkey. Similarly, Gharehgozli et al. (2020) conduct a cross-country analysis of income distribution and inequality in 29 countries from 2000 to 2013, using a daily Big Mac Affordability (BMA). Previous research has ranked the variability of living standards and purchasing power among individuals. Subsequently, this research can assess the comparative value of a currency worldwide by using this global product index.

Numerous scholars have undertaken extensive research on the structural aspects of currency denominations and have recommended discontinuing specific denominations, focusing on the lowest one. Drawing on examples from countries such as New Zealand, Australia, the Netherlands, France, and Spain, there is an ongoing discourse regarding the potential elimination of the penny, which holds the lowest value denomination. The research conducted by Prescott and Shy (2023) indicates that discontinuing the penny would significantly alleviate the burden of exchanging cash, making transactions more efficient and less time-consuming. This research provides valuable insights into the potential advantages of discontinuing the penny and adopting more efficient currency structures. However, the removal should be accompanied by government support and education to retailers to convince people that this action would not impact the price level or round up inflation (The Isle of Man Treasury, 2023).

This suggestion is consistent with King (2006), who asserts that due to its minimal value and excessive manufacturing expenses, the penny proves to be ineffective and unfeasible. The US Mint's annual report (United States Mint, 2022) indicates that the production cost of a penny is 2.72 cents, while the cost of manufacturing a nickel is 10.41 cents, implying that the cost of creating and distributing these coins exceeded their economic worth (Nguyen, 2023). Hence, eliminating it would result in cost savings and enhance the efficiency of our monetary framework. Additionally, Spector (2019) has argued that in a world without small denominations like pennies, rounding to the nearest nickel would balance out the economy and question the usefulness of pennies. However, in a country where coins hold low value, people's negative attitude towards them should be addressed through a national initiative. In contrast, Sa'idu et al. (2022) suggest that even if higher-value currency notes are introduced, coins should be used alongside them, and their purchasing power should be raised.

This finding is supported by rounding up phenomena that potentially trigger inflaton that should be appropriately addressed by the authority, such as by adjusting the value of coins-related inflation (Nguyen, 2023), providing an alternative mean of payments for small denominations, and implementing policy through the adjustment of denomination structure (Hernandez, 2023; Udo & Agbai, 2023). Additionally, enhancing the supply chain management of coins is also necessary, as addressed by the Federal Reserve System (FRS) and

Depository Institutions (DI), to ensure the adequate supply of coins and improve coin circulation (Huang et al., 2022).

Methodology

This research aims to investigate the role of Rupiah coins in terms of their comparative worth to other currencies and their purchasing power within the country over some time. In order to gain insight into the economic significance of Rupiah coins, this research uses a cross-country comparative analysis of the monetary value of coins. Data are from various reputable institutions: Bloomberg for gold price data from 1993 to 2022, Statista for Big Mac price data, central bank and national statistic agency of selected countries for currency denomination and minimum wage information as of December 2023, and the Indonesia National Bureau of Statistics (BPS) for Indonesia's minimum wage data from 1997 to 2023.

Initially, this research evaluates the relative worth of the Rupiah coin over time by comparing it to the price of Gold, which is widely recognized as a safe haven asset. Following this, this research conducts a cross-country analysis to evaluate the comparative value of Rupiah coins about the currencies of other nations. Moreover, this research compares the highest denomination of each country's coins, using a globally available commodity like the Big Mac from McDonald's, to evaluate the relative value of the Rupiah coin against other currencies. This analysis is based on data obtained from Statista, as referenced by Dyvik (2023).

Subsequently, this research assesses the depreciation of Rupiah coins over time, and the denomination of Rupiah coins that are most suitable in light of economic variables is determined by utilizing the D-Metric model proposed by Payne and Morgan (1981). The D-Metric model posits that the purchasing power of particular denominations of banknotes and coinage diminishes because of the inflation. The model evaluates the suitability of the denomination structure by utilizing the average day's pay (D), which signifies the typical daily wage of households. Figure 1 illustrates the detailed algorithm of the denomination structure for both banknotes and coins within the D-Metric model.

Despite its intrinsic limitations, such as the absence of a theoretical framework and the limited variables evaluated in determining a currency's denomination structure (Ismaiel & Al-Ahmad, 2023), the D-Metric model's simplicity renders it suitable as a guideline for assessing the appropriate currency denomination structure. It has also been successfully applied in various countries worldwide (Arshadi, 2019; Hernandez, 2023; Manikowski, 2017).



Figure 1 D-Metric Model

Source: Payne and Morgan (1981)

An autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) model, a subset of the univariate model, is employed to predict the average daily wage *(D)* for the subsequent years. The ARIMA model is employed for its applicability and relevance to this research. Moreover, some scholars find that simple univariate forecasting algorithms often outperform and exhibit greater accuracy than a more complex multivariate model (Banerjee et al., 2005; Salehi et al., 2024). In these models, a time series is represented by incorporating the historical values of the series, as well as the present and previous values of a "white noise" error term. The regular ARIMA models are univariate models comprising an autoregressive polynomial, an order of integration *(d)*, and a moving average polynomial.

The ARIMA *(p, d, q)* model is implemented on the entire set of wage data points, which can be expressed as follows:

$$y_t = \mu + \sum_{i=1}^{p}(\emptyset y_{t-1}) + \sum_{i=1}^{q}(\theta\, \varepsilon_{t-1}) + e_t \quad (1)$$

y_t is the differenced and stationary series of relevant variables (wage), μ is the mean value of the time series data, p is the number of autoregressive lags, $\emptyset$ is autoregressive coefficients (AR), q is the number of lags of the moving average process; θ is moving average coefficients (MA),), ε_t is the error term, e_t is the white noise error term, d is the number of differences. The behaviour of the Partial Autocorrelation Function (PACF) and the Autocorrelation Function (ACF) can be used to determine the value of the ARIMA parameters (p, d, and q) for AR and MA.

Based on the D value from the ARIMA estimations, the D-Metric method evaluates the appropriateness of Rupiah coin denominations over time, as well as the coin denomination structures of selected countries for a cross-country comparison with the current Indonesian coin denomination structure.

Results and Discussion

Rupiah Coin Purchasing Power and Cross-comparison

Declining of Purchasing Power

Since its introduction in 1993, the depreciation of the IDR 1,000 coin in Indonesia has been a strong indicator of the country's economic direction over the last three decades. The main factor responsible for this decrease in value is inflation, a prevalent economic occurrence characterized by the gradual decline of a currency's purchasing power. Consequently, a IDR 1,000 coin could no longer purchase an item that demanded a substantial amount of currency to acquire in the early 1990s. Therefore, an item purchased in the early 1990s could no longer be purchased with a current IDR 1,000 coin. A decline in value is not merely a theoretical concept. It is a practical reality that affects the daily lives of individuals. The economic consequences of inflation are demonstrated by the decreasing utility of lower-denomination currency, such as the IDR 1,000 coin, in daily transactions. The diminishing purchasing power of this highest-value coin is also apparent when contrasted with the price of gold. According to Chiang (2024), gold is often considered an insurance or safe haven asset against inflation due to its scarcity and long-lasting nature, particularly in the United States, the United Kingdom, China, and Indonesia.



Figure 2 Purchasing Power of IDR 1,000 in terms of gold (IDR 1,000/price of 0.01 grams of gold)

Source: Bloomberg, Author's Calculation

Figure 2 indicates that throughout the observed period, the value of the coin denomination has consistently decreased. In contrast, the price of gold has steadily increased over the years. Compared to its value in 1993, the IDR 1,000 coin has experienced a significant decline in purchasing power. In the early 1990s, IDR 1,000 are sufficient for transactions involving minimal quantities of gold, such as small gold jewelry, using 20-30 coins. However, these coins now lack the purchasing power to acquire even a fragment of gold due to their depreciating value. As of 2022, its ability to buy 0.01 grams of gold has decreased by 95.96%. One consideration is whether our coin is the only one with such a low value on a global or regional scale.

This phenomenon is commonly observed whereby fiat money, such as the Rupiah, tends to depreciate relative to the value of assets like gold. The eventual depreciation of coins in Indonesia illustrates how fiat money may gradually lose value relative to a more stable intrinsic asset, such as gold. This situation reflects broader global economic trends, wherein currencies often experience a decline in their purchasing power due to inflation.

Cross-country Comparison

This research conducts a comparative study of coins between different countries to compare the Indonesian Rupiah with other currencies and highlight its distinctive characteristics in the context of the country's monetary and economic system. This research focuses on neighboring countries in Southeast Asia. Vietnam currently has the coin with the highest nominal value in circulation, 5,000 Dong, which was first issued in 2003. Indonesia follows with the second-highest denomination, the 1,000 Rupiah coin, introduced in 1993. Most developed countries typically have their highest denominations of coins in circulation within the single to double-digit range. Exceptions exist in Japan, which introduced the 500-yen coin in 1982, and South Korea, which similarly introduced the 500 KRW coin in that same year. Table 1 illustrates that most countries have a range of coin denominations, typically five to six denominations. Then, Appendix A reports more details on coin denominations in various countries.

Table 1 demonstrates that the IDR 1,000 coin is a fairly large denomination compared to the largest denominations of coins in circulation in other ASEAN countries such as Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand. These countries have SGD 1 (equivalent to 0.75 USD), RM 1 (equivalent to 0.21 USD), and THB 10 (equivalent to 0.28 USD), respectively. Some nations with three-digit zeros coins include Colombia, with a denomination of COP 1000, which is comparable to USD 0.25, and Vietnam, with a denomination of VND 5000, which is equivalent to USD 0.20. Another comparison may be made with nations that have two-digit zeros. The Central African Republic has a currency of XAF 500, which is comparable to USD 0.827, and Cambodia has a currency of KHR 500, which is equivalent to USD 0.12. The coins of all countries under observation exhibit higher value when compared to the Indonesian coin IDR 1,000, which is equivalent to USD 0.064.

Table 1 Coin Currency Denomination in Selected Countries

Countries	Code	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
United States	USD	1	0.5	0.25	0.1	0.05	0.01	-	-
United Kingdom	GBP	1	0.5	0.2	0.1	0.05	0.02	0.01	-
Germany	EUR	2	1	0.5	0.2	0.1	0.05	0.02	0.01
Colombia	COP	1,000	500	200	100	50	20	10	5
South Africa	ZAR	5	2	1	0.5	0.2	0.1	-	-
Central African Rep.	XAF	500	100	50	25	10	5	1	-
Australia	AUD	1	0.5	0.2	0.1	0.05	-	-	-
Japan	JPY	500	100	50	10	5	1	-	-
South Korea	KRW	500	100	50	10	0	0	-	-
China	CNY	1	0.5	0.1	-	-	-	-	-
Philippines	PHP	20	10	5	1	0.3	0.1	0.05	0.01
Thailand	THB	10	5	2	1	0.5	0.25	-	-
Vietnam	VND	5,000	2,000	1,000	500	200	-	-	-
Malaysia	MYR	1	0.5	0.2	0.1	0.05	-	-	-
Cambodia	KHR	500	200	100	50	-	-	-	-
Singapore	SGD	1	0.5	0.2	0.1	0.05	-	-	-
Indonesia	IDR	1,000	500	200	100	50	-	-	-

Source: The Central Bank of Each Country

Despite variations in behavior across countries and the distinct characteristics of each payment instrument that may influence adoption levels (Chang et al., 2023), this cross-country analysis illustrates the standing of Rupiah coins in relation to other nations, regionally and globally. In a nutshell, the coin denomination and value comparison may clearly illustrate the distinctiveness of Indonesia's monetary and economic policies compared to other nations in a straightforward manner.

The comparison of nominal denominations may provide a more precise visualization of the high nominal value of Rupiah coins, which possess three-digit zeros, to those of other nations. However, this does not necessarily represent the actual value of the coins from each country. A purchasing power analysis can be conducted to evaluate the value of currency in the selected nations for specific goods or services.

Purchasing Power Comparison

Gaining a comprehensive understanding of Indonesia's economic condition within the global context, specifically concerning the stability of its currency's purchasing power, holds considerable significance. Several factors, including inflation, the state of the real economy and financial stability, the dynamics of international trade, and government exchange rate policy, determine a country's currency value. A comparative analysis is conducted to assess the monetary value of Rupiah coins relative to the coin currency of other nations. This objective can be achieved by examining the purchasing power of the Rupiah relative to globally recognized products, such as Coca-Cola and McDonald's.

Although the Big Mac Index (BMI) does not perfectly reflect CPI inflation due to its representation of the relative price of all goods and services in the consumer basket, the BMI remains a useful tool for examining purchasing power parity as an alternative non-traded good (Wee & Lee, 2022). This research conducts a comparative analysis of Rupiah coin purchasing power relative to other nations' coins using a Big Mac price index. This analysis is based on the Global pricing of a Big Mac as of July 2023, utilizing data obtained by Dyvik (2023). The denomination of the Rupiah coin used for comparison is IDR 1000, compared to the highest coin denomination of other countries. Figure 3 illustrates the coins necessary to purchase a Big Mac in the local currency of different countries, as derived from the Big Mac Index for July 2023.



Note: 1. Switzerland; 2. Norway; 3. Uruguay; 4. Argentina; 5. Europe Area; 6. Sweden; 7. Denmark; 8. United States; 9. Sri Lanka; 10. Costa Rica; 11. Britain; 12. Canada; 13. Mexico; 14. Saudi Arabia; 15. New Zealand; 16. Lebanon; 17. Australia; 18. Poland; 19. United Arab Emirates; 20. Colombia; 21. Singapore; 22. Czech Republic; 23. Brazil; 24. Chile; 25. Israel; 26. Kuwait; 27. Bahrain; 28. Nicaragua; 29. Honduras; 30. Peru; 31. South Korea; 32. Hungary; 33. Qatar; 34. Thailand; 35. Oman; 36. Guatemala; 37. Moldova; 38. Turkey; 39. Jordan; 40. China; 41. Azerbaijan; 42. Pakistan; 43. Romania; 44. Japan; 45. Vietnam; 46. Hong Kong; 47. Malaysia; 48. Ukraine; 49. Philippines; 50. South Africa; 51. Egypt; 52. India; 53. Indonesia; 54. Taiwan.

Figure 3 Big Mac Index and Amount of Coins Required, By Country

Source: Dyvik (2023) and Author's Calculation

According to Figure 3, the price of a Big Mac in Indonesia is comparatively lower than several other nations, including those within the ASEAN area. Nevertheless, the number of coins required to purchase a Big Mac in Indonesia is disproportionately high compared to other countries when the local currency of each country is taken into account based on its highest denomination. The substantial variation in the number of coins needed to purchase a Big Mac indicates the disparity in the purchasing power of Rupiah coins globally, with

Indonesia being one of the countries with the lowest coin values in the global economy. Consequently, Rupiah coins possess a considerably lower value than other countries, including those within the ASEAN regions.

The minimum number of coins to purchase a Big Mac in Indonesia is 38, which is significantly higher compared to the Philippines and Vietnam, where only 8 and 15 coins are needed for the same purchase. The value of Indonesia's coins was among the lowest in the global context. However, it was not as low as Lebanon, Honduras, and Pakistan, which required 860 coins, 204 coins, and 198 coins to purchase a single Big Mac. It is important to note that the cost of a Big Mac in Uruguay is USD 6.86, more than double the cost in Indonesia, which is only USD 2.52. However, individuals in Uruguay only require six coins to purchase a Big Mac. This finding suggests that while the inflation rate in Indonesia, as indicated by the Big Mac index, is relatively low, the buying power of IDR coins is considerably lower. Therefore, it is necessary to conduct a more thorough evaluation, especially concerning the suitability of the Rupiah coin denomination structure.

Rupiah Denominations and Economic Growth (D-Metrics)

The analyzes of the appropriateness of Rupiah coins and their denomination structure rely on the D-Metric model (Payne & Morgan, 1981). The research cover the period of 1997–2023 using data from the Indonesian Statistics Bureau (BPS, 2023). In obtaining the results for the whole country, the wages of each province are then calculated into the national average.

Forecasting the Wages

In the initial phase of conducting the D-Metric analysis, the wage (D) for the subsequent years until 2030 is forecasted using an autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) model. The ARIMA forecasting model is identified by observing the Autocorrelation Function (ACF) and Partial Autocorrelation Function (PACF) plots between data points in time series and previous series values measured for different lag lengths. According to the stationarity test result, the data on Indonesian wages are not stationary at the level and first difference. However, it is stationary at the second difference (see Appendix B.1). Based on the ACF and the PACF graph, the appropriate ARIMA model should be ARIMA with the values for each parameter (p, d, q) are 3, 2, and 0.

All the data on minimum wage in Indonesia are included in the ARIMA estimation covering a period from 1997 to 2022 with a forecast period of 7 years. Figure 4 shows the forecasting results of Indonesia's minimum wage from the ARIMA model.



Figure 4 Forecasted Average Monthly Pay

Source Author's Calculation

Figure 4 depicts Indonesian workers' minimum wage from 1997 to 2023 and its forecast until 2030, showing a consistent upward trajectory. According to Schaefer and Singleton (2022) and Schmillen et al. (2023), this phenomenon can be explained by the fact that minimum wages are often adjusted based on various economic factors, such as economic growth, inflation rate, cost of living, worker productivity, and labor market conditions which shows a trend of economic development in the last decade. Government policies that are aimed at improving worker welfare and reducing the unemployment rate and poverty may also be implemented through an increase in the minimum wage (Medrano-Adán & Salas-Fumás, 2023).

Analysing the Rupiah Coin Denomination Structure

Subsequently, the Rupiah coin denomination structure is analyzed using the D-Metric model. To achieve the appropriate value, the data in this D-Metric model use the assumption of the number of working days in one month, as many as 22 days. The minimum monthly wage is obtained based on data from the Indonesia Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS), and the autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) forecast. The D-value is calculated by dividing the Rupiah's net monthly wages by the number of working days in a month. Table 2 shows the D values determined from minimum wage, considering the number of days.

Table 2 D-Value Calculation

	1997	2007	2021	2022	2023	2030f
Working days	22	22	22	22	22	22
Net monthly wages (IDR)	135,000	672,480	2,687,724	2,725,505	2,923,309	4,776,626
D-Value	6,136	30,567	122,169	123,887	132,878	217,119

Source: Author Calculation

Note:

f: forecasted data

Table 2 displays the trend of daily minimum wage for Indonesian workers, which will be the primary factor in analyzing the denomination of Rupiah coins using the D-Metric model. Once the D value is acquired, this research examines the attributes of the D-Metric to get a more comprehensive understanding of the denominations of the Rupiah. The D-Metric analyzes three currency types: coins, banknotes, and the boundary between coins and banknotes. The coin characteristics are explained from D/5000 to D/100, while the coin-note boundary is determined using D/50 and D/20. The banknote characteristics are calculated within the range of D/10 to 5D. Figure 5 shows the result of a detailed assessment of the D-Metric Model for coins in Indonesia.

The comparison of the D-Metric Model among selected countries is reported in Appendix C. Based on the D-Metric analysis, the highest coin denomination is positioned at the boundary of a note and a coin, which are D/50 and D/20. The summary of the D-Metric model analysis for the denomination structure of coins in Indonesia is shown in Figure 5 below. Each row presents the D value derived from the D-Metric method for 2004 to 2030, while each column corresponds to the various denominations of coins or banknotes. The suggested denomination for the designated observation period falls within the D-value class (each region defined by two diagonal lines).

According to Figure 5, the D-Metric analysis indicates that the suggested possible highest denomination of the Rupiah coin in 2023 is IDR 5,000, positioned between D/20 and D/50, with values of 6664 and 2658, respectively. The IDR 5,000 denomination is advised may be made in the form of coins or notes. In response to the increase in the daily wage of labor, the D-Metric evaluates how frequently different denominations are used in day-to-day transactions and how efficiently they serve the demands of both consumers and merchants. As a result, the overall structure of the coin denomination needs to be adjusted in response to the inflation rate and the increase in the minimum wage of labor. The following denominations are suggested: IDR 2,000 (between D/50 and D/100, with a value of 2,658 and 1,329), IDR 1,000 (between D/200 and D/500, with a value of 1,329 and 664), IDR 500 (between D/500 and D/1000, with a value of 664 and 266), and IDR 200 (between D/1000 and D/2000, with a value of 266 and 133).



4	10	21	42	104	208	417	1,042	41,681.82	2004
5	12	23	46	115	231	462	1,154	46,154.27	2005
5	14	27	55	137	274	548	1,370	54,791.09	2006
6	15	31	61	153	306	611	1,528	61,134.55	2007
7	17	34	68	169	339	678	1,695	67,791.73	2008
8	19	38	77	191	383	765	1,913	76,502.73	2009
8	21	41	83	207	413	826	2,066	82,620.36	2010
9	22	45	90	225	449	899	2,247	89,893.55	2011
10	25	49	99	247	495	990	2,475	98,991.18	2012
12	29	59	118	295	590	1,179	2,948	117,900.73	2013
14	36	72	144	360	720	1,440	3,601	144,035.55	2014
16	41	81	163	407	814	1,628	4,069	162,758.36	2015
18	45	91	182	454	908	1,816	4,540	181,619.91	2016
19	47	95	189	473	945	1,890	4,726	189,029.45	2017
21	52	103	206	516	1,031	2,063	5,157	206,261.27	2018
22	56	112	223	558	1,116	2,232	5,581	223,242.00	2019
24	61	121	243	607	1,215	2,429	6,074	242,942.82	2020
24	61	122	244	611	1,222	2,443	6,108	244,338.55	2021
25	62	124	248	619	1,238	2,478	6,194	247,773.18	2022
27	66	133	266	664	1,329	**2,658**	**6,644**	265,755.36	**2023**
30	75	149	299	747	1,493	2,986	7,465	298,607.01	2024
33	83	166	331	828	1,655	3,311	8,277	331,062.97	2025
35	88	177	354	884	1,769	3,537	8,843	353,737.39	2026
37	92	183	366	916	1,832	3,664	9,160	366,388.72	2027
38	95	190	380	951	1,902	3,805	9,512	380,471.17	2028
40	101	202	403	1,008	2,015	4,030	10,076	403,027.42	2029
4	10	21	43	1,086	2,171	4,342	10,856	434,238.73	2030

Figure 5 D-Metric Model of Denomination Structure Coins in Indonesia (IDR)

Source: Author's Calculation

The D-Metric analysis indicate that the model effectively addresses the impact of inflation, which reduces the purchasing power of current Rupiah coins. It suggested the necessity for a higher denomination of IDR 2,000 and the potential issuance of a IDR 5,000 coin, which could remain suitable until 2030. However, a more thorough evaluation of a new coin denomination structure is required. The implications of coins being valued below their suggested nominal can be observed in the diminished purchasing power, rendering transactions increasingly impractical for both merchants and consumers. This situation may ultimately lead to the rejection of such coins in the purchase of everyday goods and services.

Cross-Country Comparison of Coin Denominations Structure

This research has conducted a comparative analysis of currency denomination structures across various countries. This analysis focuses on the value of Rupiah coins in relation to other countries, including developed and Asian nations, and neighbouring countries such as Vietnam, Cambodia, and Singapore. The US dollar is often used as a benchmark because it is the global currency with the highest Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Additionally, Taiwan is noted for having one of the lowest Big Mac prices, as reported by Dyvik (2023). Table 3 shows the outcomes of comparing the value of coins among the surveyed countries.

Table 3 Findings of the Currency Denomination Structure Analysis in Several ASEAN Countries, US, and Taiwan

D value and Coin	Indonesia		Vietnam		Singapore		Thailand		Malaysia		Cambodia		United States		Taiwan	
	D / Coin Denomination															
	132,887	Rupiah	212,727	Dong	284	S$	353	Baht	68	Ringgit	37218	Riel	58	$	1200	NT$
	B	I	B	I	B	I	B	I	B	I	B	I	B	I	B	I
Coins																
		-		-								-		0.01		-
D/5,000	27		43		0.06		0.07		0.01		7.44		0.01		0.24	
1st Coin		50		-		0.05				-		-		0.05		0.5
D/2,000	66		106		0.14		0.18		0.03		18.61		0.03		0.6	
2nd Coin		100		200		0.1		0.25		0.05		-		0.05		1
D/1,000	133		212,73		0.28		0.35		0.07		37.22		0.06		1.2	
3rd Coin		200		500		0.2		0.5		0.1		50		0.1		-
D/500	266		425,45		0.57		0.71		0.14		74.44		0.12		2.4	
4th Coin		500		1,000		0.5		1		0.2		100		0.25		5
D/200	664		1,063.64		1.42		1.77		0.34		186.09		0.29		6	
5th Coin		1,000		2,000		1		2		0.5		200		0.5		10
D/100	1,329		2,127.27		2.84		3.53		0.68		372.18		0.58		12	
6th Coin		NA		5,000		NA		5		1		500		1		20
Note-coin boundary																
D/50	2,658		4,255		5.68		7.06		1.36		744.36		1.16		24	
Coin Note		NA		5000		NA		10		NA		NA		NA		50
D/20	6,644		10,636		14		17.65		3.4		1,861		2.9		60	

Source: Author's Calculation, the Central Bank and National Statistic Agency in Each Country.

Note:
B: Bound
I: Items

Based on the data in Table 3, the coin denominations of countries in Southeast Asia, the United States, and Taiwan mostly follow the D-Metric structure. However, it should be noted that Indonesia and Singapore deviate from this alignment. According to D-Metric, the highest denomination coins in the United States, Malaysia, and Cambodia fall within the recommended range of appropriate coin denomination structure. In the United States, the highest denomination coin is the US$ 1 coin, falling within the recommended range of 58 cents to US$ 1.16. The largest denomination coins in Cambodia and Malaysia are the 500 Riel coin and the 1 Ringgit coin, which lie between the D/200 and D/100 ranges. It is worth mentioning that Vietnam, Thailand, and Taiwan have effectively positioned their highest denomination coins within particular ranges of D/50 to D/20 range, the note-coin boundary border, to limit the expected impact of future inflation. The highest denomination coins in these countries are 500 Dong, 10 Baht, and NTD 50. From the denomination structure point of view, the highest Rupiah coin, IDR 1000, introduced in 1993, was already forward-looking and considered the future economic condition that will make it suitable for the next 20 years until 2013. However, Indonesia's highest denomination coin is IDR 1,000, which falls below the D-Metric range of D/100 (1.329), which ideally should be the second-highest coin. The denomination structure of Indonesian coins is comparable to that of Singapore Dollar coins, both below the suggested value, as indicated by D-Metric analysis.

This research aligns with the examination by Manikowski (2017). However, based on the D-Metric model analysis, countries with developed economies do not necessarily have a better denomination structure that corresponds effectively with increases in their household incomes. Regarding the Rupiah coin denomination, this research suggests further comprehensive examination to analyze the overall Rupiah denomination structure of banknotes and coins. The Rupiah coin denomination exhibits a remarkably low value, similar to the situation observed with the Canadian and USA pennies. The purchasing power of these pennies has progressively diminished. Consequently, individuals often accumulate low-value coins instead of using them for transactions (Nguyen, 2023).

An analysis of the nominal value of Rupiah coins for goods and services reveals a distinct trend that underscores the diminishing value of these coins within the economy, warranting the attention of the central bank. Moreover, through cross-country comparisons, such as those illustrated by the Big Mac index, this research discerns the standing of Indonesian coins in relation to others regionally and globally. It concludes that the purchasing power of the Rupiah is relatively low.

Although the value of money in relation to inflation is primarily influenced by monetary policy, it is essential to assess the structure of Rupiah coin denominations to ensure that their purchasing power within the economy and their function as a medium of exchange remain intact. This evaluation helps prevent hoarding behaviours and mitigate the potential rise in minting costs associated with the deficit of coins in circulation.

Conclusion

This research examines the declining importance of coins in the economy, particularly in the context of Indonesia. Moreover, this research offers a thorough examination of the value of Rupiah coins. The diminishing value of Rupiah coins over time affects their purchasing power within the country and in comparison, to other countries. This diminishing values is resulting in Rupiah coins being among the lowest valued currencies globally, necessitating 38 coins to purchase a Big Mac.

Despite employing a relatively simple D-Metric and an ARIMA model in its analyses, this research demonstrates strong results and offers valuable insights for policy recommendations. The findings indicate that the current denomination structure of Indonesian coins is inadequate for the existing economy, given the depreciating value of Rupiah coins domestically and in comparison to other countries, regionally and globally. From the perspective of denomination structure, the highest Rupiah coin, IDR 1,000, introduced in 1993, was designed with foresight, anticipating economic conditions that would render it suitable for the subsequent 20 years, up to 2013. However, its value must be adjusted to align with the current economic conditions while anticipating future economic trends, with a recommended range between 2.658 (D/50) and 6.644 (D/20).

This research suggests several policy recommendations. The central bank must conduct a comprehensive assessment of the existing denomination structure of Rupiah coins to restore their function as a means of payment in the economy. Furthermore, it is advisable for the central bank to undertake further research on the overall denomination structure of the Rupiah, encompassing both banknotes and coins, while assessing the denomination structure of coins. This initiative would improve the efficiency of cash usage in economic transactions and potentially enhance the efficiency of cash usage in economic transactions.

This research has limitation, particularly due to the simplicity of the D-Metric model in assessing the suitability of the currency denomination structure and the narrow focus on Rupiah coins. Therefore, it is suggested to improve the examination of banknotes and coins through a more rigorous methodology that incorporates additional macroeconomic factors, including financial innovation and the behavioural aspects of individuals and merchants. The analysis should also incorporate the behavioural aspects of merchants and consumers, such as the principles of least effort (PLE) and the principle of least cost (PLC). Anticipating the potential risk of introducing too high denominations is also essential, as it may influence the shadow economy in the country.

Acknowledgement

The authors declare no conflict of interest. The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views or policies of Bank Indonesia.

About The Authors

Wishnu Badrawani is a senior researcher at Bank Indonesia Institute, Bank Indonesia, Indonesia. He obtained his PhD in Economics from the Department of Economics at the University of Birmingham and his master's degree from the University of Queensland. He focuses his research on the economics of payment systems and the digital economy, policy impact analysis, central banking, and the application of interpretable machine learning.

John Fender has been teaching at the University of Birmingham since 1992 and was a Professor of Macroeconomics between 1998 and 2021. Since February 2021, he has been an Emeritus Professor. He is an active researcher and supervises postgraduate students.

Muhammad Hasan Ghozali is an Junior Analyst at Bank Indonesia Institute and obtained his Master of Business Administration from Bandung Institute of Technology in 2021.

References

Aguilar, R. A. C., Diaz-Bonilla, C., Fujs, T. H. M. J., Jolliffe, D., Mendoza, M. C. V., Wu, H., & Yonzan, N. (2023). *Global Poverty Monitoring Technical Note: Update to the Poverty and Inequality Platform (PIP)*. World Bank Group.

Akarsu, M. Z., Gharehgozli, O., & Atal, V. (2024). An investigation of income and wage inequality in Turkey using burgernomics. *Eastern European Economics*, *62*(3), 340–360. https://doi.org/10.1080/00128775.2023.2253216

Alfaro, I., Bloom, N., & Lin, X. (2024). The finance uncertainty multiplier. *Journal of Political Economy*, *132*(2), 577–615. https://doi.org/10.1086/726230

Arshadi, A. (2019). Currency denomination and spacing analysis for IRAN by D-METRIC method. *Monetary & Financial Economics*, *26*(18), 313–335. https://doi.org/10.22067/PM.V26I17.48418

Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS). (2023). *Upah Minimum Regional/Propinsi - Tabel Statistik - Badan Pusat Statistik Indonesia*. Badan Pusat Statistik. https://www.bps.go.id/id/statistics-table/2/MjIwIzI=/upah-minimum-regional-propinsi.html

Banerjee, A., Marcellino, M., Masten, I., Banerjee, A., Marcellino, M., & Masten, I. (2005). Leading indicators for Euro-area inflation and GDP growth. *Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 67*(1), 785–813. https://doi.org/10.1111/J.1468-0084.2005.00141.X

Bartzsch, N., Brandi, M., Devigne, L., de Pastor, R., Maddaloni, G., Posada Restrepo, D., & Sene, G. (2023). *Forecasting Euro Banknotes in Circulation with Structural Time Series Models in Times of the COVID-19 Pandemic* (Working Papers, 919). Banque de France.

Bordo, M. D., & Rockoff, H. (2013). The influence of Irving Fisher on Milton Friedman's monetary economics. *Journal of the History of Economic Thought*, *35*(2), 153-177

Brandao-Marques, L., & Ratnovski, L. (2024). *The ECB's Future Monetary Policy Operational Framework: Corridor or Floor?* (IMF Working Paper No. 2024/056). International Monetary Fund.

Chang, A., Gunawan, T., & Sumarwan, U. (2023). A conceptual framework of mobile payment system adoption and use in Southeast Asia. *Journal of ASEAN Studies*, *11*(2), 417–433. https://doi.org/10.21512/JAS.V11I2.8815

Chernoff, E. J. (2022). Do you need 'the machine'? Tipping in Canada is unconscious (Part I). *Canadian Journal of Science, Mathematics and Technology Education*, *22*(1), 259–269. https://doi.org/10.1007/s42330-022-00202-9

Chiang, T. C. (2024). Evidence of Gold as a Hedge or Safe Haven Against Risks and Policy Uncertainty. *Advances in Pacific Basin Business, Economics and Finance*, *12*, 77–109. https://doi.org/10.1108/S2514-465020240000012003

Çoban, M. N. (2022). The effect of the internet on inflation: A research on ASEAN-5 countries. *Journal of ASEAN Studies*, *10*(1), 61–79. https://doi.org/10.21512/JAS.V10I1.7310

Dyvik, E. H. (2023, August 13). *Big Mac index 2023.* Statista. https://www.statista.com/statistics/274326/big-mac-index-global-prices-for-a-big-mac/

Elkington, P., & Guttmann, R. (2024). *Understanding the Post-pandemic Demand for Australia's Banknotes.* Reserve Bank of Australia. https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2024/jan/understanding-the-post-pandemic-demand-for-australias-banknotes.html

Fabris, N. (2019). Cashless society - The future of money or a utopia? *Journal of Central Banking Theory and Practice*, *8*(1), 53–66. https://doi.org/10.2478/JCBTP-2019-0003

Fisher, I. (1911). *The Purchasing Power of Money: Its Determination and Relation to Credit, Interest and Crises*. The Macmillan Co.

Freitas, M. L. D. (2022). International currency substitution and the demand for money in the euro area. *Economic Modelling*, *117*. https://doi.org/10.1016/J.ECONMOD.2022.106064

Gharehgozli, O., & Atal, V. (2020). 'Big Mac Affordability' and real-income inequality across countries. *Applied Economics Letters*, *27*(16), 1352–1356. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2019.1679342

Giles, C. (2015, September 24). *In cash we trust — abolish it and you invite tyranny*. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/ffdb3034-610e-11e5-9846-de406ccb37f2

Guttmann, R., Pavlik, C., Ung, B., & Wang, G. (2021). *Cash demand during COVID-19.* Reserve Bank of Australia. https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2021/mar/cash-demand-during-covid-19.html

Haryono, E. (2022, August 18). *Bank Indonesia and the government release 2022 Edition Rupiah Banknotes*. Bank Indonesia. https://www.bi.go.id/en/publikasi/ruang-media/news-release/Pages/sp_2421922.aspx

Hendrickson, J. R., & Park, J. (2021). The case against eliminating large denomination bills. *Journal of Macroeconomics*, *68*. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2021.103308

Hernandez, R. R. (2023). An Evaluation of the Denominational Structure of Philippine Currency. *Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Discussion Paper Series, 10*.

Huang, Y., Zhu, Y., Majumdar, M., Shetty, B., & Sriskandarajah, C. (2022). Managing coins for depository institutions in coin supply chains for improved circulation. *SSRN Electronic Journal*. https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.4224952

Ikhsan, M. (2021). *Persepsi pedagang kaki lima atas penolakan uang logam sebagai alat tukar di Pasar Batangtoru Kabupaten Tapanuli Selatan* [Undergraduate Thesis, IAIN Padangsidimpuan]

Inklaar, R., Marapin, R., Woltjer, P., & Timmer, M. (2022). Inconsistencies in Cross-Country Price Comparisons over Time: Patterns and Facts. In D. Chotikapanich, A.N. Rambaldi, & N. Rohde (Eds.), *Advances in Economic Measurement* (pp. 633–663). Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-2023-3_13

Ismaiel, L., & Al-Ahmad, Z. (2023). A D-Metric Analysis of the Denomination Structure of the Syrian Pound. *Syrian Journal for Science and Innovation*, *1*(3).

Khiaonarong,T., & Humphrey, D. (2023). *Measurement and Use of Cash by Half the World's Population* (IMF Working Paper No. 2023/062*)*. International Monetary Fund.

King, S. D. (2006). Common *cents?: The role of pennies in the US economy* [Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School].

Kitamura, Y. (2022). *Quest for good money: Past, present and future*. Springer Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-5591-4_2

Kotnal, J. R. (2017). Demonetization impact the Indian economy: A descriptive study. *International Journal of Applied Research*, *3*(3), 599–603.

Kumar, K. C. P. (2023). *Less-cash or more-cash? Determinants and trends of currency in circulation in a panel of 17 economies* (IES Working Papers No. 32/2023). Institute of Economic Studies (IES).

Kyei-Mensah, J. (2023). The long-run validity of PPP in some major advanced and emerging countries using alternative models. *Cogent Economics & Finance*, *11*(1). https://doi.org/10.1080/23322039.2023.2220248

Manikowski, A. (2017). Analysis of the denomination structure of the Polish currency in the context of the launch of the new 500 zloty banknote. *Bank i Kredyt*, *48*(5), 495–530.

Medrano-Adán, L., & Salas-Fumás, V. (2023). Do minimum wages deliver what they promise? Effects of minimum wage on employment, output, and income inequality from occupational choice theory. *Economic Analysis and Policy*, *80*, 366–383. https://doi.org/10.1016/J.EAP.2023.08.009

Nguyen, J. (2023, June 30). *Does it make sense to get rid of the penny?* Marketplace News Letter. https://www.marketplace.org/2023/06/30/does-it-make-cents-to-get-rid-of-the-penny/

Payne, L. C., & Morgan, H. M. (1981). UK currency needs in the 1980s. *The Banker*, *131*, 45.

Prescott, B. C., & Shy, O. (2023). Cash payments and the penny policy debate. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 208,* 80-94. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2023.01.024

Purdie, E., & Song, I. (2022, July 17). *Purchasing power parities – putting a global public good to work in socioeconomic analyses*. The World Bank. https://datatopics.worldbank.org/world-development-indicators/stories/purchasing-power-parities-putting-global-public-good-socioeconomic-analyses.html

Putri, D. L., & Nugroho, R. S. (2023). *Viral, video uang rupiah logam ditolak petugas parkir, BI buka suara*. Kompas. https://www.kompas.com/tren/read/2023/02/26/210000365/viral-video-uang-rupiah-logam-ditolak-petugas-parkir-bi-buka-suara?page=all

Sa'idu, I., Yahaya, S., & Garba, S. A. (2022). Elimination of coins in Nigeria: A critical assessment of its implication on the Nigerian economy. *IOSR Journal of Economics and Finance (IOSR-JEF)*, *13*(2), 52–59.

Schaefer, D., & Singleton, C. (2022). The extent of downward nominal wage rigidity: New evidence from payroll data. *Review of Economic Dynamics, 51*, 60-76. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2022.11.006

Schmillen, A., Stops, M., & Wang, D. (2023). The determinants of China's minimum wage rates. *China & World Economy*, *31*(3), 59–91. https://doi.org/10.1111/CWE.12489

Shy, O. (2023). Cash is alive: How economists explain holding and use of cash. *Journal of Economic Literature*, *61*(4), 1465–1520. https://doi.org/10.1257/JEL.20221632

Spector, D. (2019). *In Pennies We Trust, But Should We?* [Master's Thesis, Northeastern University]. Northeastern Repository.

Sugandi, E. A., & Shirai, S. (2019, October 16). *The cash hoarding puzzle*. VoxEU-CEPR. https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/cash-hoarding-puzzle

The Isle of Man Treasury. (2023). *Consultation on the removal of low value coins*. The Isle of Man Government Response Document. https://consult.gov.im/treasury/removal-of-1p-2p-and-5p-coins/results/20231031consultationresponsedocumentviewssoughtontheremovalof1p2pand5pcoinsfromcirculation-forpublication.pdf

Udo, O. O., & Agbai, E. P. (2023). The Impact of Currency Redenomination on Economic Development. *Journal of Accounting and Financial Management (JAFM)*, *9*(10), 114-132.

United States Mint. (2022). *2022 Annual Report*. United States of Department of the Treasury. https://www.usmint.gov/about/reports

Vo, H. L., & Vo, D. H. (2023). The purchasing power parity and exchange-rate economics half a century on. *Journal of Economic Surveys*, *37*(2), 446–479. https://doi.org/10.1111/JOES.12504

Warjiyo, P. (2024). Synergy of economic policies and innovation in driving momentum for sustainable global economic recovery in the era of digital transformation. *Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking*, *26*, 1. https://doi.org/10.59091/1410-8046.2053

Wee, J.-W., & Lee, H.-A. (2022). Testing the validity of purchasing power parity: Panel cointegration approaches with big mac index. *Proceedings 2022, 82*(1), 1-8. https://doi.org/10.3390/PROCEEDINGS2022082005

Zhan, M., Wang, L., Zhan, S., & Lu, Y. (2023). Does digital finance change the stability of money demand function? Evidence from China. *Journal of Asian Economics*, *88*. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.asieco.2023.101649

Appendix A. Denominations of Coins by Countries (list of nations in the Big Mac Index)

Country	*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Argentina	ARS	10	5	2	1	-	-	-	-	-
Australia	AUD	2	1	0.5	0.2	0.1	0.05	-	-	-
Azerbaijan	AZN	0.5	0.2	0.1	0.05	0.03	0.01	-	-	-
Bahrain	BHD	0.5	0.1	0.05	0.025	0.01	0.005	-	-	-
Brazil	BRL	1	0.5	0.25	0.1	0.05	-	-	-	-
United Kingdom	GBP	2	1	0.5	0.2	0.1	0.05	0.02	0.01	-
Canada	CAD	2	1	0.5	0.25	0.1	0.05	0.01	-	-
Cambodia	KHR	500	200	100	50	-	-	-	-	-
Chile	CLP	500	100	50	10	5	1	-	-	-
China	CNY	1	0.5	0.1	-	-	-	-	-	-
Central African Rep.	XAF	500	100	50	25	10	5	1	-	-
Colombia	COP	1000	500	200	100	50	20	10	5	-
Costa Rica	CRC	500	100	50	25	10	5	1	-	-
Croatia	HRK	5	2	1	0.5	0.2	0.1	0.05	-	-
Czech Republic	CZK	50	20	10	5	2	1	-	-	-
Egypt	EGP	1	0.5	0.25	-	-	-	-	-	-
Euro area	EUR	2	1	0.5	0.2	0.1	0.05	0.02	0.01	-
Germany	EUR	2	1	0.5	0.2	0.1	0.05	0.02	0.01	-
Guatemala	GTQ	1	0.5	0.25	0.1	0.5	0.01	-	-	-
Honduras	HNL	0.5	0.2	0.1	0.05	-	-	-	-	-
Hong Kong	HKD	10	5	2	1	0.5	0.2	0.1	-	-
Hungary	HUF	200	100	50	20	10	5	-	-	-
India	INR	10	5	2	1	-	-	-	-	-
Indonesia	IDR	1000	500	200	100	50	-	-	-	-
Israel	ILS	10	5	2	1	0.5	0.1	-	-	-
Japan	JPY	500	100	50	10	5	1	-	-	-
Jordan	JOD	1	0.5	0.25	0.1	0.05	0.01	-	-	-
Kuwait	KWD	0.1	0.05	0.02	0.01	0.005	-	-	-	-
Lebanon	LBP	500	250	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Malaysia	MYR	1	0.5	0.2	0.1	0.05	-	-	-	-
Mexico	MXN	20	10	5	2	1	0.5	-	-	-
Moldova	MDL	10	5	2	1	0.5	0.25	0.1	0.05	-
New Zealand	NZD	2	1	0.5	0.2	0.1	-	-	-	-
Nicaragua	NIO	10	5	1	0.5	0.25	0.1	0.5	-	-
Norway	NOK	20	10	5	1	-	-	-	-	-
Oman	OMR	0.5	0.1	0.05	0.025	0.01	0.05	-	-	-
Pakistan	PKR	10	5	2	1	-	-	-	-	-
Peru	PEN	5	2	1	0.5	0.2	0.1	-	-	-
Philippines	PHP	20	10	5	1	0.3	0.1	0.05	0.01	-
Poland	PLN	5	2	1	0.5	0.2	0.1	0.5	0.2	-
Qatar	QAR	0.5	0.25	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Romania	RON	1	0.5	0.1	0.05	0.01	-	-	-	-
Saudi Arabia	SAR	2	1	0.5	0.25	0.1	0.5	0.01	-	-
Singapore	SGD	1	0.5	0.2	0.1	0.05	0	-	-	-
South Africa	ZAR	5	2	1	0.5	0.2	0.1	-	-	-
South Korea	KRW	500	100	50	10	-	-	-	-	-
Sri Lanka	LKR	10	5	2	1	0.5	0.25	0.1	-	-
Sweden	SEK	10	5	2	1	-	-	-	-	-
Switzerland	CHF	5	2	1	0.5	0.2	0.1	0.05	-	-
Taiwan	TWD	50	20	10	5	1	-	-	-	-
Thailand	THB	10	5	2	1	0.5	0.25	-	-	-
Turkey	TRY	1	0.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
United Arab Emirates	AED	1	0.5	0.25	-	-	-	-	-	-
United States	USD	1	0.5	0.25	0.1	0.05	0.01	-	-	-
Uruguay	UYU	10	5	2	1	-	-	-	-	-
Venezuela	VES	1	0.5	0.25	-	-	-	-	-	-
Vietnam	VND	5000	2000	1000	500	200	-	-	-	-

Appendix B.1 Unit Root Test

Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test on D(UMP,2)

Null Hypothesis: D(UMP,2) has a unit root
Exogenous: None
Lag Length: 2 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=6)

		t-Statistic	Prob.*
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic		-5.606274	0.0000
Test critical values:	1% level	-2.674290	
	5% level	-1.957204	
	10% level	-1.608175	

Appendix B.2 ACF-PACF Correlogram of Indonesia Monthly Minimum Wage

Correlogram of D(UMP,2)

Date: 11/17/23 Time: 11:05
Sample: 1997 2030
Included observations: 25

Autocorrelation	Partial Correlation		AC	PAC	Q-Stat	Prob
		1	-0.144	-0.144	0.5853	0.444
		2	-0.195	-0.221	1.7061	0.426
		3	-0.348	-0.444	5.4134	0.144
		4	0.157	-0.082	6.2008	0.185
		5	0.201	0.046	7.5642	0.182
		6	-0.042	-0.131	7.6269	0.267
		7	-0.061	0.019	7.7674	0.354
		8	-0.265	-0.270	10.552	0.228
		9	0.051	-0.220	10.659	0.300
		10	0.106	-0.118	11.160	0.345
		11	0.002	-0.325	11.161	0.430
		12	0.048	-0.097	11.282	0.505

Appendix C.1. D-Metric analysis of Selected Country

	Vietnam		**Indonesia**		**Thailand**		**Malaysia**		**US**		**Cambodia**	
	D =											
	212,727	Dong	132,887	Rupiah	353	Baht	68	Ringgit	58	$	37,218	Riel
	B	I	B	I	B	I	B	I	B	I	B	I
						coins						
		-		-		-		-	-	0.01		-
D/5000	43		27		0.07		0				7.44	
1st Coin		-		50		-		-	-	0.05		-
D/2000	106		66		0.18		0				18.61	
2nd Coin		-		100		0.25		0.05	0.25	0.05		-
D/1000	212.73		133		0.35		0.1				37.22	
3rd Coin		200		200		0.5		0.1	0.5	0.1		50
D/500	425.45		266		0.71		0.1				74.44	
4th Coin		500		500		1		0.2	1	0.25		100
D/200	1,063.64		664		1.77		0.3				186.09	
5th Coin		1000		1000		2		0.5	2	0.5		200
D/100	2,127.27		1,329		3.53		0.7				372.18	
6th Coin		2000		**NA**		5		1	5	1		500
						note-coin boundary						
D/50	4,255		2,658		7.06		1.4		1.16		744.36	
Coin Note		5000		**NA**		10		NA		NA		NA
D/20	10,636		6,644		17.65		3.4		2.9		1,861	

Appendix C.2. D-Metric analysis of Selected Country (continue)

	Taiwan		Philippines		United Kingdom		Japan		South Korea	
	D =									
	1,200	NT$	506	Peso	147	Pounds	13	Yen	171,343	Won
	B	I	B	I	B	I	B	I	B	I
coins										
		-		0.01		0.02		-		-
D/5000	0.24		0.1012		0.0232		2.6022		34	
1st Coin		0.25		0.05		0.05		-		10
D/2000	0.6		0.253		0.058		6.5055		86	
2nd Coin		0.5		0.1		0.1		1		50
D/1000	1.2		0.506		0.116		13.011		171	
3rd Coin		1		0.3		0.2		5		100
D/500	2.4		1.012		0.232		26.022		343	
4th Coin		5		1		0.5		10		500
D/200	6		2.53		0.58		65.055		857	
5th Coin		10		5		1		50		NA
D/100	12		5.06		1.16		130.11		1,713	
6th Coin		20		10		2		100		NA
note-coin boundary										
D/50	24		10.12		2.32		260.22		3,427	
Coin Note		50		20		NA		500		NA
D/20	60		25.3		5.8		650.55		8,567	

Insights into the Uneven Impact of Foreign Direct Investment, Sector-Specific Official Development Assistance, and Remittances on Human Development in ASEAN-9: Evidence from Panel Data Models

Nguyen Thi Vu Ha

International Finance Department, Faculty of International Business and Economics,
VNU University of Economics and Business, Hanoi, Vietnam 122000

hantv@vnu.edu.vn

How to Cite: Ha, N. T. V. (2024). Insights into the Uneven Impact of Foreign Direct Investment, Sector-Specific Official Development Assistance, and Remittances on Human Development in ASEAN-9: Evidence from Panel Data Models. *Journal of ASEAN Studies, 12*(2), 331-351. https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v12i2.11043

Abstract

ASEAN's motto of "One Vision, One Identity, One Community" aims for peace, stability, market integration, and inclusivity. However, development disparities persist among member countries. This research analyzed the impact of foreign capital flows on the Human Development Index (HDI) in ASEAN-9 from 2002 to 2021, using panel data regression models and data from reputable international sources. It also highlights the data characteristics and variations in HDI across member countries. Results show that while Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and remittances contribute significantly to capital inflows, only FDI affects HDI. Despite its smaller share, Official Development Assistance (ODA) significantly influences HDI. However, the effects of ODA vary across sectors, with grants for social infrastructure and manufacturing, as well as ODA loans for manufacturing and other sectors, positively impacting HDI, while grants for economic infrastructure and other sectors negatively affect HDI. This highlights the complex relationship between foreign capital flows and HDI in ASEAN-9. Targeted ODA allocation and policy considerations are crucial for regional human development, even if the direct impact of remittances on HDI is limited.

Keywords: HDI, FDI, ODA, remittances, and ASEAN.

Introduction

Foreign capital flows, including FDI, ODA, and remittances, have emerged as significant catalysts for economic development, particularly in emerging and developing economies. Each type of capital flow contributes uniquely to human development: FDI is pivotal in facilitating technology transfer, providing technical support, enhancing management skills, augmenting production capacity, and creating employment opportunities within host countries (Blomström & Kokko, 1998; Dunning, 1993). In contrast, ODA supports recipient nations' development through initiatives targeting social and economic infrastructure, promoting productive sectors, and fostering sustainable development (Burnside & Dollar, 2000). Remittances play a distinct role by directly increasing household income, which can be reinvested into education, healthcare, and improved living standards (Jahjah et al., 2003). Consequently, these external capital flows are indispensable in advancing economic growth and human development in recipient countries. However, empirical research has yielded mixed findings, with some research showing positive impacts of foreign capital flows, particularly FDI, on human development in middle-income countries. At the same time, other studies indicate limited or no significant effects, especially in lower-income countries where governance and policy inefficiencies may diminish the benefits. These variations suggest that foreign capital flows may not consistently or substantially encourage human development, as their effects depend significantly on the economic context, governance capacity, specific countries, sectors, and periods examined.

Situated strategically in Asia, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has attracted a substantial influx of foreign capital. Nonetheless, notable disparities in human development persist among ASEAN member countries. This prompts crucial questions: How do different types of foreign capital flows—such as FDI, ODA, and remittances—specifically contribute to human development within ASEAN countries?; What role does each country's internal governance capacity play in moderating the impact of these capital flows on the HDI?; and How can targeted foreign capital allocation, alongside political stability, enhance the quality of life in these nations? By focusing on these nuanced relationships, this research explores how different forms of foreign capital influence HDI across the diverse ASEAN region.

Despite extensive research on foreign capital flows, existing research often shows mixed findings and has not fully explored the specific context of ASEAN. This research addresses this gap by evaluating the impact of foreign capital flows (FDI, ODA, and remittances) on the HDI within nine ASEAN countries (ASEAN-9). Brunei and Singapore are excluded from the analysis as they no longer receive significant ODA and remittances, which are key components of this research's focus on foreign capital flows. ASEAN-9 represents a region marked by significant variations in governance quality (government effectiveness and political stability), developmental outcomes (GDP per capita), and the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Literature Review

Examining the influence of foreign capital flows on the HDI has garnered considerable attention among scholars, mainly due to the growing recognition of the significance of human development quality over mere economic growth. Extant literature in this domain has primarily focused on several key aspects.

FDI is widely regarded as a key driver of HDI due to its ability to stimulate economic growth, create employment opportunities, and improve infrastructure. Haddad (2018) utilizes the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method to examine the impact of inward and outward FDI on HDI in the United Arab Emirate (UAE), revealing significant positive contributions of inward FDI to human development. Similarly, Johansen cointegration and Toda-Yamamoto causality tests (as cited in Gökmenoğlu et al., 2018) demonstrate the long-term positive impact of FDI on life expectancy and gross national income in Nigeria, emphasizing FDI's role in advancing key determinants of HDI. Ahmad et al. (2019), using panel regression models and two-stage least squares (2SLS) methods, find that FDI positively influenced HDI and contributed to poverty reduction in ASEAN and SAARC economies. However, contrasting findings highlight limitations in FDI's impact, with Ustubici and Irdam (2012) reporting no significant relationship between FDI and HDI, attributing this to weak institutional frameworks in specific regions. Tamer (2013) also concludes that governance challenges in low-income African countries hindered FDI's potential to foster human development. These findings suggest that while FDI significantly enhances human development by driving economic growth, advancing technological capabilities, and creating employment opportunities, its impact depends on governance quality and institutional capacity.

H1: FDI positively impacts the HDI by fostering economic growth, facilitating technology transfer, stimulating export activities, and generating employment opportunities.

ODA has similarly been studied for its potential to improve HDI, particularly through investments in critical sectors such as education, healthcare, and social infrastructure. Ahn and Park (2019) find that ODA significantly enhanced healthcare and welfare in recipient countries using panel least squares estimation with country-fixed effects. Through panel regression models and fuzzy set ideal-type analyses, Lee, Jung, and Sul (2019) demonstrate that targeted ODA investments in public services directly improved HDI across 15 Asian countries. However, challenges in ODA effectiveness have been noted, with Tamer (2013) reporting negative effects of ODA in low-income African regions due to inefficient resource allocation and governance challenges. Ustubici and Irdam (2012) similarly observe no significant relationship between ODA and HDI in low-income countries, citing the misallocation of aid as a critical barrier. These findings underline the dynamic relationship between ODA and HDI, emphasizing the importance of governance frameworks and political stability to ensure effective resource utilization and maximize developmental outcomes.

H2: ODA positively impacts the HDI when effectively allocated toward education, healthcare, and social infrastructure.

Remittances are also recognized as a significant contributor to HDI by increasing household income and facilitating investments in education and healthcare. Olcoz-Amaya (2020) uses fixed-effects models to examine the effects of remittances on HDI in Latin American countries, finding that their impact depended on their allocation, with productive investments yielding stronger effects. Ustubici and Irdam (2012) further demonstrate a significant positive relationship between remittances and HDI in middle-income countries, highlighting their role in supporting consumption and human capital development. These findings emphasize the role of remittances in improving human development in countries, where they alleviate poverty, enhance consumption patterns, and foster long-term investments in human capital.

H3: Remittances positively impact the HDI by increasing household incomes, reducing poverty, and improving access to essential services.

Governance quality significantly shapes the relationship between foreign capital flows and HDI. Thi Cam Ha et al. (2023) highlight the importance of institutional frameworks, demonstrating through panel data techniques that institutional quality moderates the impact of FDI on HDI. Topalli et al. (2021) find that governance improvements are essential for maximizing the developmental benefits of foreign capital inflows. Then, Pérez-Segura (2014) emphasizes the role of regulatory quality and the rule of law in enhancing FDI's contributions to HDI. Reiter and Steensma (2010) further establish that low corruption and effective governance amplify FDI's positive impacts on HDI. These findings underscore that governance quality, distinct from the volume of foreign capital inflows, is pivotal in translating these resources into tangible improvements in human development.

H4: Government effectiveness positively impacts the HDI by enabling the implementation of sound policies in public health, education, and poverty reduction.

H5: Political stability positively impacts the HDI by creating a favorable environment for foreign capital inflows and ensuring the continuity of development policies.

GDP per capita (GDPPC) is a fundamental determinant of HDI, reflecting a country's economic capacity to invest in human development. Ahmad et al. (2019) demonstrate that GDPPC significantly improved HDI in ASEAN and SAARC economies, particularly in middle-income countries. Lee (2015) highlights the diminishing returns at higher income levels, recommending the use of logarithmic transformations to capture these dynamics. The research collectively suggests that GDPPC contributes to HDI by improving access to essential services, reducing poverty, and enhancing living standards, although its effects taper in high-income regions.

H6: GDP per capita positively impacts the HDI by improving access to essential services, reducing poverty, and enhancing living standards.

Finally, the COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted human development globally by affecting income, healthcare, and education systems. Alkire et al. (2021) document significant declines in HDI during the pandemic, particularly in countries with weaker healthcare systems, while Anetor et al. (2020) highlight that COVID-19 exacerbate existing inequalities,

further lowering HDI in vulnerable populations. These research findings underscore the pandemic's profound and detrimental effects on key sectors critical to human development, hindering progress in countries.

H7: The COVID-19 pandemic negatively impacts the HDI by disrupting income, healthcare access, and education systems.

In summary, scholarly investigations into the impact of foreign capital flows on HDI highlight the growing recognition of human development quality as a measure surpassing economic growth. Various research have explored the relationships between FDI, ODA, remittances, and HDI, while also addressing factors such as governance quality, political stability, and economic conditions that shape outcomes. These insights contribute to a deeper understanding of the complex dynamics between foreign capital flows and HDI, offering valuable guidance for advancing human development in ASEAN-9 countries and informing policymakers.

Methodology and Data

This research employs a panel data regression model to investigate the effects of foreign capital flows on the HDI in nine ASEAN countries from 2002 to 2021. Brunei and Singapore are excluded from the analysis as they no longer receive ODA and remittances. The data for ASEAN-9 countries are collected comprehensively over the research period, except FDI data for Timor-Leste in 2002 and 2003, and remittance (RET) data for Timor-Leste in 2002, 2003, and 2004. These gaps introduce some limitations to the analysis for Timor-Leste.

Panel data is chosen because it accounts for both cross-country differences and changes over time, providing a more comprehensive view of the relationship between foreign capital flows and HDI. Compared to time-series or cross-sectional data, panel data offers the advantage of capturing both individual heterogeneity and temporal dynamics, which helps reduce the risk of omitted variable bias and improves the accuracy of the findings.

Based on previous research by Olcoz-Amaya (2020), Lee (2015), Anetor (2020), and others, the article aims to assess the influence of various foreign capital flows on HDI, including FDI, ODA, and remittances. Additionally, the research examines the impact of ODA on specific sectors and forms. Moreover, the research endeavor takes into account the level of government efficiency (GE) and political stability (PS), as suggested by Pérez-Segura (2014), to provide a comprehensive analysis of the variables' effects. The research model, which elucidates the relationship between foreign capital flows and HDI in ASEAN countries, is formulated as follows:

$$HDI_{it} = a_0 + a_1FDI_{it} + a_2ODAGS1_{it} + a_3ODAGS2_{it} + a_4ODAGS3it + a_5ODAGSO_{it} + + a_6ODALS1_{it} + a_7ODALS2_{it} + a_8ODALS3_{it} + a_9ODALSO_{it} + a_{10}RET_{it} + a_{11}GE_{it} + a_{12}PS_{it} + a_{13}GDPPC_{it} + a_{14}COV_{it} + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

Note:

HDI_{it}: Human Development Index in country i at time t (dependent variable), sourced from the UNDP database (UNDP, 2023). The independent variables are collected from reliable and recognized sources, as detailed in Table 1.

Table 1 Independent Variables in the Research Model

Variable	Description	Unit	Source
FDI	Foreign direct investment net inflows	(% of GDP)	WDI, 2023a
ODAGS1	ODA grants received by a country, allocated to the social infrastructure sector	% of GDP	OECD, 2024
ODAGS2	ODA grants received by a country, allocated to the economic infrastructure sector	% of GDP	OECD, 2024
ODAGS3	ODA grants received by a country, allocated to the production sector	% of GDP	OECD, 2024
ODAGSO	ODA grants received by a country, allocated to other sectors	% of GDP	OECD, 2024
ODALS1	ODA loans received by a country, allocated to the social infrastructure sector	% of GDP	OECD, 2024
ODALS2	ODA loans received by a country, allocated to the economic infrastructure sector	% of GDP	OECD, 2024
ODALS3	ODA loans received by a country, allocated to the production sector	% of GDP	OECD, 2024
ODALSO	ODA loans received by a country, allocated to other sectors	% of GDP	OECD, 2024
RET	Remittances received by a country	(% of GDP)	WDI, 2023c
GE	Government Effectiveness Index. The GEI, which ranges from 1 to 100, with 100 reflecting the highest level of effectiveness, indicates the government's capacity to enact policies that positively influence various aspects of human development.	Index (1 – 100)	WGI, 2023b
PS	Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism Index. This index, which ranges from 1 to 100, with 100 representing the highest level of stability, provides a measure of the political climate and its effect on the overall development of a country.	Index (1 – 100)	WGI, 2023
l_GDPPC	Log of GDP per capital. The logarithmic transformation of GDP per capita (logGDPPC) is used to capture diminishing returns in income growth and to normalize income distribution across countries.	USD (log scale)	WDI, 2023b
DCov	Dummy: Covid19 pandemic. Given that the pandemic emerged in early 2020, the variable representing its impact will be assigned a value of 1 for the years 2020 and 2021. In contrast, for the remaining years, the variable will be assigned a value of 0, indicating the absence of the pandemic's influence during those periods.		

Results and Discussions

Overview of HDI and International Capital Flows Trends in ASEAN-9 (2002-2021)

Based on a descriptive statistical analysis of the data in 2002-2021, nine countries in Southeast Asian (ASEAN-9) have notable differences in HDI, international capital flows, per capita income, political stability, and government efficiency. Regarding the HDI within ASEAN-9 countries, notable patterns emerge. Except for Timor-Leste, all other countries in ASEAN-9 experienced an upward trajectory in their HDI, indicating human development across the three dimensions of income, education, and health. Among the ASEAN-9 countries, Malaysia achieved a high HDI level at the earliest, attaining this status in 2002. Thailand holds the second-highest HDI within ASEAN-9 and has maintained a high HDI level since 2007. The Philippines, Indonesia, and Vietnam exhibit similar HDI levels and reach a high HDI threshold in 2015 (Philippines), 2016 (Indonesia), and 2018 (Vietnam), respectively. Timor-Leste stands out in terms of significant HDI variability among the countries. After separating from Indonesia, Timor-Leste experiences rapid and continuous HDI growth within the first ten years. However, it subsequently experiences a sharp decline, settling within the medium HDI threshold. Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar are the countries with lower HDI levels within the group. Nevertheless, these countries achieve the medium HDI threshold in 2010 (Laos), 2012 (Cambodia), and 2015 (Myanmar).

The emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic led to a continuous decline in HDI across the ASEAN-9 countries in 2020 and 2021 (see Figure 1). Consequently, based on HDI levels, the ASEAN-9 countries can be divided into two groups: one comprising countries that have achieved a high HDI (including Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia, and Vietnam), and the other consisting of countries with a medium HDI (Timor-Leste, Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar).



Figure 1 HDI in ASEAN 9 in 2002-2021

Source: UNDP (2023)



Figure 2 International capital flows in ASEAN 9 in 2002-2021 (mil.$)

Source: WDI (2023a), WDI (2023c), OECD (2023)

Between 2002 and 2021, the ASEAN-9 countries received approximately USD 2,117 billion in foreign capital inflows, consisting of ODA, net FDI inflow, and remittances. Among these inflows, remittances and FDI accounted for roughly the same proportion, approximately 45% each, while ODA constituted the lowest proportion at only around 9.6%. Notably, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Vietnam emerged as the top three countries with the highest total foreign capital inflows among the ASEAN-9. In contrast, Timor-Leste, Laos, and Cambodia recorded the lowest total inflows. The disparity in attracting foreign capital inflows within the ASEAN-9 is evident in the substantial difference between the Philippines, with a total inflow of approximately USD 590 billion, and Timor-Leste, with an inflow of slightly over USD 6.6 billion (see Figure 2).

The composition of foreign capital flows also varies across the ASEAN-9 countries. Vietnam stands out as the largest recipient of ODA among ASEAN countries during the 2002-2021 period (see Figure 3). However, when considering the proportion of ODA relative to GDP, Timor-Leste accounts for the majority. It is worth noting that the flow of ODA into ASEAN-9 countries has been declining, primarily because some countries have achieved a low-middle income level. Among the ASEAN-9, Myanmar experiences the most significant fluctuations in ODA flows. Indonesia emerges as the country attracting the highest FDI inflows in the region, while Cambodia exhibits a notably higher FDI-to-GDP ratio. The Philippines receives the most enormous amount of remittances among the ASEAN-9 and demonstrates the highest remittances-to-GDP ratio, except for 2010, 2011, and 2012, when Timor-Leste held the highest ratio (see Figure 3).



Note: IDN (Indonesia), VNM (Vietnam), PHL (Philippines), THA (Thailand), MYS (Malaysia), MMR (Myanmar), LAO (Laos), KHM (Cambodia), and TLS (Timor-Leste)

Figure 3 Structure of International Capital Flows in ASEAN 9 during 2002-2021 (percentage of total each flow) Source: WDI (2023a), WDI (2023c), OECD (2023)

Differences among the ASEAN-9 countries are evident across various dimensions, encompassing government effectiveness, political stability, absence of violence/terrorism, and per capita income. Malaysia consistently emerges as the country with the highest level of government effectiveness, while Myanmar lags with the lowest index. Political stability varies within the ASEAN-9, with Malaysia and Vietnam occupying the top two positions regarding the highest indices, while the Philippines records the lowest index (see Figure 4).



Figure 4 Average of Government Effectiveness (GE) and Political Stability (PS) indexes in ASEAN-9 in 2002-2021 (WGI, 2023)



Figure 5 GDP per capita (current US$) in ASEAN-9 in 2002-2021 (WDI, 2023b)

Despite a significant overall increase in per capita income across the ASEAN-9 from 2002 to 2021, excluding the period impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic, substantial disparities persist in the region. Essentially, there is a lack of convergence regarding GDP per capita between lower-middle-income and upper-middle-income countries within the ASEAN-9. Malaysia has the highest per capita income, approximately nine times greater than the lowest-ranking country, Myanmar, as of 2021 (see Figure 5).

Panel Data Estimation of International Capital Inflows' Impact on HDI

The research utilizes the GRETL software to conduct an empirical analysis of the influence of foreign capital flows on the HDI within the ASEAN-9 countries. To address potential multicollinearity and ensure the stationarity of the data series, the initial step involved transforming the variables into a first-difference form. Subsequently, the researcher examined the correlation relationships among the independent variables. Table 2 indicates that most independent variables have negligible correlations with each other, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a significant concern in this model. For example, key variables such as FDI and HDI have a weak positive correlation of 0.2. Then, ODA grants for social

infrastructure exhibit a low correlation of 0.3 with HDI, confirming their suitability for inclusion in the regression analysis. However, a moderate correlation coefficient of 0.6 is observed between the variables ODAGSO and ODALSO (see Figure 6). This correlation suggests that while the variables are related, they still capture distinct aspects of ODA allocation. As a result, the independent variables included in the model are considered suitable for assessing their respective influences on the dependent variable.

Table 2 Correlation matrix

	d_HDI	d_FDI	d_RET	d_PS	d_GE	d_ODAGS1	d_ODAGS2	d_ODAGS3	d_ODALS1	d_ODALS2	d_ODALS3	d_ODAGSO	d_ODALSO	d_l_GDPPC
d_HDI	1	0.2	0.0	-0.1	-0.1	0.2	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2
d_FDI	0.2	1	0.1	-0.1	0.0	-0.1	0.0	0.3	0.1	0.1	-0.1	-0.1	0.0	0.1
d_RET	0.0	0.1	1	0.0	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	-0.2
d_PS	-0.1	-0.1	0.0	1	0.3	-0.2	0.0	0.0	-0.1	-0.3	-0.1	-0.2	0.0	0.1
d_GE	-0.1	0.0	-0.1	0.3	1	-0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.2	-0.1	0.0
d_ODAGS1	0.2	-0.1	-0.1	-0.2	-0.1	1	-0.1	-0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	-0.1
d_ODAGS2	0.0	0.0	-0.1	0.0	0.1	-0.1	1	0.3	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0
d_ODAGS3	0.3	0.3	-0.1	0.0	0.1	-0.1	0.3	1	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.2	0.0	0.0
d_ODALS1	0.0	0.1	0.1	-0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.5	-0.1
d_ODALS2	0.0	0.1	0.0	-0.3	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.3	1	0.1	0.2	0.2	-0.1
d_ODALS3	0.0	-0.1	0.0	-0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.1	1	0.0	0.0	0.0
d_ODAGSO	0.0	-0.1	0.0	-0.2	-0.2	0.3	0.1	-0.2	0.4	0.2	0.0	1	0.6	-0.1
d_ODALSO	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	-0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.2	0.0	0.6	1	-0.1
d_l_GDPPC	0.2	0.1	-0.2	0.1	0.0	-0.1	0.0	0.0	-0.1	-0.1	0.0	-0.1	-0.1	1

Note: When transforming the variables into a first-difference form, a "d_" prefix is added to each variable.

Source: Author's calcution from GRETL

In the subsequent stage, this research estimates the impact of the independent variables on the HDI utilizing the Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model. The results indicate that the pooled OLS model accounted for 36.03% of the variability in HDI attributed to the independent variables (adjusted R-squared = 0.3603) across the ASEAN-9 countries. The model does not suffer from multicollinearity (VIF values < 4) or first-order autocorrelation (Wooldridge test p-value = 0.772827). Endogeneity is also not an issue, as confirmed by the instrumental variables' two-stage least squares method using lags of the independent variables as instruments. The Hausman test (p-value = 0.186267) indicates no endogeneity, and the Sargan test (p-value = 0.608375) validates the instruments. The Pesaran CD test (p-value = 0.446586) shows no cross-sectional dependence, implying no need for further adjustment. However, the OLS model exhibits heteroskedasticity (Wald test p-value = 5.88111e-52). In addition, to assess whether differences among the countries under study affect the results of the Pooled OLS model, an F-test is conducted. The results of the F-test provide evidence that the presence of country-specific fixed effects necessitates a revision of the pooled OLS model (P-value = 0.0000). Consequently, the estimation is conducted using the Fixed Effects Model (FEM).

The outcomes of the analysis reveal that the FEM captures 42.35% of the variation in HDI, resulting from the independent variables in the ASEAN-9 countries. However, the FEM model exhibits heteroskedasticity, necessitating the utilization of a Heteroskedasticity - corrected model to address this issue.

The estimation results obtain from the Heteroskedasticity-corrected model demonstrate its statistical effectiveness, as evidenced by the significantly low p-value (F-test) approaching zero. The R-squared and adjusted R-squared values are relatively high, measuring 0.601448 and 0.564979, respectively. These results indicate that 56.5% of the variability in HDI is explained by the independent variables, showing that this model offers the most robust fit. The relatively high R-squared values across the models confirm that the independent variables, particularly those related to foreign capital flows and economic growth, significantly contribute to the explanation of HDI variability in ASEAN-9 countries.

Moreover, Table 3 presents the probability values (p-values) of each independent variable, revealing that five variables exhibit a significant influence on the dependent variable HDI at a 1% significance level. This high significance level implies a strong and reliable relationship between these variables and HDI, indicating that these factors are crucial for human development in ASEAN countries. One variable demonstrated significant influence at a 5% significance level, suggesting a still strong but slightly less certain effect. Two variables exhibited significance at a 10% level, which indicates a moderate impact that, while less robust, remains relevant for policy consideration, particularly in sectors like disaster preparedness and environmental protection.

To ensure the robustness of the results, multiple model specifications, including a heteroskedasticity-corrected model, fixed-effects model, and pooled OLS model, are employed. Across all models, ODA grants for social infrastructure and production consistently positively impact HDI, underscoring the importance of targeted aid. FDI demonstrates a significant positive effect in the heteroskedasticity-corrected model at the 1% level, though it was not statistically significant in the fixed-effects model, indicating potential country-specific influences**.** ODA loans for the production sector also had a positive effect, albeit at a 10% significance level, with less consistent results in other models. Economic growth, measured by GDP per capita, consistently correlates positively with HDI across all models, reinforcing the importance of economic development. Conversely, ODA grants for other sectors negatively impact HDI, highlighting the limitations of less-targeted aid. The COVID-19 pandemic variable significantly negatively affects HDI, reflecting income, education, and healthcare disruptions. These consistent findings across models confirm the robustness of the research and highlight the importance of targeted ODA and economic growth in driving human development.

Table 3 Regression Analysis Results from Heteroskedasticity-corrected, Fixed Effect and Pooled OLS Models

Model's results	Heteroskedasticity-corrected				Fixed-Effects	Pooled OLS
Variable	**Coefficient**	**Std. Error**	**t-Ratio**	**P-value**	**Coefficient**	**Coefficient**
const	0.00492538	0.000652733	7.546	3.75e-12 ***	0.00530178***	0.00526432***
d_FDI	0.00104673	0.000301668	3.470	0.0007 ***	0.000324066	0.000346378
d_ODAGS1	0.00167858	0.000380399	4.413	1.92e-05 ***	0.00151992***	0.00165289***
d_ODAGS2	-0.00261806	0.00160029	-1.636	0.1039	-0.00431011***	-0.00349347***
d_ODAGS3	0.0119920	0.00284026	4.222	4.14e-05 ***	0.0139592***	0.0147495***
d_ODAGSO	-0.00243825	0.000963935	-2.529	0.0124 **	-0.00282052***	-0.00247715***
d_ODALS1	0.00122197	0.00184441	0.6625	0.5086	0.0011451	0.00168319
d_ODALS2	-0.00244384	0.00196016	-1.247	0.2144	-0.00254059	-0.00281372
d_ODALS3	0.00779972	0.00470553	1.658	0.0995 *	0.00204717	0.00259945
d_ODALSO	0.00382176	0.00197023	1.940	0.0542 *	0.00485613***	0.00439993***
d_RET	0.000114572	0.000278652	0.4112	0.6815	2.40914e-05	0.000124479
d_PS	-1.54496E-05	5.26786E-05	-0.2933	0.7697	-4.53163e-05	-5.51403e-05
d_GE	-2.97885E-05	0.000100965	-0.2950	0.7684	-5.37931e-05	-6.71890e-05
d_l_GDPPC	0.0160390	0.00508521	3.154	0.0019 ***	0.0147201***	0.0159609***
DCov	-0.00884452	0.00152611	-5.795	3.76e-08 ***	-0.00993621***	-0.00985791***

Note:
When transforming the variables into a first-difference form, a "d_" prefix is added to each variable
* : Significant at the 10% level
**: Significant at the 5% level
***: Significant at the 1% level.

Source: Author's Calcution from GRETL

Discussion of Key Findings

The Impact of FDI on HDI

FDI is pivotal in promoting human development, particularly through its impact on job creation, industrial capacity expansion, and technological innovation. In ASEAN-9, FDI has been instrumental in driving these outcomes, which align with Baghirzade (2012) and Gökmenoğlu et al. (2018). The research find that FDI positively impacts education, healthcare, and income levels. For example, Vietnam has leveraged FDI effectively, transitioning into a global manufacturing and export hub. Sectors such as electronics, textiles, and automobiles, driven by global corporations like Samsung and LG, have experienced significant growth, creating jobs and raising income levels. This economic expansion has enhanced education and healthcare access, directly improving HDI outcomes. Notably, FDI inflows into Vietnam's manufacturing sector surpassed $23.5 billion in 2023, further solidifying the country's position in global supply chains (Interesse, 2024).

Similarly, Indonesia has benefited from FDI in its manufacturing and infrastructure sectors, which has resulted in improved living standards, job creation, and enhanced social infrastructure (Oxford Business Group, n.d). These cases demonstrate how well-targeted FDI inflows can catalyze economic growth, leading to broader social improvements that enhance HDI.

The Impact of ODA on HDI

ODA has been instrumental in enhancing HDI in ASEAN-9, particularly through targeted investments in healthcare, education, and infrastructure. ODAGS1 has a substantial positive impact on HDI by improving healthcare and education systems across ASEAN-9. In Laos, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)-funded projects have expanded access to essential services, such as maternal and child healthcare, which directly boosted health outcomes and HDI (JICA, 2023). Similarly, in Cambodia, ODA grants have strengthened the healthcare system by upgrading hospital infrastructure and improving educational services (Open Development Cambodia, 2022). These findings align with Lee et al. (2019), who conclude that targeted ODA for social infrastructure contributes significantly to HDI improvements. Furthemore, ODAGS3 also plays a key role in Vietnam's transformation from a low-income country into a manufacturing hub, fostering economic growth and raising employment and income levels—key elements of HDI improvement (Lee et al, 2019).

ODALS3 and ODALSO, which target areas such as environmental protection, disaster preparedness, and food security, have also positively impacted HDI. For instance, in Vietnam, ODA loans have driven the development of the country's manufacturing sector, creating jobs, driving economic growth, and improving living standards (Nguyen, 2023). In Timor-Leste, JICA's infrastructure projects, such as the construction of National Road No.1 and irrigation systems, have improved rural livelihoods and food security, directly contributing to HDI (JICA, 2024). Similarly, in the Philippines, JICA's Post-Disaster Standby Loan has been crucial in facilitating disaster recovery efforts, reducing the adverse effects of natural disasters on public health and livelihoods, thereby indirectly supporting HDI growth (Jocson, 2023). When managed effectively, these examples show that even untargeted ODA can contribute positively to human development. This stand contrasts with research by Ustubici et al. (2012), which shows mixed effects of untargeted ODA.

However, untargeted ODA grants (ODAGSO) have shown limited effectiveness in improving HDI. Broad and unfocused allocations, such as those aimed at environmental protection and disaster preparedness, often fail to address critical human development needs like healthcare and education. Ustubici et al. (2012) similarly observe that untargeted ODA tends to be less effective, especially in low-income countries where immediate social services are lacking. In ASEAN-9, the allocation of ODA grants to broad categories has been substantial in countries like Myanmar and Cambodia. In Cambodia, for instance, around 20% of total ODA has been allocated to sectors such as environmental protection and disaster preparedness, while in Myanmar, this figure is approximately 40% (OECD, 2023). Despite

these significant investments, these countries face challenges in improving HDI. Myanmar, for example, still struggles with a low HDI ranking—0.585 in 2021, placing it 149th out of 191 countries (UNDP, 2023). This suggests that ODA needs to be more strategically focused on sectors like education and healthcare to generate better human development outcomes.

Interestingly, ODAGSO's limited effectiveness contrasts with the positive outcomes of ODALSO, where loans with stricter oversight ensure better accountability and targeted development outcomes. In countries like Timor-Leste, ODA loans have been successfully directed toward infrastructure projects such as road development and irrigation systems, which have directly enhanced food security and rural livelihoods, positively impacting long-term human development (JICA, 2024). Similarly, in the Philippines, JICA's Post-Disaster Standby Loan has provided critical financial support for disaster recovery, directly improving public health and livelihoods, which indirectly boosts HDI (Jocson, 2023). These examples show that loans, with better oversight, can be more effective than grants in ensuring positive development outcomes.

While ODA grants for economic infrastructure (ODAGS2) do not demonstrate statistically significant effects at the highest confidence levels in the heteroskedasticity-corrected model, they show a significance level of 1% in the other two models, implying a relatively negative relationship with HDI. Economic infrastructure projects—such as those focusing on transport, energy, or large-scale infrastructure—typically take longer to translate into tangible human development outcomes. A significant portion of ODA has been allocated to large infrastructure projects in Cambodia and Laos. However, social outcomes, such as improvements in healthcare and education, have lagged. Despite the influx of ODA, Cambodia's health sector remains fragmented, with resources scattered across numerous small, uncoordinated projects, leading to inefficiencies in healthcare delivery (Lee & Park, 2024).

Similarly, in Laos, while ODA has supported infrastructure projects, progress in social services like healthcare and education remains limited. The World Bank (2024**)** notes that although access to education has improved in Laos, significant gaps persist due to economic challenges and inadequate funding for comprehensive social services. These cases highlight the need for a more balanced approach to ODA allocation, ensuring that investments in social services complement infrastructure development to achieve holistic development. Tamer (2013) suggests that investments in economic infrastructure often delay immediate improvements in human development, particularly in regions where basic social services are underdeveloped. The negative correlation in ODAGS2 highlights the importance of complementing long-term infrastructure projects with targeted aid for health and education, which can generate more immediate social benefits.

Finally, ODA loans for infrastructure (ODALS1 and ODALS2), which typically involve long-term projects, may not have had enough time to show measurable effects on human development outcomes within the period studied. The nature of these loans—focused on infrastructure—could also delay benefits in key sectors like healthcare or education.

The Impact of Remittances and Governance Quality on HDI

Remittances (RET), political stability (PS), and government effectiveness (GE) do not exhibit statistically significant effects on HDI in ASEAN-9 countries during the research period. Several factors could explain this outcome. For remittances, their primary use in supporting household consumption rather than fostering long-term investments in education or healthcare may limit their impact on HDI within the ASEAN context. This contrasts with regions like Latin America, where remittances are often directed toward developmental purposes. Political stability and government effectiveness are structural factors whose benefits tend to accrue gradually over extended periods, becoming evident through governance reforms and sustained policy implementation. While these variables do not show immediate statistical significance, they remain integral to human development. Their potential influence on HDI, especially through indirect pathways such as enhanced institutional frameworks and economic resilience, underscores the need for further research to understand their roles in the ASEAN context.

The Impact of GDP per Capital on HDI

GDP per capita (logGDPPC) demonstrates a consistently strong positive relationship with HDI across all ASEAN-9 countries, corroborating findings from Pérez-Segura (2014) and Lee, Y. (2015). In countries such as Malaysia and Thailand, higher per capita incomes have facilitated significant improvements in human development outcomes by enabling greater investments in education, healthcare, and enhanced living standards. This emphasizes the pivotal role of sustained economic growth in fostering human development across the region, highlighting GDP per capita as a key driver of progress in ASEAN-9.

The Impact of Covid-19 Pandemic to HDI

The COVID-19 pandemic stands is a significant external shock that severely undermined human development across ASEAN-9. The pandemic disrupted healthcare systems, education, and economic activities, leading to widespread declines in HDI indicators such as life expectancy, income, and access to education. Cambodia and Myanmar were particularly hard hit, with overwhelmed healthcare systems and reduced access to essential services (WHO, 2023). In Cambodia, prolonged school closures affected over 3 million students, resulting in significant learning losses and threatening to reverse years of educational progress (UNICEF, 2022). At the same time, essential health services declined, exacerbating existing human development challenges (UNDP, 2020). In Indonesia, over 68 million students were affected by school closures, resulting in learning losses estimated to range from 0.9 to 1.2 years (Empatika, 2021). This disruption not only hindered academic progress but also impacted the psychosocial well-being of children. The healthcare system similarly struggled, as resources were diverted to manage the pandemic, straining essential services and further affecting HDI outcomes. This aligns with broader findings in the literature, such as Lee (2015), which emphasizes the vulnerability of human development to

external shocks and the importance of resilient healthcare and education systems. The negative impact of COVID-19 on HDI underscores the need for ASEAN-9 countries to invest in robust social safety nets and resilient health and education systems capable of withstanding future crises. Without such systems in place, countries remain vulnerable to future shocks, threatening to erode hard-won development gains.

Conclusions

The research sheds light on the complex relationship between foreign capital flows and the HDI in the ASEAN-9 countries. It reveals significant variations across these nations regarding HDI, foreign capital inflows, political stability, government effectiveness, and per capita income. The use of panel regression analysis deepens understanding of these dynamics, particularly concerning the impact of remittances on HDI, which, despite constituting a substantial portion of foreign capital inflows, do not exhibit an evident influence on human development.

The research also highlights the heterogeneous effects of ODA across different sectors, underscoring the importance of formulating targeted strategies to attract and effectively utilize ODA in specific fields. This emphasizes the need for policymakers to consider sector-specific approaches to promote human development within the ASEAN countries. It is crucial to tailor these strategies to the unique circumstances of each country, taking into account the considerable variation in the ODA-to-GDP ratio.

Furthermore, a focused approach becomes imperative given the declining trend in ODA sources, particularly for countries that have reached a medium-income level, such as Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Policymakers should prioritize ODA aid towards social and production infrastructure projects and ODA loans in other sectors like environmental protection and food security while reducing allocations for economic infrastructure projects. This targeted allocation of resources can actively support the development of populations in countries with a medium HDI, including Timor-Leste, Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar.

Based on the findings of this research, policymakers in ASEAN countries should adopt several key recommendations to maximize the positive impacts of foreign capital inflows and address the challenges identified in different sectors.

First, prioritizing FDI in sectors such as manufacturing and infrastructure is crucial. The research findings show that FDI has significantly promoted human development, particularly in Vietnam and Indonesia, where FDI has driven economic growth, job creation, and technological advancements. These investments have directly improved education and healthcare, critical components of HDI. Governments must focus on creating stable and transparent investment environments to fully leverage FDI's benefits. For countries with lower HDI, such as Myanmar and Cambodia, FDI should be directed toward upgrading healthcare and educational services. In contrast, countries with higher HDI, like Malaysia and

Thailand, should concentrate on maintaining and enhancing existing infrastructure to sustain their progress.

Second, the strategic allocation of ODA is critical for enhancing human development. This research demonstrates that ODA grants for social infrastructure (ODAGS1), particularly in Laos and Cambodia, have significantly improved healthcare and education, positively affecting HDI. However, ODA to less targeted sectors, such as environmental protection or disaster preparedness (ODAGSO), negatively affects HDI. Therefore, policymakers should ensure that ODA is channeled into sectors. Therefore, policymakers should ensure that ODA is channeled into sectors with direct impacts on human development, like education, healthcare, and social services, especially in lower-HDI countries, where addressing basic human needs is essential for achieving development goals.

Third, while ODA loans for other sectors (ODALSO) have positively impacted HDI, stricter oversight and accountability are required to ensure their effective use. Examples from Timor-Leste and the Philippines show that ODA loans for infrastructure projects, disaster recovery, and rural development have improved food security and contributed to long-term development. In maximizing these benefits, close monitoring and effective management of loans are necessary to ensure they foster sustainable human development.

Fourth, sustained economic growth, as indicated by GDP per capita, is a key driver of human development across ASEAN. Higher-income countries like Malaysia and Thailand have experienced better HDI outcomes due to consistent economic growth. Policymakers should promote sustainable growth by supporting small and medium enterprises (SMEs), improving labor productivity, and enhancing access to international markets. However, this growth must be coupled with reinvestment in social services, ensuring that rising incomes improve healthcare, education, and living standards.

Lastly, the significant negative impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on HDI highlights the urgent need for ASEAN countries to build resilient social safety nets and strengthen healthcare and education systems. The pandemic severely disrupts these sectors, particularly in Cambodia and Myanmar, where school closures and overwhelmed healthcare systems led to setbacks in human development. ASEAN countries must invest in robust social infrastructures capable of withstanding external shocks to prevent future crises from eroding development gains. This includes building comprehensive healthcare systems, improving access to quality education, and ensuring disaster preparedness to protect vulnerable populations.

ASEAN countries can significantly enhance human development outcomes by focusing on targeted FDI, optimizing ODA allocations, fostering sustainable economic growth, and building resilient social systems. Tailoring these strategies to the unique circumstances of each country ensures that foreign capital and aid flows contribute effectively to long-term, inclusive, and sustainable development across the region.

Thus, policymakers in the ASEAN countries should integrate the insights gained from this study to inform their decision-making. By understanding the nuances of foreign capital

flows, sector-specific impacts, and individual country contexts, policymakers can allocate resources more effectively and prioritize areas that lead to substantial and sustainable improvements in human development.

While this research provides valuable insights, several limitations must be acknowledged. The primary limitation is the time frame, which extends only until 2021 and may not capture more recent developments in foreign capital flows and ODA, particularly in the post-COVID-19 context. Extending the analysis in future research would offer a more comprehensive understanding of the long-term effects on HDI. Additionally, further research could benefit from sectoral disaggregation and the exploration of regional variations within ASEAN to assess the nuanced impacts of foreign capital flows. Although robustness checks are conducted, potential issues related to endogeneity and omitted variable bias remain areas for further investigation. Expanding the time frame and incorporating more granular data would deepen the understanding of these dynamics and provide a more detailed assessment of policy implications.

Acknowledgement

I would like to express my gratitude to the anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments and suggestions, which have significantly contributed to improving the quality of this paper.

About The Authors

Nguyen Thi Vu Ha, Ph.D., is the Head of the Department of International Finance at the Faculty of International Business and Economics, University of Economics and Business, Vietnam National University – Hanoi (VNU-UEB). She earned her Ph.D. in International Economics from VNU-UEB in 2014 and has over 20 years of experience in teaching and research. Her research and publications focus on topics such as exchange rates, financial and monetary cooperation, economic integration, capital flow management, official development assistance, and the digital economy. Email: hantv@vnu.edu.vn

References

Ahmad, F., Draz, M. U., Su, L., Ozturk, I., Rauf, A., & Ali, S. (2019). Impact of FDI inflows on poverty reduction in the ASEAN and SAARC economies. *Sustainability, 11*(9), 2565. https://doi.org/10.3390/su11092565

Ahn, H., & Park, D. (2019). Recipient countries' financial development and the effectiveness of ODA. *The Journal of Industrial Distribution & Business, 10*(1), 69-76. https://koreascience.kr/article/JAKO201915658233818.page

Anetor, F. O., Esho, E., & Verhoef, G. (2020). The impact of foreign direct investment, foreign aid, and trade on poverty reduction: Evidence from Sub-Saharan African countries. *Cogent Economics & Finance, 8*(1). https://doi.org/10.1080/23322039.2020.1737347

Baghirzade, N. (2012). *The impact of foreign direct investment on human development index in Commonwealth of Independent States* [Doctoral dissertation, Eastern Mediterranean University]. http://i-rep.emu.edu.tr:8080/xmlui/handle/11129/311

Blomström, M., & Kokko, A. (1998). Multinational corporations and spillovers. *Journal of Economic Surveys*, *12*(3), 247-277. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6419.00056

Burnside, C., & Dollar, D. (2000). Aid, policies, and growth. *American Economic Review, 90*(4), 847-868. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.90.4.847

Dunning, J. H. (1993). *Multinational enterprises and the global economy*. Addison-Wesley.

Empatika. (2021). *COVID-19 in Indonesia: Experiences of children and families*. UNICEF Indonesia. Empatika. https://www.empatika.org/projects/covid-19-in-indonesia%3A-experiences-of-children-and-families

Gökmenoğlu, K. K., Apinran, M. O., & Taşpınar, N. (2018). Impact of foreign direct investment on human development index in Nigeria. *Business and Economics Research Journal, 9*(1), 1-14.

Haddad, A. M. (2018). The impacts of the inwards and outwards FDI on the development measured by HDI: The case of United Arab Emirate. *International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues*, *8*(4), 301–312.

Interesse, G. (2024, March 14). *Vietnam's 2024 FDI landscape poised to see robust growth*. Vietnam Briefing. https://www.vietnam-briefing.com/news/vietnams-2024-fdi-landscape-opportunities-incentives-and-emerging-trends.html/

Jahjah, S., Chami, R., & Fullenkamp, C. (2003). Are immigrant remittances flows a source of capital for development? *IMF Working Paper*, *2003* (189). https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451859638.001

Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). (2023). *Laos*. JICA. https://www.jica.go.jp/laos/english/index.html

Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). (2024). *Timor-Leste*. JICA. https://www.jica.go.jp/easttimor/english/index.html

Jocson, L. M. J. C. (2023, August 30). *Philippines, JICA sign ¥30-billion loan deal*. BusinessWorld. https://www.bworldonline.com/top-stories/2023/08/30/542193/philippines-jica-sign-¥30-billion-loan-deal/

Lee, E., Kwangho, J., & Jinbae, S. (2019). Searching for the Various Effects of Subprograms in Official Development Assistance on Human Development across 15 Asian Countries: Panel Regression and Fuzzy Set Approaches. *Sustainability, 11*(4), 1152. https://doi.org/10.3390/su11041152

Lee, S., & Park, E. Y. (2024). Examining aid fragmentation and collaboration opportunities in Cambodia's health sector. *Globalization and Health, 20* (62). https://doi.org/10.1186/s12992-024-01063-7

Lee, Y. (2015). *Comparison study of disaggregated ODA and FDI impact on welfare of ODA recipient countries* [Master's thesis, KDI School of Public Policy and Management].

Nguyen, M. (2023, October 18). *Japan gives Vietnam biggest-ever ODA package*. Hanoitimes. https://hanoitimes.vn/japan-gives-vietnam-biggest-ever-oda-package-325109.html

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2023). *Data from Creditor Reporting System* (CRS). *OECD*. https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/serials/creditor-reporting-system-on-aid-activities_g1gha57a.html

Olcoz-Amaya, K. (2020). *Remittances and HDI.* [Unpublished master's thesis, University of the South]. https://dspace.sewanee.edu/items/0cce12fc-649f-4320-9c13-602bb3463ecb

Oxford Business Group. (n.d). *How can Indonesia increase its industrial output?* Oxford Business Group. https://www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/reports/indonesia/2020-report/economy/manufacturing-development-investment-reforms-and-labour-market-liberalisation-clear-the-way-for-expanded-industrial-output

Pérez-Segura, A. (2014). *FDI and human development: What is the role of governance?* [Honors thesis, University of Pennsylvania]

Reiter, S. L., & Steensma, H. K. (2010). Human development and foreign direct investment in developing countries: The influence of FDI policy and corruption. *World Development, 38*(12), 1678-1691. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2010.04.005

Tamer, C. R. (2013). *The effects of foreign direct investment and official development assistance on the Human Development Index in Africa* [Master's Thesis, University of Massachusetts Boston]. https://www.proquest.com/openview/264767681a246d810b5e46566f3d5591/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=18750

Thi Cam Ha, V., Doan, T., Holmes, M. J., & Tran, T. Q. (2024). Does institutional quality matter for foreign direct investment and human development? *Evaluation Review, 48*(4), 610-635. https://doi.org/10.1177/0193841X231195798

Topalli, M., Papavangjeli, M., Ivanaj, S., & Ferra, B. (2021). The impact of foreign direct investments on poverty reduction in the Western Balkans. *Economics*, *15*(1), 129-149. https://doi.org/10.1515/econ-2021-0008

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). (2020). *Project brief: Projected impacts of COVID-19 on the 2020 Human Development Index in Cambodia and* its neighbors. United Nations Development Programme.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). (2023). *Human Development Index (HDI)*. United Nations Development Programme. https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/documentation-and-downloads

United Nations & Development Partners. (2023). *Updated Common Country Analysis: Cambodia 2023*. Retrieved from https://minio.uninfo.org/uninfo-production-main/962f11aa-0f96-4923-8f83-01c2f40fbf60_Updated%20CCA%202023CAMBODIA.pdf

UNICEF. (2022). *Learning Loss Report: Cambodia*. UNICEF Cambodia. https://www.unicef.org/cambodia/reports/learning-loss-report

Ustubici, A., & Irdam, D. (2012). The impact of remittances on human development: A quantitative analysis and policy implications. *Economics & Sociology*, *5*(1), 74-95.

World Bank. (2024, March 15). *Urgent action needed to restore education funding in Lao PDR*. World Bank. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2024/03/15/urgent-action-needed-to-restore-education-funding-in-lao-pdr

World Development Indicator (WDI). (2023a). *Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$)*. World Bank Open Data. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD?view=chart

World Development Indicator (WDI). (2023b). *GDP per capita (current US$)*. World Bank Open Data. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD

World Development Indicator (WDI). (2023c). *Personal remittances, received (% of GDP)*. World Bank Open Data. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS

Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). (2023). *WGI dataset*. Worldwide Governance Indicators. https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/worldwide-governance-indicators

Rethinking Border Management: A Human Security Approach to Combating Human Trafficking in the Mekong Subregion

Firstyarinda Indraswari

Department of International Studies, The Graduate School of International Studies, Ewha Womans University, Seoul, South Korea 03670
Department of International Relations, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Brawijaya, Malang, Indonesia, 65145

fv.indraswari@ub.ac.id

How to Cite: Indraswari, F. (2024). Rethinking border management: A human security approach to combating human trafficking in the Mekong Subregion. *Journal of ASEAN Studies, 12*(2), 353-382. https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v12i2.11591

Abstract

The research examined the relationship between border regulations, human trafficking, and human security in the Mekong subregion. The research applied a qualitative case study methodology to analyze border management policies from 1993 to 2023, employing the first and second-generation human security concepts as a theoretical framework. By focusing on specific regulations and agreements within the Mekong Subregion, the research assessed their ability to address transnational threats such as human trafficking. The findings reveal that while political and economic dimensions dominate, critical aspects of human security—such as personal, environmental, and community security—are often overlooked. Only 23% of border regulations explicitly address human trafficking, reflecting the persistence of state-centric, first-generation approaches that prioritize sovereignty and economic interests over people-centered solutions. The second-generation human security framework highlights the need for a multidimensional, collaborative approach to border management. However, the research analysis shows that existing policies fail to fully integrate human security dimensions, leaving significant gaps in addressing systemic vulnerabilities. This research contributes theoretically by bridging human security concepts with international relations studies, offering a more comprehensive understanding of border management's role in combating human trafficking. Empirically, it critically evaluates policy gaps and their implications for regional governance. By integrating human security principles, border management frameworks in the Mekong Subregion can better address the root causes of human trafficking, providing both theoretical advancements and practical insights for policy development.

Keywords: Mekong Subregion, human security, border management, regulations

Journal of ASEAN Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2 (2024), pp. 353−382
P-ISSN 2338-1361/ E-ISSN 2338-1353
Received: 07th May 2024/ Revised: 23rd January 2025/ Accepted: 25th January 2025

Introduction

Equitable development covers urban areas in a country and ideally includes communities in border areas. Several empirical pieces of evidence show that the success of border management not only brings prosperity to local communities but also increases the intensity of the economy between countries (Scott & Liikanen, 2010; Carter & Goemans, 2018; Hastings & Wang, 2018; Vinokurov et al., 2022; Moorthy & Bibi, 2023). The Schengen visa, for example, has activated the mobility of people, goods, and services, improving the economy and more strategic cooperation relations (Popa, 2016; Felbermayr et al., 2018; European Commission, 2024). The management of the borders between the European Union (EU) member states enlivens the dynamics of the borders of each country.

In the Mekong Subregion, the cooperation among countries contributes to the economic growth. Between 1993 and 2018, the Mekong Subregion experienced an average annual economic growth rate of 6.3%, with Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita rising by 5% annually and intra-regional trade expanding 90 times over (Duong et al., 2020). Thailand has 59 projects valued at around US$ 16 million (Embassy of The People's Republic of China in the Kingdom of Thailand, 2023). The Great Mekong Subregion (GMS) programs had reached around $30 billion in 2024. The program connected over 1,000 km of railway lines and installed over 3,000 megawatts (Greater Mekong Subregion, 2023). The hydropower project also significantly accelerated energy trade among six countries for 10 years (2012-2022), achieving annual 5% of GDP growth (Shin & Lee, 2024). The mobility of people in the tourism sector peaked in 2019 at approximately 33.7 million before plummeting significantly in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic (ASEANStats, 2023).

On the other hand, the development in the Mekong Subregion also brought broader challenges. From an environmental perspective, hydropower projects harm farmers and fishermen from the upper to the lower Mekong basin. Additionally, uncontrolled development has led to land and water degradation, while deforestation and severe flooding pose ongoing threats to the region's member countries (Corrado et al., 2023; UNODC, 2019a). Furthermore, illegal drug trafficking has increased sharply along with various infrastructure development projects that have opened connections between countries. For example, in 2018, Thai law enforcement seized 17 times more methamphetamine than was confiscated over the entire previous decade (UNODC, 2019b). Based on the International Centre for Prize (ICPS), the female prisoners increased by an estimated 40% from 2000 to 2023 2013 (Walmsley, 2014. Lastly, the COVID-19 pandemic significantly decreased the number of tourism visitors within the subregion by over 99,66% from 1,538,767 in 2019 to just 5,222 in 2021 (ASEANStats, 2023).

Despite various mechanisms for countering human trafficking through the years, Mekong Subregion countries still face critical issues (Pearson et al., 2005; Surtees, 2017; Division of Anti-Trafficking in Persons (DATIP) & Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), 2019; UNODC, 2024). The research explores how border regulations in the Mekong subregion incorporate human security dimensions in addressing transnational issues, particularly human trafficking. Unlike previous research that primarily focuses on multilateral cooperation or specific sectors, such as natural resource management in the

Mekong region, this research aims to provide an empirical contribution by situating the human security framework more explicitly within border management policies in Southeast Asia. The novelty of this paper lies in its emphasis on integrating human security into border regulation, moving beyond traditional state-centric or crime-focused approaches.

The research argues that regulations built by each country or multiparty are still conducted with the mindset of economic development and neglect border and humanitarian aspects. National laws from each country barely consider human security frameworks as the baseline in formulating the act. Furthermore, bilateral and multilateral agreements do not protect migrant workers or victims of human trafficking at the border. Theoretically, the paper can provide input for expanding the analytical thinking framework related to more humane and comprehensive border management.

Literature Review and Analytical Framework

The research on human security places a "people-centered" approach at the core of its analysis. Over time, it evolves through two generations. The first generation, introduced by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), proposes dimensions of human security to provide more detailed and measurable indicators (UNDP, 1994). However, these seven indicators have proven challenging to fully implement in practice. Scholars have critiqued the fragility of this framework in addressing increasingly complex global issues, its inability to avoid the perception of liberal interventionism, and the irony of relying on state actors as the sole legal executors with binding authority. Another critique highlights the instructive nature of the framework, which is often promoted by developed countries and international regimes to developing nations (Booth, 2007; Grayson, 2008; JICA Ogata Sadako Research Institute for Peace and Development, 2022). It is difficult for developing countries to adapt, as they are frequently part of the root causes of insecurity due to their inability to fulfill their citizens' basic needs.

The concept of human security emerged from the need to protect civil rights and the state's right to defend its sovereignty. The United Nations (UN) developed the framework under the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), introducing seven dimensions of security with a development-oriented focus (UNDP, 1994). The sectors in question include economic, food, health, environmental, individual, community, and political security (UNDP, 1994). A few roots of insecurity in the seven sectors are used as the basis for action to promote human security. Table 1 shows types of human insecurity and the root of the problem according to the UNDP report.

Table 1 Type of Human Insecurity and the Root Causes based on UNDP

Type of Insecurity	Root Causes
Economic	Persistent poverty, unemployment, lack of access to credit and other economic opportunities
Food	Hunger, famine, sudden rise in food prices
Health	Epidemics, malnutrition, poor sanitation, lack of access to basic health care
Environmental	Environmental degradation, resource depletion, natural disasters
Personal	Phyisical violence in all its forms, human trafficking, child labor
Community	Inter-ethnic, religious, and other identity-based tensions, crime, terrorism
Political	Political repression, human rights violations, lack of rule of law and justice

Source: (UNDP, 1994)

Over time, human security has become a tool to justify various UN policies and the European Union (EU) in addressing global issues such as climate change, disease outbreaks, terrorism, and human trafficking (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 2008; United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, 2017). Within the collective security framework, human security has been brought into deeper realms, involving multiple actors—UN member states—acting together under agreed-upon humanitarian operations. However, these actions often maintain liberal-democratic hegemony favoring Western powers in regions deemed conflict-prone or developing areas labeled as weak states or even failed states (Newman, 2020; Martin & Owen, 2010). Another critique of the implementation of first-generation human security is its alignment with securitization, which has been subject to misuse by states. Stakeholders have politicized specific issues, framing society or individuals as threatened objects (Neocleous et al., 2011; Zedner, 2009; Chandler, 2008; Buzan, 2004) from external actors (Mateos & Dunn, 2021). At this securitization stage, human security is often used to justify extreme policies and as a pretext to override established norms and regulations. Consequently, even when such issues are successfully suppressed, minimized, or eliminated, their recurrence or worsening remains possible because the individuals involved are not provided with a sense of legal security or a sustained commitment to protection. Without addressing these gaps, the potential for instability and insecurity at borders will persist, undermining long-term solutions.

Martin and Owen (2010) propose a new concept of human security called the second-generation human security. While the first generation focused on protecting individuals from threats and fostering development, the second generation offered a system to support these efforts. Their work offers a more refined conceptualization of human security grounded in a post-liberal peace perspective. This concept has been further developed by the Human Security Study Group (2016), and Kaldor, Rangelov, and Selchow (2018).

Based on EU perspective, the concept of human security has been further developed against the backdrop of ongoing wars and conflicts in various parts of the world, which are

likely to affect European stability. New instruments are proposed, including multilateral diplomacy at multiple levels, a focus on impartial justice, smart sanctions involving local communities, adherence to international law, and efforts to combat corruption, predation, sectarianism, and impunity—prioritizing these over introducing neoliberal reforms. Civilian-based missions are also envisioned, combining humanitarian workers, human rights observers, legal experts, police, and military personnel when necessary, emphasizing the inclusion of both men and women (The Human Security Study Group, 2016).

Concerning border issues, The Human Security Study Group (2016) briefly discussed the formulation of border security policies during the 2015 refugee crisis. The group argued that these policies reflected the failure of European states to address the migrant crisis as a global issue that affects not only Europe but also other regions worldwide. Moreover, Suhrke (2003) has long criticized the securitization of borders to block the arrival of foreign migrants for fundamentally neglecting humanitarian principles.

Focusing on Europe and the EU, Kaldor et al. (2018) advance the concept of second-generation human security by addressing crises in 21st-century conflicts. Kaldor and colleagues sought to reinforce human security by positioning it as a practical strategy in response to global and regional conflicts. This strategy must originate from both local and international contexts rather than being purely instructive, as was criticized in the first-generation concept.

In this framework, international law is reinterpreted as an instrument that empowers local groups to reduce violence and enhance community security, protecting individual rights. In certain situations, international intervention may be necessary to achieve human security. When this occurs, the concept emphasizes the importance of community engagement and the ability to manage the interests of foreign and private actors involved.

This expanded framework also includes a broader range of grassroots actors, such as local activists, community leaders, women's groups, professional organizations, and critical intellectuals, aimed at transforming social conditions toward a hybrid peace. Collaborative initiatives to achieve this condition encompass political, economic, and security dimensions, cutting across local, national, regional, and global levels.

The concept of human security continues to generate debate, as its practical implementation has fallen short of achieving the outcomes envisioned by its advocates. Newman (2020) identifies key gaps, including the challenge of preserving the concept's original intent while ensuring tangible policy impacts despite its normative appeal and longstanding analytical weaknesses (Newman, 2004, 2010). He underscores the need to refocus human security on pressing global issues—such as armed conflict, disease prevention, and human trafficking—through interdisciplinary research and targeted policy efforts. To address these challenges effectively, future approaches should prioritize operationalizing policies over conceptual debates, positioning human security as a practical and ethical framework for addressing emerging global threats.

Despite advancements in human security discourses, Southeast Asia remains underexplored as an empirical focus, with much of the literature concentrating on regions like Europe, Africa, and the Balkans (Moyo et al., 2021; Panebianco, 2021, The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), 2006; United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 2008). Existing studies in Southeast Asia often adapt the UNDP's 1994 framework, examining the region's diverse political, economic, ethnic, and geographic contexts through issues like migration, human trafficking (Ford et al., 2012), and climate change (Elliott & Caballero-Anthony, 2013). The Association of South East Asia Nations (ASEAN) is viewed as a potential promoter of human security, though its principles of non-interference and consensus-building limit systematic integration of the concept, especially in areas like civil society mobility and refugee protection (Oishi, 2016). Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) also play a significant role in addressing community vulnerabilities (Carnegie et al., 2016). In the Mekong region, human security research primarily addresses non-traditional security issues, including environmental challenges, food security, health, transnational crime, and human trafficking (Chantavanich, 2020; Shimazaki, 2021). These partial analyses highlight the region's complex vulnerabilities and the multifaceted nature of human insecurity.

Previous research has highlighted the importance of collaborative roles for state and non-state actors, both domestically and externally, including community organizations, international governmental organizations (IGOs), and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) (Caballero-Anthony, 2004; UNODC Regional Office for Southeast Asia and the Pacific, 2023). These collaborations aim to maximize resources and ensure targeted outcomes. However, they also underscore the inability of states to meet the demands for human security enforcement. Unfortunately, agents within state governments, from central to local levels, are often complicit in perpetuating insecurity.

Several scholars have explored border regions as critical areas of vulnerability that contribute to human insecurity due to escalating conflicts among bordering entities. Borders are perceived as weak points for central government oversight, enabling the establishment of hubs for illicit economic activities such as casinos, human and goods smuggling, and money laundering (GI-TOC, 2023; Molland, 2012; Ullah & Hossain, 2011; Wagner, 2021). Johnson et al. (2020) propose guidelines to address human trafficking from the experience of five ASEAN countries, including Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam. The border check-up procedures help identify trafficking victims. Border police play an important role in rescuing and protecting the victims at the frontline before being referred to other government agencies to provide initial guidance.

Guo (2005, 2015) highlights the complexities of border management through a regime-based framework, categorizing approaches into cooperative management, joint management, and third-party trusteeship. While these regimes focus on resource-sharing and conflict resolution, their implications for human security remain underexplored. For instance, internet access in border areas, which Guo identifies as crucial, underscores the need for equitable access that aligns with human security goals, but further research is necessary to integrate these aspects into border management frameworks.

Scholars linking human security with border management often adopt issue-centered approaches, with human rights serving as a focal point and human security treated as a secondary concern (Fontana, 2021; Panebianco & Tallis, 2022). Current border frameworks prioritize state or institutional interests, leaving people-centered approaches largely absent. Policies like the EU's Dublin and Interoperability Regulations illustrate this disconnect, as they emphasize territorial security over human security, often at the expense of vulnerable populations, including refugees and children (Casagran, 2021; West et al., 2021).

In the Mekong subregion, borders are identified as hotspots for human trafficking due to inadequate border controls and weak victim support systems (Chantavanich, 2020; JICA, 2022;). Although initiatives such as the Coordinated Mekong Ministerial Initiative Against Trafficking (COMMIT) and the United Nations Action for Cooperation Against Trafficking in Persons (UN-ACT) have established standards for victim identification and repatriation, their implementation remains inconsistent. Although countries like Laos and Vietnam have bilateral frameworks, regional efforts still lack the integrated border management to address trafficking comprehensively (ASEAN, 2016a). Additionally, resistance from countries such as Cambodia and China to adopt international guidelines reflects broader challenges in aligning border policies with human security principles (Plümmer, 2022).

Debates surrounding the role of non-state actors in border management add another dimension to this issue. While IGOs, NGOs, and private entities promote human protection, their involvement often raises concerns about state sovereignty and the ethical management of personal data collected at borders (Ford & Lyons, 2013; ODIHR, 2021). These dynamics highlight the urgent need for a balanced approach that integrates human security into border governance while effectively addressing both state and non-state roles. The discourse shows a paradigm shift between the conceptualizations of first and second-generation human security. First-generation scholars emphasize a liberal perspective focusing on individual rights, whereas second-generation approaches have transformed to promote post-liberal values as an alternative to neoliberal reforms. Furthermore, the first generation relied heavily on states and supranational institutions to manifest the concept. In contrast, the second generation mobilized non-state actors such as civil society, stakeholders, and other multilateral participants to engage in long-term, sustainable processes.

While first-generation human security focused on preventive and mitigative measures against threats, the second generation extended its scope to include crisis management and reconstruction. In pursuing collaborative human security, international institutions such as the UN and the EU have become key units of analysis. Their attempts to institutionalize this concept internally and externally have been tested, yielding both positive outcomes and unintended consequences. However, there remains a need for more interdisciplinary studies that can explore the deeper internalization of human security, both in terms of policy and implementation, to ensure that all dimensions of individual human security are adequately protected.

Non-state actor involvement remains a dilemma. On one hand, these actors support governments in advancing human security. On the other, asymmetric dependency may

tarnish the image of the state. The capacities of nations and international organizations to address this issue vary significantly. For developed countries and well-established regional organizations like the EU, systematic proposals are carefully designed to incorporate non-state actors into formulating border regulations to safeguard human rights. The EU, for instance, strives to create a framework ensuring that third-party actors do not exceed their authority in managing borders. This framework includes regulating the handling of databases on individuals and goods crossing boundaries. However, such measures do not eliminate the risk of negative consequences, such as data breaches or misuse.

Developing countries, such as those in Southeast Asia, face significant challenges. Efforts to strengthen border management cooperation were only initiated in 2019 and have not resulted in specific regulations (ASEAN, 2024a). The current focus of such collaboration is predominantly aimed at combating transnational crimes, such as drug trafficking, human trafficking, and the illegal arms trade (ASEAN, 2024a; Johnson, et al., 2020), while mainly neglecting a people-centered approach. As part of Southeast Asia, the Mekong subregion is included in several cooperative action frameworks (ASEAN 2024b; Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia, 2021)

ASEAN has partnered with the EU to initiate regulatory frameworks under programs such as the EU-ASEAN Migration and Border Management Programme (ASEAN, 2016b). However, there has yet to be an integrative, region-wide regulation developed within the human security framework. Previous research on this issue have primarily been limited to the context of multilateral cooperation frameworks and specific sectors, such as the management of natural resources in the Mekong River Basin (Asian Development Bank, 2005; Campbell, 2016; Pitsuwan & Caballero-Anthony, 2014).

By examining the intersection of human security, border management, and human trafficking, this research bridges gaps in international relations scholarship that often separate these domains. The research provides a nuanced analysis of how Mekong Subregional cooperation, despite its current limitations, could evolve to align more closely with people-centered principles. Moreover, this research highlights the comparative challenges that developed countries in Southeast Asia face compared to more established regions like the EU, offering new insights into how international and regional organizations can address asymmetric dependencies and regulatory gaps. Through a content analysis of national and regional border management regulations, this research aims to deepen the discourse on how the principles of human security can be operationalized in a region where such integration remains underexplored.

Research Method

This research uses the qualitative method by focusing on case studies. Moreover, this research compares border management regulations at the national and regional levels, among countries, and between countries with international organizations. As Britannica (n.d) defined, regulation refers to the promulgation of targeted rules, typically accompanied by

some authoritative mechanism for monitoring and enforcing compliance. Regulations become essential instruments for the government to put in order all aspects within its territory and abroad, organize particular economic entities and activities, and maintain stability among diversity and heterogeneity (Chevallier, 2001; Olcese & Miranda, 2019). Feasible civilization will be preserved when the proper legal regulations are continuously produced and improved as the environment changes (Such-Pyrgiel et al., 2023).

A total of 40 regulations related to border management are collected from governmental and international government organizations (IGOs) websites of six Mekong countries. There are 23 national regulations, eight bilateral agreements and protocols, and nine multilateral agreements, including the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). Official reports from research institutes, non-governmental organizations, and journal articles are also gathered to support the research. The document analyzes using content analysis methods (Schereier, 2012). By classifying regulations and agreements based on seven dimensions of human security by UNDP, the research starts by making the coding analysis baseline to determine whether it has been filled with the context of human security. Creating scales are used as the supporting tool for analysis. Three scaling ranges are provided as the guideline to categorize whether the regulation has met the indicators of each UNDP's human security dimensions. A scale of 0 denotes the complete absence of a dimension, 0.5 reflects partial inclusion, and 1 indicates full incorporation. In the next stage, the analysis explores to what extent the regulation meets the dimension's indicators and whether the regulations have accommodated efforts to combat human trafficking in the Mekong Subregion. Additional references, such as official report documents from government agencies and databases in each country, supported the investigation. Information from the Great Mekong Subregion database and academic reviews from journal articles enriched the findings.

Analysis

This section analyzes border management regulations and human trafficking issues from a human security perspective, with the Mekong subregion countries as case studies. It introduces border management regulations, produced nationally by six countries in the Mekong subregion, and some multilateral agreements for further analysis. The analysis focuses on two main points. First, assessing the availability of human security dimensions within these regulations and evaluating how well the articles align with the indicators of the UNDP's human security framework. The seven dimensions, central to the first-generation human security discourse, are used as the main element promoted globally. The section also explores how these regulations are interpreted through the second-generation human security perspective. Second, examining the extent to which these regulations have effectively addressed human trafficking issues. Findings and discussion enrich this section by capturing the pattern of border management regulations in the subregion and how they can be improved to complete the core of human security principles and resolve the threats in human trafficking and other potential threats ahead.

Border Management in The Mekong Subregion

The Mekong River is one of the strategic natural resources that connects five Southeast Asian countries with one major country in the East Asia region. Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, and China are the member countries of the Mekong subregion. In 1992, these countries agreed to develop their multi-party cooperation with the assistance of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), which was later known as The Mekong Subregion (GMS) (Asian Development Bank, 2005; Greater Mekong Subregion, 2024). Since then, land and water connectivity has developed, including border zones. This chapter examine the transformation of border management by each country under specific regulations. The regulations collected included national regulations and bilateral/multilateral involved state and non-state actors. Not all rules founded directly or specifically revolve around borders.

Laos

Regarding border management, Laos has several regulations for managing its land and rivers. The law on road transportation was published in 1997 to accommodate business activity (VERTIC, 1997). The updated Customs Law was released four years later, which stated the border as the place for goods mobility checkpoints, replacing the 2005 Customs Law (VERTIC, 2011). Other decrees were issued in 2015 and 2018 (Bank of The Lao P.D.R., 2014; Lao People's Democratic Republic, 2015; Ministry of Public Works and Transport, Lao PDR, 2019; VERTIC, 2021). Unfortunately, these two decrees only included administrative border management regulations. Arrangements for the entry and exit of people, goods, and services are regulated in it.

There is a special decree for managing the trade zone in Dansavanh, which has been in force since 2002 (Nouansavanh, 2010). In this Decree on the Dansavanh Border Trade Zone, some articles specifically regulate the movement of people in and out of Vietnam, which borders Laos in the east. Certain regulatory bodies at the local level have the authority to issue permits to enter and exit the area. Unique permit cards are issued to help identify the mobility of Vietnamese citizens (World Trade Organization, 2002). Meanwhile, with the Thai government, Laos signed an MoU on handling the issue of human trafficking (UN Women, 2013). Laos also received foreign assistance from Japan in designing energy supply projects to support cross-border development from 2014-2019 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2012).

In a multilateral scope, the cooperation framework of the Great Mekong Subregion (GMS), Laos and Thailand is connected through a bridge infrastructure project that connects Khammouane Province in Laos with Nakhonephanom Province in Thailand (Nouansavanh, 2010). Further expansion of cooperation is directed at energy, telecommunications, tourism, agriculture, environmental maintenance, human resource development, investment, and trade promotion (Nouansavanh, 2010). Apart from the GMS, other cooperation frameworks focus on providing alternative funding sources to realize land connectivity in the Southeast Asian region. The Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy

(ACMECS) was formed in 2018 by Laos, Thailand, Myanmar, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Unfortunately, this collaboration was a vacuum due to initiatives from the United States, China, South Korea, and India trying to hook these countries separately (Thalang et al., 2023).

Unfortunately, the orientation of border management in Laos is still dominated by the need to build infrastructure. The aspect of human security has not become a priority concern. The MoU on handling human trafficking faces challenges because the costs to be incurred by prospective migrant workers from Laos to Thailand are still relatively expensive, which is around 18,000 baht. These funds are used to take care of agency fees, additional costs upon arrival in Thailand, residence permit fees, costs for purchasing work application forms, medical examination fees, and transportation costs from the border to the destination workplace (Chalamwong, 2011).

Thailand

Meanwhile, border management in Thailand is no less complex. This country, which is the destination of legal and illegal migrant workers from neighboring countries, must think hard to reduce the high number of transnational crimes, which, among others, occur in border areas. From the 1990s to 2011, Archavanitkul and Hall (2011) identified a few efforts made by the Thai government in dealing with the issue of human trafficking, especially the sector of low-skilled illegal migrant workers. Several laws were published and implemented nationally to prevent and deal with this issue. Those are the 1996 Prostitution Prevention and Suppression Act, Labor Protection Act BE 2541 (1998), the 1997 Act concerning Measures to Prevent and Suppress Trafficking in Women and Children, the 2008 Alien Employment Act B.E. 2551, and the 2008 Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act B.E. 2551 (Chalamwong, 2011).

Within bilateral cooperation, Thailand entered MoU with neighboring countries such as Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and China. These MoUs seek to prevent and protect the human rights of migrant workers (Chalamwong, 2011). Unfortunately, according to Chalamwong (2011), this MoU has not been effective in dealing with human trafficking and border management issues. Lengthy and complicated procedures, low staff capacity, high cost of recruiting migrant workers, strict regulations in sending countries, and the lack of experience of migrant workers in the company environment are some of the obstacles they face. It is suggested to improve rules, strict law enforcement, and advocate more effective cross-border management by involving non-governmental organizations. Strengthening cooperation between countries through bilateral and regional cooperation is also another prescription.

Dialogue with international institutions such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) shows Thailand's seriousness in managing borders (UNODC, 2022). All parties are committed to strengthening the border office network within the ASEAN Border Management Cooperation Roadmap framework. This cooperation framework between UNODC and ASEAN includes support for capacity building and preparing a better policy framework in border management. Thailand is noted to have 28 offices spread across the region bordering Myanmar, Laos, and Thailand. The activities include exchanging

intelligence information between neighboring countries, which has been carried out for years. The decline in illegal drug transactions is claimed as the success of this collaboration.

Besides state-to-state cooperation, Thailand has also tried collaborating with the social community to address migrant issues at the border. The government coordinates with civil society, including the Keng Tung MRC and the FOCUS Foundation, to pursue better foreign labor rights (International Labour Organization, Australian Aid, and Canada, 2023). However, the obstacle may remain because migrants still face difficulties obtaining new passports or other legal documents to support their legal existence across the border.

Myanmar

Myanmar's government faces a more complicated situation. The country's political and government conditions are fragile and are still dominated by the military junta. The Myanmar Special Economic Zone Law 2014 only informed the border as a gateway for international economic activity (Myanmar Law Information System, 2018). The current law was published by the government in 2022. The Myanmar Police Force Law mentions borders as the areas that need to be protected by special forces to prevent transnational organized crime threats. As a result, police forces are stationed on the border, collaborating with International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and other International organizations (Myanmar Centre for Law and Democracy, 2022).

All illegal migrant workers who come to Thailand, 80-90 percent come from Myanmar (Chalamwong, 2011). Most of those who cross are ethnic minorities in Myanmar who are afraid of the government's military action that discriminates against them. Even though there is a Ministry of Border Affairs, which legally has progressive tasks and programs, it focuses more on efforts to raise awareness of nationalism internally (Myanmar National Portal, n.d.). The flow of trade that crosses Myanmar's border areas benefits traders regardless of using formal or informal channels. Aung (2009) shows the critical role of informal liaison at the border. They are considered capable of turning the wheels of the economy and contributing to the lives of people around the border (Aung, 2009). The Martial Law No.8/2023 declaration also put people in townships near Thailand's borders, making it hard to cross the border (NPNews, 2023).

Bilaterally, Myanmar signed a border security protocol with China in 1997. This protocol regulates security movements at the border to prevent criminal acts (Ministry of Foreign Affairs People's Republic of China, 2018). Myanmar also signed an MoU with Thailand in 2003 to manage the flow of migrant workers. However, its implementation is questionable because of the high number of illegal Myanmar migrants who enter neighboring countries (McGann, 2013). Thailand receives support from Australian NGOs for handling the border related to the issue of increasing refugees from Myanmar to their country due to the political crisis that never subsided. This support includes managing refugee tents, providing food and health services, and providing vocational education (AusAid, 2012). However, landmines along the border between Thailand and Myanmar still exist, making the situation still dangerous (UNHCR, 2024).

China

The Beijing government released the Exit and Entry Administration Law in 2012 to manage the mobility of entry and exit people. Border management aspects are controlled in the context of people and goods inspections. The central government allows the provinces and autonomous regions that border with other countries to formulate local regulations and rules to manage the flow of residents in both areas under Article 90 (National Immigration Administration The People's Republic of China, 2012). In 2021, China tightened its border regulation by issuing the Land Border Law. This law is the first Chinese regulation focusing on governing the land border (NPC Observer, 2021; Wei, 2021). Furthermore, this law is enacted in response to the emergence of 122 illegal hubs along the northern Myanmar-China border, which became hotspots for drug trafficking, human trafficking, and prostitution (Gong, 2023). The law provides a detailed explanation of central government authority and the mechanism of intra-coordination among agencies at the multilevel. The central government gives certain a degree of flexibility in the border management toward local governments, but there's no standardization of border regulation and facilities (Plümmer, 2022).

Cambodia

The Cambodian government's attention to the border was established in the Law on Immigration published in 1994. The legislation manages the movement of foreigners living along the borders who have met specific requirements (World Trade Organization, 1994). The Cambodian government received the initiative proposed by the Chinese government to strengthen the community. After the summit meeting between the two leaders in early 2023, both agreed to address human rights advancement by fulfilling people's basic needs and countering the politicizing of human rights issues. Border management also stated the scope of countering illegal gambling, drug trafficking, and human trafficking. Exchange and sharing of information between officials is conducted under the China-Cambodia Law Enforcement Cooperation and Coordination Office (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (MFAIC) Kingdom of Cambodia, 2023). This border issue can be considered new in the meeting agenda since the 2018 Joint Communique between the two governments did not raise it (Press and Quick Reaction Unit, 2018).

Vietnam

Vietnam's government had detailed regulations about borders so far among Mekong subregion countries. In 2004, regulation related to national security was released. Border areas such as land, sea, and air must be controlled with special measures. The border guards and civil officers were assigned and responsible for administrative and security purposes (International Commission on Jurists (International Commission on Jurists (ICJ), 2004). The Regulations on Land Border Gate was formulated in 2005 to manage the economic activity on the border. The mechanism for entry and exit of people and goods for export-import transactions is regulated in this decree (VERTIC, 2005). The following legislation released in

2014 complemented previous legislation published in 1997, 2001, and 2003 (Thu Vien Phap Luat, 2019; Văn Bản Pháp Luật, 2017). It regulated the activities of people and vehicles, and the responsibility for construction (Food and Agriculture Organization of The United Nations, 2014). Moreover, it put more concern on protecting the border areas from mismanagement of people activities. The environmental preservation aspect comes together with the prevention effort from illegal actions and transnational organized crime. The 2020 Law was released to strengthen the border defense. This regulation governed border management from peaceful to critical situations. International political aspects were also included with the involvement of the international community in managing borders through peaceful means (Vietnam Law & Legal Forum Magazine, 2021). At the multilateral level, China, Vietnam, and Cambodia signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to counter human trafficking in their region in 2004.

Discussion

Based on Guo's border management framework (Guo, 2005, 2015), countries in the Mekong Subregion exhibit varying levels of cooperation. Laos demonstrates level 2 cooperation, involving information exchange and occasional low-level meetings with Thailand. However, Thailand reaches level 4, regularly coordinating with neighbors and UNODC to manage and protect transboundary resources. In contrast, Myanmar, marked by conflict and negative cross-border impacts, remains at level 1, with minimal collaboration. None of the three countries implement claims-based joint management, relying on crisis-based approaches to address transnational crime. At the same time, only Thailand incorporates community-based resource management through partnerships with Australian NGOs. Despite having basic legal frameworks for border management, operational guidelines involving non-state actors are lacking, and bilateral agreements often fail in practice. Weak political stability, economic disparities, and precarious livelihoods render border areas vulnerable to threats like human trafficking, with victims frequently detained due to unclear legal statuses (Zimmerman, 2014).

From 1993 to 2023, Mekong Subregion countries enacted 40 national, bilateral, and multilateral border management regulations, with Laos and Vietnam leading in national-level frameworks. National regulations dominate, reflecting a state-centric approach focused on sovereignty and internal policy alignment. Bilateral agreements remain minimal, with Laos being slightly more active due to its landlocked position. Multilateral cooperation, though underrepresented across individual countries, gains prominence in the Mekong Subregion's four agreements with external actors, emphasizing international collaboration in addressing transnational organized crimes, such as human and drug trafficking.

The region prioritizes agreements with ASEAN, UNODC, and ADB, balancing infrastructure development with efforts to combat cross-border crime. However, the low participation in bilateral and multilateral agreements highlights gaps in regional cooperation. The reliance on national regulations and limited multilateral engagement indicates the need for more cohesive, people-centered policies to address shared challenges like economic

integration and human trafficking. External actors' involvement underscores the potential for greater international collaboration to enhance regioal border governance and human security. Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of border-related regulations across the Mekong Subregion countries (1993–2023), categorized into national, bilateral, and multilateral frameworks.



Figure 1 Regulation related Border of the Mekong Subregion Countries (1993-2023)

Sources: Collected by Authors from Various Resources



Figure 2 Timeline of Regulations Related Border Published by the Mekong Subregion Countries (1993-2023)

Source: Collected by Authors from Various Resources

Figure 2 displays the timelined border-related regulations in the Mekong subregion (1993–2023), highlighting the influence of historical and regional events on policy development. A regulatory peak between 1996 and 2000 coincided with the region's transition from economic growth to the 1997 financial crisis. During this period, Thailand spearheaded initiatives focused on transportation and human security, exemplified by the formation of the Human Security Network. This period also saw the adoption of four national, two bilateral, and three multilateral agreements, signaling growing awareness of cross-border challenges.

From 2016 to 2023, regulatory developments reflected pre and post COVID-19 pandemic. Pre-pandemic efforts prioritized connectivity, such as border checkpoints and transportation infrastructure. However, in the post-pandemic years, the focus shifted to border security, driven by rising transnational threats like drug trafficking. During 2017–2021, methamphetamine seizures in East and Southeast Asia accounted for 44% of global distribution, highlighting the urgent need for strengthened border controls (UNODC, 2023a). Additionally, the 2021 military coup in Myanmar further intensified regional vulnerabilities, with border areas becoming hubs for illicit activities and refugee crises (UNODC, 2023b).

Despite the implementation of these regulations, human trafficking remains a significant challenge in the Mekong Subregion. By 2022, trafficking cases exceeded the global average by two points, aligning with global trends of increasing victim counts, which reached approximately 115,000 in 2022 (Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2023; Statista, 2023a; Statista, 2023b). This timeline underscores the need for more effective implementation of border management policies to balance regional connectivity and transnational security.

Based on The United Nations Trafficking in Persons (UN TIP) Protocol and the United States Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA), most of the countries in the Mekong subregion scored with Tier 3 for the last decade (2013-2023). A Tier 3 score indicated that the government is still considered to have not met the minimum standard of TVPA (U.S. Departement of State, 2024). There have been periods when assessments placed some countries on the Tier 2 Watch List (2WL), which means the country has made significant attempts to comply with the TVPA's standard but still has not yet fully achieved the standardization. There were no active or progressive efforts when the cases of human trafficking increased from 2022 to 2023. The highest-ranking position ever reached by Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam was Tier 2. Despite the failure to reach the minimum standard of TVPA, these countries were still acknowledged for their efforts to comply with the standard (United States Department of State, 2023).

The failure of governments to improve this situation is rooted in several factors, such as fragile institutional infrastructure and widespread corruption among government officials, both at the central and local levels, particularly along the borders (UNDP, 2017). Insufficiency in criminal justice reform worsened the condition (Ropes & Gray, 2021; UNODC, 2019). Governments tend to focus more on addressing external perpetrators while neglecting the systemic issues within institutions that perpetuate the persistence of the problem. Table 2 shows the dynamic status of the trafficking in-person index.

Table 2 Trafficking in Person Index of Mekong Subregion Countries 2013-2023

No.	Country	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
1	Cambodia	2WL	2WL	2WL	2	2	2	2WL	2WL	2WL	3	3
2	China	3	2WL	2WL	2WL	3	3	-	3	3	3	3
3	Lao PDR	2	2WL	2WL	2WL	2WL	3	2WL	2	2	2	2
4	Myanmar	2WL	2WL	2WL	3	2WL	3	-	3	3	3	3
5	Thailand	2WL	Tier 3	3	2WL	2	2	2	2	2WL	2	2
6	Vietnam	2	2	2	2	2	2	2WL	2WL	2WL	3	2WL

Source: (US Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, 2024)

Note:
WL: Watch List

The social welfare indices in three countries, such as Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia have not improved much over time. Domestic political instability adds to society's vulnerability. About 85% of cross-border movement from Laos to the outside is illegal (UN Women, 2013). In 2006-2010, the number of illegal migrant workers from Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia who entered Thailand ranged from 500,000 to 1 million people.

In dealing with the issue of illegal migrant workers and human trafficking, border control has not been one of the major investment sectors among numerous efforts from academic and practitioner perspectives. The need for multi-actor involvement in border security proposed by Niyomrerks, the Deputy Permanent Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs Thailand (Border Management Conference, 2010). The need for multi-actor involvement in border security is proposed by Niyomrerks, the Deputy Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Thailand (Border Management Conference, 2010). The protective procedure on personal documents check-ups at the border checkpoint, especially for children, is also part of the NGO's concern as they become easy targets for this crime (World Vision Australia, 2014). The presence of Border Liaison Offices supports the identification of human trafficking cases and raises closer inter-state engagement to address it. Furthermore, bilateral cooperation mechanisms, such as the Border Cooperation on Anti-Trafficking in Persons, also conducted between Myanmar and Thailand (Division of Anti-Trafficking in Persons (DATIP) & Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). However, Division of Anti-Trafficking in Persons (DATIP) and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) (2019) also revealed the challenges arising from numerous agreements, policies, and guidance from the cooperation.

The proportion of regulations and agreements in the Mekong Subregion and its international partnerships that explicitly address human trafficking as a threat and provide mechanisms to combat it reveals a stark disparity. Only 23% of the regulations and agreements directly address human trafficking. So, less than one-fourth of the policy frameworks in the Mekong Subregion explicitly recognize human trafficking as a significant threat or include specific mechanisms to address it. The remaining 77% of the regulations and agreements do not address human trafficking directly. These policies likely prioritize broader issues such as trade facilitation, economic development, or cross-border movement of goods

and people, often sidelining critical human security concerns. Considering that the Mekong Subregion is a hotspot for human trafficking, the limited number of regulations targeting this issue highlights a significant policy gap. This lack of focus undermines efforts to to protect vulnerable populations and combat transnational crimes effectively.

The small percentage of regulations addressing human trafficking reflects a potential misalignment between regional and international priorities. This underscores the need for more vital collaboration between Mekong countries and their global partners to develop comprehensive frameworks integrating human trafficking prevention and protection mechanisms. Figure 3 presents an analysis of border regulations in the Mekong Subregion based on the seven dimensions of human security as defined by UNDP. Moreover, Figure 3 compares the total regulations (blue line) with elements of all human security dimensions (orange line), using a scale where 0 indicates the absence of any dimension, 0.5 represents partial inclusion, and 1 represents full inclusion.



Figure 3. Regulation's Analysis of the Mekong subregion Borders based on 7 UNDP's Human Insecurity Dimensions

Source: Author

The analysis of border regulations in the Mekong Subregion highlights critical gaps in integrating the seven UNDP human security dimensions. Political and economic security dominate, reflecting a state-centric approach driven by governance and trade priorities. Political dimensions focus on territorial protections and coordination mechanisms among actors but neglect the civilian impacts of disputes, such as Rohingya refugees being forced back into Myanmar by Thai authorities (Human Rights Watch, 2023). Bribery, such as the

15,000-baht fee for smuggling or trafficking persons (Duncan, 2022), further undermines personal security.

Health-related regulations in the region remain reactive, emerging temporarily during crises like the COVID-19 pandemic (Laocharoenwong, 2020). While ADB-supported projects in Laos emphasize disease prevention and health protection (Asian Development Bank, 2010), healthcare policies still exclude undocumented migrants, leaving survivior of human trafficking in precarious situations (Ropes & Gray, 2021). Female migrant workers face cultural barriers to reproductive healthcare, influenced by beliefs about karma (Brase, 2020). Moreover, competition among ex-trafficking victims further complicates anti-trafficking efforts (UNODC, 2019a). While infrastructure projects, like the China-Vietnam adaptive mechanism, contribute to economic security (Speelman, 2022), protections for migrant workers remain inadequate, allowing illegal labor markets to persist at borders. Food security is also inadequately addressed, as dams disrupt essential ecosystems for agriculture and fisheries in the Mekong River. Comprehensive public health policies are needed to protect biodiversity, food security, and livelihoods along the Mekong River (Manohar et al., 2023; Park, 2022).

Community security is strained by social inequalities and informal networks sustaining trafficking at the Thailand-Laos border. While shared tribal identities reduce internal conflict, illegal migration and social disparities contribute to rising criminality and systemic harm. Trafficking victims often become brokers, perpetuating exploitation (Molland, 2012; Senawong, 2019). This condition reflects a lack of inclusive regulatory framework to harmonize border communities. Environmental security suffers from weak regulations and law enforcement, with ecological damage from hydropower projects and rising sea levels. Vietnam's environmental policies lack enforcement mechanisms for restoration after infrastructure development (Ly et al., 2023; Triet et al., 2020). Personal security remains a major concern, particularly for over 90,000 refugees on the Thailand-Myanmar border, facing violence, blocked aid, and statelessness due to the ongoing Junta conflict (ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR), 2024; Nyunt & Ric, 2019). Additionally, shifting Chinese policies near the Vietnam border force migrant workers to adapt continuously, creating further instability (Speelman, 2022). These issues highlight the critical need for personal security protections in border policies.

These findings emphasize transitioning from state-focused, economically driven frameworks to a multidimensional, people-centered approach. By addressing these insecurities and fostering multilateral partnerships, such as those suggested by Molland (2019), the Mekong Subregion can better tackle transnational challenges like trafficking and border governance. This transformation requires inclusive governance involving diverse actors under a second-generation human security framework, ensuring sustainable and equitable border management.

Conclusion

The border regulations analysis in the Mekong Subregion underscores a critical need to transition from the predominantly state-centric and economically driven frameworks of the first generation of human security to the transformative, people-centered agenda of the second generation. By addressing the multidimensional insecurities affecting individuals, fostering multilateral partnerships, and prioritizing the inclusion of non-state actors, the Mekong Subregion can develop border management policies that truly reflect the principles of human security. This shift will not only strengthen the region's capacity to address transnational issues like human trafficking but also contribute to building sustainable and equitable governance systems.

The Mekong Subregion, situated at the heart of Southeast Asia, presents unique challenges and opportunities for advancing border management and human security compared to regions like Europe. While European integration, exemplified by the European Union (EU), operates within a more structured institutional framework that prioritizes human rights, regional governance in Southeast Asia—particularly through ASEAN—follows a principle of non-interference and often prioritizes state sovereignty. This contrast shapes how border management and human security are conceptualized and implemented in the Mekong subregion.

This research, rooted in the Mekong Subregion, contributes to expanding multidisciplinary approaches by addressing the intersection of human trafficking, border management, and human security. By examining these issues through an Asian lens, the study highlights the importance of aligning border policies with human security dimensions in regions where state sovereignty remains dominant. It also seeks the potential of regional mechanisms, such as ASEAN, to incorporate human security principles while respecting the cultural and political dynamics of the region.

The Mekong Subregion represents a vital yet underexplored context for advancing human security in border management. The research, grounded in Asian perspectives, underscores the importance of tailoring human security frameworks to the region's unique socio-political and cultural contexts. By addressing the limitations of state-centric approaches and embracing the multidimensional nature of human security, future policies, and research can contribute to creating more equitable, inclusive, and sustainable frameworks for addressing transnational challenges like human trafficking. Through these efforts, the Mekong subregion has the potential to serve as a model for integrating human security principles into border management in a way that respects regional diversity while advancing global human security goals.

Future research could compare the Mekong Subregion's border management and human security approaches with those of other regions, such as Europe, Africa, or Latin America. This would highlight unique regional challenges and opportunities while identifying transferable best practices. Comparative research related to assessing human trafficking regulations from human security approaches or border management perspectives is also crucial, as this analysis has not yet been explored comprehensively in this paper.

About The Authors

Firstyarinda Indraswari is a doctoral researcher in the International Studies Department at Ewha Womans University, Seoul, South Korea. Her research focuses on city diplomacy, examining the role of local governments in international relations. She is also a lecturer at Universitas Brawijaya, Malang, Indonesia. Beyond city diplomacy, her research interests include border management, terrorism, and radicalization.

References

Archavanitkul, K., & Hall, A. (2011). Migrant Workers and Human Rights in a Thai Context. In *Thailand Migration Report 2011 Migration for development in Thailand: Overview and tools for policymakers*. International Organization for Migration Thailand, Thailand.

ASEAN. (2024a). *Border Management Overview.* ASEAN. https://asean.org/our-communities/asean-political-security-community/peaceful-secure-and-stable-region/border-management/

ASEAN. (2024b). *ASEAN Cooperation Plan to Tackel Illicit Drug Production and Trafficking in the Golen Triangle 2020-2022*. ASEAN. https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/ASEAN-Cooperation-Plan-2020-2022-ADOPTED.pdf

ASEAN. (2016a). *Regional Review on Laws, Policies and Practices within ASEAN Relating to the Identification, Management and Treatment of Victims of Trafficking, especially Women and Children*. The ASEAN Secretariat.

ASEAN. (2016b, November 3). *ASEAN, EU Cooperation Spotlights Border Security*. ASEAN. https://asean.org/asean-eu-cooperation-spotlights-border-security/

ASEANstats. (2023). *Visitor Arrival to ASEAN Member States by Orgin Countries (in Person): Host Country KH, LA, MM, TH, VN Source Country:KH,LA,MM,TH,VN,CN*). ASEANstats. https://data.aseanstats.org/visitors

ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR). (2024*). Fact-Finding Mission: Humanitarian Aid to the Thai-Myanmar Border.* https://aseanmp.org/publications/post/fact-finding-mission-humanitarian-aid-to-the-thai-myanmar-border

Asian Development Bank. (2010*). Lao people's democratic Republic: Sustainable growth and integration.* Asian Development Bank.

Asian Development Bank. (2007). *Development Effectiveness Brief: Greater Mekong Subregion*. Mandaluyong City: Asian Development Bank. https://www.adb.org/publications/greater-mekong-subregion-development-effectiveness-brief

Asian Development Bank. (2005). *Mekong countries sign agreements to open borders.* https://www.adb.org/news/mekong-countries-sign-agreements-open-borders

Aung, W. S. (2009). *The role of informal cross-border trade in Myanmar*. https://www.isdp.eu/content/uploads/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2009_set-aung_the-role-of-informal-cross-border-trade.pdf.

AusAID. (2012). *Australia's assistance to refugees on the Thai-Myanmar border*. https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/thai-myanmar-border-assistance-refugees.pdf

Bank of The Lao P.D.R. (2014). *Unofficial Translation Law on Foreign Exchange Management*. https://www.bol.gov.la/en/fileupload/14-06-2019_1560480906.pdf

Booth, K. (2007). *Theory of world security*. Cambridge University Press.

Border Management Conference. (2010). *Summary report 1st conference on technical cooperation & capacity building for border management*. https://cb4ibm.iom.int/bmic7/assets/documents/4thBMC-Report.pdf

Britannica. (n.d). Regulation. *In Britannica.com encyclopedia*. Retrieve May 5th2024, from https://www.britannica.com/topic/regulation

Buzan, B. (2004). A reductionist, idealistic notion that adds little analytical value. *Security Dialogue, 35*(3), 369– 370. https://doi.org/10.1177/096701060403500326

Caballero-Anthony, M. (2004). Re-visioning human security in Southeast Asia. *Asian Perspective*, 28(3), 155-189.

Campbell, I. C. (2016). Integrated management in the Mekong River Basin. *Ecohydrology and Hydrobiology*, *16*(4), 255–262. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecohyd.2016.09.003

Carnegie, P. J., King, V. T., & Ibrahim, Z. (2016). Human insecurities in Southeast Asia. Springer Nature. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-2245-6

Carter, D. B., & Goemans, H. E. (2018). International trade and coordination: Tracing border effects. *World Politics*, 70(1), 1–52. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887117000284.

Casagran, C. B. (2021). Fundamental rights implications of nnterconnecting migration and policing databases in the EU. *Human Rights Law Review*, *21*(2), 433–457. https://doi.org/10.1093/hrlr/ngaa057

Chalamwong, Y. (2011). Management of cross-border low-skilled workers in Thailand: An update. *TDRI Quarterly Review*, *26*(4), 12–20.

Chandler, D. (2008). Human security: The dog that didn't bark. *Security Dialogue*, *39*(4), 427–38.

Chantavanich, S. (2020). Thailand's challenges in implementing anti-trafficking legislation: The case of the Rohingya. *Journal of Human Trafficking*, *6*(2), 234–243. https://doi.org/10.1080/23322705.2020.1691825

Chevallier, J. (2001). La régulation juridique en question. *Droit et société*, 49(3), 827-846. https://doi.org/10.3917/drs.049.0827

Corrado, R., Liwan. A., and Korwatanasakul, U. (2023). Environmental Issues in the Mekong River Region: A Mitigation Model Based on Information and Communications Technology. In Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (Eds), *Dialogues on Connectivity between Europe and Asia: The Next Gen EU-ASEAN Think Tank Dialogue* (pp. 89-118).

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia. (2021). *ASEAN and Mekong*. https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/development-cooperation-fact-sheet-asean-and-mekong.pdf

Division of Anti-Trafficking in Persons (DATIP) & Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). (2019). *The 9th Mekong regional workshop: Towards well-knit net of assistance for*

victims of trafficking in the Greater Mekong sub-region: Learning from the bilateral and regional cooperation experiences [workshop]. Project on Capacity Development on Assisting Victims of Trafficking in the Greater Mekong Sub-Regional Countries, Bangkok, Thailand.

Duncan, K. (2022, 16 September). *News Report: Thai-Burma Border Bribery*. DVB. https://english.dvb.no/thai-burma-border-bribery/

Duong, N. A., Hang, D. T. and Thanh, V. T. (2020). Mekong subregion: Development and cooperation status. In *Subregional development strategy in ASEAN after COVID-19: Inclusiveness and sustainability in the Mekong Subregion (Mekong 2030)* (pp. BP1–BP23). Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia

Elliott, L., & Anthony, M. C (Eds.). (2013). *Human security and climate change in Southeast Asia*. Routledge Taylor & Francis Group.

Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Kingdom of Thailand. (2023, 20 March). *Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Benefits Its Six Members and China and Thailand Are to Write a New Chapter Together*. http://th.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/ztgx/zxdt/202312/t20231219_11206882.htm

European Commission. (2024). *Migration and affairs: Schengen*. European Commision. https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/schengen-borders-and-visa_en

Felbermayr, G., Gröschl, J. and Steinwachs, T. (2018). The trade effects of border controls: Evidence from the European Schengen agreement. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 56(2), 335–351. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12603.

Fontana, I. (2021). The human (in)security trap: How European border(ing) practices condemn migrants to vulnerability. *International Politics*, *59*, 465–484. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-020-00268-y

Food and Agriculture Organization of The United Nations. (2014). *Decree on promulgating the regulation on land border areas of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam* https://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/vie167780.pdf

Ford, M., & Lyons, L. (2013). Outsourcing border security: NGO involvement in the monitoring, processing and assistance of Indonesian nationals returning illegally by sea. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, *35*(2), 215–234.

Ford, M., Lyons, L., & Schendel, W. (Eds.). (2012). *Labour migration and human trafficking in Southeast Asia*. Routledge.

Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. (2023). *Organized crime in the Mekong: Briefing series*. https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/Organized-crime-in-the-Mekong-Briefing-series-GI-TOC-August-2023-1.pdf

Gong, X. (2023, October 1). *The Mekong region is a test of China's global development and security model*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/12/01/mekong-region-is-test-of-china-s-global-development-and-security-model-pub-91144

Grayson, K. (2008). Human security as power knowledge: The biopolitics of a definitional debate. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, *21*(3), 383– 401.

Greater Mekong Subregion. (2024). *About the Greater Mekong Subregion Program*. Greater Mekong Subregion. https://greatermekong.org/g/about

Greater Mekong Subregion. (2023). *GMS Program Infographics: 30 Years*. Greater Mekong Subregion. https://greatermekong.org/gms-program-infographics-30-years

Greater Mekong Subregion. (2019). *MoU on the Initial Implementation of the Agreement between and among the Governments of the Kingdom of Cambodia, the People's Republic of China, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, the Kingdom of Thailand, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam for the Facilitation of Cross-Border Transport of Goods and People at Myawady, Republic of the Union Myanmar and Mae Sot, Kingdom of Thailand*. https://www.greatermekong.org/sites/default/files/MYA-T%20IICBTA%20MoU%20signed%2013Mar19.pdf

Guo, R. (2015). *Cross-border management theory, method and application*. Springer Berlin.

Guo, R. (2005). *Cross-border resource management: Theory and practice*. Elsevier.

Hastings, J. V. & Wang, Y. (2018). Informal trade along the China-North Korea border. *Journal of East Asian Studies*, 18(2), 181–203. https://doi.org/10.1017/jea.2018.4

Human Rights Watch. (2023, November 29). *Thailand: Recent refugees pushed back to Myanmar*. Human Right Watch. https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/11/29/thailand-recent-refugees-pushed-back-myanmar

International Commission on Jurists (ICJ). (2004). *Law on National Security of Socialist Republic of Vietnam*. https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/VietNam-Law-on-National-Security-2004-eng.pdf

International Labour Organization, Australian Aid, and Canada. (2023). *TRIANGLE in ASEAN. Quarterly Briefing Note: Myanmar*. ILO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific

JICA Ogata Sadako Research Institute for Peace and Development. (2022). *Human security today: Revisiting Human Security, No.1 2022*. https://www.jica.go.jp/Resource/jica-ri/publication/booksandreports/jveaq800000071xq-att/Human_Security_Today_EN_20221031.pdf

Johnson, L.S., McAdam, M., Surtees, R., & Zulbahary, T. (2020). *Trafficking victim protection frameworks in Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Thailand, and Viet Nam: a resource for practitioners*. NEXUS Institute and Winrock International.

Kaldor, M., Rangelov, I., & Selchow, S. (2018). *EU global strategy and human security: Rethinking approaches to conflict*. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315104232

Lao People's Democratic Republic. (2015). *Law on Immigration and Foreigner Management of the Lao PDR*. Ministry of Public Security in cooperation of Department of Law Propaganda, Training, Ministry of Justice.

Laocharoenwong, J. (2020). *Critical nature: COVID-19, health borders, and the purity of the Thai Nation*. CSDS Faculty of Political Science Chulalongkorn University. https://www.csds-chula.org/publications/2020/6/2/critical-nature-covid19-health-borders-and-the-purity-of-thai-nation

Ly, S., Sayama, T., & Try, S. (2023). Integrated impact assessment of climate change and hydropower operation on streamflow and inundation in the lower Mekong Basin.

Progress in Earth and Planetary Science 10, 55, 1-20, https://doi.org/10.1186/s40645-023-00586-8

Manohar, S., Downs, S., Shaikh, S., Mak, S., Sok, S., Graham, E., Miachonf, L., & Fanzoa, J. (2023). Riverine food environments and food security: A case study of the Mekong River, Cambodia. *Bulletin of the World Health Organization*, *101*(2), 140-148. https://doi.org/10.2471/BLT.22.288830

Martin, M., & Owen, T. (2010). The second generation of human security: Lessons from the UN and EU experience. *International Affairs*, *86*(1), 211–224. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2010.00876.x

Mateos, N. R., & Dunn, T. J (Eds.). (2021). *Handbook on human security, borders and migration*. Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.

McGann, N. (2013). *The opening of Burmese borders: Impacts on migration*. Migration Policy Institute. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/opening-burmese-borders-impacts-migration

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (MFAIC) Kingdom of Cambodia. (2023). *Joint Statement between the Kingdom of Cambodia and the People's Republic of China on Building a Cambodia-China Community with a Shared Future in the New Era.* Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Kingdom of Cambodia. https://www.mfaic.gov.kh/posts/2023-02-11-Press-Release-Joint-Statement-between-the-Kingdom-of-Cambodia-and-the-People-s-Republic-of-China-on-Building-a-Cam-09-16-11

Ministry of Foreign Affairs People's Republic of China. (2001). *Protocol between the Ministry of Public Security of The People's Republic of China and The Ministry of Home Affairs of The Union of Myanmar on cooperation in border areas*. http://treaty.mfa.gov.cn/tykfiles/20180718/1531876993474.pdf

Ministry of Public Works and Transport, Lao PDR. (2019). *Laos Trade Facilitation: Current on Cross Border Transport Connectivity Infrastructure.* ESCAP-UNCTAD Workshop on Promoting Structural Economic Transformation in Asian-Pacific Landlocked Developing Countries. Bangkok, Thailand, 4-7 November 2019. https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/Session%205_Lao%20PDR.pdf

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2012). *Country Assistance Policy for Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR)*. https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000103003.pdf

Molland, S. (2019). On Trafficking survivors: Biolegitimacy and multiplications of life. *Dialectical Anthropology*, *43*(3) 279-293. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10624-019-09557-2

Molland, S. (2012). Safe migration, dilettante brokers and the appropriation of legality: Lao-Thai "trafficking" in the context of regulating labour migration. *Pacific Affairs*, *85*(1), 117-136. https://doi.org/10.5509/2012851117

Moorthy, R. & Bibi, S. (2023). Water security and cross-border water management in the Kabul River Basin. *Sustainability*, 15(1), 792. https://doi.org/10.3390/su15010792

Moyo, I., Laine, J.P., & Nshimbi, C.C (Eds.). (2021). *Intra-Africa migrations reimaging borders and migration management*. Routledge.

Myanmar Centre for Law and Democracy. (2022). *The Myanmar Police Force Law: The State Administration Council Law No. (4/2022)*. https://www.law-democracy.org/live/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/English-Translation-of-Myamar-Police-Law.pdf

Myanmar National Portal. (n.d.). *Ministry of Border Affairs*. Myanmar National Portal https://www.myanmar.gov.mm/ministry-of-border-affairs

Myanmar Law Information System. (2014). The Myanmar special economic zone law 2014. Myanmar Law Information System https://www.mlis.gov.mm/mLsView.do?lawordSn=9563

National Immigration Administration the People's Republic of China. (2019). *Laws and Regulations_National Immigration Administration*. National Immigration Administration. https://en.nia.gov.cn/n147418/n147458/index.html

Neocleous, M., & Rigakos, G. S (Eds.). (2011). *Anti- Security*. Red Quill Press.

Newman, E. (2020). Human Security. In F. O. Hampson, A. Özerdem, & J. Kent (Eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Peace, Security and Development* (pp. 33-44). Routledge.

Newman, E. (2010). Critical human security studies. *Review of International Studies, 36*(1), 77–94

Newman, E. (2004). A normatively attractive but analytically weak concept. *Security Dialogue,* 35(3), 358– 359.

NPC Observer. (2021). *The People's Republic of China - Land borders law*. NPC Observer. https://npcobserver.com/legislation/land-borders-law

NPNews. (2023). *Breaking news: SAC imposes martial law in regions/states*. https://npnewsmm.com/news/63dbca444bf60440bb11b358

Nouansavanh, K. (2010). Lao PDR Perspectives and Policies toward GMS. *Ritsumeikan International Affairs*, *8*, 17–30.

Nyunt, H.S., and Ric. (2019). *Becoming migrants and losing citizenship rights after the coup - a study of Myanmar migrants in Mae Sot, Thailand*. Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion. https://www.institutesi.org/pages/reimagining-the-social-contract-of-citizenship-in-myanmar

Oishi, M. (2016). Can ASEAN cope with "human insecurity" in Southeast Asia? In search of a new ASEAN way. *Human Insecurities in Southeast Asia*, 103-119.

Olcese, T., & Miranda, R. (2019). The Notion of Regulation in Internacional Law. *Latin American Journal of Trade Policy, 2*(4), 20-33. https://doi.org/10.5354/0719-9368.2019.54585

OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). (2021). *Border management and human rights*. The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/f/a/499777.pdf

Park, E. (2022). *Environmental issues in the Mekong Delta: Drivers, consequences, and management outlooks*. Geography Unit, Humanities Branch, Ministry of Education Singapore.

Panebianco, S. (2022). Human security at the Mediterranean borders: Humanitarian discourse in the EU periphery. *International Politics*, *59*(3), 428–448. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-021-00316-1

Panebianco, S., & Tallis, B. (2022). Special issue on "shifting borders of European (in) securities: Human security, border (in)security and mobility in security." *International Politics*, *59*, 399–409. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-022-00375-y

Pearson, E., & Mekong Sub-regional Project to Combat Trafficking in Children and Women. (2005). *The Mekong challenge human trafficking: Redefining demand.* International Labour Organization.

Pitsuwan, S., & Caballero-Anthony, M. (2014). Human security in Southeast Asia: 20 years in review. *Asian Journal of Peacebuilding*, *2*(2), 199–215.

Plümmer, F. (2022). Contested administrative capacity in border management: China and the Greater Mekong Subregion. *China Information*, *36*(3), 407-429. https://doi.org/10.1177/0920203X221103053

Popa, C. E. (2016). The challenges of the Schengen area. *Expert Journal of Economics*, *4*(3), 96–104.

Press and Quick Reaction Unit. (2018). *Joint communique between the Kingdom of Cambodia and the People's Republic of China*. Press and Quick Reaction Unit https://pressocm.gov.kh/en/archives/21867 .

Ropes & Gray. (2021). *Pandemic impact on human trafficking in the greater Mekong sub-region*. Ropes & Gray. https://www.ropesgray.com/en/insights/viewpoints/102h3ld/pandemic-impact-on-human-trafficking-in-the-greater-mekong-sub-region

Schereier, M. (2012). *Qualitative content analysis in practice*. SAGE Publication.

Scott, J. W., & Liikanen, I. (2010). Civil society and the "Neighbourhood" - Europeanization through cross-border cooperation? *Journal of European Integration*, *32*(5), 423–438. https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2010.498628.

Senawong, M. (2019). Producing affective performance and capital: Lao migrant women in the sex industry along the Thai-Lao border. Journal of Mekong Societies, 15(1), 62-86.

Shimazaki, Y. (2021). *Human trafficking and the feminization of poverty: Structural violence in Cambodia.* Rowman & Littlefield.

Shin, N., & Lee, S. (2024). Energy trade in the Greater Mekong Subregion: Evaluating impacts of the Mekong power grid on hydropower development in the Mekong River Basin. *Journal of Korean Association of Thai Studies 30(*2), 195-227. https://doi.org/10.22473/kats.2024.30.2.007.

Speelman, T. (2022). Guest workers and development-security conflict: Managing labour migration at the Sino-Vietnamese border. *China Information*, *36*(3) 363-384. https://doi.org/10.1177/0920203X221098546

Statista. (2023a). T*otal number of human trafficking victims identified worldwide from 2008 to 2022.* Statista. https://www.statista.com/statistics/459637/number-of-victims-identified-related-to-labor-trafficking-worldwide/

Statista. (2023b). *Number of human trafficking victims identified worldwide in 2023, by region.* Statista. https://www.statista.com/statistics/459646/number-of-victims-identified-related-to-human-trafficking-worldwide-by-region/

Such-Pyrgiel, M., Gołębiowska, A., & Prokopowicz, D. (2023). Human security as an element of the concept of sustainable development in International law. *Journal of Modern Science, 52*(3), 39-61. https://doi.org/10.13166/jms/173159

Suhrke, A. (2003). Human security and the protection of refugees. In E. Newman & J. van Selm (Eds.), *Refugees and Forced Displacement: International Security, Human Vulnerability and the State* (pp 93-108). United Nations University Press.

Surtees, R. (2017). *Supporting the Reintegration of Trafficked Persons. A Guidebook for the Greater Mekong Sub-Region.* NEXUS Institute.

Thalang, C., & Patchimnan, A. (2023, May 27). *Rethinking ACMECS amidst changing regionalism in Southeast Asia*. Heinrich Böll Stiftung Southeast Asia. https://th.boell.org/en/2023/05/27/rethinking-acmecs-regionalism-southeast-asia

The Human Security Study Group. (2016). *From Hybrid Peace to Human Security: Rethinking EU Strategy towards Conflict*.

The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region. (2006). *Development of border zones and promotion of human security*. The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region. https://icglr.org/ova_doc/development-of-border-zone-and-promotion-of-human-security/

Thu Vien Phap Luat. (2019). *National border law socialist Republic of Vietnam*. https://thuvienphapluat.vn/van-ban/Bo-may-hanh-chinh/Law-06-2003-QH11-national-border-429118.aspx

Triet, N. V. K., Dung, N. V., Hoang, L. P., Le Duy, N., Tran, D. D., Anh, T. T., Kummu, M., Merz, B., & Apel, H. (2020). Future projections of flood dynamics in the Vietnamese Mekong Delta, *Science of the Total Environment*, *742*, 1-26, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2020.140596

Ullah, A. A., & Hossain, M. A. (2011). Gendering cross-border networks in the Greater Mekong Subregion: Drawing invisible routes to Thailand. *ASEAS-Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies*, *4*(2), 273–289. https://doi.org/10.14764/10.ASEAS-4.2-5

UNDP. (2017). *United Nation Action for cooperation against trafficking in persons: Annual progress report 2017*. https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/migration/asia_pacific_rbap/RBAP-DG-2018-UN-ACT-Annual-Progress-Report-2017.pdf

UNDP. (1994). *Human development report 1994*. United Nations Development Programme Human Development Report. https://hdr.undp.org/content/human-development-report-1994

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. (2008). *Human security: Approaches and challenges*. STEDI MEDIA.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee (UNHCR). (2024). *2024 Refugee preparedness and response plan: Thai-Myanmar Border*.

UNODC Regional Office for Southeast Asia and the Pacific. (2023, June 29). *INTERVIEW: Policing one of the world's 'biggest drug trafficking corridors.* United Nations. https://www.unodc.org/roseap/en/2023/06/biggest-drug-trafficking-corridors/story.html

UNODC. (2024). *Transnational organized crime in the Pacific: Expansion, challenges and impact* (Issue October). https://www.unodc.org/roseap/uploads/documents/2024/TOCTA_Pacific_2024.pdf

UNODC. (2023a). *World drug report 2023*: *Contemporary issues on drugs*. United Nations.

UNODC) (2023b. *IOM and UNODC release new guidance to help combat human trafficking through data*. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. https://www.unodc.org/unodc/frontpage/2023/October/iom-and-unodc-release-new-guidance-to-help-combat-human-trafficking-through-data.html

UNODC. (2022, May 5). *UNODC and Thailand hold high-level national border management dialogue.* United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. https://www.unodc.org/roseap/en/2022/05/thailand-high-level-national-border-management-dialogue/story.html

UNODC. (2019a). *Transnational organized crime in Southeast Asia: Evolution, growth, and impact*. United Nations on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Regional Office on Southeast Asia and the Pacific.

UNODC. (2019b). *Synthetic drugs in East and South-East Asia: Trends and patterns of amphetamine-type stimulants and new psychoactive substances*. United Nations on Drugs and Crime.

United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security. (2017, August 9). *Strengthening Human Security in the Border Communities of Turkana, Kenya*. United Nations. https://www.un.org/humansecurity/hsprogramme/strengthening-human-security-in-the-border-communities-of-turkana/

UN Women. (2013). *Sending Countries: Southeast Asia Lao PDR*. https://asiapacific.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/Field%20Office%20ESEAsia/Docs/Misc/2013/migration_hub/Lao_PDR_Policies_Regulations_Governing_Asian%20pdf.pdf

US Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons. (2024). *Trafficking in Persons Report.* U.S. Department of State. https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/

Văn Bản Pháp Luật. (2017). *Ordinance on Border Guard*. Văn bản pháp luật https://vanbanphapluat.co/ordinance-no-55-1997-l-ctn-of-march-28-1997-on-border-guard

VERTIC. (2021). *Decree on Border Checkpoint and International Airport*. Verification Research, Training and Information Centre. https://www.vertic.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/LA_Decree-on-border-airport_2018_EN.pdf

VERTIC. (2011). *Lao People's Democratic Republic peace independence democracy unity prosperity: Customs Law (revised version*). Verification Research, Training and Information Centre. https://www.vertic.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/LA_Customs_Law_2011.pdf

VERTIC. (2005). *Decree of the government: Regulation on land border gate Socialist Republic of Vietnam*. Verification Research, Training and Information Centre. https://www.

vertic.org/media/National%20Legislation/Vietnam/VN_Regulation_on_Land_Border_Gate.pdf

VERTIC. (1997). *Decree of the President of the Lao People Democratic Republic on the Promulgation of the Land Transport Law*. Verification Research, Training and Information Centre. https://www.vertic.org/media/National%20Legislation/Laos/LA_Land_Transport_Law.pdf

Vietnam Law & Legal Forum Magazine. (2021, April 14). *Law on Vietnam Border defense*. Vietnam Law & Legal Forum Magazine. https://vietnamlawmagazine.vn/law-on-vietnam-border-defense-37677.html

Vinokurov, E., Ahunbaev, A., Babajanyan, V., Berdigulova, A., Fedorov, K., Kharitonchik, A., Malakhov, A., Pereboev, V., Usmanov, N., & Zaboev, A. (2022). The Economy of Central Asia: A Fresh Perspective. *Eurasian Development Bank Reports and Working Papers, 22*(3).

Wagner, J. (2021). *Border management in transformation: Transnational threats and security policies of European states*. Springer.

Walmsley, R. (2014). *World female imprisonment list* (3rd ed). World Prison Brief

Wei, C. (2021, October 26). *NPCSC adopts new laws on family education and land borders, amends audit law & authorizes new regulatory and military reforms*. NPC Observer. https://npcobserver.com/2021/10/npcsc-adopts-new-laws-on-family-education-and-land-borders-amends-audit-law-authorizes-new-regulatory-and-military-reforms/

West, C. D., Stokeld, E., Campiglio, E., Croft, S., Detges, A., Duranovic, A., West, C.D., Stokeld, E., Campiglio, E., Croft, S., Detges, A., Duranovic, A., von Jagow, A., Jarząbek, Ł., König, C., Knaepen, H., Magnuszewski, P, Monasterolo, I., & Reyer, C. P. O. (2021). Europe's cross-border trade, human security and financial connections: A Climate risk perspective. *Climate Risk Management*, *34*. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crm.2021.100382

World Vision Australia. (2014). *The vulnerability report: Human trafficking in the Greater Mekong Sub-region*. Word Vision Australia.

World Trade Organization. (2002). Lao People's Democratic Republic Peace Independence Democracy Unity Prosperity: Decree on Dansavanh Village border trade zone. World Trade Organization https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/lao_e/WTACCLAO5A1_LEG_7.pdf

World Trade Organization. (1994). The National Assembly Kingdom of Cambodia Law on Immigration: *The compendium of Cambodian laws*. World Trade Organization https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/khm_e/wtacckhm3a3_leg_44.pdf

Zedner, L. (2009) *Security*. Routledge.

Zimmerman, C. (2014). *Health and human trafficking in the Greater Mekong Subregion*. International Organization for Migration.

Regional Identity and Lingua Franca in the ASEAN Region: A Comparative Study of Indonesian and Malay

Ahmad Sirulhaq[1]* and Muh Ardian Kurniawan[2]

[1]Department of Languages and Arts, Faculty of Teacher Training and Education, Universitas Mataram, Mataram, Indonesia 83125
[2]Linguistics Study Program, School of Postgraduate, Universitas Pendidikan Indonesia, Bandung, Indonesia 40154

[1]ahmad_haq@unram.ac.id; [2]ardianmuhammad@upi.edu
*Corresponding author

How to Cite: Sirulhaq, A., & Kurniawan, M. A. (2024). Regional identity and lingua franca in the ASEAN region: A comparative study of Indonesian and Malay. *Journal of ASEAN Studies, 12*(2), 383-412. https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v12i2.9582

Abstract

Indonesian and Malay share a common ancestral origin. After being separated nearly a century ago, the trajectories of these two languages have diverged significantly. While Indonesian has experienced rapid growth, Malay has lagged. Amid discussions about establishing a lingua franca in the ASEAN region, both languages have been proposed as potential candidates. However, despite prolonged debate, progress in this direction has faced challenges. Neighboring Malay-speaking countries advocate for Malay as the ASEAN lingua franca, while Indonesia actively promotes Indonesian. This research aimed to examine the evolution of Malay in the Archipelago or ASEAN region while demonstrating why Indonesian is a more suitable candidate for lingua franca status than Malay. The research applied qualitative methods, specifically an integrative-critical review and a netnographic approach. The findings reveal that both language share roots in a 7th-century Southeast Asian lingua franca, which was later modernized during colonialism and played a pivotal role in regional trade. This shared historical legacy continues to influence the collective identity of ASEAN Linguistically, Indonesians have developed more complex markers than Malay, reflecting Indonesia's dynamic sociocultural evolution. These features align with universal language principles, facilitating precise and efficient communication. Additionally, sociolinguistic and geopolitical advantages have bolstered Indonesia's prominence, leading to its adoption in foreign education and UNESCO recognition. In contrast, Malay has not achieved comparable milestones.

Keywords: identity, ASEAN, Indonesian, Malay, lingua franca

P-ISSN 2338-1361/ E-ISSN 2338-1353
Received: 10th February 2023/ Revised: 28th January 2025/ Accepted: 18th February 2025

Introduction

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established in Bangkok in 1967 by five Southeast Asian nations: Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, and the Philippines. The declaration issued by the five nations was composed in English. The ASEAN bloc currently has 10 member countries: Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Brunei Darussalam, and Vietnam. The region has varied geographical features, political systems, cultural traditions, and linguistic diversity. Most countries in the ASEAN region share a common historical foundation, particularly with Malay identity, culture, language, and religion (Collins, 2017; Gil, 2024; Maharam, 2021; Safari et al., 2024). This historical foundation is intrinsically linked to the strategic position of Southeast Asian countries at the crossroads of maritime routes. The region has historically enabled cultural exchange and economic relations since the rise of colonial powers (Ayuso-Díaz, 2022).

Despite a relatively harmonious relationship, ASEAN countries have experienced fluctuations in their relations. This is partly because of territorial disputes among ASEAN countries (Putten et al., 2011), for example, territorial disputes between Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, China, and Taiwan in the South China Sea (Raharjo, 2011). In addition, relations between Malaysia and Indonesia have often become heated over claims to border areas on the islands of Sipadan and Ligitan (Nabilla, 2022; Putra & Afrizal, 2016; Rochmawati et al., 2022). Moreover, former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Muhammad claimed Indonesia's Riau Islands as part of Malaysian territory (Reditya, 2022). In 1962, under President Diosdado Macapagal, the Philippines also claimed the Sabah region as its territory. The claim continued under the leadership of President Ferdinand Marcos (Kadir, 2024).

Moreover, disputes between ASEAN countries often occur in the cultural sphere (Curaming, 2022; Dollah, et al., 2024; Guan & Suryadinata, 2007; Mahayana, 2010; Selo et al., 2015; Weintraub, 2013). Some ASEAN countries claim some existing cultural arts as theirs. For example, in 2008, Thailand and Cambodia had a dispute over the ownership of the Preah Vihear Temple (Mohtar,2023). This led to a political conflict that affected the bilateral relations between the two countries. In addition, some of Indonesia's cultural arts are also often claimed by Malaysia, such as *wayang kulit* (shadow puppet performance), *rasa sayange* song, *batik* clothes, *reog ponorogo* art performance, *rendang* food, *angklung* art performance, *pendet* dance, and *kuda lumping* dance (Lahitani, 2015).

Some territorial and cultural disputes show that the bonds of solidarity among ASEAN countries are still very fragile. As a result, the strengthening of the bonds of brotherhood still needs to be pursued. The researchers believe that one way to build a collective consciousness among ASEAN countries is to build or establish a linguistic identity. However, it is notable that ASEAN countries still tend to use English as their lingua franca or working language instead of using their native language in the ASEAN region. Indeed, the role of English in promoting a common identity and sense of belonging among member states is unclear and far removed from the historical spirit of Southeast Asian countries that have been under colonial rule for a long time (Lee, et al., 2022, 2023). In addition, the ASEAN region is home to thousands of local languages—approximately 1,200-1,300 local languages if all unique local

languages are added together—including Malay (*Bahasa Melayu*) and Indonesian (*Bahasa Indonesia*) (Kirkpatrick, 2010). Given this linguistic diversity, the research raises the question of which languages deserve to be the lingua franca of identity in the ASEAN region.

Most of the official languages in ASEAN countries are part of the Austronesian (Malay-Polynesian) language family. Two of them, namely Khmer (Mon-Khmer branch) and Vietnamese (Viet-Muong branch), are from the Austroasiatic family (Ethnologue, n.d.). Therefore, these two languages cannot represent ASEAN's regional identity. Meanwhile, Thai and Lao (Kam-Tai branch) belong to the Kra-Dai group, which is more closely related to the languages of China (Sino-Tibetan family) than the native languages of Southeast Asia. As a result, these languages are somewhat distanced from the motherland of Southeast Asian languages. Furthermore, the scripts used by Khmer and Thai do not use the familiar Latin script. This condition makes it difficult for these languages to represent ASEAN's regional identity. Enfield (2019) even refers to these languages as mainland Southeast Asian languages. This provides an even stricter boundary as it confronts mainland Southeast Asia with the islands (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, Brunei Darussalam and Timor Leste).

Furthermore, based on a typological perspective, the languages of mainland Southeast Asian have complex language characteristics. The characteristics of Austronesian languages are agglutinative, while the languages of mainland Southeast Asia are isolative and flexional, with rich in suprasegmental phonemes (tones). Austronesian languages, by contrast, are not familiar with suprasegmental phonemes. If tone languages are emphasized, it takes adjustments for speakers of other languages to adapt to the typical language. Even when compared to the number and distribution of speakers, other languages in ASEAN still fall far behind Indonesian and Malay. This disparity causes the formation of regional identity to narrow down to two potential languages, namely Indonesian and Malay.

Indonesian and Malay are descended from a common ancestor. There has been a long evolution from the emergence of Malay to the emergence of Indonesian. Although Indonesian is much younger than Malay, using it as a lingua franca in the Southeast Asia is more appropriate. On that basis, this research aims to explain the evolution of Malay in the archipelago or ASEAN region; and explain why Indonesian deserves to be proposed as a lingua franca in the ASEAN region.

Language and Regional Identity: A Theoretical Framework

The identity of a multinational region is often complex and diverse. This complexity is due to the unique historical, cultural, and socio-political dynamics of each country in the region. The frequent crises in the Balkan region, for example, which includes countries such as Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, are partly triggered by language issues. Linguistic cleavages are endemic in the Balkans and have long been a symptom of and a cause of ethnic animosity (Greenberg, 2004; Hranova, 2002; Skendi, 1975). At the same time, despite their history and tensions, these countries share a common language, cultural traditions, and economic ties (Akova & Kantar, 2021; Citaku, 2024; Plantak & Paleviq, 2022). This shared

identity as Balkan countries is further strengthened by their collective efforts to address regional challenges such as political instability and economic development (Hudson, 2010). Indeed, the dynamics of language and regional identity in the Balkans are shaped by a combination of historical legacies, sociopolitical changes, and cultural exchanges. However, the region's linguistic diversity and the role of language in national and regional identity formation highlight the complex and evolving nature of the Balkans' cultural landscape. Language plays a crucial role in shaping national and regional identities. The codification and standardization of languages often reflect nationalistic ambitions and efforts to consolidate national identity (Jordan, 2019; Skendi, 1975).

Language as an identity and unifying factor not only applies as a link between countries in a particular region but also plays a crucial role in determining the ties that exist between regions within a country. This can be seen in the relationship between the Catalonia region in Spain. The issue of the lingua franca in Catalonia is nuanced and multifaceted, shaped by historical, political, social, and cultural dynamics. It raises a question of which language will serve as the common medium of communication in a region where multiple languages coexist, with Catalan and Spanish being the two dominant ones. Over the years, Catalan has been promoted as the region's primary language, while Spanish remains the dominant language of communication across Spain.

In Catalonia, Catalan is the language of choice in public administration, media, and education, but due to the diverse immigrant population, Spanish is the lingua franca (Boix-Fuster & Sanz, 2008). By actively promoting the use of Catalan in schools, government institutions, and everyday life, the people of Catalonia maintain a strong connection to their cultural and historical traditions. This language revival has not only helped to strengthen their regional identity but has also been a form of resistance in attempts to suppress their autonomy and distinctiveness (Canga, 2019; Woolard, 2005). Therefore, the separatist movement or referendum that Catalonia carried out in 1917 under the Spanish government cannot be separated from the linguistic identity that emerged from the Catalan language. In this way, language is a powerful tool to preserve heritage and promote unity in diverse communities. It allows the expression of unique cultural values and traditions and fosters a sense of pride and belonging among its speakers.

The emergence of a lingua franca or regional unifying language, can be traced to Aramaic, a Semitic language spoken in the Persian Empire in the 12th century BC (European Commission, 2011). It emerged long before the development of Latin and Greek. Languages with large numbers of speakers and a wide distribution of speakers, such as English, French and Spanish, have transcended national, regional and global boundaries. This has led to these languages as lingua franca in a global context. Additionally, other languages have emerged that connect regional countries, such as Swahili, Quechua, Hausa, Arabic, and Malay (Brown & Miller, 2013). Swahili, one of the Bantu languages, has become the lingua franca of countries in the African region. Quechua is the lingua franca of Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador. Hausa is the lingua franca of Central Africa, especially in Nigeria. Arabic is the lingua franca of the Middle East.

Based on linguistic factors, a language used as a regional identity (lingua franca) must meet the requirements of the number of speakers, simplicity or ease, language distribution, and modernity. This principle aligns with Poedjosoedarmo's (2006), Pakir's, (2010) and Schneider's (2013) view regarding universal languages. Furthermore, the language selected as a lingua franca should be easily understood by different cultures and ethnic groups within the region. This aims to ensure that their messages are understood without having to find common ground (Kecskes, 2007). Additionally, the language must be adaptable to various dialects and accents to foster inclusivity and promote communication among diverse populations. Other requirements include the use of fixed expressions with clear compositional meanings and the ability to create new formulas as needed.

Besides linguistic factors, social factors also play a crucial role in the formation of lingua franca, such as power, prestige, political policy, demography, culture, history, economy, and science and technology (Amelia, 2024; Pennycook, 2011; Smakman, 2018). Furthermore, a lingua franca requires a strong infrastructure within the education sector to ensure its continued growth and relevance in the modern world (Crystal, 2003; Gil, 2022). These factors play an important role in shaping the dominance of a particular language as a lingua franca in different regions of the world. For example, English has become a global lingua franca due to the historical influence of British colonialism, the economic power of the United States, and the widespread use of English in international business and technology. As a result, English has become the lingua franca for communication in many multinational corporations, academic institutions, and diplomatic circles. Thus, the complex relationship between linguistic and non-linguistic factors is important for lingua franca communication in the modern world.

Research Methods

To gain the empirical insights relating to Indonesian and Malay issues (Banister & Wee, 2015), the research applies qualitative methods, namely integrative or critical review (Snyder, 2019) and netnography approach (Fenton & Parry, 2022). Data is collected from various written sources, including journal articles, books, online media or websites, and archives relevant to the topic or problem. These data sources are collected, processed, coded, and validated through word processing techniques. Various tools are used, mainly by using search queries provided in online database libraries and/or in (social) media, with basic techniques of documentation, observation, listening, and note-taking.

The collected data is then systematically sorted based on its relevance and credibility. Irrelevant sources are identified and excluded, while relevant and credible sources are organized based on the themes in the research questions. For the data analysis, the research combines thematic analysis, discourse analysis, content analysis (Fenton & Parry, 2020; Kozinets, 2010), and interactive analysis (Denzin & Lincoln, 2009). As the discussion also includes analysis related to linguistic structure, the data analysis uses an approach called comparative equating and comparative differentiating (Mahsun, 2017). Thus, the steps of data

analysis in the research consist of coding, recording, abstracting and comparing, checking and refining, generalizing, and theorizing (Kozinets, 2010).

Malay Evolution

Its Origin and Spread in the Archipelago

The Malay has long been spread across the Archipelago that now encompasses several countries in the Southeast Asian region, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Brunei, and Singapore (Adelaar & Himmelmann, 2005) (see Figure 1). However, according to Adelaar (2005), the traditional habitat of the Malay variety is primarily the land area around the South China Sea, specifically Sumatra, West Kalimantan, and West Malaysia, or the Malay Peninsula. During the colonial era, this region was commonly known as the Asiatic Islands, the Eastern Islands, or the Malay Archipelago (see Figure 2). Malay is part of the Austronesian language, and its origins have been the subject of extensive scholarly debate (Adelaar, 1992; Clynes & Deterding, 2011; Mahsun, 2010; Sneddon, 2003).



Figure 1 Map of Areas Where Malay Isolects are Spoken (Adelaar & Himmelmann, 2005).



Figure 2 Map of the Asian or Eastern Islands 1863 depicting the Malay Archipelago based on a paper on physical geography by Alfred Rusell Wallace 1863 (Arowsmith, 1863)

Historically, proto-Malay speakers have spread in several areas since a thousand years ago, such as Jakarta (Betawi), Ambon, Manado, Pengambengan (Bali), Ampenan (Lombok), Kupang (Timor), and Larantuka (East Flores) (Andaya, 2001; Blust, 1988; Embong et al., 2016). Related to economic interests, Malay spread as a language of communication and trade (Maxwell, 1907; Ricci, 2013). According to archaeologists and historians, ancient Malay has been spoken in Indonesia since the 7th century (Masinambow & Paul, 2002; Maxwell, 1907). This is indicated by empirical evidence in written sources in Malay, such as the Sojomerto inscription, the Dieng inscription, the Manjusrigrha inscription, and the Karang Brahi inscription. Some other indications of the presence of ancient Malay in the archipelago are also clearly recorded by stone inscriptions in Trengganu on the east coast of the Malay Peninsula. In the early 19th century, these inscriptions were discovered by an Arab merchant and tin miner named Siayid Husin bin Ghulam al-Bokhari on the Tĕrĕsat River near Kuala Brang. Although the inscription on the stone is in Malay, it is written in Arabic (Paterson, 1924). This may be because the inscription refers to the introduction of Islam, which was brought by the Prophet Muhammad and written in Arabic script, or because the maker did not recognize Latin or other types of script. It is estimated that this inscription was written around the 13th century.

The Malay is part of the Austronesian language family, specifically within the Malay-Polynesian branch (Nothofer, 2006). Many scholars argue that the Malay language spread from the eastern region of Sumatra. However, in linguistic studies, diachronic linguistic methods are usually used to prove the origin and spread of languages. Therefore, the spread

of Malay in the Archipelago has to be proved based on the principles of diachronic linguistics, namely by reconstructing the form of the ancient language. This begins with efforts to reconstruct the proto-Malay, as has long been done by leading diachronic linguists such as Adelaar, Blust, Nothofer, Kridalaksana, and Wolff (as cited in Ahmad & Zain, 1988). Adelaar's reconstructions are performed on related languages to determine the same general patterns.

These findings have significantly contributed to the research on Malayic languages spoken in different parts of the Archipelago, especially in the Asian region. Along with the changes and development, the Malay has survived in several countries in Asia until today. At the same time, the languages have experienced changes such as the addition of the number of lexicons, shifts in the form of lexicons, and changes in grammatical structure. Scholars have reconstructed this language, suggesting that the origin of ancient Malay in Asia was on the island of Borneo (Collins, 2005, see Figure 3). This is evidenced by many dialectal variations in the region. Linguistic theory holds that language's origin can often be traced to the area with the most dialectal variants.



Figure 3 Map of Ancient Malay Migration in West Kalimantan according to Nothofer (in Collins, 2005).

The spread of Malay in the archipelago during the premodern era cannot be separated from cultural and imperial factors. In the early first millennium AD, the cultural center of the Malay Archipelago was initially in northeastern Borneo. During this time, the Austronesian speakers began migrating gradually southwestward, which influenced the spread and development of the Malay (Kullanda, 2006). From the 7th to 14th Century, the hegemony of the Srivijaya Empire, a Malay-speaking empire, played a crucial role in the spread of Malay. The empire's dominance in trade and governance helped establish Malay as the lingua franca across the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Borneo, and parts of the Moluccas (Omar, 2020). Trade is a key factor in the spread of Malay. Malay served as the lingua franca for traders and sailors, facilitating communication and commerce across the Archipelago region. The language's

richness in nautical and maritime terms underscores its importance in trade and navigation. Additionally, the spread of Islam significantly impacted the development of Malay, introducing Arabic vocabulary, writing, and educational practices. It helps unify different ethnicities under a common linguistic identity, further promoting the use of Malay (Ali & Alduagishi, 2024; Hoogervorst, 2024; Othman, 2023**).**

Given the wide spread of Malay over thousands of years in the pre-modern era, it is not surprising that modern Malay has many dialects across the Indonesian Archipelago. Historical factors have contributed to the dispersion of Malay dialects across several countries within ASEAN. In Indonesia, these dialects are spread from Sabang City to Merauke City (from the western tip of Sumatra to the eastern tip of Papua). There are also Chinese Malay dialects among these dialects (Oetomo, 1991). In other countries, such as Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and several other countries in the ASEAN region, Malay dialects occupy several enclaves in each of these countries. This indicates that Malay has not only survived through the centuries but also occupied several enclaves in several countries in Southeast Asia.

Malay in the Colonial and Post-Colonial Era

On March 23, 1598, Frederick and Cornelis brought their crews to the Indonesian Archipelago, specifically to Weh Island off the coast of Aceh (Linehan, 1949). They were both captains of the Dutch ships (Lion and Lioness) and arrived in Aceh on June 26, 1599. On November 11 of the same year, Frederick disembarked with about 30 crew members. The Sultan of Aceh sent them gifts. According to Linehan (1949), the gifts were food to which "poison" (or drugs) had been added. While the crew was under the influence of the drug, Frederick and Cornelis were attacked and captured. While in captivity, he wrote a book on Malay. It was the first writing on Malay in Europe, published in the Netherlands a year after his release from prison in 1602 (Linehan, 1949). In Linehan's account, it is not clear whether the book was written in Malay. However, a closer examination of the timeline surrounding the creation of the Malay glossary raises strong doubts, suggesting that Frederick's work not only focused on the Malay language but also included a Malay glossary. Furthermore, the title of his book, *Spraeck ende Woord-boek in de Maleysche ende Madagascar,* reinforces this possibility. This perspective is only speculation as scholars generally believe that the first Malay glossary was recorded in Pigafetta's list of 400 Malay-Italian vocabulary words written in 1522 (Echols, 1978; Soriente, 2024).

In addition, Linehan's (1949) interesting account shows that since about the 15th century, there have been at least several countries or kingdoms that came to the Archipelago, both for trading purposes and to spread the influence of Christianity (Sokol, 1948). Among these were the Chinese (who settled in Malacca in the 16th century), the Portuguese (who took control of Malacca in 1511), the Dutch (who began to conquer the Malay Archipelago in 1461), and the British (who began to establish their influence in the Archipelago in the 17th century) (Linehan, 1949). The arrival of these countries had a tremendous impact on the embryonic existence of the modern Malay (not proto-Malay) in the Archipelago. By the 16th century,

word lists or glossaries of Malay equivalents with other languages have emerged, such as Malay-Chinese and Malay-Italian. Regarding administrative matters, the use of Malay as a lingua franca in the commercial world was proposed in the early days of the colonial era in the late 15th century or around the beginning of the 16th century (Nugroho, 1957). This was because Malay was considered grammatically simpler than other languages, such as Javanese, which has a complex grammatical structure (Nugroho, 1957; Sokol, 1948; Steinhauer, 1980).

The Malay language occupied an important position and became a concern for immigrants from the European continent. So, the serious development of Malay is very important. Projects to develop the Malay were started, such as creating a Malay dictionary, which began in the 16th century. According to Collins (2005), in 1522, the first European-Malay vocabulary was collected by the Italian colonizer, Antonio Pigafetta, who joined Magellan on a tour around the world. The practice of making dictionaries of Malay, particularly Dutch-Malay, by Europeans continued until the 19th century (Nugroho, 1957). Some of them are the dictionary made by Thomas Bowery in 1701 printed in London (Mee, 1929), the dictionary made by Roorda van Eysinga in 1824 (Echols, 1978), and the dictionary made by Van der Tuuk in 1865 (Van der Tuuk, 1865) published by the Journal of the Royal Asian Society of Britain and Ireland. In addition to the Malay dictionary, Malay grammar began to be compiled. Malay grammar began to be written by a Swiss linguist named Werndly in 1936 (Errington, 2008; Collins, 2005; Harun, 2009). However, before that, a Malay grammar had been written by William Marsden in 1812 (Müller, 2014). Apart from the role of the colonizing countries in the development of the Malay in the archipelago, their presence also contributed to the division of the region. The East India Company and the V.O.C. agreement on March 17, 1824, in the form of the Anglo-Dutch Treaty, formalized this division between British and Dutch rule(Ahmad, 1986).

The development of Malay in the archipelago during the colonial period was more influenced by political and trade factors. This is because, in the past, the archipelago was a vital region for global trade. That is also why the articulation of the Malay concept was influenced by Western ideas, especially in the early 19th century (Müller (2014). As a result, Malayness or the Malay (epistemic) community, at least in terms of discourse, is a product of the colonizers. Nevertheless, the development of the Malay, both through the publication of dictionaries and the creation of grammars, was significant for the interests of Malay in the archipelago in the future. Some Malay words have also influenced current English vocabulary, such as orangutan, babirusa, and dugong (Scott, 1896).

At the end of the colonial era, the spirit of anti-colonialism emerged in the Southeast Asia region, including in Indonesia. Among the countries under colonial rule, only Indonesia made Malay the spirit of the struggle, and Malay was the *Bahasa Indonesia* (Indonesian) on October 28, 1928, in the Indonesia Youth Pledge. Later, Indonesian began to differ from other Malayic languages. The end of this colonial era was a turning point in the situation of Malay in the Southeast Asian region. In Brunei Darussalam, Malay is the official language, along with English. However, English is more dominantly used for important domains than Malay. In Singapore, Malay is the official language, along with English, Mandarin, and Tamil. However, the choice of Malay in Singapore is more due to political factors to avoid the

impression of being different from Indonesia and Malaysia, which use Malay. Most of the activities of people's lives in Singapore are carried out using English. In Malaysia, Malay is the official state language, followed by English. In education for specialized subjects, such as science, Malaysia still uses English. Moreover, Indonesian is spoken in Malaysia as one of the lingua franca alongside nine other local Malay dialects. In Pattani, Pattani Malay is a dialect of Malay spoken by the Muslim Pattani ethnicity in Southern Thailand. Additionally, Malay has become the identity of certain ethnic and religious groups, and its position is that of a minority group. In the Philippines, Cambodia, and Vietnam, Malay is recognized as a language of communication in a small part only, and the number of speakers continues to decline.

In addition to the Malay situation in ASEAN countries, several ASEAN countries have collaborated on language-related matters post-independence. For example, in 1967, Indonesia and Malaysia created a common spelling called Ejaan Malaysia-Indonesia (Malindo). Furthermore, in 1972, Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, and Malaysia formed a joint body called Majelis Bahasa Brunei Darussalam-Indonesia-Malaysia (MABBIM). Singapore is only an observer in this body, although the first international Malay congress was held in Singapore in 1952 (Ahmad, 1986). While the echo of MABBIM is not very strong, it shows that the desire of the ASEAN countries to revive the Malayness imagination or identity is still preserved. Unfortunately, neither Malay nor Indonesian has become a lingua franca in the Southeast Asian region and is not the working language of the ASEAN group of countries. After centuries in the Southeast Asian region, Malay has yet to become the master of its own house.

Considering Indonesian or Malay to be a Lingua Franca

Linguistic Considerations

Malay speakers are spread across various regions in Indonesia and other neighboring countries; the spread is still happening today. This, of course, has implications for the many dialects of Malay. Therefore, in global parlance, the term Malay does not directly refer to a particular community of speakers, as this diversity of dialects is spread within and beyond the Archipelago. The dialects of Malay also have very striking differences in terms of lexical and grammatical structures, as seen in Chaer (2007), Gil (2024), and Samuel (2008) compared with Phillips (1973), Poedjosoedarmo (2000a), Clynes and Deterding (2011), Sneddon (2003) and Hoogervorst (2018), even though several standard Malayic languages have been attempted (Payne, 1964; Omar, 1971; Rozan et al., 2007; Clynes, & Deterding, 2011; Harun et al, 2018; Hoogervorst, 2018; Mahdi, 2018).

Table 1 Comparison between Malaysian-Malay and Indonesian based on Lexicological Aspects (adapted from Chaer, 2007; Gil, 2024)

Malay (Malaysia)	Indonesian	English
drebar	sopir	driver (n)
enjin	mesin	machine/engine (n)
tayar	ban	tire (n)
taip	ketik	type (v)
borang	formulir	form/table (n)
tiket	karcis/tiket	ticket (n)
basikal	sepeda	bicycle (n)

Table 2 Comparison between Malaysian-Malay and Indonesian based on Morphological Aspects (adapted from Chaer, 2007; Gil, 2024)

Malay (Malaysia)	Indonesian	English
bersetuju {ber- + setuju}	menyetujui {me-/-i + setuju}	agree (v)
memulakan {me-/-kan + mula}	memulai {me-/-i + mula}	start (v)
memandangkan {me-/-kan + pandang}	memandang {me- + pandang}	look (v)
tempatan {tempat + -an}	setempat {se- + tempat}	local (n)
memantuni {me-/-i + pantun}	berpantun {ber- + pantun}	chant (v)
berkendara {ber- + kendara}	berkendaraan {ber - + kendaraan}	drive (v)
pengingatan {peN-/-an + ingat}	peringatan {per-/-an + ingat}	commemoration (n)

Table 1 and 2 highlight differences between the lexicon (lexicography) and affixation (morphology) of Indonesian and Malaysian-Malay, revealing not only the differences between the two languages or dialects. Therefore, using the term Malay, can lead to quite complicated and problematic linguistic implications. It is difficult to determine which dialect of Malay to use as a reference, given the language's numerous variants across different regions in Indonesia and other countries. In Indonesia, there are at least sixty Malay enclaves, including Minangkabau Malay, Banjar Malay, Ambon Malay, North Sulawesi Malay, Central Malay, East Nusa Tenggara Malay, Central Sulawesi Malay, Kerinci Malay, Jambi Malay, Bukampai Malay, and others (Gau, 2011; Paauw, 2008; Masinambow, 2002). Other differences can also be seen between Indonesian and Brunei Malay. This difference is seen in the prosody system and grammar (word order). In the grammar of the Brunei-Malay (BM) language or dialect, a sentence begins with a main phrase and ends with an additional phrase. On the other hand, in Indonesian (I) grammar, a sentence begins with an introductory phrase and ends with an auxiliary phrase (Poedjosoedarmo, 2006; Aves et al.,1998). This is illustrated in the Figure 4 (Poedjosoedarmo, 2006).



Figure 4. Comparison of the grammatical structures of Indonesian (I) and Brunei-Malay (BM)

Referring to Poedjosoedarmo (2000a, 2000b, 2000c), there are differences between Brunei Malay (BM) and Standard Malay (SM). The difference can be seen in phrase order, nominative pronouns, possessive phrases, and suffix *-i* (Poedjosoedarmo, 1996; 2004; 2005a). Another difference between SM and BM is word order, which is an important feature of a language. Following Greenberg's (in Poedjosoedarmo, 2025b) model, languages can be grouped according to word order into three main types: Verb + Subject + Object (VSO), Subject + Verb + Object (SVO), and Subject + Object + Verba (SOV). Based on these principles, the most fundamental difference between SM and BM is the word order in the sentence. In this framework, the most fundamental difference between SM and BM lies in the word order used in sentences (Mintz, 1994; Poedjosoedarmo 2000a, 2005c;). For example:

(1) *Ia mandi dulu* (SM-SVO)
He bathe first
'He took a bath first'

(1b) *Mandi tia dulu* (BM-VSO)
Bathe pert.he first
'He took a bath first'

(2) *Engkau sedang buat apa*? (SM-SVO)
You do what (interrogative marker)
'What are you doing?'

(2b) *Bahapa kau*? (BM-VSO)
Do what you (interrogative marker)
'What are you doing?'

Usually, the most notable differences in a language dialect lie at the level of phonology, especially vocabulary differences. However, one Malay with another Malay has striking differences from all existing linguistic levels, ranging from phonology, morphology, and syntax (including prosodic systems). These differences present a significant challenge if the concept or term "Malay" is maintained, as it fails to refer to a particular standardized language variant. The Brunei Malay is considered closer in pronunciation and grammar to Indonesian, while its lexical variation aligns more with Peninsular Malay (Poedjosoedarmo in Clynes & Deterding, 2011). However, the existence of standard Malay variation complicates the process

of referencing. These variations can also create challenges for foreign speakers attempting to learn Malay. Conversely, learning Indonesian is relatively easier for foreign speakers because there is only one standard language or reference in Indonesian. The situation differs from the case of English. Although there are some differences between American English and British English, there are no significant grammatical variations that could hinder foreign speakers from learning English. Thus, in a global context, with its standardized grammar, Indonesian is more ready and possible to be used as a reference.

One of the principles of universal language is efficiency, which refers to the ability of language to be conveyed fluently, concisely, and clearly (Poedjosoedarmo, 2006). Based on this principle, languages develop from simple to complex forms. The more complex a language becomes, the closer it aligns with these principles. In the development of language dialects, complexity guarantees the principles of fluency, clarity, and conciseness. As a result, there may be a slow evolution towards a standardized dialect. This happens because, in everyday communication, speakers tend to use language efficiently. Efficiency is guaranteed when a language includes complex markers that allow a sentence to be expressed in multiple variations while retaining the same meaning, ensuring clarity and conciseness.

Among the existing Malay dialects, complex markers are more commonly found in Indonesian, which is triggered by the rapid changes in Indonesian. According to Phillips (1973), this rapid change led to the change of Indonesian from an isolative language to an agglutinative language, facilitating the affixation process. Regarding the principle of language efficiency, the dramatic development of Indonesian caused Indonesian to be expressed with complex markers, ensuring fluency, conciseness, and clarity. This proves that Indonesian is more flexible and reliable than other Malayic languages, making it more appropriate as a standard language than other variants, particularly if it is proposed as the language of international *association* among ASEAN countries. *F*rom a linguistic perspective, the term *Indonesian* or the mainstreaming of Indonesian as a reference language or lingua franca in international relations can be scientifically justified. This is because the language of global association must refer to a standardized language and not be confusing when practiced and learned.

Sociolinguistic and Geopolitical Considerations

Several major Southeast Asia countries still use Malay, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Brunei Darussalam. The language is also found in other countries, such as Thailand, Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, and the Philippines. In the dynamics of the relationship between Indonesian and Malayic languages, there are similarities in the efforts made by each country to speak Malay, such as the establishment of the MABBIM. However, there are various problems between the people of Indonesia and other Malay-speaking countries, stemming from linguistic and geopolitical issues (Mahsun, 2010). These issues become the complexity of the relationship between Indonesian and Malay, which needs to be prioritized in global relations, raising questions on why Indonesian can be seen as more representative than other Malayic languages.

The long-standing use of Malay as the dominant language throughout modern Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore is one of the reasons why Malay is currently the national language in all three countries (Lowenberg, 1985). However, even before Lowenberg's statement, Indonesian began to be considered politically distinct from Malay on October 28, 1928. On this date, Malay was first announced as the Indonesian to fight colonialism. This territorial political restriction has implications for the later course of Malay and Indonesian. For instance, since its declaration as an Indonesian, Indonesian (Indonesian-Malay) has undergone rapid changes in Indonesia, which only a few languages in the world have experienced throughout history (Sneddon, 2003). Moreover, according to Sneddon (2003), Indonesian may become similar to the Malayic languages of Malaysia and Brunei in the future. The change could happen not because Indonesians follow Malaysian and Bruneian but because both languages follow Indonesian. From this perspective, the future of Indonesian is more promising than Malay.

Based on the history of Malay development, Indonesian has experienced quite complex problems compared to Malay. However, the challenges Indonesian has experienced over time have made it a resilient language. For example, Indonesian has been used as a language of unity, a form of national bonding, and an instrument to build solidarity against colonialism. The language of unity has proven to bind Indonesian national solidarity since the Indonesian Youth Pledge on October 28, 1928, and the first language congress on June 25-27, 1938 (Dardjowidjojo, 1998; Guan & Suryadinata, 2007). There is clearly no notable polemic between Indonesian and regional or foreign languages in Indonesia. In fact, modern Indonesian in the 60s and 70s showed a new political-cultural intelligence and perspective (Anderson, 1966; Grimes, 1996). The declaration of Malay becoming Indonesian had a tremendous spiritual impact on nation-state consciousness among Indonesians. The use of Indonesian also unified the resolve among the Indonesian people to repel the colonizers. Moreover, the use of Indonesian structures is a form of deep spiritual mentality rooted in traditional values in Malay culture (Anderson, 1966). Consequently, Indonesian has played a fundamental role in the structure of Indonesian, significantly as the vocabulary of other pre-existing languages, such as Javanese and Balinese, has enriched modern Indonesian.

Indonesian has also grown rapidly, enriching its vocabulary. In 1953, the number of vocabulary words in the Indonesian language dictionary was only 23,000 (Mahsun as cited in Grehenson, 2022). In 1988, Indonesia began seriously creating a dictionary known as Kamus Besar Bahasa Indonesia (KBBI). The first edition of KBBI contained only 62,000 vocabulary words, and the sixth edition of KBBI, published in 2016, had 127,000 words, an increase of at least two times in 28 years (Sugono, 2017). In 2024, the Indonesian government, through Badan Pengembangan dan Pembinaan Bahasa (the Language Development and Guidance Agency), undertook an ambitious project by publishing a new edition of the KBBI with 200,000 lemmas. In the same year, Indonesian was recognized as one of UNESCO's official languages. In contrast, Brunei Darussalam produced a Malay dictionary in 2003, using 62,000 words from the KBBI. Meirina (2014) states that Brunei Darussalam added only 400 vocabulary words from their Malay. The fourth edition of Malaysia's Dewan Dictionary also has much less vocabulary than the KBBI, with only 34,578 words (Redaksi Jantungmelayu, 2019).

Historically, Indonesian has undergone phases similar to those of other Malayic languages. However, two important moments set Indonesian apart from other Malayic languages. First was the establishment of Indonesian as the language of unity on October 28, 1928, and the second was Indonesian rapid linguistic modernization, including the addition of vocabulary, the formation of terms, and the refinement of the grammatical system. These two aspects are more prominent in Indonesian than in other Malayic languages. Samuel (2008) states that these two elements or moments can be referred to as language status and language corpus. This is also reinforced by the rapid development of newspapers in Indonesia during the first four decades (Grimes, 1996), which played a role in building the concept of Indonesian nationhood (Anderson, 2001; Groeneboer, 1999).

The rapid development of Indonesian compared to other Malayic languages has resulted in Indonesian having a higher social status compared to other Malayic languages, both Malayic languages in Indonesia and Malayic languages in other Malay-speaking countries. In Indonesia, this social status is represented by using formal dialect (*baku*) in various official state activities. As a result, other Malay speakers tend to follow standardized expressions in Indonesian. Similarly, Malay speakers in Malaysia tend to follow standardized Indonesian compared to Malaysian Malay. This is because they consider that Indonesian has a higher prestige than Malay in Malaysia. The phenomenon shows the differences in linguistic expressions in formal speech and songs. In formal speech, the final letter in vocabulary that sounds [e] (such as in the words *kita (*we), *saya (*me), or *berbeda* (different)) is still pronounced with [e] by Malaysian officials. However, in Malaysian songs, the vowel [e] is pronounced with [a]. These linguistic expressions reflect a tendency of these expressions to follow Indonesian. This is in line with the positive language attitudes towards Indonesian among students from ASEAN countries. In 2022, the Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization (SEAMEO) of ASEAN conducted research on the interest of ASEAN students in learning ASEAN languages. Interestingly, the findings showed that students from ASEAN countries were highly interested in learning Indonesian compared to other languages in ASEAN, including Malay, Tagalog, Vietnamese, Tetun, and so on (Hardini et al., 2023).

Another interesting distinction between Indonesian and Malay's standard dialect in Malaysia should also be noted. The Indonesian standard dialect does not refer to any local Malay dialect in Indonesia. So, anyone using Indonesian in formal communication (such as in a television show) does not show that the person is using a Malay dialect from any region in Indonesia. However, in modern Indonesian movies, there is a tendency to use the Jakarta dialect (Betawi dialect). Jakarta dialect cannot be used in official state speeches, national news readings, and other formal communications. This reflects that besides having a standardized grammatical structure, Indonesian also has standardized communication expressions. This contrasts with Malaysian-Malay, where it is unclear which dialect is meant by standard language (Omar, 1971). Some argue that the standard dialect is the Johor-Riau Malay dialect, while others argue that the standard dialect is the dialect used on television and radio.

These facts help to limit the dominance of foreign languages in Indonesia. Although English is considered prestigious, Indonesian as a communication tool in formal and non-formal contexts is not replaced by other foreign languages (Sneddon, 2003). As a result, the

Indonesian variant has a strong position compared to the Malay. This contrasts with the experiences of Malayic languages in other countries, such as Singapore and Malaysia. In Singapore, English is not considered problematic and cannot threaten the local language (Rappa & Wee, 2006). The strong hegemony suggests that the position of the Malay in Singapore is very weak as a counter-hegemony against foreign languages, especially if the language seeks to be globalized. This is also because Malay speakers in Singapore constitute only about 15% of the population, compared to 75% of Chinese speakers (Samuel, 2008). Moreover, Singapore has also been unwilling to join MABBIM, which indicates the lack of a political stance to make Malay a lingua franca in the international world.

In Malaysia, there is a tendency among many non-Malaysian-Malay students to openly reject Malay, and the use of English in formal settings has become a sensitive issue despite the Malaysian-Malay having been declared the national language in 1957 independence (Rappa & Wee, 2006; Omar, 1998). Furthermore, according to Hamzah and Azma (2017), compared to Adam (2014) and Coluzzi (2017), 80 percent of Malaysians believe that Malay is not suited for intellectual purposes. This situation is similar to Brunei (Goode, 2020; McLellan, 2020; Morve et al., 2023; Sharbawi, 2020). Thus, it is difficult to expect (non-Indonesian) Malay to become an international language or ASEAN lingua franca if it is not widely adopted by its speakers, as is the case in Malaysia, Singapore, or Brunei. In other words, the future of Indonesian-Malay or Indonesian is much more promising to be used as the lingua franca of ASEAN than Malay.

Along with the development of digital technology, the use of Indonesian on social media also shows very significant numbers. Statista (2020) reports that Indonesia is one of the third highest users of social networks in the world, behind China and India. Moreover, this picture is very similar to that of most Twitter and Facebook users. Indonesia ranks fourth in *Twitter* and Facebook users worldwide, behind the United States, India, and Brazil (Stevany, 2024). In the real world, statistically, as stated by Sukatman et al.(2017), out of at least 500 million people in ASEAN, 300 million speak Indonesian. In contrast, Malaysian-Malay has only about 45 million speakers (Burhani, 2014; Grehenson, 2022).

The use of Indonesian has led to its widespread research in other countries. Indonesian is also designated as a second language, for example, the use of Indonesian at Al-Azhar University in 2019 (Humas Seketariat Kabinet Republik Indonesia, 2019). Furthermore, the Indonesian government continuously facilitates language diplomacy in other countries through the implementation of Bahasa Indonesia for Foreign Speakers (BIPA) (Ningrum et al., 2017; Rohimah, 2018; Solikhah & Budiharso, 2020; Tiawati, 2015). This initiative started in 1990, and the BIPA teaching affiliation started in 1999. Although the program's growth is relatively slow, it shows the Indonesian government's commitment in developing the language (Goebel, 2002). The Indonesian government has also sent 200 BIPA teachers to 22 countries with 79 host institutions (Salamah et al., 2018). The Indonesian Center for Strategy Development and Language Diplomacy carries out this step. The Indonesian government has also introduced the Indonesian Proficiency Test (UKBI), which aligns with the principles of TOEFL and IELTS.

Efforts to develop Indonesian are not only made by policymakers; leading academics in the country also provide a strong impetus to make Indonesian an international lingua franca. On November 6, 2019, in conjunction with the 55th Anniversary of Surabaya State University, the Forum of Indonesian Professors Council (FDGBI) declared Indonesian as an international scientific language with a four-point manifesto to make it an international language (Kurniawan, 2019). The manifesto highlights several points: (1) Indonesian qualifies as an international language because it has been taught in 45 countries around the world; (2) Indonesian has more than 100,000 adequate vocabulary and scientific terms in various aspects of science; (3) the number of Indonesian speakers is more than 267 million people and is widely understood in numerous countries, especially ASEAN countries, and (4) Indonesian is projected as a lingua franca in economic activities, so it is taught and studied in various countries. All points show that Indonesian is far more advanced than Malay in the ASEAN region.

Unfortunately, the FDGBI does not address the use of Indonesian in scientific journals. The policy of scientific publications is one of the weak aspects of Indonesia's language policy. As is widely recognized, the Indonesian government, along with academic institutions and communities, only consider articles written in English or one of the official UN languages to be international publications within the scientific field. Publications using Indonesian are not recognized as international publications, regardless of the quality of the article. Moreover, journals in Indonesia are only recognized as international journals by the Ministry if they are published in English or an official UN language. This is why all scientific journals in Indonesia indexed in the SCOPUS database are published in English. In contrast, Malaysia's journal publishing policy allows SCOPUS-indexed international journals to be published in English and Malay. Since the academic or scientific institutions sector is one of the crucial sectors for language promotion in international relations, this highlights the weakness of Indonesia's language policy. Furthermore, the FDGB's declaration that Indonesian is an international scientific language is really refuted by this fact.

Some Obstacles

Efforts to make Indonesian one of the official languages of ASEAN have been ongoing for a long time. It started in late 2010 and was initiated by the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia (DPR). At the 31st ASEAN General Assembly in Vietnam, they proposed Indonesian to be one of the official languages of ASEAN (Muhammad, 2011). It is in accordance with Indonesia Law No. 24/2009 Article 44, which states, "the government will improve the function of Indonesian as an international language gradually, systematically, and sustainably." This campaign lasted several years, and the discourse reappeared at the 2015 ASEAN Summit held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (Guepedia, 2016). This was followed by the issuance of Presidential Regulation No. 63/2019 on the use of Indonesian by the President and Vice President in official international forums. Political support from the parliament or government is unquestionable and crucial as language policy in other countries reflects similar efforts (Zulfikar, 2019).

Despite the Indonesian elites' efforts and the advantages of the Indonesian language, the opportunity for Indonesian to become an international lingua franca in ASEAN encounters a steep road. It is because of several challenges from external and internal factors (Yang, 2008). Although Indonesian seems more representative than other Malayic languages in the context of an international lingua franca in the ASEAN region, gaining such recognition remains challenging. For example, the use of Indonesian in official ASEAN forums has proven ineffective, and it struggles to compete with English. Thus, the struggle to make Indonesian an international language at the ASEAN level faces obstacles, especially from other Malay-speaking countries such as Malaysia, Singapore, and Brunei. The influence of English in these countries since colonial times has played a significant role (Kirkpatrick, 2010; Lauder, 2008).

Competition with Malay can also hinder the promotion of Indonesian as a lingua franca. On one hand, Indonesia, with its majority of Indonesian speakers, favors the term "Indonesian" as the preferred lingua franca. On the other hand, Malaysia and other Malay-speaking countries in Asia prefer the term "Malay." Malaysia often tries to make Malay a lingua franca in the ASEAN region, as proposed by the former Malaysia Prime Minister, Datuk Seri Ismail Sabri Yakob (Reditya, 2022). This proposal is not new, as efforts by Malaysian officials or politicians to build a Malay identity have been going on for a long time (Watson, 1996). The Malaysian proposal was immediately rejected by the former Indonesian Minister of Education and Culture, Nadiem Makarim. The rejection stemmed from Indonesia's belief that the Indonesian was better or superior to the Malay (Fahlevi, 2022).

Global pressures in recent years can also affect Indonesia's language policy. Policies issued by the Indonesian government in the era of President Joko Widodo weakened the position of the Indonesian language. The former president issued Presidential Regulation No. 20/2018 on the Use of Foreign Workers issued on March 26, 2018. The regulation stated that foreign workers are no longer required to speak Indonesian but must take language courses. Under the old regulation, Indonesia Minister of Manpower and Transmigration Regulation No. 12/2013, foreign workers in Indonesia were required to speak Indonesian. Therefore, Presidential Regulation No. 20/2018 on the use of foreign workers is counterproductive compared to Law No. 24/2009 on the Flag, Language, and State Emblem, as well as the National Anthem as an effort to make Indonesian an international language. Additionally, it is not in line with Presidential Regulation No. 63/2019 on the Use of Indonesian, which regulates the obligation of the President, Vice President, and other State Officials to use Indonesian at home and abroad.

Furthermore, the attitude of Indonesian society in general does not strongly support the internationalization of Indonesian (Jazeri & Maulida, 2018; Muslich, 2010; Muslich & Oka, 2010). According to Sylado (2002), Indonesian people, especially politicians, tend to use foreign languages, especially English, in almost every political dialog on television. In addition, the use of English is also frequently seen in the titles or themes of songs, films, and television programs. This is contrary to efforts to make Indonesian the language for international communication. Damshäuser (2017) states powerlessness towards English is also a major obstacle in international relations and economic interests. The influence of English in Indonesia has an impact, including within the educational system, although not as

severe as the hegemony of English in other Malay-speaking countries (Murtisari & Mali, 2017; Nguyen & Chon, 2020). This is because English is taught from primary school to university as a compulsory subject throughout Indonesia (Herminingsih & Jazeri, 2020). However, this can be overcome by the Indonesian government's strict regulations regarding using Indonesian and English in schools (Harwati, 2012).

Conclusion

Malay and Indonesian originate from the same progenitor that has been utilized throughout Southeast Asia since the 7th century. It has experienced modernization since the colonial era and was a strategically utilized language in the trade sector. This history fosters a shared imagination concerning allied countries in Southeast Asia, subsequently unified within the ASEAN group of countries. The dynamics of relations among ASEAN nations have fluctuated. Consequently, establishing a shared identity within the ASEAN region is crucial, including adopting a lingua franca distinct from English, as English undermines the historical ethos of ASEAN nations, most of which have endured colonization. While Indonesian and Malay may be alternatives, Indonesian is much more suitable and judicious from linguistic, sociolinguistic, and geopolitical perspectives, considering many factors.

The linguistic structure of Malay differs in phonology, morphology, and syntax. These differences pose significant challenges if the term or concept of Malay is to be preserved. This is because Malay terminology does not refer to a particular standardized language variety, unlike Indonesian terminology, which is distinct, established, and used in various aspects of social life. Indonesian has more complex markers than Malay due to the rapid changes in Indonesia. The number of complex markers in Indonesian adheres to the universal linguistic principle of allowing speakers to communicate fluently, concisely, and clearly. The advantages of the Indonesian language are also evident from sociolinguistic and geopolitical perspectives. Indonesian language's stance in promoting Indonesia has made it accepted and taught in many countries worldwide. It has been maintained until today, which has caused the language to experience an increase in vocabulary words, reaching 200,000 in 2024. Additionally, in 2024, UNESCO recognized Indonesian as one of the official languages. This achievement is lacking in Malay, whether in Indonesia or other ASEAN countries.

Consequently, Indonesian is appropriate for usage as a lingua franca in the ASEAN region and merits consideration as one of the working languages in ASEAN. Nevertheless, based on the lengthy discussion above, both Indonesian and Malay will not find an easy way to become a lingua franca in the ASEAN region and/or become the working language of ASEAN. However, suppose both parties, Indonesia and Malay-speaking countries in ASEAN, relax their nerves. In that case, a middle way may be taken, namely proposing both languages at once, Malay and Indonesian, to become the lingua franca or working language of ASEAN or by combining the names of the two languages with Malay/Indonesian or Indonesian/Malay specifically in the ASEAN region or specifically for the ASEAN working language. Despite the advantages of the Indonesian language, if the ego of Indonesian-ness

and Malay-ness is not lowered, neither Indonesian nor Malay will likely be able to become a host at home in the ASEAN region until whenever amid the siege of English.

Acknowledgement

The authors would like to express their sincere gratitude to the four blind reviewers for their insightful and constructive feedback on the initial draft of this article. Their thorough comments have significantly contributed to improving various aspects of the manuscript. Additionally, the second author extends sincere gratitude to Lembaga Pengelola Dana Pendidikan (LPDP/The Indonesia Endowment Fund for Education), Balai Pembiayaan Pendidikan Tinggi (BPPT), and Pusat Layanan Pembiayaan Pendidikan (Puslapdik) for providing scholarship and/or research support to the second author in pursuing a doctoral degree at Universitas Pendidikan Indonesia.

About The Authors

Ahmad Sirulhaq is a lecturer at the Department of Languages and Arts, Faculty of Teacher Training and Education, Universitas Mataram, Indonesia. He has research interests in linguistics, critical discourse studies, education, media, and ideology.

Muh. Ardian Kurniawan is a Ph.D. candidate at Universitas Pendidikan Indonesia, Bandung, Indonesia. He is a lecturer at Department of Indonesian Language and Literature Education, Faculty of Education, Universitas Timor, Indonesia. His research is related to cultural linguistics, dialectology, pragmatics, and sociolinguistics

References

Adam, S. D. B. S. (2014). Cabaran dan reaksi pelaksanaan bahasa kebangsaan dalam bidang pentadbiran dan pendidikan di Malaysia, 1957-1966. *Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences*, *134*, 305-315. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sbspro.2014.04.253

Adelaar, A., & Himmelmann, N. P. (Eds.) (2005). *Austronesian languages of Asia and Madagascar*. London and New York: Routledge.

Adelaar, K. A. (1992). *Proto Malay: A reconstruction of its phonology and parts of its lexicon and morphology.* Department of Linguistics, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University.

Ahmad, H.M.A. (1986). Singapura dengan MABBIM. *Sekata, 3*(1), 38-41. The Malay Council.

Ahmad, M. T., & Zain, Z. M. (Eds.). (1988). *Rekonstruksi dan cabang-cabang Bahasa Melayu induk*. Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, Kementerian Pendidikan Malaysia.

Akova, S., & Kantar, G. (2021). Globalization in the context of multiculturalism and ethnicity in the Western Balkans and intercultural communication. *Journal of Public Affairs*, *21*(2). https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.2185

Ali, A. S. S., & Alduagishi, S.S. A. (2024). The Islamic dimension in the national identity of the Malay. *Global Journal Al-Thaqafah*, *14(*1), 209-222.

Amelia, N. (2024). Sociolinguistic Dimensions of English as a Lingua Franca: Power, Prestige, and Policy. *Journal Pustaka Ilmu, 4(1),* 1-20.

Andaya, L. Y. (2001). The search for the 'origin' of the Malay. *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 32(3), 315-330. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022463401000169

Anderson, B. (1966). The languages of Indonesian politics. *Indonesia*, *1*, 89-116.

Anderson, B. (2001). *Imagined communities: Komunitas-komunitas terbayang*. INSISTPress and Pustaka Pelajar.

Arowsmith, John. (1863). *Asiatic, or Eastern Archipelago, 1863*. ANU Asia-Pacific Map Collection. https://jstor.org/stable/community.32800089

Ayuso-Díaz, A. (2022). Natural trading partners versus empires in East and Southeast Asia regional integration (1840-1938). *Journal of the Japanese and International Economies*, *63*. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jjie.2021.101184

Banister, D. J., & Van Wee, B. (2015). How to write a literature review paper. *Transport Reviews, 36*(2), 278–288. https://doi.org/10.1080/01441647.2015.1065456

Blust, R. (1988). *Historical Malay Linguistics: A Progress Report*. Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, Ministry of Education Malaysia.

Brown, K. & Miller, J. (2013). *The Cambridge dictionary of language*. Cambridge University Press.

Burhani, R. (2014, June 18). *Bahasa Indonesia ditargetkan jadi bahasa internasional ke-7*. Antara News. https://www.antaranews.com/berita/439728/bahasa-indonesia-ditargetkan-jadi-bahasa-internasional-ke-7

Canga, L. Á. (2019). Conflicts regarding official status of languages in Spain. In A. M. Ocaña (Ed.), *Clashing wor(l) ds: From international to intrapersonal conflict* (pp. 67-81). Brill. https://doi.org/10.1163/9781848883642_007

Chaer, A. (2007). *Leksikologi & leksikografi Indonesia*. Rineka Cipta.

Citaku, M. (2024). Turk character in the legendary Albanian songs named the songs of the frontier warriors. *Milli Folklor*, *18*(142), 76-85. https://doi.org/10.58242/millifolklor.1160485

Clynes, A. & Deterding, D. (2011). Standard Malay (Brunei). *Journal of the International Phonetic Association*, *41*(2), 259-268. https://doi.org/10.1017/S002510031100017X

Collins, J. T. (2005). *Bahasa Melayu, Bahasa Dunia: Sejarah Singkat*. Yayasan Obor Indonesia.

Collins, J. T. (2017). Malay identity in Southeast Asia: Understanding the cultural and linguistic phenomena. *Advanced Science Letters*, *23*(10), 9932–934. https://doi.org/10.1166/asl.2017.10345

Coluzzi, P. (2017). Language planning for Malay in Malaysia: A case of failure or success. *International Journal of the Sociology of Language*, *2017*(244), 17-38. https://doi.org/10.1515/ijsl-2016-0055

Crystal, D. (2003). *English as a Global Language* (2nd ed). Cambridge University Press.

Curaming, R. (2022). Enrique de Malacca/Maluku: Another chapter in the Indonesia–Malaysia heritage war? *TRaNS Trans -Regional And -National Studies of Southeast Asia*, *11*(1), 1–15. https://doi.org/10.1017/trn.2022.10

Damshäuser, B. (2017). Dialog Sunyi: Bahasa dan Sastra Indonesia dalam Konteks Global. In Sukatman, A. Muti'ah, & A. Taufig (Eds.), *Prosiding Seminar Nasional Bahasa dan Sastra Indonesia dalam Konteks Global*. Program Studi Pendidikan Bahasa dan Sastra Indonesia, Fakultas Keguruan dan Ilmu Pendidikan, Universitas Jember.

Dardjowidjojo, S. (1998). Strategies for a successful national language policy: the case of Indonesia. *International Journal of the Sociology of Language, 130(1),* 35-48. https://doi.org/10.1515/ijsl.1998.130.35

Denzin, N. K. & Lincoln, Y. S. (2009). *Handbook of qualitative research*. Pustaka Pelajar.

Dollah, R., Maraining, A., Jafar, A., Joko, E. P., & Sakke, N. (2024). Exploring the interdependence model in Malaysia-Indonesia relations: Insights from Sabah, Malaysia. *Intellectual Discourse*, *32*(1). https://doi.org/10.31436/id.v32i1.1943

Echols, J. M. (1978). Dictionary of Presidential Speeches and Dictionary Making: Malay and Indonesian. *The Journal of Asian Studies, 38*(1), 11-24. https://doi.org/10.2307/2054235

Embong, A. M., Jusoh, J. S., Hussein, J., & Mohammad, R. (2016). Tracing the Malays in the land of Malays. *Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences*, *219*, 235-240. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sbspro.2016.05.011

Enfield, N. J. (2019). *Mainland Southeast Asian Language - A concise typological introduction*. Cambridge University Press.

Errington, J. J. (1986). Continuity and change in the development of Indonesian. *The Journal of Asian Studies*, *45*(2), 329-353. https://doi.org/10.2307/2055846

Errington, J. J. (2008). *Linguistics in the Colonial world: A story of language, meaning and power*. Blackwell Publishing.

Ethnologue. (n.d.). Vietnamese. In Ethnologue.com, from https://www.ethnologue.com/subgroup/3008/

European Commission. (2011). *Lingua Franca: Chimera or Reality?*. Publications Office

Fahlevi, F. (2022). *Mendikbudristek Nadiem Tolak Usul Malaysia Jadikan Bahasa Melayu Jadi Bahasa Resmi ASEAN*. Tribun News. https://m.tribunnews.com/nasional/2022/04/04/mendikbudristek-nadiem-tolak-usul-malaysia-jadikan-bahasa-melayu-jadi-bahasa-resmi-asean?page=all#goog_rewarded

Fenton, A., & Parry, K. D. (2022). Netnography-an approach to ethnography in the digital age. In L. Sloan, & A. Quan-Haase (Eds.), *SAGE Handbook of Social Media Research Methods* pp. 214-227). SAGE.

Gau, S. (2011). Menjejaki bahasa Melayu Maluku di Papua: Kerangka pengenalan. *Jurnal Elektronik Jabatan Bahasa dan Kebudayaan Melayu*, 3, 21-40.

Gil, D. (2024). Borrowing within Malayic; The role of exotericity. *Wacana, Journal of the Humanities of Indonesia*, *25*(3). https://doi.org/10.17510/wacana.v25i3.1793

Gil, J. (2022. How does a language become global. In J. Gil, & S. Marsen (Eds.), *Exploring Language in Global Context* (pp. 95-109). Routledge.

Goebel, Z. (2002). When do Indonesians speak Indonesian? Some evidence from interethnic and Foreign-Indonesian interactions and its pedagogical implications. *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development*, *23*(6), 479-489. https://doi.org/10.1080/01434630208666481

Goode, C. (2020). English language in Brunei: Use, policy, and status in education–A review. *Indonesian JELT: Indonesian Journal of English Language Teaching*, *15*(1), 21-46. https://doi.org/10.25170/ijelt.v15i1.1411

Greenberg, R. D. (2004). *Language and identity in the Balkans: Serbo-Croatian and its disintegration*. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199208753.001.0001

Grehenson. G. (2022, May 23) Penutur Bahasa Indonesia Capai 300 Juta Jiwa. Universitas Gadjah Mada. https://ugm.ac.id/id/berita/22527-penutur-bahasa-indonesia-capai-300-juta-jiwa

Grimes, C. E. (1996). Indonesian-the official language of a multilingual nation. In S. Wurm, P. Mühlhäusler & D. Tryon (Eds.), *Atlas of Languages of Intercultural Communication in the Pacific, Asia, and the Americas* (pp. 719-728). De Gruyter Mouton. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110819724.2.719

Groeneboer, K. (1999). Politik bahasa pada masa Hindia Belanda. *Wacana, Journal of the Humanities of Indonesia, 1*(1), 32-48. https://doi.org/10.17510/wacana.v1i1.279

Guan, L. H., & Suryadinata, L. (Eds.). (2007). *Language, nation, and development in Southeast Asia*. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Guepedia. (2016, January 15). *Bahasa Indonesia Terpilih sebagai Bahasa Pemersatu ASEAN*. Kompasiana. https://www.kompasiana.com/guepedia/569874d5f09273a5050a9650/

Hamzah, Z. & Azma, Z. (2017). Bahasa Melayu sebagai Bahasa Asean: Antara realiti dengan hambatan. MAHAWANGSA, *4* (1), 99-108.

Hardini, T. I., Yulianeta, Fikrianto, M., Hamidah, H., Emilia, E., & Kharismawati, L. R. S. (2023). ASEAN students' interest in learning the Indonesian language: A descriptive study from the perspective of SEAMEO ASEAN. *International Journal of Language Education*, 7(4), 746-762. https://doi.org/10.26858/ijole.v7i4.59491

Harun, K. (2009). Latin influence in early Malay grammar. *Jurnal Melayu*, *4*, 1-10.

Harun, K., Ismail, K., Wahid, L. A., Ismail, Z., & Sabil, A. M. (2018). Membangun kerangka standard bahasa Melayu dan bahasa Indonesia. *Jurnal Melayu, 17*(2).

Harwati, L. N. (2012). Will English coexist with Indonesian. *Asian EFL Journal Professional Teaching Articles (Special CEBU Issue)*, *61*, 41-51.

Herminingsih, D.I & Jazeri, M. (2020). Elevating the Speaking Ability through a Culture Talk in a Video: Evidence from Universitas Tulungagung, Indonesia. *Asian ESP Journal, 16*(5.2), 191-203.

Hoogervorst, T. G. (2018). Utterance-final particles in Klang Valley Malay. *Wacana, Journal of the Humanities of Indonesia, 19*(2), 291-326. https://doi.org/10.17510/wacana.v19i2.704

Hoogervorst, T. G. (2024). Seventeenth-century Malay wordlists and their potential for etymological scholarship. *Wacana, Journal of the Humanities of Indonesia*, *25*(3), 7. https://doi.org/10.17510/wacana.v25i3.1782

Hranova, A. (2002). Language: Borders, identities and utopias: Balkan cases. *New Europe College Yearbook*, 10, 213-254.

Humas Seketariat Kabinet Republik Indonesia. (2019, October 19). *Bahasa Indonesia resmi jadi bahasa kedua di Universitas Al Azhar Mesir*. Seketariat Kabinet Republik Indonesia. https://setkab.go.id/bahasa-indonesia-resmi-jadi-bahasa-kedua-di-universitas-al-azhar-mesir/

Jazeri, M., & Maulida, S. Z. (2018). Hambatan dan harapan pemartabatan Bahasa Indonesia. *Indonesian Language and Education Literature*, *4*(1), 52-61. https://doi.org/10.24235/ileal.v4i1.2493

Jordan, P. (2019). Languages and space-related identity: The rise and fall of Serbo-Croatian. In: S. Brunn, R. Kehrein (Eds.), *Handbook of the Changing World Language Map* (pp. 541-561). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02438-3_47

Kadir, N. (2024). Resolving the conflicts between the Philippines and Malaysia: Mediation on the Sabah dispute and its impact on socio-economic cooperation (1986-1998). *Journal of International Studies*, *20*(2), 119-147. https://doi.org/10.32890/jis2024.20.2.5

Kirkpatrick, A. (2010). *English as a Lingua Franca in ASEAN: A Multilingual Model*. Hong Kong University Press.

Kozinets, R. V. (2010). *Netnography: Conducting Ethnographic Research Online*. SAGE publication.

Kridalaksana, H. (1988). Methodological Issues in the Reconstruction of "Ancient Malay". *Reconstruction and the Branches of Primary Malay*. Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, Ministry of Education Malaysia.

Kullanda, S. (2006). Nushāntara or java?: the acquisition of the name. *Indonesia and the Malay World*, *34*(98), 91–98. https://doi.org/10.1080/13639810600652386

Kurniawan, D. (2019, November 7). *Ilmuwan Nusantara Sepakat Pakai Bahasa Indonesia sebagai Bahasa Ilmiah Internasional*. Liputan 6. https://www.liputan6.com/surabaya/read/4104986/ilmuwan-nusantara-sepakat-pakai-bahasa-indonesia-sebagai-bahasa-ilmiah-internasional

Lahitani, S. (2015, January 5). 8 Warisan Budaya Indonesia yang Pernah Diklaim Malaysia. Liputan 6. https://www.liputan6.com/citizen6/read/2156339/8-warisan-budaya-indonesia-yang-pernah-diklaim-malaysia.

Lauder, A. (2008). The status and function of English in Indonesia: A review of key factors. *Makara Human Behavior Studies in Asia, 12*(1), 9-20. https://doi.org/10.7454/mssh.v12i1.128

Law Number 24 of 2009 on the internationalization of the Indonesian.

Lee, H. Y., Hamid, M. O., & Hardy, I. (2022). Problematising ASEAN language policy: Is the ASEAN way the only way?. *Language Problems and language planning*, *46*(1), 55-77. https://doi.org/10.1075/lplp.21044.lee

Lee, H. Y., Hamid, M. O., & Hardy, I. (2023). English and regional identity in ASEAN. *World Englishes*, *42*(2), 239-253. https://doi.org/10.1111/weng.12571

Linehan, W. (1949). The earliest word-lists and dictionaries of the Malay Language. *Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 22*(1), 183-187.

Lowenberg, P. (1985). *Malay in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore: Three Faces of a National Language*. U.S. Department of America.

Maharam, M. E. (2021). Transnational cultures of Malaysian, Indonesian, Singaporean, and Philippine national cinema. *Transnational Screens*, *12*(2), 134–149. https://doi.org/10.1080/25785273.2021.1962065

Mahayana, M.S. (2010). *Akar Melayu: Ideologi dalam sastra*. Bukupop.

Mahdi, W. (2018). The first standard grammar of Malay: George Werndly's 1736 Maleische spraakkunst. *Wacana, Journal of the Humanities of Indonesia*, *19*(2), 257-290. https://doi.org/10.17510/wacana.v19i2.644

Mahsun. (2017). *Metode Penelitian Bahasa: Tahapan, Strategi, Metode, dan Tekniknya*. Rajawali Press.

Mahsun. (2010). *Genolinguistk: Kolaborasi Linguistik dengan Genetika dalam Pengelompokan Bahasa dan Populasi Penuturny*. Pustaka Wacana.

Masinambow, E.K.M., & Paul, H. (2002). *Bahasa Indonesia dan Bahasa Daerah.* Yayasan Obor Indonesia.

Maxwell, W. E. (1907). *A Manual of the Malay Language*. 8th Edn. Dodo Press.

McLellan, J. (2020). Brunei English. In K. Bolton, W. Botha, A. Kirkpatrick (Eds.), *The handbook of Asian Englishes* (pp. 399-418). John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Mee, R. (1929). An Old Malay Dictionary. *Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 7*(2), 316-326).

Meirina, Z. (2014, August 8). *Brunei klaim 62.000 kosa kata Bahasa Indonesia*. Antara. https://www.antaranews.com/berita/447599/brunei-klaim-62000-kosa-kata-bahasa-indonesia

Mintz, M.W. (1994). *A Student's Grammar of Malay & Indonesian*. EPB Publishers.

Mohtar, O. (2023, December 21). Kamboja dan Thailand dalam Pusaran Sengketa Kuil Preah Vihear. https://tirto.id/kamboja-dan-thailand-dalam-pusaran-sengketa-kuil-preah-vihear-gTlg.

Morve, R. K., Wen, X., & Mansour, N. (2023). The role of English and the sociocultural structure of Bahasa: a study of Brunei Darussalam. *Asian-Pacific Journal of Second and Foreign Language Education*, *8*(1), 14. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40862-023-00186-5

Muhammad, D. (2011, May 6). Bahasa Indonesia Jadi Bahasa ASEAN?. Republika. http://www.republika.co.id/berita/internasional/global/11/05/06/lks73o-bahasa-indonesia-jadi-bahasa-asean.

Müller, M. (2014). Manufacturing Malayness: British debates on the Malay nation, civilisation, race and language in the early nineteenth century. *Indonesia and the Malay World*, 42(123), 170-196. https://doi.org/10.1080/13639811.2014.912409

Murtisari, E. T., & Mali, Y. C. G. (2017). Impact of English on the Indonesian Language and culture: High school students' perceptions. *Studies about Language*, *30*, 90-104. https://doi.org/10.5755/j01.sal.0.30.17570

Muslich, M. (2010). *Bahasa Indonesia pada era globalisasi: Kedudukan, fungsi, pembinaan, dan pengembangan.* Bumi Aksara.

Muslich, M., & Oka, I. G. N. (2010). *Perencanaan bahasa pada era globalisasi*. Bumi Aksara.

Nabilla, F. (2022, June 23). *5 Daerah di Indonesia yang Pernah Diklaim Malaysia***.** Suara.com. https://www.suara.com/news/2022/06/24/104548/5-daerah-di-indonesia-yang-pernah-diklaim-malaysia?page=3.

Nguyen, L.T.T & Chon, Y.V. (2020). Ideologies of English and English Language Teaching in Facebook Advertisements of Vietnamese Private Language Institutions. *Asian EFL Journal*. *24*(5), 6-37.

Ningrum, R. K., Waluyo, H. J., & Winarni, R. (2017). BIPA (Bahasa Indonesia Penutur Asing) sebagai upaya internasionalisasi universitas di Indonesia. *The 1st Education and Language International Conference Proceedings Center for International Language Development of Unissula*, Indonesia, 726-732.

Nothofer, B. (2006). Malay. In K. Brown (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of Language & Linguistics* (pp. 450-453). Elsevier. https://doi.org/10.1016/B0-08-044854-2/02130-1

Nugroho, R. (1957). The Origin and Development of Bahasa Indonesia. *PMLA/Publications of the Modern Language Association of America*, 72(2), 23-28. https://doi.org/10.2307/2699135

Oetomo, D. (1991). The Chinese of Indonesia and the development of the Indonesian language. *Indonesia*, 53-66. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.2307/3351254

Omar, A.H. (2020). A Typology of the Spread of Malay. *Asian Linguistic Anthropology*, 2(4) 28-48. https://doi.org/10.47298/jala.v2-i4-a2

Omar, A. H. (1998). Language planning and image building: the case of Malay in Malaysia. *International Journal of Sociology of Language*, *130*(1), 49-66. https://doi.org/10.1515/ijsl.1998.130.49

Omar, A. H. (1971). Standard language and the standardization of Malay. *Anthropological Linguistics*, 13(2), 75-89.

Othman, Z. (2023). English Malay Maritime Words in the Malay Seas. *3L: Language, Linguistics, Literature*, *29*(4). https://doi.org/10.17576/3L-2023-2904-01

Paauw, S. H. (2008). *The Malay Contact Varieties of Eastern Indonesia* [Doctoral Dissertation, The State University of New York at Buffalo]

Pakir, A. (2010). English as a lingua franca: Negotiating Singapore's English language education. In L. Lim, A. Pakir, & L. Wee (Eds), *English in Singapore: Modernity and management* (pp. 261-279). Hong Kong Scholarship Online.

Paterson, H. S. (1924). An early Malay Inscription from Trengganu. *Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 2*(3), 252-258.

Payne, Edward M.F. (1964). *Basic syntactic structures in Standard Malay* [PhD Thesis, SOAS University of London]. https://doi.org/10.25501/SOAS.00029124

Pennycook, A. (2011). Global Englishes. In R. Wodak, B. Johnstone, & P. Kerswill (Eds.), *The SAGE handbook of sociolinguistics*. SAGE Publications.

Phillips, N. (1973). Differences between Bahasa Indonesia and Bahasa Malaysia. *Indonesian Circle. School of Oriental & African Studies. Newsletter, 1*(2), 7-9. https://doi.org/10.1080/03062847308723526

Plantak, M., & Paleviq, E. (2022). "Banal Balkanism?" - Rethinking Banal Nationalism and regional identity in the Post-Yugoslav media space. *Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe*, *21*(1), 1-22.

Poedjosoedarmo, S. (2006). Perubahan tata bahasa: penyebab, proses, dan akibatnya. *Pidato Pengukuhan Guru Besar Fakultas Sastra Universitas Sanata Dharma. Yogyakarta*

Poedjosoedarmo, S. (2005a). Language Change: Interactions between Grammatical Components. *Phenomena: Journal of Language and Literature, 9* (1), 1-20.

Poedjosoedarmo, S. (2005b). Teori tata bahasa universal. *Kajian Linguistik dan Sastra,* 17(2), 109-122.

Poedjosoedarmo, S. (2004). Language development and grammatical principles. *Review of Linguistics and Literature*, *16* (31), 80-88.

Poedjosoedarmo, S. (2000a). Syntactic change in Malay. *Phenomena: Journal of Language and Literature*, *4*(1), 1-15.

Poedjosoedarmo, S. (2000b). The order of noun phrases and syntax. *Humanity*, *1*(2), 951-112.

Poedjosoedarmo, S. (2000c). Pengaruh urutan frasa pada perwujudan frasa dan kata. *Jurnal Pendidikan Humaniora* , 1(2), 117-127.

Poedjosoedarmo, S. (1996). Personal pronouns and focus in Brunai Malay: Austronesian dialects in the Archipelago. *Proceedings of an International Seminar*. Jabatan Bahasa Melayu Fakulti Sastra dan Sains Sosial Universitas Brunai Darussalam.

Presidential Regulation No. 20/2018 on the Use of Foreign Workers (2018)

Presidential Regulation No. 63/2019 on the Use of Indonesia (2019)

Putra, I. P., & Afrizal. (2016). Politik luar negeri Indonesia terhadap Malaysia dalam mempertahankan kepemilikan terhadap blok Ambalat pasca konflik pulau Sipadan dan Ligitan tahun 2012-2105. *Jurnal Online Mahasiswa Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Politik, 3*(2), 1-16.

Putten, J. V. D. (2011). Riau: A Malay Heart on the Border. In M. Mohamad, & S. M. K. Aljunied (Eds.), *Melayu: the politics, poetics and paradoxes of Malayness* (pp. 219-240). NUS Press.

Raharjo, S. N. I. (2011, August 2). ASEAN dan sengketa kawasan. Kompas. https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2011/08/02/04414029/asean.dan.sengketa.kawasan?page=all

Rappa, A.L., & Wee, L. (2006). *Language policy and modernity in Southeast Asia: Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand*. Springer.

Reditya, T. H. (2022, June 21). *Mahathir: Malaysia harus klaim Kepulauan Riau dan Singapura*. Kompas. https://www.kompas.com/global/read/2022/06/21/130000970/mahathir--malaysia-harus-klaim-kepulauan-riau-dan-singapura?page=all.

Ricci, R. (2013). The Malay World, Expanded: The world's first Malay newspaper, Colombo, 1869. *Indonesia and the Malay World*, *41*(120), 168-182. https://doi.org/10.1080/13639811.2013.794527

Rochmawati, I., Rusdiono, R., & Arifin, A. (2022).The Involvement and Conflict of Authority of Actors Managing the East Indonesia-Malaysia Border Area. *Journal of Government Science*, *7*(3).

Rohimah, D. F. (2018). Internasionalisasi bahasa Indonesia dan internalisasi budaya Indonesia melalui bahasa Indonesia bagi penutur asing (BIPA). *AN-NAS: Jurnal Humaniora*, *2*(2), 199-212. https://doi.org/10.36840/an-nas.v2i2.104

Rozan, M. Z. A., & Yoshiki, M. (2007) Orthographic reform of standard Malay online: Towards better pronunciation and cross-linguistic environment building. *Journal of Universal Language, 8*(1), 129-159. https://doi.org/10.22425/jul.2007.8.1.129

Safari, Amrulloh, M. A., & Musadad, A. N. (2024). Renarrating the Islamisation of the Malay-Indonesian archipelago in 13th-19th centuries. *Jurnal Ilmiah Islam Futura*, *24*(2), 304-328. https://doi.org/10.22373/jiif.v24i2.24843

Salamah, S., et al., (2018). Pengembangan bahasa Indonesia melalui diplomasi kebahasaan di luar negeri: sebuah pengamatan awal. *Diglosia : Jurnal Pendidikan, Kebahasaan, dan Kesusastraan Indonesia*, *2*(2). 85-92.

Samuel, J. (2008). *Kasus Ajaib Bahasa Indonesia?: Pemodernan Kosakata dan Politik Peristilahan.* KPG (Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia).

Schneider, E. W. (2013). Leisure-activity ESP as a special case of ELF: the example of scuba diving English. *English Today*, *29*(3), 47-57. https://doi.org/10.1017/S026607841300031X

Scott, C. P. G. (1896). The Malayan words in English. *Journal of the American Oriental Society, 17*, 93-144. https://doi.org/10.2307/592501

Selo, A., et al. (2015). Media dan khalayak: Pemberitaan isu konflik Malaysia dan Indonesia. *Jurnal Komunikasi: Malaysian Journal of Communication*, *31*(2,) 15-32.

Sharbawi, S. (2020). An English-centric monolingual Brunei? Predictions and reality. *Asian Englishes*, *22*(3), 257–281. https://doi.org/10.1080/13488678.2019.1709335

Skendi, S. (1975). Language as a factor of national identity in the Balkans of the nineteenth century. *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, *119*(2), 186-189.

Smakman, D. (2018). *Discovering sociolinguistics*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Sneddon, J. N. (2003). *The Indonesian: Its history and role in modern society*. UNSW Press.

Snyder, H. (2019). Literature review as a research methodology: Overview and guidelines. *Journal of Business Research*, *104*, 333-339. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2019.07.039

Sokol, A. E. (1948). Communication and production in Indonesian history. *The Far Eastern Quarterly, 7*(4), 339-353. https://doi.org/10.2307/2049724

Solikhah, I., & Budiharso, T. (2020). Standardizing BIPA as an international program in language policy. *The Asian ESP Journal*, *16*(5.2), 181-205.

Soriente, A. (2024). Cross-cultural encounters of Italian travellers in the Malay world; A perspective on the languages spoken by the local populations. *Wacana, Journal of the Humanities of Indonesia*, *25*(2). https://doi.org/10.17510/wacana.v25i2.1679

Statista (2020). *Number of social network users in some countries in 2020 and 2025*

Steinhauer, H. (1980). On the history of the Indonesian. *Studies in Slavic and General Linguistics*, *1*, 349-375.

Stevany, R. (2024, July 28). *Indonesia pengguna X atau Twitter terbanyak keempat di dunia*. Radio Republik Indonesia. https://www.rri.co.id/biak/lain-lain/859350/indonesia-pengguna-x-atau-twitter-terbanyak-keempat-di-dunia

Sugono, D. (2017). Bahasa Indonesia menuju bahasa internasional. *Fon: Jurnal Pendidikan Bahasa dan Sastar Indonesia*, *11*(2). https://doi.org/10.25134/fjpbsi.v11i2.722

Sukatman, Muti'ah, A., Taufig, A., Dafik (Eds.). (2017). *Prosiding seminar nasional bahasa dan sastra Indonesia dalam konteks global*. Program Studi Pendidikan Bahasa dan Sastra Indonesia, Fakultas Keguruan dan Ilmu Pendidikan, Universitas Jember.

Sylado, R. 2002. *Esei-Esei Bentara.* Kompas.

Tiawati, R.L. (2015). Bahasa Indonesia di Thailand menjadi media diplomasi kebahasaan dan budaya di ASEAN melalui pengajaran BIPA. *Jurnal Gramatika: Jurnal Penelitian Pendidikan Bahasa dan Sastra Indonesia*, *1*(1), 29-44.

Van der Tuuk, H. N. (1865). On the existing dictionary of Malay. *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland*, 1(1/2), 181-186.

Weintraub, A. N. (2013). [Review of the book Southeast Asia. Melayu: The politics, poetics and paradoxes of Malayness, edited by Maznah Mohamad and Syed Muhd Khairudin Aljunied]. *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 44*, 526-529 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022463413000428

Woolard, K. (2005). *Language and identity choice in Catalonia: The interplay of contrasting ideologies of linguistic authority.* https://escholarship.org/uc/item/47n938cp

Yang, S. (2008). Bahasa Indonesia dan bahasa Korea: Dua Model Menuju Bahasa internasional. *Southeast Asia Journal, 18*(1), 3-26.

Zulfikar, A. (2019, October 28-31). *Bahasa Indonesia sebagai embrio bahasa ASEAN: Peluang dan tantangan menuju ASEAN community 2015* [Congress presentation]. Kongres Bahasa Indonesia X, Jakarta, Indonesia.

Power Networks of Political Families in Southeast Asia: The Enduring Dynastic Influence in Democratic Contexts

Rahmad Hidayat

Department of Administrative Science, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Mbojo Bima, Bima, Indonesia 84119

rahmad.hidayat@universitasmbojobima.ac.id

How to Cite: Hidayat, R. (2024). Power networks of political families in Southeast Asia: The enduring dynastic influence in democratic contexts. *Journal of ASEAN Studies, 12*(2), 413-438. https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v12i2.12013

Abstract

This research systematically analyzed the dynamics of political dynasties in Southeast Asia by uncovering their prevalence, influence, and evolution over the 2009 to 2024 period. Using bibliometric mapping and content analysis, it explored 74 documents across 47 sources, including journals, books, and conference papers, obtained from the Scopus database. The primary objective was to identify thematic trends, blind spots, and the implications of these findings for understanding political stability, governance, and democratic processes in the region. The results highlighted a remarkable concentration of research in Southeast Asia, particularly the Philippines and Indonesia, where entrenched political dynasties shape governance and democratic processes. These countries dominate the literature, reflecting their unique political landscapes and the pervasive influence of familial power structures. In contrast, the lack of research on other Southeast Asian nations such as Brunei, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Timor Leste, and Vietnam highlights a critical gap that leaves the dynamics of political dynasties in these less-studied contexts. The geographic imbalance underscores the need for broader investigations to develop a more inclusive understanding of Southeast Asian political dynasties.

Keywords: bibliometrix, dynasty, family, power, Southeast Asia

Introduction

Political dynasties have long been integral to political history in various parts of the world, including Southeast Asia. In this region, political dynasties often control political power and profoundly influence social, economic, and cultural aspects. In democratic contexts, the term refers to the practice of inheriting political power from one generation to the next within a family (Teehankee et al., 2023), even within a political system that is

P-ISSN 2338-1361/ E-ISSN 2338-1353
Received: 10th August 2024/ Revised: 8th March 2025/ Accepted: 12th March 2025

supposed to be based on free and fair elections. Political leadership should be produced through a competitive electoral process open to all eligible citizens. However, dynastic politics can arise when certain family members use their power networks, social influence, and economic resources to maintain and extend their political power from one generation to the next (Dal Bó et al., 2009). It can take various forms, such as a father passing his office to his son, siblings taking turns holding important positions, or multiple family members executing office at different levels of government.

The Philippines and Indonesia are prominent examples of how political dynasties operate within Southeast Asian republics. Dynastic families in the Philippines leverage patronage networks to maintain their influence across generations, often affecting governance quality and democratic processes. Similarly, Indonesia's decentralization has enabled local political families to consolidate power, reflecting a complex interplay between democracy and entrenched elites. These cases illustrate the persistence and adaptability of dynastic politics in diverse socio-political contexts (Purdey, 2016b). Monarchies, such as those in Cambodia and Thailand, also represent dynastic governance through hereditary succession rather than electoral processes. While monarchies provide a contrasting backdrop, this article primarily focuses on republics where dynastic politics coexist with democratic institutions. The persistence of dynastic politics in democratic settings often sparks controversy, as it can undermine democratic principles, diminish healthy political competition, and exacerbate social and economic inequality (Schafferer, 2023). By concentrating power within families, political dynasties challenge the equitable representation of society and highlight critical issues in the intersection of tradition, governance, and modern democracy (Purdey, 2016b; Schafferer, 2023).

In recent decades, Southeast Asian political dynasties have become an increasingly popular research subject among academics. Bibliometric trends reveal a notable increase in publications, with the number rising sharply from two articles in 2013 to 14 in 2016 and maintaining consistent growth through 2024. The surge in interest reflects the expanding evidence of dynasties' impact on governance and society. Prior research has shown that in the Philippines, provinces dominated by political dynasties experience higher corruption levels and fragile governance quality (Davis et al., 2024; Mendoza, 2023; Mendoza et al., 2012; Tusalem & Pe-Aguirre, 2013). These findings highlight the dynasties' critical role in shaping political landscapes and underscore the need for further in-depth research into their mechanisms and impacts.

Political dynasties in Southeast Asia are a unique phenomenon that significantly influences governance, democratic processes, and economic development. Despite the growing body of literature, a comprehensive understanding of how these dynasties operate across different countries remains limited. The authors seek to address such a research gap through a bibliometric review and content analysis that offers a systematic overview of academic discourse from 2009 to 2024. Seventy-four papers are taken from the Scopus database, which includes scientific publications from various disciplines, including political science, sociology, economics, and history. By focusing on trends, thematic evolutions, and

blind spots, the research provides novel insights into the mechanisms, persistence, and impacts of political dynasties in Southeast Asia.

Political dynasties in Southeast Asia considerably affect political stability, quality of governance, and democratic processes (Purdey, 2016b; Ufen, 2017). In the Philippines, political dynasties are often associated with increased corruption, weakened governance, and widespread social inequality (Bulaong et al., 2024; Davis et al., 2024; Mendoza et al., 2012, 2016; Mendoza & Banaag, 2020; Rodan, 2021; Purdey, Tadem, & Tadem, 2016). In Indonesia, decentralization has strengthened the influence of local political families while creating dynastic patterns that are adaptive to regional political opportunities (Purdey, Aspinall & As'ad, 2016; Kenawas, 2023; Kimura & Anugrah, 2024; Maharani et al., 2024; Noak, 2024). Patronage networks, cultural legitimacy, and exploitation of state resources are the primary mechanisms to maintain power across generations. While the research of political dynasties shows an upward trend over the past two decades, this research also reveals significant gaps, particularly in the context of other Southeast Asian countries such as Brunei, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Timor Leste, and Vietnam, which have not been widely explored. These findings highlight the need for further research to comprehend the complexities of political dynasties in various social, economic, and cultural contexts in the region.

The research discusses two prominent aspects of political dynasties in Southeast Asia: their impact on democracy and governance and how power networks sustain them. Family dominance in politics often limits fair electoral competition, narrows the space for leadership regeneration, and weakens government accountability. In the Philippines and Indonesia, political dynasties maintain power through control over state resources, electoral rules that favor incumbents, and strong patronage networks. Instead of promoting a more inclusive democracy, political dynasties deepen corruption, nepotism, and patronage politics, creating barriers for new political actors to compete fairly. In addition to controlling public office, political dynasties build networks of power involving economic elites, the military, and political parties to nourish their dominance. In Thailand and Cambodia, military support has been a crucial factor in the stability of political dynasties, while in Singapore, strict political regulation ensures the continued rule of certain families. Thus, the sustainability of political dynasties depends not only on the popularity of individuals but also on their ability to adjust to political change through extensive patronage networks. Understanding these dynamics is key to analyzing how political dynasties continue to survive and influence democratic governance in Southeast Asia.

Methods

The research applies bibliometric review and content analysis using data from the Scopus database, focusing on publications related to Southeast Asian political dynasties from December 2009 to July 2024. To identify relevant publications, the research initially searched using the keywords 'political dynasty' and 'Southeast Asia,' with restrictions on the categories 'political science' and 'sociology.' This search yielded 74 relevant publications, including journal articles, books, book chapters, conference papers, notes, and reviews published

between 2009 and 2024. Moreover, the research uses one leading software, Bibliometrix RStudio, as a software package that runs on the RStudio platform and provides various bibliometric and scientometric analysis tools. It allows for a more in-depth and complex analysis of bibliometric data and integration with other data analysis software in RStudio (Aria & Cuccurullo, 2017).

The selection of Scopus as the primary data source is based on the extensive coverage of the database in the global scientific literature (Adilansyah et al., 2024; Firmansyah & Hidayat, 2024; Hidayat, 2024a, 2024b; Rifai et al., 2024). However, the authors recognize the limitations of representation caused by the dominance of English-language publications in Scopus. To mitigate such a potential bias, the scope of the Scopus database is carefully considered, with a recommendation to use additional databases such as Web of Science in the future to complete the analysis. In addition, omitting non-English publications or relevant regional studies is recognized as a limitation, emphasizing the need for a broader dataset in future research.

Data obtained from Scopus is exported in a compatible format for further analysis using Bibliometrix RStudio. The pre-processing process included data cleaning and standardization to ensure consistency and accuracy. Duplicate or irrelevant publications are excluded, while keywords such as 'Keywords Plus' and 'Author's Keywords' are crossed out to improve data reliability. Additionally, non-relevant publications in the context of Southeast Asian political dynasties are manually reviewed to ensure that only necessary documents are included. The findings produced by Bibliometrix are compared with previous research on political dynasties in Southeast Asia to ensure the validity of the analysis. This step aims to test the consistency of the findings within the context of existing academic discourse. Such a validation provides a more credible framework for interpreting the bibliometric analysis results.

In the thematic analysis, keyword co-occurrence networks are mapped to identify significant clusters, while citation analysis was used to determine influential authors and seminal works. To complement this quantitative analysis, selected documents are qualitatively reviewed to provide additional context to key themes, such as the impact of political dynasties on governance and economic development. These steps ensure that the analysis thoroughly covers the academic discourse on political dynasties in Southeast Asia, provides insights into an under-explored area, and builds a foundation for further research.

Results

Core Details of the Dataset

The dataset, as shown in Table 1, contains 74 documents from 47 sources which confirms a considerable annual growth rate of 14.87%, with an average age of documents of 5.68 years. Each document has received an average of 7.541 citations, and the authors of all papers used 3,490 references. Regarding document content, 63 keywords are added by researchers (Keywords Plus), and the authors themselves determined 215 keywords (Author's

Keywords). Prior research involves 114 authors, 27 of whom wrote the documents individually. It depicts the high individual contribution to the research on Southeast Asian political dynasties, although collaboration is also significant. There are 34 documents written by one author and an average of 2.09 authors per document, reflecting collaboration in some studies. The percentage of international collaboration is relatively high, at 14.86%, indicating the involvement of researchers from various countries in those studies. The documents comprise 56 articles, 2 books, 4 book chapters, 1 conference paper, 1 note, and 10 reviews. The dominant documents focus on scientific journal publications as the primary medium for disseminating research results on Southeast Asian political dynasties.

Table 1 Core Details of the Dataset

Description	Results
Timespan	December 2009–July 2024
Sources (Journals, Books, etc.)	47
Documents	74
Annual Growth Rate %	14.87
Document Average Age	5.68
Average citations per document	7.541
References	3490
Keywords Plus	63
Author's Keywords	215
Authors	114
Authors of single-authored documents	27
Single-authored documents	34
Co-Authors per documents	2.09
International co-authorships %	14.86

Source: Biblioshiny using RStudio

Annual Scientific Output

The trend of annual scientific production, as depicted in Figure 1, is based on the number of articles published yearly from 2009 to 2024. At the beginning of the observation period (2009–2012), the number of articles published per year was deficient and stable, with only 1 article each in 2009, 2011, and 2012. The topic of Southeast Asian political dynasties was still relatively unnoticed at the beginning of this period. However, there was a considerable spike in 2013, with 2 articles published indicating increased interest and attention to research on political dynasties in Southeast Asia.

The article fluctuated slightly, with 1 in 2014 and 0 in 2015. The decrease describes variability in research focus or data availability. Nevertheless, in 2016, the number of articles increased dramatically to 14. Such an increase marks a period when the topic of Southeast Asian political dynasties began to receive greater attention from the academic community.

After the peak in 2016, the number of articles published decreased slightly but remained high, with 5 articles in 2017, 5 papers in 2018, 5 documents in 2019, and 4 works in 2020. This fluctuation depicts dynamics in research that may be influenced by external factors such as the availability of new data or changes in research focus. In 2021–2024, there has been a consistent and steady increase in articles published. The years 2021 and 2022 had 11 and 7 articles, respectively, while 2023 peaked with 9. The year 2024 continues the trend with 8 articles. This consistent increase shows that the topic of Southeast Asian political dynasties is increasingly becoming an essential focus of academic research.



Figure 1 Annual Scientific Output (2009–2024)

Source: Biblioshiny using RStudio

Prominent Journals

Between 2009 and 2024, research on Southeast Asian political dynasties produced much literature published in various scientific journals and books. It shows how the topic has been explored from multiple perspectives and disciplines—Figure 2 highlights only the ten most productive journals during the analysis period.



Figure 2 Top Ten Most Productive Journals (2009–2024)

Source: Biblioshiny using RStudio

"South East Asia Research" took the top spot with nine articles. This journal focuses on interdisciplinary research on the Southeast Asian region, covering various political, economic, and socio-cultural aspects of political dynasties. The "Philippine Political Science Journal" came in second with six articles focusing on politics in the Philippines, including the dynamics of political dynasties in the country. In the third place, the "Asian Journal of Comparative Politics" contributed five articles that examine comparative politics in Asia, including an analysis of how political dynasties play a role in diverse political systems on the continent. "Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs" contributed four articles. This journal explores current issues in Southeast Asia, particularly concerning the structure and sustainability of political dynasties. Asian Survey ranked in fifth place with three articles. The journal explores political and economic issues across Asia, encompassing the dynamics of political dynasties.

Next, several journals and books contribute two articles, including the Asian Journal of Political Science, Asian Politics and Policy, Building Inclusive Democracies in ASEAN, Contemporary Southeast Asia, and Southeast Asian Studies. These journals cover various aspects of Southeast Asian politics, ranging from studies on political parties and public policy to issues of gender and inclusivity in politics. In addition, several journals contributed one article, indicating that the topic of political dynasties in Southeast Asia is also recognized and analyzed in a broader range of academic contexts. These journals include but are not limited to, Asia Maior, Asia-Pacific Social Science Review, Asian Affairs (UK), Asian Journal of Peacebuilding, Asian Journal of Women's Studies, Asian Studies Review, Austrian Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Cogent Social Sciences, Comparative Political Studies, Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies, Critical Asian Studies, Journal of Asian Studies, Journal of Democracy, New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies, Oxford Development Studies, Parliamentary Affairs, and Quarterly Journal of Political Science.

The diversity of these publication sources reflects that political dynasties in Southeast Asia are a complex topic that attracts attention from various disciplines, including political science, economics, social sciences, and cultural studies. These articles contribute to a deeper understanding of how political dynasties operate, develop, and influence political dynamics in Southeast Asian countries. In addition, the involvement of journals with different geographical focuses also emphasizes the significance of a country-based perspective in studying the phenomenon of political dynasties across the Southeast Asian region.

Thematic Map

Thematic mapping of author keywords, based on centrality and density rankings in a strategic diagram, is illustrated in Figure 3. Centrality measures the degree of connectedness between keywords, while density indicates the strength of internal relationships within the network. Using these research fields, the themes were mapped onto the dimensional strategic diagram and grouped into four categories: motor, niche, emerging or declining, and basic themes (Aria & Cuccurullo, 2017; Lucey et al., 2023). There are six foremost clusters labeled according to their respective dominant themes in Southeast Asian political dynasties-related research. Each cluster reflects keyword relatedness and thematic relevance based on centrality metrics such as betweenness centrality, closeness centrality, and PageRank centrality.



Figure 3 Thematic Map (2009–2024)

Source: Biblioshiny using RStudio

Motor Themes (Quadrant Q1): The motor themes have a strong centrality and high density, making them significant for advancing research on Southeast Asian political dynasties. Cluster 4, "political families," is the motor theme containing several primary keywords: political families, elections, Thailand, and democratization. This theme highlights the relationship between political families and the electoral process. The keyword "Thailand" underscores the influence of political families in the country. The centrality value shows that the topic is important but less dominant than other clusters.

Niche Themes (Quadrant Q2): Niche themes are highly developed, have strong connections, and are highly specialized. However, these themes do not have a sufficient connection to the primary context of the field. Cluster 1, "House of Representatives," consists of several main keywords: house of representatives, lawmaking, and Philippine congress, categorized as a niche theme. This cluster focuses on legislative functions, particularly on representative bodies such as the Philippine Congress. The keyword Philippine congress shows a direct link to the political context in the Philippines. Cluster 5, "Dynasty," is also categorized under a niche theme containing the prominent keywords: dynasty, ASEAN, and authoritarianism. This cluster reflects the issue of political dynasties in the context of Southeast Asia (ASEAN). The link with authoritarianism emphasizes that political dynasties are often connected to authoritarian systems, while politics and society highlight their impact on social structures.

Emerging or Declining Themes (Quadrant Q3): Emerging or declining themes tend to have low density and centrality, so they are considered weak because they represent topics that are just developing at an early stage or issues that are losing relevance. This theme contains Cluster 6, "Indonesia," which consists of the main keywords: Indonesia, women's political representation, and gender quotas. The cluster focuses on the issue of women's representation in Indonesian politics. The high betweenness centrality value for Indonesia (3539) indicates the significance of this theme in the network. The association with gender quotas confirms the efforts to encourage women's political participation.

Basic and Transversal Themes (Quadrant Q4): The basic themes have high relevance due to their high centrality but low density. Although the themes are important to the research field, their development is still sub-optimal. Cluster 2, "Political Dynasty," reflects the substance and scope of the basic theme. It contains several keywords: political dynasty, political dynasties, philippines, oligarchy, corruption, and poverty. Cluster 2 is the central theme in the data, with the highest betweenness centrality value (political dynasties: 4048), and shows that the issue of political dynasties is highly influential in the keyword network. Associations with corruption and poverty reflect the negative impact of political dynasties, while connections to economic development and incumbency highlight their influence on economic development and power. Cluster 3, "Local Politics," is also included, consisting of the main keywords: local politics, democracy, inequality, and rent-seeking. This cluster focuses on the dynamics of local politics. The association with keywords such as democracy and inequality shows the interaction between democratization efforts and inequality challenges. The highest PageRank centrality value is found for the keyword local politics (0.0148), confirming that local politics plays a significant role in the overall network.

Thematic Evolution

Research on Southeast Asian political dynasties has undergone a thematic evolution that confirms the changing focus of the study over time, from 2009 to 2024, as shown in Figure 4. The analysis focuses on how these topics changed and developed during two different periods, namely 2009–2020 and 2021–2024, relying on various metrics such as weighted increase, increase index, occurrence, and stability.

Figure 4 Thematic Evolution (2009–2024)

Source: Biblioshiny using RStudio

From Corruption to Political Dynasties and Political Parties (2009–2020 to 2021–2024): In 2009–2020, corruption was a dominant theme in the study of political dynasties in Southeast Asia. This topic then focused on "dynasties" and "political parties" in 2021–2024. The theme of corruption, often associated with dynastic politics, suggests that political dynasties often engage in corruption to maintain their power. However, over time, attention has shifted to how political dynasties interact with political parties and the structure of the dynasty, highlighting the role of political parties in supporting or opposing political dynasties.

Focus on Indonesia (2009–2020 to 2021–2024): Indonesia as a theme has seen a significant increase in academic attention. In the early period, there were fewer studies on Indonesia, but in 2021–2024, it has become one of the main focuses. It reflects the growing interest in how political dynasties operate in Indonesia and how they affect political and democratic processes.

Stability of Dynasty Theme (2009–2020 to 2021–2024): The theme of "dynasty" remained stable from 2009–2020 to 2021–2024. This theme encompasses studies on the continuity and

ways political dynasties maintain power from generation to generation. Despite changes in context and case studies, the focus on dynasties as stable political entities remains consistent.

Democratization and Elections (2009–2020 to 2021–2024): The topics of "democratization" and "elections" have undergone significant development. From an initial focus on dynasties, academic attention has shifted to how democratization and electoral processes are affected by the existence of political dynasties. It depicts a growing interest in understanding the impact of political dynasties on democratic institutions and electoral processes, as well as the challenges they face in changing contexts.

Oligarchy and Local Politics (2009–2020 to 2021–2024): The themes of "oligarchy" and "local politics" have emerged as new focuses in research on political dynasties. Political dynasties often function in oligarchic contexts where power is concentrated in the hands of a few families or individuals. In addition, local politics has become essential for understanding how political dynasties operate and maintain their power at a more micro-level.

Changes in Political Dynasties and Political Families (2009–2020 to 2021–2024): The topics of "political dynasties" and "political families" have undergone considerable changes in research. "Political families" has become a more detailed theme, describing how political families strategize and adapt to changing political environments. Political dynasties continue to be a central theme but with a deeper focus on family dynamics and the strategies they use to maintain power.

The thematic evolution confirms a shift in focus from corruption issues to a deeper exploration of dynastic structures, the role of political parties, and the impact on democratization and elections. The growing interest in Indonesia as a case study highlights the country's significance in the context of Southeast Asian political dynasties. Meanwhile, the themes of oligarchy and local politics represent an attempt to understand power dynamics at a more granular level. The research of political dynasties continues to grow, reflecting the complexity and changes in the political landscape in the region.

Discussion

Reflective Reading on Bibliometric Dataset

The dataset provides an overview of the development of political dynasty literature in Southeast Asia, reflecting the issue's complexity and sustainability in the regional political landscape. With an annual publication growth of 14.87%, academic attention to the issue has increased over the past 15 years. It indicates that political dynasties are not just a static historical topic but a dynamic entity that continue transforming as a challenge to contemporary democracy and modern governance.

The geographical distribution of prior research confirms the dominance of the Philippines and Indonesia as the central locus of research. This dominance reflects the political realities of both countries, where political dynasties play a crucial role in directing policy,

influencing democratic processes, and deepening social inequality. However, such an uneven distribution is also a reminder of the research gaps in other countries such as Brunei, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Timor Leste, and Vietnam, although having unique political systems, have not received adequate attention from academics. It points to the need to develop more inclusive literature so that the understanding of political dynasties in Southeast Asia can portray more diverse dynamics. With only a 14.86% international collaboration rate, prior studies tend to be local or regional. It confirms the nature of deeply rooted political dynasties in local contexts, thus requiring an in-depth perspective of political, cultural, and social dynamics in every country in the region. However, the lack of international collaboration is an opportunity to expand research horizons through cross-country cooperation, which can provide new insights into how political dynasties operate in various governance systems in Southeast Asia.

Reflection on the thematic clusters also affirms the significance of issues such as corruption, inequality, and oligarchy as dominant themes. The underlying theme of the "Political Dynasty" cluster highlights the relevance of these issues to governance and democracy in the region. Meanwhile, the "Local Politics" and "Dynasty" clusters show how political dynasty is often closely linked to local political dynamics, where patronage networks and inequality play a prominent role. Thus, political dynasties are not only a national problem but also directly impact political structures and processes at the local level. Nonetheless, the reflection reveals significant blind spots. The disparity in the representation of certain countries suggests that the narrative of political dynasties in Southeast Asia remains biased, with an overly large focus on electoral democracies such as the Philippines and Indonesia. There is a need to comprehend how political dynasties interact with authoritarian or hybrid political contexts, such as Cambodia and Vietnam. As such, it invites researchers to expand the geographical reach of research and consider more diverse methodological approaches, such as social network analysis or phenomenological exploration, to uncover new dimensions of political dynasties.

Overall, the dataset provides an influential platform for understanding Southeast Asia's political dynasties' complexities and dynamics. However, these data also call for deeper reflection on how these studies can go beyond existing boundaries to address critical questions about the sustainability of democracy, social justice, and institutional reform in the region.

Formation Mechanisms of Southeast Asian Political Dynasties

The phenomenon of political dynasties across Southeast Asia depicts a complex interplay of mechanisms through which these powerful families establish and maintain their political dominance. Dynasty formation operates through three interconnected pathways that collectively create resilient political structures capable of sustaining power across generations. The first crucial mechanism emerges from strategically exploiting initial electoral victories to serve as foundational moments for establishing dynastic power. This pattern is particularly evident in the Philippines, where candidates who secure their first election by a narrow

margin become approximately five times more likely to establish political dynasties than those who narrowly lose (Querubin, 2016). It illuminates how access to public office becomes a critical catalyst for dynasty formation as successful candidates leverage their positions to create lasting political infrastructure. The pattern extends across the region, with Indonesian data showing how direct regional head elections create enhanced opportunities for incumbents to establish and strengthen dynastic power bases (Purwaningsih & Widodo, 2020).

The second formation mechanism involves the sophisticated utilization of cultural, religious, and traditional authority structures, which proves particularly effective in societies where traditional social hierarchies retain remarkable influence. The case of Indonesia's Bima regency provides a compelling example of how the royal family maintains political control by strategically deploying the sultan's image as a source of cultural legitimacy. Such an approach proves especially powerful in communities where traditional beliefs remain strong to facilitate consistent electoral support (Yuliadi et al., 2021). These findings demonstrate how successful dynasties skillfully blend traditional authority with modern political structures, creating a hybrid form of legitimacy that resonates across different segments of society.

The third and most intricate mechanism involves the development of extensive patronage networks that artfully combine elite interests with grassroots support. Prior studies reveal how these networks operate as sophisticated ecosystems of power, incorporating various societal elements. In Indonesia, such networks extend to religious institutions, with Islamic boarding schools receiving state facilities in exchange for supporting dynasty agendas (Azizah et al., 2021). The sustainability of these patronage networks relies heavily on sophisticated resource distribution strategies. Governors in the Philippines from political clans strategically increase economic spending when facing competition (Solon et al., 2009), while the Arroyo administration exemplified how patronage networks could simultaneously maintain political stability and influence economic governance (Abinales, 2011). These findings underscore how successful dynasties maintain control over both formal political institutions and informal power structures, creating comprehensive systems of influence that adapt to changing political contexts.

Particularly noteworthy is how these three mechanisms—electoral exploitation, cultural authority, and patronage networks—operate not in isolation but in dynamic interaction. When initial electoral victories provide access to state resources, these resources can be channeled through patronage networks, reinforcing cultural authority. This cyclical reinforcement creates resilient political structures capable of withstanding prominent social and political changes. Dynasty formation is not simply a matter of inherited privilege but involves sophisticated mechanisms combining traditional authority, modern political structures, and complex social networks. Understanding these formation mechanisms proves crucial for analyzing the persistence of political dynasties and their profound implications for democratic development in the region.

Distinct Regional Patterns of Political Dynasties in Southeast Asia

The phenomenon of political dynasties in Southeast Asia reflects the region's distinctive historical backgrounds, cultures, and diverse political systems. These family-based power dynamics involve the inheritance of political positions and show how social values and patronage networks are deeply rooted in governance structures. These family often influence democratic processes and political participation, shaping patterns of power that prioritize family continuity in public roles and maintaining a status quo that benefits specific groups. The phenomenon poses challenges in creating a political system that is more inclusive and open to potential new figures.

Southeast Asia has unique political dynamics, especially related to the formation and operation of political dynasties. Although the region consists of 11 countries, previous research has focused on only five: Cambodia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand. The Philippines dominates, with 37 reflecting the high academic attention paid to political dynasties in the country. Due to the entrenched existence and significant influence of political dynasties in Philippine local and national politics, it has become a deep and ongoing political phenomenon. Past research has often explored the mechanisms of dynastic politics, its impact on democracy, and its link to poverty and inequality in the country (Buendia, 2021; Bulaong et al., 2024; Dulay & Go, 2022; Mendoza et al., 2012, 2016, 2023; Querubin, 2016; Reyes et al., 2018; Rodan, 2021; Purdey, Tadem, & Tadem, 2016; Tuaño & Cruz, 2019; Tusalem & Pe-Aguirre, 2013). Indonesia, with 24 studies, ranks second in the amount of literature. The research focuses on the dynamics of local politics, especially at the regional level, where political dynasties often emerge in the context of regional head elections. Research in Indonesia also highlights the transparency, accountability, and corruption aspects of political dynasties (Purdey, Aspinall & As'ad, 2016; Fauzanafi, 2016; Kenawas, 2023; Kimura & Anugrah, 2024; Purwaningsih & Widodo, 2020).

Thailand has nine studies, most of which focus on the influence of political dynasties in its parliamentary system and local politics (Purdey & Kongkirati, 2016; Nethipo, 2024; Nethipo et al., 2023; Nishizaki, 2013, 2018, 2019, 2023, 2024; Thananithichot & Satidporn, 2016). Political dynasties in Thailand are often associated with political conflicts between traditional and modern elites and their impact on the country's political stability. Meanwhile, research in Cambodia is relatively limited, with only one study detected. The research explores the dominance of a particular family in Cambodian politics, reflecting how power is centralized in one elite group (Bennett, 2023). Like Cambodia, there is only one research on dynastic politics in Singapore (Barr, 2016). It examines how Singapore is governed by a family-centered network of former Prime Minister of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew's close associates and relatives, despite official claims that the country is led by its most talented individuals and is grounded in professionalism.

Political dynasties in the Philippines have been a persistent feature of the country's political landscape. The phenomenon illustrates how certain families dominate political positions and retain power from generation to generation. Their formation often begins with a narrow first election victory, allowing other family members to occupy political positions in

the future. Political dynasties employ various adaptive strategies to maintain their dominance and enable multiple members of a political family to hold different political offices simultaneously, influencing policymaking (Dulay & Go, 2022; Reyes et al., 2018; Teehankee, 2018). However, social and economic issues will significantly determine the outcome of future inter-dynastic political contests as tensions between the Marcos-Romualdez dynasty and Duterte's coalition emerge in 2023 (Zialcita, 2024).

Indonesia also has a long history of political dynasties that have influenced various aspects of political and social life in the country. Political dynasties reflect the continuity of power within one family and show how that power is maintained and developed amidst remarkable political and social changes. The structure of political opportunities and the weaknesses of the state and political parties greatly influence the formation of political dynasties. Many regents in Central Kalimantan tried to build political dynasties, but only a few succeeded. Intergenerational stability in political dynasties still requires further discovery (Purdey, Aspinall, & As'ad, 2016). Decentralization and electoral democracy in Indonesia have facilitated the emergence of new elites and their families as political dynasties in Pekalongan, Central Java. Local political families were highly adaptable to external opportunities, threats, and internal family dynamics (Savirani, 2016). Furthermore, at the village scale, the adaptability and resilience of political dynasties to consistently win village head elections are influenced by unclear legal rules, undemocratic village institutions, and the strength of formal and informal social networks (Noak, 2024).

The operation of political dynasties often involves patronage networks and political resources to maintain power, as done by the Djojohadikusumo political dynasty, which has held positions of power for four generations. This dynasty adapts to changing political structures and the external and internal factors influencing its sustainability (Purdey, 2016a). After the rapid transition from an authoritarian system to a democracy, the old elite tried to regain power through various strategies. One is employing great nostalgia and past successful leadership images, such as Suharto, as part of the regime's restoration strategy to maintain relevance in contemporary political situations (Tyson & Nawawi, 2022). Political dynasty operations often use pragmatic tactics to ensure election victory, including single-candidate arrangements. Political parties and internal party structures influence the placement of dynasty women on committees, indicating the vital role of dynasties in politics so that political dynasty operations involve internal party arrangements to maintain their power and influence (Prihatini & Halimatusa'diyah, 2024).

In Cambodia, the transformation into a dynastic autocracy was influenced by economic recovery after the COVID-19 pandemic, human rights restrictions, and regional political relations. The future of Hun Manet's government remains uncertain, but it is expected to follow the pattern set by his father (Bennett, 2023). Political dynasties also play a prominent role in Singapore. Lee Kuan Yew was central to a significant power network from the early 1980s until his son, Lee Hsien Loong, consolidated power in 2011. Despite official rhetoric that the best talents run the country, the reality is that a group of families and relatives control the government. Political dynasties depend on individual ability and the networks of strong families, making it impossible for others to rise to the highest positions of power (Barr, 2016).

Thailand also experiences a unique political dynasty phenomenon. King Bhumibol Adulyadej mobilized his national patronage network to shape contemporary politics. Monarchy built a symbiotic relationship with Banharn Silpa-Archa, a rural politician considered dishonest, for their political interests. It describes how political dynasties often involve collaboration between the monarchy elite and local politicians to maintain power (Nishizaki, 2013). However, given the history and pattern of wealth accumulation and political power, many political dynasties only lasted two legislative terms because frequent military coups disrupted parliamentary institutions and the electoral process. Ideological conflicts and mass movements after the 2006 military coup further weakened the power of the old political dynasties. Political stability is heavily influenced by military dynamics and internal conflicts, which impact the sustainability of political dynasties (Purdey & Kongkirati, 2016). Being part of a political dynasty can provide electoral advantages. However, the most influential factor is being a member of the Pheu Thai Party or the Democrat Party. One of the best ways to avoid the monopoly of political families in Thailand is to empower and support qualified party members and voters to get involved in party affairs and activities (Thananithichot & Satidporn, 2016).

In summary, in the region's various political systems, political dynasties can maintain a particular family's dominance in public office and shape policy patterns and resource distribution. Political dynasties in the Philippines and Indonesia demonstrate how controlling democratic institutions can be used to maintain power through electoral mechanisms that favor incumbents. In these countries, political patronage and the exploitation of state resources have become key instruments in securing the political position of powerful families, often at the expense of transparency and accountability. The impact extends to various aspects of governance, from more closed decision-making to unequal access to political power for new actors.

Moreover, the networks of power that sustain political dynasties in Southeast Asia show complex patterns and vary by country. Some dynasties survive through alliances with economic and military elites, such as in Thailand and Cambodia, where the relationship between political power and the armed forces is crucial in maintaining power stability. Meanwhile, in Singapore, strict political regulations effectively preserve the dominance of certain families in the government system. By using extensive patronage networks, political dynasties can adapt to changes in the political and economic environment without losing control of power.

Impacts of Political Dynasties in Southeast Asia

Political dynasties significantly impact governance quality, economic development, voter behavior, and the sustainability of political parties and democratic institutions across Southeast Asia. Dynasties often influence governance by intertwining family interests with public office. This fusion can lead to nepotism, corruption, and the prioritization of personal wealth accumulation over effective policymaking. Such practices challenge the development of transparent and accountable governance structures.

Political dynasties in the Philippines have a detrimental effect on good governance, with provinces dominated by them tending to experience less effective governance regarding infrastructure development, health spending, crime prevalence, and quality of government (Tusalem & Pe-Aguirre, 2013). The dominance of political dynasties in the 2013 midterm elections, where 74% of elected members of the House of Representatives came from dynasty groups, led to patronage politics and corruption (Purdey, Tadem, & Tadem, 2016), so there is a positive relationship between the concentration of dynastic political power and the risk of corruption in the Philippines when viewed from the perspective of public procurement contracts (Davis et al., 2024). Moreover, in Indonesia, political dynasties represent each vested interest in the form of the elite's need to remain in power, supported by political freedom that can fulfill their rights without limits (Marwiyah et al., 2017). Political dynasties in several regions directly impact society and government bureaucracy, which often ends in acts of corruption, collusion, and nepotism (Muslikhah et al., 2019).

Economic impacts present a complex picture. While some regions show positive correlations between dynasty presence and poverty reduction, as seen in parts of Indonesia during regional autonomy (Guritno et al., 2019), income inequality and social exclusion typically increase in dynasty-dominated areas. The Philippines demonstrates how political dynasties and family conglomerates hamper non-elites capacity to implement progressive policies, leading to persistent inequality and low social mobility (Tuaño & Cruz, 2019). Areas dominated by political dynasties have lower living standards and levels of human development and higher levels of deprivation and inequality (Mendoza et al., 2012). They have a weak relationship with overall economic performance. However, higher economic spending is accompanied by lower economic development in areas where mayors, governors, and congress members come from the same clan (Garces et al., 2021).

Democratic institution development faces noteworthy challenges from dynasty dominance. The consolidation of political power within influential families often curtails the democratization process. By limiting access to political office for individuals outside dynastic circles, political dynasties hinder the representation of diverse societal interests. This power consolidation perpetuates a form of "elite democracy," where competition remains confined to a small pool of interconnected families. It then undermines broader political inclusivity. As a result, electoral policies in dynastic contexts frequently sustain unequal competition. The reliance on name recognition and familial networks skews electoral outcomes, favoring dynastic candidates. For instance, institutional reforms in Thailand paradoxically allowed political families to strengthen their parliamentary hold (Nishizaki, 2018). The concentration of power in the hands of political dynasties results in increased political violence, with such concentrated power fueling weak governance and poor development outcomes, which in turn provoke political violence (Mendoza et al., 2022).

Political dynasties also significantly shape voter behavior, leveraging cultural norms, patron-client relationships, and historical legacies. In many Southeast Asian societies, familial loyalty and respect for traditional hierarchies translate into voter preferences for candidates with recognizable family names. For example, voters in Indonesia often perceive dynastic politicians as stable and trustworthy due to their established networks and historical presence

(Kenawas, 2023). However, their perceptions are not uniformly favorable. Increasing voter awareness, particularly among younger generations and urban populations, has led to growing resistance against dynastic politics (Fauzanafi, 2016).

The sustainability of political parties in Southeast Asia is closely intertwined with the influence of dynasties. Dynastic leadership often prioritizes personal loyalty over institutional development, weakening party structures (Mufti, 2015). Conversely, political dynasties can ensure party continuity by providing stable leadership and mobilizing resources during electoral campaigns (Amundsen, 2016). This duality underscores the complex relationship between dynasties and party resilience.

Addressing such severe implications of dynastic politics requires a combination of legal reforms, electoral transparency, voter education, and institutional strengthening. Anti-dynasty legislation initiated in Indonesia can limit family dominance in politics or restrict simultaneous office-holding among relatives (Kenawas, 2023). Electoral reforms, including tighter regulations on campaign financing, will ensure fair competition and reduce the advantages of dynastic wealth (Aspinall & Berenschot, 2019). Voter education campaigns can shift voter focus toward merit rather than familial ties (David & Legara, 2017). The rise of digital platforms has further disrupted traditional voter patterns where social media can amplify reformist voices and challenge dynastic dominance (Gurri, 2018). Furthermore, strengthening intra-party democracy will allow non-dynastic leaders to emerge and diversify political representation (Chandra, 2016). By integrating these strategies, Southeast Asian democracies can foster accountability, inclusivity, and equitable political representation to mitigate the entrenched power of political dynasties.

Emerging Trends and Challenges

There are several prominent emerging trends and challenges in Southeast Asian political dynasties. Digital resistance emerges as a powerful new force, particularly in Indonesia, where citizens increasingly use online platforms to challenge corrupt dynasty regimes (Fauzanafi, 2016). This digital transformation of citizenship practices represents a significant shift in how populations engage with and resist dynastic power. It could pressure dynastic regimes to reform or risk losing legitimacy. The proliferation of social media analytics and digital tools also enables more precise targeting of corrupt practices, accelerating judicial and public scrutiny (Hidayat, 2019; Kamaluddin et al., 2022).

Women's political participation presents complex dynamics. While dynasties facilitate women's entry into politics, as seen in Indonesia's parliament, where 44% of female legislators come from political families (Wardani & Subekti, 2021), this pattern often reinforces rather than challenges traditional power structures. Dynasty women's success does not necessarily translate to broader female political empowerment. Within a decade, systemic reforms—such as gender quotas unlinked to dynasties—could emerge, driven by public advocacy for more representative political participation.

Voter behavior shows evolving patterns across the region. In the Philippines, there is growing voter skepticism toward dynastic politicians, with voters increasingly perceiving them as less qualified and less supportive of universal policies than non-dynastic candidates (David & Legara, 2017). Similar trends appear in other countries, suggesting a potential shift in public attitudes toward political dynasties. This disillusionment could weaken dynastic strongholds over the next 5–10 years, especially as younger, digitally-savvy voters demand more meritocratic governance. This trend might lead to a surge in support for non-dynastic, reform-oriented candidates, ultimately transforming electoral dynamics and reducing the influence of entrenched elites.

The rise of reform-oriented local politics represents another emerging trend. Some local politicians have begun challenging political dynasties in the Philippines by implementing programmatic governance, as demonstrated in Dinagat Island (Hara, 2021). It suggests potential pathways for democratic reform even within dynasty-dominated political systems. As these local successes gain visibility, they may inspire broader movements for systemic reforms, encouraging replication in other regions. This shift could lead to the gradual dismantling of dynastic systems, replaced by governance structures prioritizing transparency and accountability.

Blind Spots

Regarding the distribution of research loci, the Philippines and Indonesia dominate the literature. At the same time, other countries such as Brunei, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Timor Leste, and Vietnam have not been represented through any research. It confirms a noteworthy research gap that needs to be bridged, especially to understand the phenomenon of political dynasties in countries that have not been detected as the locus of previous research. This geographic neglect has broader implications for the field. Without examining other countries, current scholarship risks offering an incomplete narrative about political dynasties in Southeast Asia. The unique governance systems in these countries—from authoritarian regimes to hybrid democracies—can provide critical insights into the adaptability and resilience of political dynasties under different political conditions. Furthermore, studying these countries could uncover patterns of dynastic entrenchment that differ from those observed in democracies like the Philippines or hybrid systems like Thailand. The lack of comprehensive studies on these jurisdictions limits comprehension of how political dynasties interact with varying degrees of authoritarianism, historical legacies, and cultural frameworks.

Another crevice is the lack of research on the relationship between political dynasties and Southeast Asian democratic development. Political dynasties are often considered a barrier to democratic development because the power concentration in a single family can inhibit broader political participation and reduce government accountability. However, in-depth research on how political dynasties interact with democratization processes and how they influence the development of democratic institutions is still minimal. Further research is

essential to understand whether political dynasties always harm democracy or whether there are specific conditions under which they may contribute positively.

Most research on political dynasties in Southeast Asia uses a historical or case study approach focusing on specific political dynasties. While these approaches provide valuable insights, more in-depth quantitative and qualitative analyses that can identify general patterns and broader trends in the phenomenon are needed. Bibliometric analysis, social network analysis, and other statistical methods can fill this gap and provide a more comprehensive picture of Southeast Asian political dynasties.

A final cleft is investigating political dynasties' adaptation and resilience strategies in the digital era. With the advancement of digital technology and social media, there is a need to understand how political dynasties adapt and use these technologies to maintain and expand their power. Fauzanafi (2016) highlights how digital technology in Indonesia has transformed citizenship practices, but similar research in other Southeast Asian countries still needs to be conducted. Understanding the use of digital technology by political dynasties can provide important insights into contemporary power dynamics and how they can survive and adapt in a changing era.

Conclusion

The research systematically examined the dynamics of political dynasties in Southeast Asia, focusing on their prevalence, influence, and evolution from 2009 to 2024. Political dynasties remain deeply entrenched in many Southeast Asian countries, profoundly shaping democratic governance and maintaining power through strong patronage networks. In the Philippines and Indonesia, political dynasties utilize electoral mechanisms that favor incumbents, control over state resources, and patronage practices to secure dominance, often undermining government transparency and accountability. Meanwhile, in Thailand and Cambodia, alliances with military elites are crucial in maintaining the stability of political dynasties. However, in Singapore, strict political regulations ensure the continuity of power of certain families. By adapting their strategies to political and economic changes, political dynasties in the region continue to survive, demonstrating how control over political institutions and power networks allows them to adapt without losing dominance in the governance system.

This review also underscores significant national disparities, with the Philippines and Indonesia dominating the discourse. These nations exhibit entrenched dynastic politics characterized by leveraging familial networks and alliances with political elites, influencing national governance and local development. Conversely, the article identified a critical gap in the study of political dynasties in other countries where strong executive power and limited political freedoms likely create fertile ground for dynastic persistence. The absence of scholarly attention to these areas highlights the need for expanded geographical and contextual research to develop a more holistic understanding of political dynasties in diverse socio-political environments. The interaction between political dynasties and democratization

processes presents an area ripe for exploration, including how dynasties adapt to emerging challenges such as digital resistance and voter disillusionment. Policy recommendations derived from these insights include promoting transparency in electoral processes, limiting familial succession, and fostering inclusive political participation. These steps are essential to mitigating the adverse effects of dynastic dominance and advancing democratic governance across Southeast Asia.

Acknowledgement

The author thanks the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments. Many thanks also go to the editorial team of JAS, who helped the author to improve the quality of the article's content.

About The Authors

Rahmad Hidayat is a senior lecturer at the Department of Administrative Science at Universitas Mbojo Bima, Indonesia. He obtained his master's in human rights and democracy studies from the Department of Politics and Government, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Indonesia. His area of interest relates mainly to political issues such as citizenship, constituency, human rights, democracy, and social movements. Throughout his career, he has primarily contributed to academic writing in these interest areas, with more than 40 papers published in various journals.

References

Abinales, P. N. (2011). The Philippines in 2010: Blood, ballots, and beyond. *Asian Survey*, *51*(1), 163–172. https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2011.51.1.163

Adilansyah, A., Firmansyah, F., Kamaluddin, K., Sauki, M., & Hidayat, R. (2024). The evolution and current state of research on pork-barrel politics (1970–2024). *Thammasat Review*, *27*(2), 351–405. https://doi.org/10.14456/tureview.2024.28

Amundsen, I. (2016). Democratic dynasties? Internal party democracy in Bangladesh. *Party Politics*, *22*(1), 49–58. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068813511378

Aria, M., & Cuccurullo, C. (2017). Bibliometrix: An R-tool for comprehensive science mapping analysis. *Journal of Informetrics*, *11*(4), 959–975. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joi.2017.08.007

Aspinall, E., & Berenschot, W. (2019). *Democracy for sale: Elections, clientelism, and the state in Indonesia*. Cornell University Press.

Azizah, N., Nkwede, J. O., & Armoyu, M. (2021). The octopus-like power of Pesantren dynasty in the dynamics of local politics. *Cogent Social Sciences*, *7*(1), 1–10. https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2021.1962056

Barr, M. D. (2016). The Lees of Singapore: A quality brand. *South East Asia Research*, *24*(3), 341–354. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967828X16659727

Bennett, C. (2023). Cambodia 2022-2023: Securing dynastic autocracy. *Asia Maior*, *34*, 217–234.

Buendia, R. G. (2021). Examining Philippine political development over three decades after `democratic' rule: Is change yet to come? *Asian Journal of Political Science*, *29*(2), 169–191. https://doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2021.1916970

Bulaong, O., Mendoza, G. A. S., & Mendoza, R. U. U. (2024). Cronyism, oligarchy and governance in the Philippines: 1970s vs. 2020s. *Public Integrity*, *26*(2), 174–187. https://doi.org/10.1080/10999922.2022.2139656

Chandra, K (Ed.). (2016). *Democratic dynasties: State, party, and family in contemporary Indian politics*. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316402221

Dal-Bó, E., Dal Bó, P., & Snyder, J. (2009). Political dynasties. *The Review of Economic Studies*, *76*(1), 115–142. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937X.2008.00519.x

David, C. C., & Legara, E. F. T. (2017). How voters combine candidates on the ballot: The case of the Philippine senatorial elections. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, *29*(1), 70–94. https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edv041

Davis, D. B., Mendoza, R. U., & Yap, J. K. (2024). Corruption risk and political dynasties: Exploring the links using public procurement data in the Philippines. *Economics of Governance*, *25*, 81–109. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-023-00306-4

Dulay, D., & Go, L. (2022). When running for office runs in the family: Horizontal dynasties, policy, and development in the Philippines. *Comparative Political Studies*, *55*(4), 588–627. https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140211024292

Fauzanafi, M. Z. (2016). Searching for digital citizenship: Fighting corruption in Banten, Indonesia. *Advances in Southeast Asian Studies*, *9*(2), 289–294. https://doi.org/10.14764/10.ASEAS-2016.2-7

Firmansyah, F., & Hidayat, R. (2024). Bibliometric and critical review of the empirical research on political deception. *Thammasat Review*, *27*(1), 1–26. https://doi.org/10.14456/tureview.2024.1

Garces, L., Jandoc, K., & Lu, M. G. (2021). Political dynasties and economic development: Evidence using nighttime light in the Philippines. *Philippine Political Science Journal*, *41*(3), 215–261. https://doi.org/10.1163/2165025X-BJA10010

Guritno, D. C., Samudro, B. R., & Soesilo, A. M. (2019). The paradox of political dynasties of regeneration type and poverty in regional autonomy era. *International Journal of Ethics and Systems*, *35*(2), 179–194. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJOES-05-2018-0069

Gurri, M. (2018). *The revolt of the public and the crisis of authority in the new millennium*. Stripe Press.

Hara, T. (2021). Beyond personalistic politics: A progressive congresswoman's challenge to a political dynasty in Dinagat Islands, Philippines. *Philippine Political Science Journal*, *42*(1), 30–55. https://doi.org/10.1163/2165025X-bja10014

Hidayat, R. (2019). Public distrust and environmental citizenship: Primary impetuses of radical protest in Bima District, 2011-2012. *Jurnal Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik*, *22*(3), 187–200. https://doi.org/10.22146/JSP.35981

Hidayat, R. (2024a). A bibliometric review of global research on constituency service (1975–2024). *Thammasat Review*, *27*(1), 248–285. https://doi.org/10.14456/tureview.2024.11

Hidayat, R. (2024b). Mapping patterns and trends in uncontested elections research (1965–2024). *Interdisciplinary Political Studies*, *10*(2), 145–173.

Kamaluddin, K., Adilansyah, A., Taufiq, M., Sauki, M., & Hidayat, R. (2022). Certain new media platforms as framing strategy? A case study of the successful anarchist social protest in Central Indonesia. *Baltic Journal of Law & Politics*, *15*(3), 465–483.

Kenawas, Y. C. (2023). The irony of Indonesia's democracy: The rise of dynastic politics in the post-Suharto era. *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics*, *8*(3), 748–764. https://doi.org/10.1177/20578911231195970

Kimura, E., & Anugrah, I. (2024). Indonesia in 2023: Between democracy and dynasty. *Asian Survey*, *64*(2), 267–277. https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2024.64.2.267

Lucey, B. M., Kumar, S., & Sureka, R. (2023). Corruption in finance research: The state of art and future research agenda. *Journal of Economic Criminology*, *1*. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconc.2023.100001

Maharani, A. E. P., Baskara, A., & Suwadi, P. (2024). Comparison of political dynasty in Indonesia and the United States. *Revista de Gestao Social e Ambiental*, *18*(4). https://doi.org/10.24857/rgsa.v18n4-016

Marwiyah, S., Boman, S., & Wahid, A. (2017). Impact of the culture of political dynasty on earthing the constitutional democracy. *International Journal of Civil Engineering and Technology*, *8*(12), 1121–1127.

Mendoza, R. U. (2023). Inequality, oligarchy, and dynasty. *DLSU Business & Economics Review*, *32*(2), 200–215.

Mendoza, R. U., & Banaag, M. S. (2020). Political and economic inequality: Insights from Philippine data on political dynasties. *Journal of Global South Studies*, *37*(2), 294–319. https://doi.org/10.1353/GSS.2020.0029

Mendoza, R. U., Beja Jr., E. L., Venida, V. S., & Yap, D. B. (2012). Inequality in democracy: Insights from an empirical analysis of political dynasties in the 15th Philippine Congress. *Philippine Political Science Journal*, *33*(2), 132–145. https://doi.org/10.1080/01154451.2012.734094

Mendoza, R. U., Beja Jr., E. L., Venida, V. S., & Yap, D. B. (2016). Political dynasties and poverty: Measurement and evidence of linkages in the Philippines. *Oxford Development Studies*, *44*(2), 189–201. https://doi.org/10.1080/13600818.2016.1169264

Mendoza, R. U., Mendoza, G. A. S., Teehankee, J. C., Tuaño, P. A. P., & Yap, J. K. (2023). Interrogating the links between dynasties and development in the Philippines. *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics*, *8*(3), 765–786. https://doi.org/10.1177/20578911231182490

Mendoza, R. U., Yap, J. K., Mendoza, G. A. S., Pizarro, A. L. J., & Engelbrecht, G. (2022). Political dynasties and terrorism: An empirical analysis using data on the Philippines. *Asian Journal of Peacebuilding*, *10*(2), 435–459. https://doi.org/10.18588/202210.00a266

Mufti, M. (2015). Factionalism and indiscipline in Pakistan's political party system. In R. D. Long, G. Singh, Y. Samad, & I. Talbot (Eds.), *State and nation-building in Pakistan: Beyond Islam and security* (pp. 60–75). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315696904

Muslikhah, U., Hajri, W. A., & Santoso, D. (2019). Political dynasty and its implications for people's welfare. *International Journal of Innovation, Creativity and Change*, *10*(2), 246–252.

Nethipo, V. (2024). Dynastic democracy: Political families of Thailand. *Journal of Asian Studies*, *83*(2), 503–505. https://doi.org/10.1215/00219118-11057950

Nethipo, V., Phon-Amnuai, N., & Vongsayan, H. (2023). Disrupting the grip: Political dynasties and Thailand's 2023 general elections. *Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs*, *45*(3), 364-371.

Nishizaki, Y. (2013). The King and Banharn: Towards an elaboration of network monarchy in Thailand. *South East Asia Research*, *21*(1), 69–103. https://doi.org/10.5367/sear.2013.0140

Nishizaki, Y. (2018). New wine in an old bottle: Female politicians, family rule, and democratization in Thailand. *The Journal of Asian Studies*, *77*(2), 375–403. https://doi.org/10.1017/S002191181700136X

Nishizaki, Y. (2019). Ironic political reforms: Elected senators, party-list MPs, and family rule in Thailand. *Critical Asian Studies*, *51*(2), 210–231. https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.2019.1574596

Nishizaki, Y. (2023). Family ties that bind: Decentralisation, local elites and the provincial administrative organisations in Thailand. *TRaNS: Trans-Regional and-National Studies of Southeast Asia*, *11*(1), 45–70. https://doi.org/10.1017/trn.2022.8

Nishizaki, Y. (2024). Dynastic female politicians and family rule in Thailand: Evidence from the 2019 and 2023 general elections. *Critical Asian Studies, 56*(3), 321–349. https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.2024.2370031

Noak, P. A. (2024). Analysis of the existence of political dynasties in village head elections in Indonesia. *International Journal of Religion*, *5*(10), 1135–1145. https://doi.org/10.61707/4bnbga38

Prihatini, E., & Halimatusa'diyah, I. (2024). Gender, political dynasties, and committee assignments: Evidence from Indonesia. *Parliamentary Affairs*, *77*(1), 196–214. https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsac019

Purdey, J. (2016a). Narratives to power: The case of the Djojohadikusumo family dynasty over four generations. *South East Asia Research*, *24*(3), 369–385. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967828X16659728

Purdey, J. (2016b). Political families in Southeast Asia. *South East Asia Research*, *24*(3), 319–327. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967828X16659027

Purdey, J., Aspinall, E., & As'ad, M. U. (2016). Understanding family politics: Successes and failures of political dynasties in regional Indonesia. *South East Asia Research*, *24*(3), 420–435. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967828X16659571

Purdey, J., & Kongkirati, P. (2016). Evolving power of provincial political families in Thailand: Dynastic power, party machine and ideological politics. *South East Asia Research*, *24*(3), 386–406. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967828X16659570

Purdey, J., Tadem, T. S. E., & Tadem, E. C. (2016). Political dynasties in the Philippines: Persistent patterns, perennial problems. *South East Asia Research*, *24*(3), 328–340. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967828X16659730

Purwaningsih, T., & Widodo, B. E. C. (2020). The interplay of incumbency, political dinasty and corruption in Indonesia: Are political dynasties the cause of corruption in Indonesia? *Revista UNISCI*, *2020*(53), 157–176. https://doi.org/10.31439/UNISCI-89

Querubin, P. (2016). Family and politics: Dynastic persistence in the Philippines. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, *11*(2), 151–181. https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00014182

Reyes, J. A. L., Arce, B. G. C., & Madrid, N. B. N. (2018). Do money, power, family and connections really matter in politics? Analysing factors of success in the 2010, 2013 and 2016 Philippine senatorial elections. *The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies*, *36*(2), 28–51. https://doi.org/10.22439/cjas.v36i2.5648

Rifai, R., Kamaluddin, K., & Hidayat, R. (2024). Exploring the roots and solutions of maladministration, power abuse, or corruption in contemporary Indonesian villages. *Pertanika Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities*, *32*(3), 1115–1140. https://doi.org/10.47836/pjssh.32.3.15

Rodan, G. (2021). Inequality and political representation in the Philippines and Singapore. *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, *51*(2), 233–261. https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2019.1607531

Savirani, A. (2016). Survival against the odds: The Djunaid family of Pekalongan, Central Java. *South East Asia Research*, *24*(3), 407–419. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967828X16659731

Schafferer, C. (2023). Political dynasties and democratization: A case study of Taiwan. *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics*, *8*(3), 708–726. https://doi.org/10.1177/20578911221148830

Solon, J., Fabella, R., & Capuno, J. (2009). Is local development good politics? Local development expenditures and the re-election of governors in the Philippines in the 1990s. *Asian Journal of Political Science*, *17*(3), 265–284. https://doi.org/10.1080/02185370903403475

Teehankee, J. C. (2018). House of clans: Political dynasties in the legislature. In M. R. Thompson & E. C. Batalla (Eds.), *Routledge handbook of the contemporary Philippines* (pp. 85–96). Routledge.

Teehankee, J. C., Chambers, P., & Echle, C. (2023). Introduction: Political dynasties in Asia. *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics*, *8*(3), 661–670. https://doi.org/10.1177/20578911231185786

Thananithichot, S., & Satidporn, W. (2016). Political dynasties in Thailand: The recent picture after the 2011 general election. *Asian Studies Review*, *40*(3), 340–359. https://doi.org/10.1080/10357823.2016.1193473

Tuaño, P. A., & Cruz, J. (2019). Structural inequality in the Philippines: Oligarchy, (im)mobility and economic transformation. *Journal of Southeast Asian Economies*, *36*(3), 304–328.

Tusalem, R. F., & Pe-Aguirre, J. J. (2013). The effect of political dynasties on effective democratic governance: Evidence from the Philippines. *Asian Politics and Policy*, *5*(3), 359–386. https://doi.org/10.1111/aspp.12037

Tyson, A., & Nawawi. (2022). Dictators never die: Political transition, dynastic regime recovery and the 2021 Suharto commemoration in Indonesia. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, *44*(3), 421–452.

Ufen, A. (2017). Political finance and corruption in Southeast Asia: Causes and challenges. In C. Rowley & M. D. Rama (Eds.), *The changing face of corruption in the Asia Pacific: Current perspectives and future challenges* (pp. 23–33). Elsevier. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-101109-6.00002-2

Wardani, S. B. E., & Subekti, V. S. (2021). Political dynasties and women candidates in Indonesia's 2019 election. *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, *40*(1), 28–49. https://doi.org/10.1177/1868103421991144

Yuliadi, I., Sumitro, Anwar, Umanailo, M. C. B., Kurniawansyah, E., Rusli, M., & Ibrahim, Z. (2021). Political dynasty in eye of the community (Sociological study of political awareness in Bima regency election 2020). *Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Operations Management Singapore,* 3884–3890.

Zialcita, J. P. L. (2024). The Philippines in 2023: The UniTeam unravels. *Philippine Political Science Journal*, *45*(1), 82–103.

Contesting Sovereignty: The State-Indigenous Relations at the Indonesia - Timor-Leste Borderlands

Eni Sugiarti[1]*, Kisho Tsuchiya[2], Mochamad Kevin Romadhona[3], Lina Puryanti[4], Edi Dwi Riyanto[5], and Gayung Kasuma[6]

[1,6]Department of History Science, Faculty of Humanities, Universitas Airlangga, Surabaya, Indonesia, 60286
[2]Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University, Sakyo Ward, Japan, 606-8501
[3]Department of Sociology, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Airlangga, Surabaya, Indonesia, 60286
[4,5]Department of English Literature, Faculty of Humanities, Universitas Airlangga, Surabaya, Indonesia, 60286

[1]eni-s@fib.unair.ac.id; [2]kishotsuchiya@cseas.kyoto-u.ac.jp; [3]kevin.romadhona@staf.unair.ac.id; [4]lina-p@fib.unair.ac.id; [5]edi-d-r@fib.unair.ac.id; [6]gayung-k@fib.unair.ac.id
*Corresponding author

How to Cite: Sugiarti, E., Tsuchiya, K., Romadhona, M. K., Puryanti, L., Riyanto, E. D., & Kasuma, G. (2024). Contesting sovereignty: The state-indigenous relations at the Indonesia - Timor-Leste borderlands. *Journal of ASEAN Studies, 12*(2), 439-460. https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v12i2.11467

Abstract

The contestation of the state and Indigenous people at the Indonesia – Timor Leste border has formed a distinctive pattern. The state's contestation represents sovereignty, while Indigenous people reflects socio-cultural integrity. The dynamics and strategic issues of the border area in Indonesia – Timor Leste are interesting topics of the study, especially those related to the resistance between the state and customary institutions. Conflicts often arise due to contestations over political and cultural boundaries, shaping the relationship between the state and local communities. This topic is significant as it involves two parties: state institutions and customary institutions. Moreover, there is a strong common thread connecting these interactions. This research examined the forms of political and cultural contestation and analyzes the factors driving the contestation between these two entities. Furthermore, it explored the implications of these contestations for the role of customary institutions in Indonesia-Timor Leste bilateral relations. This research applied an ethnographic approach, relying on the acquisition of primary and secondary data collected for analysis. The forms of contestation between the state and customary institutions include conflicts over identity, struggles regarding the formal spatial concept of the state and the socio-cultural space of customary institutions, and disputes over ownership claims. A key factor driving these contestations is the restriction of customary participation which is restricted by the government through regulations and marginalization of customary institutions. The contestation has implications for regulation, including

P-ISSN 2338-1361/ E-ISSN 2338-1353
Received: 25th March 2024/ Revised: 21st February 2025/ Accepted: 18th March 2025

compromises between the state and customary practices, the provision of new customary spaces, and the evolving relationship between Indigenous communities and transnational cultures.

Keywords*:* border area, Indigenous people contestation, politics, state contestation

Introduction

The contestation between the state and Indigenous people at the Indonesia-Timor Leste border results in direct confrontations between the state and traditional institutions (Alkatiri, 2020). The conflict over political and cultural boundaries challenges the state sovereignty and customary integrity (Benhabib, 2021). The state establishes its integrity through formal legal rules for sovereignty, while customary integrity is based on sociocultural relations and traditional ties (Strelein, 2021). On August 18, 2020, large-scale destruction of houses occured in the 3700-hectare Pubabu customary forest in Besipae, South Central Timor, to facilitate the development of livestock, tourism, and plantations. Another case involved the displacement of a customary pillar in the village of Nelu Leolbatan by the Bakorsurtanal team, which resulted in a national border conflict (Kennedy et al., 2022). These conflicts stem from intense nationalism, driving actions intended to uphold the country's dignity and sovereignty.

Research on contestation tends to examine it from symbolic aspects and opposition aspects (Thompson, 2024). The first perspective views contestation as an action expressed through symbols, while the second examines it through direct forms of resistance itself (Tho Seeth, 2023; Barton et al., 2021; Hidayahtulloh, 2024). These two approaches primarily focus on conflicts between groups. However, previous research has not thoroughly explored the implications for the contestants or the contradictions that arise. National Values at the Indonesian border in Timor-Leste are constructed through two models: civil nationalism and ethnocultural nationalism (Balcom et al., 2021).

The border of Timor Leste is a highly dynamic area in terms of political, social, cultural, and economic aspects (Arvanti et al., 2023; Mangku, 2020b; Sunyowati et al., 2022; Yahya et al., 2024). Government policies that adopt a prosperity-based approach have significantly influenced studies on national borders (Sunyowati et al., 2023). The border between Indonesia and Timor Leste is particularly noteworthy to discuss due to its long territorial boundaries and deep-rooted historical socio-cultural ties, which have evolved within traditional societies. Issues along the Indonesia-Timor Leste border have the potential to generate both conflict and bilateral consolidation, as they leverage historical socio-cultural connections between nations and Indigenous people (Kennedy et al., 2022; Dari et al., 2023; Rachmawati et al., 2020; Rachmawati & Djalaludin, 2017). The vertical conflict between the state and the people presents an intriguing topic for examining the interaction between customary and formal institutions. The research of contestation, the socio-cultural reproduction of the state, and global relations serve as a strategic issue that informs government policy-making in the development process of border areas, particularly in newly established territories.

This research is based on the idea that identity contestation is primarily limited to differences in citizenship status and the status of Indigenous people. While the country's political identity is official, it inherently allows room for change and adaptation. In contrast, people's cultural identity is both fluid and permanent, making it highly resistant to change due to the rigid customary mechanisms that govern it (Kramsch & Uryu, 2020). Although political identity is rigid, there is space for transformation. Meanwhile, the community's cultural identity remains fluid and permanent, making modifications exceedingly difficult due to the strict customary mechanisms. The political identities of border residents are not predetermined but rather shaped by the political state. This formation may stem from the need to uphold national dignity, even when it contradicts the cultural ties that traditionally serve as a medium of cohesion within society (Adelita & Romadhona, 2023; Tiwari, 2021; Wiratama et al., 2023).

Setting up the borders between countries should not be based solely on a nation's history, politics, national law, and international law (Abramson et al., 2022; Elden, 2021; Klabbers, 2020a; Paasi et al., 2022). It should also involve the people living near the borders to ensure fairness and alignment with the community's needs (Windradi & Wahyuni, 2020). They explained that centralized political and legal interests primarily drove many historical agreements defining borders (Windradi & Wahyuni, 2020). Furthermore, interaction and communication between people in border areas must adhere to the boundaries established through legal formalities. Therefore, a country's political and legal principles not only regulate sovereignty between countries but also regulate the interaction and communication of people living in the border areas (Mangku, 2020b; Damayanthi et al., 2022; Leonardi et al., 2021). The fanatical management of border areas at political and legal boundaries has led to the neglect of collective interests in border areas, especially in facilitating interaction and communication among local communities (Sunyowati et al., 2023).

In managing border areas, local governments' participation is crucial in determining regional boundaries and establishing identity per agreed political and legal policies (Sabuna, 2020). Politically, the legal identity of people living in border areas is an essential aspect to ensure the welfare and security of people in border areas, especially in carrying out the process of interaction and communication (Sabuna, 2020). Therefore, geographical, political, and legal factors are important aspects that cannot only determine territorial boundaries (Sassen, 2020; Jessop, 2020; Barbour, 2023; Schimmelfennig, 2021), but also regulate how people in border areas behave, interact, and communicate in compliance with legal provisions (Rokhanyah et al., 2023; Encarnacao et al., 2022; Uly et al., 2023; Mauk et al., 2023; Tjitrawati & Romadhona, 2024). However, the interaction and communication of people living in border areas must also be recognized as a vital socio-cultural aspect beyond political and legal perspective (Suwartiningsih & Purnomo, 2020; Ida et al., 2023), as local wisdom in these areas plays a key role in maintaining harmonization between border communities (Hasnan & Pakri, 2021).

Politically, people living in border areas are separated by administrative legal boundaries. However, regarding attitudes, interactions, and communication, there are no cultural boundaries between those people (Djuyandi et al., 2023; Arifin, 2022). In line with this,

border areas are not only a statement of administrative demarcations that define a country's sovereignty but also a cultural statement that transcends formal national boundaries (Handayani, 2020). The cultural boundaries of communities in border areas should be recognized as a strategic value in fostering harmonious welfare and security through an approach to interaction and communication between communities (Arditama & Lestari, 2020; Atem & Niko, 2020). Therefore, the management of national space and culture in border areas must accommodate national and cultural interests to enhance welfare and security among border communities. Based on the political and legal assessment of Indigenous territorial recognition, many Indigenous communities are restricted to the territories within border areas (Monteiro, 2020; Bauder & Mueller, 2023).

The cultural boundaries of people living in border areas have transcended formal political and legal administration boundaries (Roluahpuia, 2024; Gohain, 2020; Jain & DasGupta, 2021; Munandar, 2020). In this context, cultural-based regional management at the border must be implemented proportionally (Stiefel & Peleg, 2023), as each country has its uniqueness and distinctiveness, as reflected in the interaction and communication between the people of Indonesia and Timor Leste in the border area (Metherall et al., 2022). The dynamic of cultural area boundaries in border communities can positively impact increasing security and tolerance by upholding collective values among communities. Therefore, the dynamics of Indigenous territories in border areas have demonstrated a positive impact on the process of community interaction and communication. Moreover, customary involvement in border areas has played a crucial role in preventing illegal logging, human trafficking, and inter-ethnic conflicts in the border area (Irawan et al., 2021; Anwar, 2021; Haryaningsih & Andriani, 2022).

The identity of people living in border areas often creates polemics between the people and the state (Ochoa Espejo, 2020; Stoffelen, 2022; Furedi, 2020). In Nunukan Regency, North Kalimantan Province, people living in border areas only have a Temporary Residence Certificate (SKTS) as an identity card, making their Indonesian identity dependent on Malaysia's state policies (Ford, 2024). The limitations faced by border communities have pragmatically influenced their orientation toward establishing identity in a pragmatic manner. In the context of cross-border societies, political space is shaped by varying levels of cultural and ethnic interest, serving as the foundation for ideological, linguistic, and social differences (Sarjono & Rudiatin, 2022). This has led to paradoxical state policies regarding border populations. The social and cultural characteristics of people living along various borders have, in some cases, resulted in disunity among Indigenous communities, as seen in communities living in border areas between the United States and Mexico (Gonlin et al., 2020; Kurniawan et al., 2022; Subagyono et al., 2024).

Convergence and differences in preferences regarding border area regulations must gain public support to ensure politically reasonable policies and promote the integration of people living in border areas, thereby minimizing discrimination, racism, and criminal practices in border areas (Mckee et al., 2021; Morgan-Jones et al., 2020; Weiß, 2021). The low level of state participation in border areas limits access to healthcare, social services, and education about nationality (Ramadani et al., 2024; Koesbardiati et al., 2025), increasing the

likelihood of the potential for community involvement in border areas to violate the law is even greater (Sagita, 2020). The example of the law violations are such as human trafficking, drugs, and inter-ethnic conflicts which often involve people in border areas (Prayuda, 2020). This situation is further exacerbated by inadequate rights and resources, including the lack of educational facilities, insufficient teaching materials, and poor education quality, ultimately marginalizing border communities and worsening their socio-economic conditions (Lengkong & Sinaga, 2021).

This research aims to address the shortcomings of existing research by examining the implications of contestation, which leads to a new form of Indigenous people's integration. In this regard, three questions are posed (Chobphon, 2021). First, what is the nature of the contestation between nations and Indigenous people? Second, what factors contribute to the emergence of this contestation? Third, what are the implications of this identity contestation on social life in the Indonesia- Timor Leste border area? The answers to these questions provide a way to obtain more complete information about the dynamics of contestation in border areas involving Indigenous communities.

Research Method

This research is an ethnographic study (Walford, 2020). It employs participatory observation research, with data collected from primary and secondary sources through field research (Walford, 2020). This research uses purposive sampling. Primary data is the data from observations, interviews of 15 respondents and perception data. Meanwhile, secondary data is obtained from the research findings and books discussing border issues, especially in the territory of Timor Leste. Data collection methods include field studies, interviews, and literature studies. The research area covers the border of North Insana, North Central Timor, Indonesia, and the Oecusse District, which is an enclave of Timor-Leste.

The research team conducts a one-month field study. Researchers observe the daily life of the people on the border of Indonesia-Oecusse Timor-Leste. They monitor the mobility of activities in the market, common meeting space known as "*ruang bertemu bersama*", local government officials, and traditional leaders. Interview are conducted to gather extensive data on issues of customary identity, people's views on identity as citizens and as members of Indigenous peoples. Interviews are conducted with people in the border areas of Indonesia and Oecusse Timor-Leste. Then, the research team re-read various written literature related to communities on the border of Indonesia-Oecusse Timor-Leste. The key theme of this research is to address the gaps in existing research by exploring the contestation between nations and Indigenous people, the factors driving it, and its implications for social life in the Indonesia-Timor Leste border area. Thus, this research provides a comprehensive understanding of Indigenous people's integration dynamics.

Data are analyzed using an interactive analysis model proposed by Milles and Huberman (as cited in Sarosa, 2021; Li & Zhang, 2022), including data reduction, data display and data verification. The models include three components: (1) data reduction, classifying

both required and unrequired data; (2) data analysis, presenting the data the researchers made by analyzing; (3) data verification, the researchers made a conclusion based on an analysis of the data that had been reduced.

Analysis

The Indonesia-Timor Leste borders are a multifaceted area characterized by historical conflicts, colonial legacies, and Indigenous resistance (Strating, 2018). The area constitutes more than a mere physical boundary that serves as a domain where Indigenous populations navigate their identity, rights, and existence within the context of state government and evolving national policy. The boundary between Indonesia and Timor Leste has been influenced by historical occurrences, including Portuguese and Dutch colonialism, Japanese occupation during World War II, and Indonesia's annexation of East Timor in 1975 (Leach, 2016; Hägerdal, 2019; Molnar, 2009; Southgate, 2019). The boundary changes normal ways of running things like government, business, and family ties (Joseph & Hamaguchi, 2014). This makes native tribes question the limits of using historical, cultural, and ancestral claims to the land. Indigenous peoples' opposition to state-imposed sovereignty is shown through rallies, efforts to restore land, and the continued use of Indigenous governance systems even when the government gets involved.

Indigenous leaders and customary elders are important in mediating between governmental authorities and local populations, often contesting policies that jeopardize their ancestral territories. The socio-political problems and discussions in the Indonesia-Timor Leste borders illustrate an ongoing negotiation between Indigenous groups and state representatives (Wigglesworth, 2013). Land conflicts, resource ownership, political representation, security and militarism, and cultural integrity are essential components of Indigenous resilience in the area (Palmer & McWilliam, 2019). Indigenous groups preserve cultural and family connections across borders through common rituals, weddings, and social events, contesting the rigidity of national boundaries and strengthening a collective identity that transcends state-imposed divides. Language and oral traditions are crucial in countering cultural absorption with local groups and activists actively working to preserve and teach Indigenous languages (Ward & Braudt, 2015). In response to contemporary challenges, Indigenous communities utilize modern technology, engage in global Indigenous movements, and leverage social media to amplify their visibility. State-Indigenous interactions along the border between Indonesia and Timor Leste illustrate the continuous contestation of sovereignty, ongoing socio-political conflicts, and the enduring resilience of Indigenous cultural identity. For these interactions to be equitable and sustainable, it is essential to take into account Indigenous perspectives, acknowledge historical injustices, and foster an inclusive governance system that respects customary laws and cultural heritage.

Contestation of Identity: Indigenous versus the State in the Borderlands of Indonesia and Timor-Leste

The contestation between Indigenous people and the state can be observed through several aspects: the reality of identity, the concept of space, and ownership (Radhuber & Radcliffe, 2023; Bauder & Mueller, 2023; Brigg et al., 2022). The reality of identity at the borderline of Timor Leste and Indonesia is evident in how local people define themselves. They commonly express their identity with statements such as, "*I am Timorese*", Antoin Meto, "*I am a Dawan person, not an Indonesian or an East Timorese*". Timorese people communicate using their mother tongue according to the Dawan language, which reflects their tribal heritage and unique traditions. In contrast, national identities are formalized through official documents such as ID cards, passports, and official documents. The concept of space for the Timorese is based on socio-cultural relationship and ties centered around the existence of *sonaf*, which refers to the traditional house. *Sonaf* symbolizes territorial authority and serves as a cultural marker of power. Meanwhile, the state's political concept of space at the border is defined through the delineation of administrative areas and territorial boundaries. The last aspect is the ownership as it represents another significant aspect of contestation. State ownership holds full rights to land ownership, while Indigenous ownership is reflected in customary claims over sacred sites such as the Oenakaf holy water source, *Ulayat* (customary land), and traditional tribute collection practices (Suhariono et al., 2022).

Identity contestation in the border area refers to the value of pragmatism. Individuals identify themselves as citizens through formal identity markers such as *KTP* (Indonesian ID Card), passport and other official documents. However, within cultural space, identity changes to that of Indigenous people, marked by traditional symbols embedded such as language, kinship, and ancestral rituals. The concept of socio-cultural space is reflected in *Sonaf*, which represents the contestation of space. The state's concept is defined by the demarcation line outlined in the deed of land boundary agreement (Hennida et al., 2020). In contrast, when interpreted by the concept of space in customary ties, it is very fluid and does not establish rigid land boundaries. Instead, social ties such as kinship networks create expansive and territorial boundaries. The struggle for state ownership authority and customary institutions over the right to use and manage customary land remains a significant issue. This contestation leads to disputes over land rights, production resources, conflicts, claims, and broader identity issues, which have become important issues to this date. One of the most pressing identity issues is the phenomenon of dual identification, where individuals hold official documents from both countries. Cases of identity falsification have also been found among border communities in Indonesia and Timor Leste, as stated by Dhona, "*I have two passports, Indonesian and Timor Leste, to make it easier to get in and out of Timor Leste*."

This case occurs because, in border communities, formal identity is considered merely a formality. Illegal mobility remains a problem; a shortcut road crossing service has emerged for illegal movement, ironically located near the cross-border post (PLBN). Additionally, these shortcut road services are openly offered at the entrance to the cross-border post (*PLBN*). Ownership claims are also crucial issues, such as the refusal to grant *ulayat* (customary land)

for the construction of roads and facilities that pass through areas considered sacred by local custom. Furthermore, another significant claim involves the management rights to control water sources and watercourses. Traditionally, the right to manage water resources belongs to customary institutions, granting customary members in Indonesia and in Timor Leste access to these water sources. However, this situation also leads to illegal passers-by, which contradicts state law on state ownership.

The dichotomy between state-driven nationalism and Indigenous identity has been a primary source of conflict between Indonesia and Timor-Leste (Schulze, 2024). As a vast, multicultural country, Indonesia operates under a framework of national unity that often seeks to integrate Indigenous identities into more extensive national identities (Drake, 2019). Conversely, Timor-Leste's Indigenous identity is profoundly connected to its historical resistance to foreign domination and its pursuit of self-determination (Pereira & Feijó, 2024). For Indigenous populations near the border, their identity often does not align precisely with state-defined nationality. Numerous individuals have cross-border familial connections and cultural ties that precede contemporary national borders. As a result, Indigenous identity frequently conflicts with the inflexible frameworks imposed by national governments. This dynamic has led to governance issues, especially in border regions where individuals navigate between national identity and traditional cultural ties. The notion of space within the Indonesia-Timor-Leste setting transcends mere geographical boundaries. It includes historical assertions, socio-cultural exchanges, and commercial endeavors that cross boundaries.

The establishment of national borders disrupted longstanding trade networks, familial ties, and societal frameworks that had existed for generations. Disputes over land ownership, boundary delineation, and natural resource governance have intensified tensions. Numerous border communities possess historical entitlements to territories that were indiscriminately partitioned during colonial and post-colonial deliberations. The challenge of establishing legitimate ownership and jurisdiction has often led to conflicts, some of which remain unsolved to this day. In these contentious areas, inadequate regulatory enforcement has facilitated the proliferation of criminal activities, including smuggling and human trafficking, requiring more robust legal frameworks and governance structures. Since gaining independence, relations between Indonesia and Timor-Leste have improved. However, obstacles remain, especially concerning cross-border migrations, economic interactions, and security issues. The porous characteristics of the border facilitate fluid movement, but it also engenders risks that require stringent regulatory procedures. One major consequence of disputes over identity and space is the deterioration of regulatory monitoring. Owing to the complex socio-political landscape, both governments have struggled to enact coherent policies concerning citizenship, property rights, and law enforcement. Border communities often capitalize on these regulatory deficiencies, sometimes leading to conflicts, illicit commerce, and ambiguous legal statuses for persons living in border areas.

A notable issue is the governance of migration and labor. Indonesia, especially in West Timor, employs a significant number of Timorese, often under informal or inadequately regulated circumstances. The lack of robust bilateral labor agreements has resulted in labor exploitation, pay inequities, and legal ambiguities about workers' rights. Enhancing labor

legislation and cross-border employment policies is crucial to safeguarding the rights of these workers and ensuring equitable treatment.

Formation and Contestation of Political and Cultural Indo – Timor-Leste Boundaries

The driving factors behind the contestation of political and cultural boundaries can be categorized into three main aspects: political treatment, disparities in facilities, and language differences. The marginalization of customary institutions by the state is caused by not involving customary institutions in the government policies making process at the border areas. The government does not actively involve customary institutions, treating them merely as objects rather than participants in decision-making process. As stated by Yan Meko, Tribal Chief of *Usi* Meko or Meko King, "*The rapid changes at the border were like magic; some time ago. It was still pitch black, but now it is so bright. It took us by surprise to see*." Furthermore, economic marginalization is apparent as traders from migrant communities are more prevalent in border markets, while traders from local communities are rarely seen. Yan Meko further emphasized, "*The government does not include customary institutions in the development process at the border, they build without involving the community except when they need our lands*". The marginalization of traditional institutions is linked to economic disparities, characterized by low levels of the community's economy, limited education, and inadequate human resources within the local community.

The second factor contributing to contestation at the border is the complicated system and administration for crossing national borders. Government policies that enforce administrative control and improve facilities with modern technology, such as automated teller machines (ATM) and metal detectors, are responded with a reluctance to use modern bureaucracy for some Indigenous people. One of the Indigenous people said, "*To cross the river, you have to bring letter of statement which has to be processed at the village and the cross-border post (PLBN), not to mention the complicated inspection. It is easier for us to pass before there is a cross-border post (PLBN*)." The final driving factor behind contestation in border areas is language use. The government obligates people to use Indonesian as the official language to reinforce the integrity of citizens and strengthen state identity. On the other hand, using the mother tongue in border areas remains prevalent as it strengthens relations between individuals.

Trans-National Socio-Cultural Dynamics: Contestation of Political and Cultural Boundaries in Border Areas between Indonesia and Timor-Leste

There are several implications of contestation in political and cultural boundaries, namely in regulation, cultural space, and relations (Vogel & Field, 2020; Lamond & Moss, 2020; Scott, 2020; Huang et al., 2022; Naji, 2023). The implications of regulatory contestation can be seen in the emergence of new rules. The official letter number 138/BPPD-TTU/VIII/TTU/2014, issued by the Head of Agriculture Extension Center in North Central Timor Regency, serves as a relaxation policy. One of the clauses states that the Central

Government needs to listen to and accommodate all customary activities of people living in the Oecusse enclave area, including customary oaths in setting national boundaries, which have existed since before the Dutch and Portuguese colonization on the island of Timor. In this context, the community's identity as citizens become secondary when Indigenous people gather for cultural ceremonies. This is reflected in an interview with Leader of *Usi Meko,* who stated that, "*Even though our citizens are different, our identities are the same as Dawan people during traditional rituals. It does not matter what nationality we are*".

The implications of the contestation on cultural space are evident in the holding of a joint market, meeting place, joint cultural festival, and the use of rivers as gathering spaces. Indigenous people actively construct new cultural boundaries by adopting distinctive customary values. The adoption of these customary values and adaption to changes are the strategies applied by Indigenous people at the border. This process involves Indigenous people from both countries, dissolving the political identity boundaries of each nation and uniting them through customary ties.

However, the implications of the cultural contestation experienced by customary institutions have changed the existence and essence of the cultural values of Indigenous people in border areas. As stated by Ji, *Meko* Tribal Community, "*This new cultural compromise is perceived when the implementation of modernization of governance coincides with the change in the country's orientation towards the border area. Rapid changes shift some customs and customary orders. Modernization of technology shifts the tradition of social interaction, such as the tradition of munching sirih pinang (betel leaf and areca nut) as a form of politeness in social interaction. The tradition of munching sirih pinang has been replaced by the use of digital communication.*" The last aspect is the implications of relation. The implication can be seen in the use of the mother tongue in communication between Indigenous people. Relational aspects are also found in the typical form of interaction, such as nose touch.

Regulatory implications in the form of loosening regulations on border areas as a form of compromise between countries and customs are depicted in the portrait of the use of public space. One example is the common market utilization as a market representation in the cultural space. The portrait of the common market can be seen from the narrative "*…The holding of a traditional common market is unique. The common market is a product of an agreement to loosening the regulations that provide a place for our community to carry out habits such as eating together and discussing the implementation of traditional rituals other than as a place to fulfill their daily needs.*" Another example is the loosening of rules for crossing the country into and out of the border in urgent conditions, such as a deceased person. The death ritual is a ceremony involving Indigenous people in two countries. Formal rules cannot be strictly enforced. Moreover, relation aspect on the implications of cultural and political contestation is communication. The regulations to use Indonesian when communicating have changed when there is a loosening of regulations. People use their mother tongue, especially in mutual communication. It provides more space for Indigenous people and positively impacts the relationships among Indigenous people to interact. The interaction takes place in the cultural space. The government provides a common market with an agreed-upon schedule between

Indonesia and Timor Leste. Meeting spaces are also an effective place for Indigenous people to communicate. Apart from that, the river is also used as a place to solve customary problems.

The Interplay of Political Boundaries, Cultural Contestation, and Transnationalism among Indigenous Communities at Borderlands

The research on political and cultural boundary contestation discovered an important point (Ximenes, 2021). There is a seizure between the national integrity of the state and local socio-cultural integrity by Indigenous people. The state's power over the people at the border requires citizens to obey the state's formal legal rules and values (Andrian, 2020). Meanwhile, socio-cultural integrity requires its members to use customary values and rules in their relationships and interactions. Differences in interests and orientations lead to the dualism of orientations and interests, so the term state within the state emerges (Paquin, 2023). The contestation of political and cultural boundaries encourages the formation of transnationalism for Indigenous people (Koos & Wachsmann, 2023). The unique transnationalism formation of the Indigenous community can be seen from the emergence of new rules that compromise between the value of culture and formal rules. It can be applied in a common market which cross between two countries, the use of *ulayat* land to facilitate public utilization, and the adjustment of identities in accordance with the needs (Fauzi, 2023). To a certain extent, transnationalism has become a consolidated medium to suppress bilateral conflicts.

The formation of a distinctive culture among Indigenous people in border area is a logical consequence of the contestation between political boundaries—represented by formal legal relations and ties of the state and cultural boundaries as a historical experience of the socio-cultural ties of society framed in customary value, which are shaped by social formation and cultural formation (Meissner, 2021). These two forces collectively compete to influence Indigenous people as objects. Distinctive socio-cultural relations become a new building for Indigenous people in forming a new imaginary Indigenous system of relations in border areas and border dynamics as objective habitus. The new culture still maintains the relationship between citizens and the state, but there is an adjustment to customs by making compromises on values within the customary framework. This compromise has implications for deviations and even a crisis of customary values.

The research results explain that contention at the border involves two actors, namely state and non-state institutions. State actors are integrated with the formal rule system, while non-state actors are Indigenous people's institutions that are integrated in socio-cultural ties based on customary values. When there is a conflict between the state and customary institutions, they encourage customary institutions to develop socio-cultural integration in their way. Therefore, there is a new socio-cultural construction as a product of a distinctive value order by adjusting the interests of the two power territories of Indonesia and Timor Leste. The integration of people from two countries unites and forms of trans-national socio-cultural relations and ties. Moreover, it impacts the manifestation flexibility of new values in the form of global ties with national boundaries and increasing socio-cultural integrity as a place and global Indigenous people.

Several researchers have conducted research on contestation (Steininger, 2021; Wiener, 2020; Orchard & Wiener, 2023a; Orchard & Wiener, 2023b). Previous research tends to discuss the contestation between interested parties. The struggle for contestation plays a role, at the same time of their identity. This research is different from the research on the conflict interest between the state and customary institutions involving two countries with the same Indigenous people. The other interesting part is the similarity of very strong socio-cultural ties of people in two different countries. The research on contestation reveals how sociocultural ties create social and cultural transnationalism relations in border communities. By examining the factors influencing the dualism of the Indigenous people' identity at the border, a habitus is formed, especially those related to reality as citizens (Robbins, 2020). This is then considered as a subjective factor. However, identity is not solely shaped by subjective experiences but also objective factors. These objective factors include social space, such as social ties, supportive relationship networks, shared values, and others (Wolf, 2021; Schirone, 2023). While the state firmly enforces formal legal rules to establish social rules, there is still a gap for Indigenous people to implement joint mechanisms that serve as a common space and reduce cultural identity (Robles, 2023; Lipsky, 2023; Hadi & Michael, 2022; Widłak, 2021; Rahman, 2022; Kurğan, 2023).

Transnationalism of Indigenous people in the international relations between two countries (Menon, 2020), Indonesia and Timor-Leste, is v crucial to policy-making process. Transnationalism on Indigenous people cannot become a consolidated medium to suppress bilateral conflicts by involving trans-nationalist Indigenous people in those two countries. Strong socio-cultural integration between relations and interactions in trans-nationalist Indigenous people becomes social principal and cultural (Gilleard, 2020; Smart, 2022; Brough et al., 2020; Branson & Miller, 2020; Threadgold, 2020). It is to form the harmonization of bilateral relations between Indonesia and Timor Leste. The country can actively involve the community in the harmonization process under government regulations to manage the border area.

Conclusion

The intense presence of the state on Indigenous people causes the traditional structure of customary institutions to falter. Country, with its political power, enforces the rules that shape the identity of its citizens. In the government's position, Indigenous people are the object of formal regulation. The state often ignores the historical roots of society's socio-cultural relations. Customary institutions and Indigenous people strengthen the habitus of their objective factors by strengthening the network of relations that penetrate national boundaries, forming identities, concepts of space, and authority as shared spaces. Customary institutions make efforts to compromise culturally to form a new culture. The mechanism of Indigenous people at the network border forms bilateral relations between countries in the form of transnationalism of Indigenous people.

This research can provide initial insight into transnationalism research involving traditional institutions as the subject of studies on globalization issues in the Indonesian Timor

Leste border community. The issue of globalization in today's development is prevalent. However, there is an interesting gap about how two or more countries create globalization. The issue, which is based on cultural similarities, will become a new issue that needs to get attention for further research. The results of this study are expected to be helpful for the government in making regulations that still pay attention to the dynamics that exist at the community level. Regulations that still provide space for the creation of bilateral relations by using social and cultural principles as a reference. It is no exaggeration if social and cultural principles have become a consolidation medium for resolving bilateral conflicts in national border areas.

Acknowledgement

The author would like express their gratitude toward all the key informant who have involved to this research especially the community in the border of North Insana, North Central Timor, Indonesia, and the Oecusse District, Timor-Leste. This research wouldn't be successed without the support-collaborations between Faculty of Humanities Universitas Airlangga, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences Universitas Airlangga, and Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University Japan.

About The Authors

Eni Sugiarti, S.S., M.Hum is permanent lecturer and researcher at Faculty of Humanities, Universitas Airlangga expertise in gender studies, border, mobilities, and area engagements, multucultural studies, manuscripts and local tradition and social history.

Kisho Tsuchiya. Ph.D is Assistant Professor at the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University, specializing in colonialism, the cold war, race and ethnicity, social warfare, place and space, borderlands, identity politics, community formation, religious transformation, human rights and multi-culturalism. His PhD dissertation was focused on Timor-Leste and Indonesia. His major research work focusing on history of Timor Island (international border between Indonesia and Timor Leste).

Mochamad Kevin Romadhona, S.Sosio is Junior Researcher at the Global Migration Research Center, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Airlangga expertise in international migration, sociology of health, population studies, and human rights.

Lina Puryanti, S.S., M.Hum., Ph.D is permanent lecturer and researcher at Faculty of Humanities, Universitas Airlangga expertise in area studies, border studies, history, literature, and cultural studies.

Edi Dwi Riyanto, S.S., M.Hum., Ph.D is paermanent lecturer and researcher at Faculty of Humanities, Universitas Airlangga expertise in border studies, Southeast Asian studies, Ecology studies, and creative industry.

Gayung Kasuma, S.S., M.Hum. is permanent lecture and researcher Faculty of Humanities, Universitas Airlangga expertise in border studies, religion, multiculturalism, and globalization studies, and urban studies.

References

Abramson, S. F., Carter, D. B., & Ying, L. (2022). Historical border changes, state building, and contemporary trust in Europe. *American Political Science Review*, *116*(3), 875–895. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055421001428

Adelita, V. S., & Romadhona, M. K. (2023). Medical services through online media in health law perspective. *Malaysian Journal of Medicine and Health Sciences*, *19*, 25–33.

Alkatiri, F. A. (2020). The security dimension and the formation of social exclusion in the Border of Belu Regency, Indonesia. *Changing Societies & Personalities*, *4*(1), 31–52. https://doi.org/10.15826/csp.2020.4.1.088

Andrian, B. (2020). Komunikasi dan akulturasi: Studi fenomenologi pada masyarakat lokal dan muslim di perbatasan Indonesia-Malaysia. *NALAR: Jurnal Peradaban Dan Pemikiran Islam*, *4*(1), 51–63. https://doi.org/10.23971/njppi.v4i1.1981

Anwar, S. (2021). Pemanfaatan pesawat terbang tanpa awak untuk pengamanan perbatasan Kalimantan dan dampaknya terhadap ketahanan wilayah. *Jurnal Ketahanan Nasional*, *27*(3), 289–308. https://doi.org/10.22146/jkn.69622

Arditama, E., & Lestari, P. (2020). Jogo tonggo: Membangkitkan kesadaran dan ketaatan warga berbasis kearifan lokal pada masa pandemi COVID-19 di Jawa Tengah. *Jurnal Pendidikan Kewarganegaraan Undiksha*, *8*(2), 157–167.

Arifin, S. (2022). *Hukum perbatasan darat antar negara*. Sinar Grafika.

Arvanti, A., Setiawan, B., Syamsunasir, S., & Widodo, P. (2023). Dynamics of border conflict resolution between Indonesia-Timor Leste. *International Journal Of Humanities Education and Social Sciences (IJHESS)*, *3*(1). https://doi.org/10.55227/ijhess.v3i1.579

Atem, & Niko, N. (2020). Persoalan kerawanan pangan pada masyarakat miskin di wilayah Perbatasan Entikong (Indonesia-Malaysia) Kalimantan Barat. *Jurnal Surya Masyarakat*, *2*(2), 94–104.

Balcom, S., Doucet, S., & Dubé, A. (2021). Observation and institutional ethnography: Helping us to see better. *Qualitative Health Research*, *31*(8), 1534–1541. https://doi.org/10.1177/104973232110159

Barbour, K. M. (2023). A geographical analysis of boundaries in inter-tropical Africa 1. In K. M. Barbour, & R.M. Prothero (Eds.), *Essays on African Population*. Routledge.

Barton, G., Yilmaz, I., & Morieson, N. (2021). Authoritarianism, democracy, Islamic movements and contestations of Islamic religious ideas in Indonesia. *Religions*, *12*(8), 641. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12080641

Bauder, H., & Mueller, R. (2023). Westphalian vs. Indigenous sovereignty: Challenging colonial territorial governance. *Geopolitics*, *28*(1), 156–173. https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2021.1920577

Benhabib, S. (Ed.). (2021). *Democracy and difference: Contesting the boundaries of the political*. Princeton University Press.

Branson, J., & Miller, D. (2020). Pierre Bourdieu. In P. Beilharz, *Social Theory: A guide to central thinkers* (pp. 37–45). Routledge.

Brigg, M., Graham, M., & Weber, M. (2022). Relational Indigenous systems: Aboriginal Australian political ordering and reconfiguring IR. *Review of International Studies*, *48*(5), 891–909. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210521000425

Brough, M., Kippax, R., & Adkins, B. (2020). Navigating the politics and practice of social work research: With advice from Pierre Bourdieu. In C. Morley, P. Ablett, C. Noble, & S. Cowden (Eds.), *The Routledge handbook of critical pedagogies for social work* (pp. 512–522). Routledge.

Chobphon, P. (2021). Factors influencing high academic achievement of stateless migrant children in Tak Province, Thailand. *Pertanika Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities*, *29*(1). https://doi.org/10.47836/pjssh.29.1.08

Damayanthi, N. M. R., Dantes, K. F., Ardhya, S. N., & Setianto, M. J. (2022). Tinjauan Terhadap Pengelolaan Perbatasan Menurut Perspektif Hukum Internasional. *Jurnal Pacta Sunt Servanda*, *3*(2), 68–77.

Dari, A. S. D., Jacob, A. R. P., Muskanan, F. W., & Sabaat, Y. Y. (2023). Motaain boundaries: Between state sovereignty and Indigenous people. *International Journal of Environmental, Sustainability, and Social Science*, *4*(1), 135–141.

Djuyandi, Y., Husin, L. H., Mustofa, M. U., & Iriansyah, M. N. (2023). Penguatan masyarakat di wilayah perbatasan sebagai bentuk pertahahan negara: Pengalaman dari Kecamatan Entikong, Kalimantan Barat. *Dharmakarya: Jurnal Aplikasi Ipteks Untuk Masyarakat*, *12*(1), 89–97.

Drake, C. (2019). *National integration in Indonesia: Patterns and policies*. University of Hawaii Press.

Elden, S. (2021). Terrain, politics, history. *Dialogues in Human Geography*, *11*(2), 170–189. https://doi.org/10.1177/2043820620951353

Encarnacao, B. J., Hadiwijoyo, S. S., & Hergianasari, P. (2022). Kerjasama Pemerintah Indonesia dan Timor Leste dalam upaya mengatasi illegal border crosser. *Social Science*, *9*(2), 39–45.

Fauzi, A. F. (2023). Eksistensi asas-asas hukum perjanjian internasional dalam hukum postif dan implementasinya Perjanjian Celah Timor. *Jurist-Diction*, *6*(2), 215–230. https://doi.org/10.20473/jd.v6i2.44077

Ford, M. (2024). *The Politics of Cross-Border Mobility in Southeast Asia*. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108673914

Furedi, F. (2020). Why borders matter: Why humanity must relearn the art of drawing boundaries (1st ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780367815684

Gilleard, C. (2020). Bourdieu's forms of capital and the stratification of later life. *Journal of Aging Studies*, *53*.

Gohain, S. (2020). *Imagined geographies in the Indo-Tibetan borderlands: Culture, politics, place*. Amsterdam University Press.

Gonlin, V., Jones, N. E., & Campbell, M. E. (2020). On the (Racial) Border: Expressed race, reflected race, and the U.S.-Mexico Border context. *Sociology of Race and Ethnicity, 6*(2), 161-178. https://doi.org/10.1177/2332649218821145

Hadi, S., & Michael, T. (2022). Hans Kelsen's thoughts about the law and its relevance to current legal developments. *Technium Social Sciences Journal*, *38*(1), 220-227.

Hägerdal, H. (2019). Wetar and Kisar in Indonesia, and East Timor: Colonial encroachment, migration, and strategies of survival in the 17th century. *Indonesia and the Malay World*, *47*(138), 199–219. https://doi.org/10.1080/13639811.2019.1582887

Handayani, R. (2020). Bahasa Di Lintas Batas: Kajian Akomodasi Komunikasi Masyarakat Perbatasan Indonesia-Timor Leste. *Totobuang Jurnal Ilmiah Kebahasaan dan Kesastraan*, *8*(1), 29–41.

Haryaningsih, S., & Andriani, F. D. (2022). The state existence in cross-border trade policy implementation in Jagoi Babang Region in Indonesia. *Central Asia & the Caucasus*, *23*(2).

Hasnan, A., & Pakri, M. R. M. (2021). Transnational identity in Unaccustomed earth: A study of Jhumpa Lahiri's and Chitra Banerjee Divakaruni's short fictions. *Pertanika Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities*, *29*(1). https://doi.org/10.47836/pjssh.29.1.24

Hennida, C., Santoso, Y. W., & Kinasih, S. E. (2020). The role of the adat institution on land conflict resolution in Tanimbar. *International Journal of Innovation, Creativity and Change*, *13*(3), 48–61.

Hidayahtulloh, M. A. (2024). Ideological contestation and gender policy reforms in post-reformasi Indonesia. *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, *54*(3), 363–386. https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2023.2177558

Huang, X., Xu, H., & Li, X. (Robert). (2022). Spatial development of two villages: Bordering, debordering, and rebordering in a community scenic area. *Annals of Tourism Research*, *93*, 103370. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.annals.2022.103370

Ida, R., Kinasih, S. E., Febriyanti, S. N., Puspa, R., Saud, M., & Kriyantono, R. (2023). Socio-cultural values in managing risk communication during the COVID-19 pandemic in Indonesia. *Cogent Social Sciences*, *10*(1). https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2023.2287288

Irawan, A., Astuti, S. A., & Khairi, M. (2021). Model pencegahan berbasis masyarakat terhadap tindak pidana illegal logging di wilayah perbatasan Kalimantan Utara. *Pakuan Justice Journal of Law*, *1*(2), 1–17.

Jain, D., & DasGupta, D. (2021). Law, gender identity, and the uses of human rights: The paradox of recognition in South Asia. *Journal of Human Rights*, *20*(1), 110–126.

Jessop, B. (2020). Territory, politics, governance and multispatial metagovernance. In J. Agnew (Ed.), *The confines of territory*. Routledge.

Joseph, A., & Hamaguchi, T. (2014). *Timor-Leste: the history and development of Asia's newest nation*. Lexington Books.

Kennedy, P. S. J., Tobing, S. J. L., Lumbantoruan, R., Nomleni, A., & Siregar, S. L. (2022). Improved understanding of Indonesia's Border situation in Nusa Tenggara Timur Province with Timor Leste in Oecussi district. *Jurnal Pengabdian Mandiri*, *1*(7), 1261–1270.

Klabbers, J. (2020). *International law*. Cambridge University Press.

Koesbardiati, T., Kinasih, S. E., Romadhona, M. K., Ida, R., & Wahyudi, I. (2025). Reforming "Merariq": Towards harmonized approach – socio-culture, Islamic law, and biological consequences. *Journal of Law and Legal Reform*, *6*(1), 357–390. https://doi.org/10.15294/jllr.v6i1.19642

Koos, S., & Wachsmann, S. (2023). Navigating the impact of ChatGPT/GPT4 on legal academic examinations: Challenges, opportunities and recommendations. *Media Iuris*, *6*(2), 255–270. https://doi.org/10.20473/mi.v6i2.45270

Kramsch, C., & Uryu, M. (2020). Intercultural contact, hybridity, and third space. In J. Jackson (Ed.), *The Routledge handbook of language and intercultural communication* (pp. 204–218). Routledge.

Kurğan, E. (2023). Rethinking state-law relations through the Kelsen-Schmitt debate: A critical introduction. *Journal of Economics and Administrative Sciences*, *24*(4), 646–658.

Kurniawan, O. T., Manda, R. P., Kurniawan, R. D., & Syahrin, M. A. (2022). Immigration in the view of the gate guard of the State of Indonesia. *JHSS (Journal of Humanities and Social Studies)*, *6*(1), 93–97. https://doi.org/10.33751/jhss.v6i1.5341

Lamond, I. R., & Moss, J (Eds.). (2020). *Liminality and critical event studies* (Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40256-3

Leach, M. (2016). *Nation-building and national identity in Timor-Leste*. Routledge.

Lengkong, A. D. N. L., & Sinaga, T. B. (2021). Pemenuhan hak pendidikan anak di perbatasan negara menurut hak asasi manusia di Indonesia. *Lex Administrarum*, *9*(3), 111–121.

Leonardi, C., Storer, E., & Fisher, J. (2021). Geographies of unease: Witchcraft and boundary construction in an African borderland. *Political Geography, 90*. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2021.102442

Li, Y., & Zhang, S. (2022). *Applied research methods in urban and regional planning*. Springer.

Lipsky, G. A. (2023). *Law and politics in the world community: Essays on Hans Kelsen's pure theory and related problems in international law*. University of California Press.

Mangku, D. G. S. (2020). Implementation of technical sub committee border demarcation and regulation (TSC-BDR) agreement between Indonesia-Timor Leste in the resolution of the land border dispute. *Jurnal IUS Kajian Hukum Dan Keadilan*, *8*(3), 405–419.

Mauk, A. D., Luan, R. T. N. P., Bano, A. E. B., Suhardjana, F. E., & Arman, Y. (2023). Strategi Pemerintah Republik Indonesia Dalam Penanganan Masalah Pelintas Batas Indonesia-Timor Leste. *Madani: Jurnal Ilmiah Multidisiplin*, *1*(7).

Mckee, K., Leahy, S., Tokarczyk, T., & Crawford, J. (2021). Redrawing the border through the 'Right to Rent': Exclusion, discrimination and hostility in the English housing market. *Critical Social Policy, 41*(1), 91-110. https://doi.org/10.1177/0261018319897043

Meissner, M. (2021). *Intangible Cultural Heritage and Sustainable Development: The Valorisation of Heritage Practices*. Springer Cham.

Menon, D. M. (2020). Walking on water: Globalization and history. *Global Perspectives*, *1*(1), 12176. https://doi.org/10.1525/gp.2020.12176

Metherall, N., Fretes, D. R. De, Mandibondibo, F., & Caucau, T. (2022). Assessing the development impact of the Sota border post connecting Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. *Papua Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*, *2*(2), 95–122.

Molnar, A. K. (2009). *Timor Leste: Politics, history, and culture*. Routledge.

Monteiro, S. (2020). Yurisdiksi negara pantai di wilayah delimitasi maritim zona ekonomi eksklusif yang belum ditetapkan berdasarkan ketentuan hukum laut internasional (Study di Timor Leste-Indonesia). *Jurnal Komunikasi Hukum (JKH)*, *6*(1), 303–334.

Morgan-Jones, E., Sudulich, L., Cochrane, F., & Loizides, N. (2020). Citizen preferences about border arrangements in divided societies: Evidence from a conjoint experiment in Northern Ireland. *Research and Politics, 7*(3). https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168020929927

Munandar, A. (2020). Nation-state formation at the Indonesia-Malaysia border in West Kalimantan. *The International Journal of Interdisciplinary Civic and Political Studies*, *15*(2), 17.

Naji, N. (2023). Decolonial imaginings: Intersectional conversations and contestations. *Journal of Cultural Economy*, *16*(2), 306–309. https://doi.org/10.1080/17530350.2023.2186920

Ochoa Espejo, P. (2020). *On borders: Territories, legitimacy, and the rights of place*. Oxford Academic. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190074197.001.0001

Orchard, P., & Wiener, A. (2023a). Norm research in theory and practice. In P. Orchard, & A. Wiener (Eds.), *Contesting the world: Norm research in theory and practice*. Cambridge University Press.

Orchard, P., & Wiener, A. (2023b). Norms and norm contestation. In P. A. Mello, & F. Ostermann (Eds.), *Routledge handbook of foreign policy analysis methods*. Taylor & Francis.

Paasi, A., Ferdoush, M. A., Jones, R., Murphy, A. B., Agnew, J., Ochoa Espejo, P., Fall, J. J., & Peterle, G. (2022). Locating the territoriality of territory in border studies. *Political Geography*, *95*, 102584. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2021.102584

Palmer, L., & McWilliam, A. (2019). Spirit ecologies and customary governance in post-conflict Timor-Leste. *Bijdragen Tot de Taal-, Land-En Volkenkunde/Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences of Southeast Asia*, *175*(4), 474–505.

Paquin, S. (2023). La paradiplomatie identitaire des petites nations non souveraines et les pièges du nationalisme méthodologique. *Recherches Sociographiques*, *64*(2), 367–391.

Pereira, Z., & Feijó, R. G. (2024). Singularities of Timor-Leste's process of self-determination (1974–2002). *E-Journal of Portuguese History*, *21*(2), 313–336.

Prayuda, R. (2020). Kejahatan transnasional terorganisir di wilayah perbatasan: Studi modus operandi penyelundupan narkotika Riau dan Malaysia. *Andalas Journal of International Studies (AJIS)*. https://doi.org/10.25077/ajis.9.1.34-47.2020

Rachmawati, I., Dewi, M. A., Sugiarto, M., & Issundari, S. (2020). People and Nature in the Development of Border Tourism in Indonesia. *Journal of Environmental Management and Tourism*, *10*(6), 1420–1428. https://doi.org/10.14505//jemt.v10.6(38).25.

Rachmawati, I., & Djalaludin, F. (2017). Model of Indonesia-Timor Leste land border management by optimizing the cross-border post in Belu Regency, East Nusa Tenggara. *Jurnal Global & Strategis*, *10*(1). https://doi.org/10.20473/jgs.10.1.2016.1-14

Radhuber, I. M., & Radcliffe, S. A. (2023). Contested Sovereignties: Indigenous disputes over plurinational resource governance. *Environment and Planning E: Nature and Space*, *6*(1), 556–577. https://doi.org/10.1177/25148486211068476

Rahman, N. (2022). The pure theory of law: Revisiting the normative dimensions and critical legal science of Hans Kelsen. *Supremo Amicus*, *30*, 401.

Ramadani, R. Y., Tjitrawati, A. T., & Romadhona, M. K. (2024). Humanitarian commitment: Indonesia's policy on refugees' rights to health. *Healthcare in Low-Resource Settings*, *12*(s2). https://doi.org/10.4081/hls.2024.12603

Robbins, D. (2020). *The work of Pierre Bourdieu: recognizing society*. Routledge.

Robles, G. (2023). Kelsen, Hans. In G. Zanetti, M. Sellers, & S. Kirste (Eds.), *Handbook of the history of the philosophy of law and social philosophy: Volume 3: from Ross to Dworkin and Beyond* (pp. 167–177). Springer.

Rokhanyah, H., Noor, M. I. N., Harahap, A. M., Wijaya, B. S., & Amalia, N. R. (2023). Kolaborasi kebijakan pemerintah dalam mengurangi penyelundupan di daerah perbatasan (Studi kasus Republik Indonesia & Republik Demokratik Timor Leste). *Jurnal Pemerintahan dan Politik*, *8*(4), 305–313.

Roluahpuia. (2024). Border nation: Indigenous peoples, state, and the border in Indo-Myanmar borderlands. *Journal of Borderlands Studies*, *39*(1), 131–148. https://doi.org/10.1080/08865655.2022.2076250

Sabuna, V. E. (2020). Tanggung jawab negara di kawasan perbatasan. *Jurnal Hukum Yurisprudinsia*, *18*(1), 9–18.

Sagita, Y. (2020). Implementasi fungsi dan kewenangan brigade mobile kepolisian daerah Nusa Tenggara Timur Dalam. *Supremasi Hukum: Jurnal Penelitian Hukum*, *29*(1), 60–77.

Sarjono, F., & Rudiatin, E. (2022). Informal cross-border trade: Malaysia-Indonesia borders the conceptualisation from 'Authority-Defined' to" Everyday-Defined". *Baskara: Journal of Business and Entrepreneurship*, *5*(1), 108–122.

Sarosa, S. (2021). *Analisis data penelitian kualitatif*. PT Kanisius.

Sassen, S. (2020). When territory deborders territoriality. In J. Agnew (Ed.), *The confines of territory* (p. 24). Routledge.

Schimmelfennig, F. (2021). Rebordering Europe: External boundaries and integration in the European Union. *Journal of European Public Policy*, *28*(3), 311–330. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2021.1881589

Schirone, M. (2023). Field, capital, and habitus: The impact of Pierre Bourdieu on bibliometrics. *Quantitative Science Studies*, *4*(1), 186–208. https://doi.org/10.1162/qss_a_00232

Schulze, K. E. (2024). *Contesting Indonesia: Islamist, separatist, and communal violence since 1945*. Cornell University Press.

Scott, J. W. (2020). *A research agenda for border studies*. Edward Elgar Publishing. https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788972741.00007

Smart, A. (2022). Pierre Bourdieu on capitals, the state and forced resettlement: A review essay. *Anuac*, *11*(2), 229–250. https://doi.org/10.7340/anuac2239-625X-5399

Southgate, L. (2019). *ASEAN resistance to sovereignty violation*. Bristol University Press.

Steininger, S. (2021). Silvia Steininger, review of Antje Wiener, contestation and constitution of norms in global international relations. *International Journal of Constitutional Law*, 19(1), 363–367, https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/moab022

Stiefel, B. L., & Peleg, S.-A. (2023). Heritage without national boundaries. In T. Adam (Ed.), *Yearbook of transnational history, Volume six*. Fairleigh Dickinson University Press

Stoffelen, A. (2022). Managing people's (in)ability to be mobile: Geopolitics and the selective opening and closing of borders. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, *47*(1), 243–256. https://doi.org/10.1111/tran.12486

Strating, R. (2018). *The post-colonial security dilemma: Timor-Leste and the international community*. ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute.

Strelein, L. (2021). Agreement without compromise: maintaining the integrity of Indigenous sovereignty in negotiations with governments. *Australian Aboriginal Studies*, 2.

Subagyono, B. S. A., Maradona, Yunita Sabrie, H., Romadhona, M. K., Suheryadi, B., Chumaida, Z. V., & Anggraeni, A. (2024). Regulatory framework on ocean threats – transportation law analysis to multiple oil-spill cases in Indonesia. *Transactions on Maritime Science*, *13*(2), 1 - 25. https://doi.org/10.7225/toms.v13.n02.w08

Suhariono, A., Romadhona, M. K., Yanuardi, M. I., & Nampira, M. Z. (2022). Sistem publikasi pendaftaran tanah (Kajian sistem publikasi negatif bertendensi positif). *Notaire*, *5*(1), 17–30.

Sunyowati, D., Ariadhi, P. P. P., Romadhona, M. K., & Alfadhel, A. B. B. (2023). Indonesia-Timor Leste maritime boundaries on exclusive economic zone: Equitable principle. *Lex Scientia Law Review*, *7*(1). https://doi.org/10.15294/lesrev.v7i1.66126

Sunyowati, D., Indriani, M., Firdhausy, A., & Romadhona, M. K. (2022). Can big data achieve environmental justice? (Preliminary research on the performance of Indonesian agricultural application). *Indonesian Journal of International Law*, *19*(3), 485–508.

Suwartiningsih, S., & Purnomo, D. (2020). Harmoni sosial berbasis kearifan lokal "Doa Arwah" pada masyarakat perbatasan Indonesia-Timor Leste (Social harmonisation based on local wisdom of "Doa Arwah" in Indonesia-Timor Leste border community). *Anthropos*, *5*(2), 170–182.

Tho Seeth, A. (2023). The Indonesian "Cosmopolitan Islamic Intellectual" revisited: A focus on the continued prevalence of "Cosmopatriotism" and the "West." *International Journal of Islam in Asia*, *2*(2), 114–143. https://doi.org/10.1163/25899996-20223005

Threadgold, S. (2020). *Bourdieu and affect*. Bristol University Press.

Tiwari, P. (2021). Globalization and modernity: An analysis of Anthony Giddens's theory from transformationalist perspective. *Emerging Trends in Development Research*, *28*(1), 45-54.

Tjitrawati, A. T., & Romadhona, M. K. (2024). Living beyond borders: the international legal framework to protecting rights to health of Indonesian illegal migrant workers in Malaysia. *International Journal of Migration, Health and Social Care*, *20*(2), 227–245. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJMHSC-04-2023-0038

Uly, H., Harsono, G., Supriyatno, M., & Gultom, R. A. G. (2023). Strategi pertahanan negara dalam mengamankan wilayah perbatasan di Indonesia (Studi kasus perbatasan Indonesia-RDTL). *Journal on Education*, *5*(3), 7508–7521.

Vogel, B., & Field, J. (2020). (Re)constructing borders through the governance of tourism and trade in Ladakh, India. *Political Geography*, *82*. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2020.102226

Walford, G. (2020). Ethnography is not qualitative. *Ethnography and Education*, *15*(1), 122–135. https://doi.org/10.1080/17457823.2018.1540308

Ward, C. J., & Braudt, D. B. (2015). Sustaining Indigenous identity through language development: Comparing Indigenous language instruction in two contexts. In W. Jacob, S. Cheng, & M. Porter (Eds.). *Indigenous Education: Language, Culture and Identity* (pp. 139–170). Springer.

Weiß, A. (2021). Re-thinking society: How can sociological theories help us understand global and cross-border social contexts? *Current Sociology, 69*(3), 333-351. https://doi.org/10.1177/0011392120936314

Widłak, T. (2021). Kelsen's idea of a world state (Weltstaat). *Politeja*, *18*(72), 175–191. https://doi.org/10.12797/Politeja.18.2021.72.09

Wiener, A. (2020). The concept of contestation of norms-an interview. *Yearbook on Practical Philosophy in a Global Perspective (YPPGP-JPPGP)*, *4*.

Wigglesworth, A. (2013). The growth of civil society in Timor-Leste: three moments of activism. *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, *43*(1), 51–74. https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2012.735545

Windradi, F., & Wahyuni, N. (2020). Konsep Pengaturan dan ratifikasi batas kedaulatan wilayah laut Negara Kesatuan RI dalam perspektif hukum internasional. *Transparansi Hukum*, *3*(1), 23-41. https://doi.org/10.30737/transparansi.v3i1.666

Wiratama, M. G., Subagyono, B. S. A., & Romadhona, M. K. (2023). Implementation of legal efforts consumer protection and dispute settlement of social–health insurance participants for Indonesian migrant workers. *Malaysian Journal of Medicine and Health Sciences*, *19*(2), 9-17.

Wolf, M. (2021). Pierre Bourdieu. In C. Rundle (Ed.), *The Routledge handbook of translation history* (pp. 123–136). Routledge.

Ximenes, J. M. (2021). Serviço Nacional Inteligência: Hambatan, tantangan, dan implikasinya terhadap keamanan. *Al-Adalah: Jurnal Hukum Dan Politik Islam*, *6*(2), 121–136.

Yahya, Y., Widjayanto, J., & Hendra, A. (2024). National security threats in the Indonesian border areas with Timor Leste. *Indonesian Journal of Applied and Industrial Sciences (ESA)*, *3*(2), 209–218. https://doi.org/10.55927/esa.v3i2.8494

The Coalitional Presidentialism and Presidential Toolbox in the Philippines and Indonesia

Aditya Perdana[1]*, Muhammad Imam[2], and Syafril Effendi[3]

[1,2,3]Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Indonesia, Depok, Indonesia 16424

[1]aditya.perdana@ui.ac.id; [2]muhammad.imam71@ui.ac.id; [3]esyafrilseruntting@gmail.com
*Corresponding author

How to Cite: Perdana, A., Imam, M., & Effendi, S. (2024). The coalitional presidentialism and presidential toolbox in the Philippines and Indonesia. *Journal of ASEAN Studies, 12*(2), 461-481. https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v12i2.11449

Abstract

The research examined the contrasting experiences of the Philippines and Indonesia, two countries with multiparty presidential systems, in managing executive-legislative relations. While the presidentialism framework warns of institutional gridlock, the analysis reveals that Rodrigo Duterte and Joko Widodo effectively navigated these dynamics through the strategic use of presidential powers. The qualitative comparative analysis examines how the respective leaders leveraged coalition-building, patronage, and budgetary powers in divergent ways by applying a presidential toolbox framework. Duterte heavily relied on pork-barrel allocations and patronage to secure legislative support in the Philippines, while Jokowi pursued broad coalition-building, integrating opposition parties into the Indonesian cabinet. The findings suggest that the successful application of presidential toolboxs, rather than institutional design alone, plays a critical role in ensuring political stability within fragmented party systems. This challenges deterministic assumptions about the perils of presidentialism, offering a more nuanced understanding of executive adaptability in Southeast Asia. The research contributes to the comparative literature by refining the coalitional presidentialism model in emerging democracies, illustrating how distinct leadership styles, institutional arrangements, and informal practices influence the viability of multiparty presidential systems.

Keywords: presidential toolbox; executive-legislative relations; coalition-building; Southeast Asia; multiparty presidentialism

Introduction

Multiparty presidential systems can face challenges to political stability due to the complex relationship between the executive and legislative branches. Scholars have suggested that presidential systems generally face challenges in maintaining political stability (Abofarha & Nasreldein, 2022; Cheeseman, 2024; Lijphart, 2023). This is mainly due to the higher potential for gridlock between the executive and legislative branches and the risk of misusing presidential authority. The separate selection processes for the legislative and executive branches in a multiparty presidential system often result in a situation where the legislative branch is dominated by a different party or coalition than the executive. Consequently, this can lead to a lack of cooperation between the two branches, hindering effective governance (Borges & Ribeiro, 2023). Ultimately, the coexistence of a multiparty system and presidentialism creates a complex and potentially unstable political environment marked by fragmented power structures and persistent difficulties in achieving consensus and cooperation.

In several Latin American countries, such as Brazil, Argentina, and Ecuador, implementing multiparty presidential systems has often led to significant political instability (Abofarha & Nasreldein, 2022). Moreover, Abofarha and Nasreldein (2022) discover the challenges inherent in multiparty presidential systems and experienced periods of political instability. For instance, they found Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay cases where conflicts between the executive and legislative branches resulted in military interventions. These interventions are often sparked by the executive's inability to effectively control the legislative majority, leading to gridlock and political paralysis. Additionally, Akarçay (2020) has highlighted the fundamental weakness of the presidential system in Latin America, which is the high potential for gridlock. This occurs when the executive branch lacks the necessary control or influence over the legislative branch to advance its agenda. Consequently, decision-making processes are impeded, hindering effective governance and contributing to political instability.

The dynamics between the executive and legislative branches can create governance challenges in multiparty systems. A key concern is political instability, as the elected president may lack sufficient support from the parliamentary majority (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997). Without a cooperative legislature, the president's ability to govern effectively and implement their agenda is hindered. Passing legislation, enacting policies, and making important decisions become increasingly difficult. To address these challenges, scholars suggest pursuing political stability through various strategies. One proposed solution is forming political party coalitions where parties agree to long-term collaboration and establish stable alliances to support the government consistently (Martin & Vanberg, 2020). By building such coalitions, presidents can secure the backing needed to govern effectively, even in a multiparty system.

In a multiparty presidential system, the executive and legislative branches often have a divided government (Chaisty & Power, 2023). This occurs when different political parties or coalitions control the executive and legislative branches. As a result, both branches may claim authority, since each is elected by the public. The executive may struggle to control the

legislative majority, leading to gridlock and difficulties in passing laws and making decisions (Borges & Ribeiro, 2023). Such gridlock can paralyze the government and hinder effective governance. To address these challenges, cooperation and coalition-building become crucial (Santos, 2023). Then, presidents must build coalitions with legislative actors to overcome institutional gridlock. Forming alliances in a multiparty system can help the president advance their agenda. This has been observed in countries like the Philippines under Rodrigo Duterte (2016-2022) and Indonesia under Joko Widodo (Jokowi) (2014-2024).

The strategic use of coalition-building tools is essential for presidentialism in countries such as the Philippines and Indonesia. Through the effective application of these instruments, minority presidents can navigate the complexities of multiparty politics, form durable coalitions, and establish functional administrations that support political stability and effective governance.

Political coalitions play a vital role in achieving government efficiency, maintaining control over the decision-making process, and ensuring the stability and security of the ruling regime (Mietzner, 2023). Parties or factions with common interests and objectives form these coalitions. They enhance efficiency by combining resources, expertise, and support to govern effectively and implement policies. Through collaboration, coalition partners can overcome legislative gridlock, streamline decision-making, and achieve their goals. Moreover, coalitions allow political actors to maintain their influence and authority. By forging alliances with other parties or factions, they can consolidate their power and safeguard their position within the political system (Horne, 2024).

In the context of leaders such as Duterte and Jokowi, who face the complexities of multiparty systems, preventing crises between the executive and legislative branches is crucial. As conceptualized by Chaisty et al. (2018), the presidential toolbox refers to the president's formal and informal institutional arrangements to maintain coalition stability and government support amid party system fragmentation. These tools include negotiation, consensus-building, distribution of political appointments and resources to coalition partners, and strategies for managing inter-party conflicts (Junior & Pereira, 2020).

This research examines the dynamics of multiparty presidential systems, focusing on the leadership of President Duterte and President Jokowi. It explores how these leaders navigated the complex relationship between the executive and legislative branches while ensuring political stability and effective governance. The study analyzes the formation of presidential coalitions during their administrations and the strategies they employed to manage coalition politics and mitigate tensions between government branches. Central to this analysis is the concept of the presidential toolbox, which encompasses various mechanisms and techniques used by the presidents to maintain coalition stability and secure parliamentary support. Furthermore, the research challenges the assumption of perilous multiparty systems by highlighting the presidents' ability to overcome difficulties and conflicts in executive-legislative relations.

Literature Review

Multiparty Presidential System

The academic literature has extensively examined the dynamics of multiparty presidential systems since Juan Linz's seminal work *The Perils of Presidentialism* (1990). Linz argued that presidential systems face a heightened risk of political instability, particularly in newly democratic countries. It is because of the potential for governance gridlock and abuse of executive authority (Abofarha & Nasreldein, 2022). Linz (1990) and Mainwaring (1993) have examined the weaknesses of multiparty systems, particularly the challenges in achieving political stability, as observed in Latin America. The frequent conflict between the executive and legislative branches is a key factor contributing to instability, leading to prolonged crises.

Linz (1990*)* and Mainwaring (1993) have argued that multiparty presidential systems can be politically unstable, as seen in several Latin American countries. These countries have experienced political crises and even military interventions due to conflicts between the executive and legislative branches (Abofarha & Nasreldein, 2022; De Micheli et al., 2022; Llanos & Pérez-Liñán, 2021). However, some countries have resolved these issues by fostering cooperation and building coalitions led by the president (Santos, 2023). Subsequent research on multiparty presidentialism has focused on the role of coalitions in mitigating institutional crises caused by presidents facing fragmented legislatures (Kerevel & Bárcena Juárez, 2022).

Additionally, Linz (1990*)* and Mainwaring (1993) suggest that multiparty presidential systems are inherently unstable due to the potential for conflict between the executive and legislative branches. This instability is manifested in the dual legitimacy of both branches (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997), the fragmented political landscape (Llanos & Pérez-Liñán, 2021), and difficulties with coalition discipline in policy implementation (De Micheli et al., 2022). However, research suggests that presidents can address these challenges by leveraging coalition-building mechanisms within the presidential system (Chaisty et al., 2018).

Coalitional Presidentialism

The research on coalitions in multiparty presidential systems examines efforts to manage coalitions in parliament. Doyle (2020) finds that a cycle of cooperation and gridlock among political actors is common in Latin America. The coalition formation is influenced by various factors, such as ideological proximity between the president's faction and other groups, public trust in the president, a faction's affiliation with the president's party, proximity to elections, and the fairness of coalition agreements (Doyle, 2020).

Taylor (2020) examines the complexities of coalition management in Brazil's multiparty legislative landscape. The research highlights the significance of understanding coalition dynamics, including conflicts within a single coalition and conflicts between different coalitions. These conflicts, along with coalition management, indirectly influence policymaking and the functioning of the executive branch. The research underscores various

dimensions of legislative bottlenecks in Brazil. It also emphasizes the importance of internal cohesion and effective coalition management in the lawmaking process. Understanding the dynamics of coalition politics is crucial for policymakers and executives to navigate legislative hurdles and advance their agendas effectively.

Chaisty et al. (2018) find that minority presidents can build coalitions with legislators to maintain political stability. This strategy is common in Brazil, Mexico, and Latin America, where presidents use ministerial appointments and patronage to secure legislative cooperation (Doyle, 2020; Pereira et al., 2023). Similarly, Southeast Asian countries have used broad coalition-building to mitigate resistance from legislatures and stabilize governance (Mietzner, 2023; Ufen, 2023). Therefore, the primary objective of coalition-building is political negotiation, in which the president engages with parties to secure legislative support (Martin & Vanberg, 2020), to achieve stability (Kerevel & Juárez, 2022), and facilitate political bargaining (Müller et al., 2024). It ensures an exchange of benefits between the executive and legislative branches.

The Presidential Toolbox

Successful coalition formation requires certain conditions (Raile et al., 2011). Coalitions are accommodative political efforts to regulate coalition partners in the parliament under executive control. Pereira et al. (2012) emphasize the President's pivotal role in building coalitions and managing executive-legislative relations within multiparty presidential systems. This framework allows the President flexibility in cabinet appointments and policy development strategies. A coalition-based multiparty presidential regime can succeed and be stable if it meets three criteria: 1) the President is constitutionally strong, with legal protection from impeachment; 2) the President has political incentives to offer coalition partners, such as cabinet positions, to attract and retain them; and 3) there is institutionalized and effective oversight of the President's actions. Furthermore, a strong executive is necessary in a multiparty presidential system, as the President can act as a perpetual coalition builder, uniting diverse coalitions to support important policy initiatives. Therefore, the executive can employ particularistic benefits and political transfers to gather maximum political support.

Meanwhile, Chaisty et al. (2018) have analyzed presidential coalitions in the multiparty system without a parliamentary majority. They describe how elected presidents in many countries, lacking a legislative majority, strategically build and maintain coalitions in fragmented legislatures. As the number of directly elected presidents and legislative fragmentation has increased globally, more executives often need to form coalitions beyond their parties to implement policies and programs. Chaisty et al. (2018) present a cross-regional analysis of presidential coalitions, focusing on the presidential toolbox of power in nine democratizing and hybrid regimes in sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and post-Soviet Eurasia. These cases use different strategies to build and manage parliamentary coalitions.

At the core of coalitional presidentialism is the presidential toolbox, which consists of five key instruments (Chaisty et al., 2018). First, legislative powers refer to the formal legislative prerogatives of the executive branch, which enhance the president's influence over

the legislative agenda. The president can shape the legislative process and advance their policy priorities by leveraging these powers. Second, partisan powers involve the control a president typically exercises over their political party. By rallying party members and allies behind their agenda, the president can strengthen their position within the legislature and build coalitions of support. Third, cabinet authority grants the president the power to appoint ministers and agency heads, allowing them to reward allies, consolidate support, and ensure loyalty within the government. Fourth, budgetary authority allows the president to formulate and execute public spending priorities. The president can incentivize cooperation from potential coalition partners and secure their support for key initiatives by allocating resources strategically. Finally, the exchange of favors involves offering financial or material inducements to attract coalition partners, helping the president cultivate relationships and forge alliances that contribute to political stability and governance effectiveness.

The research examines how the presidents of the Philippines and Indonesia used different coalition-building strategies. Duterte relies on pork barrel politics and patronage, providing budget incentives to secure legislators' loyalty (Thompson, 2023). In contrast, Jokowi pursues a broad coalition, incorporating opposition parties to reduce legislative resistance (Mietzner, 2017; Wasisto, 2021). Then, the presidential toolbox framework is used to assess the effectiveness of these presidential strategies in addressing executive-legislative gridlock and promoting political stability.

Furthermore, this research examines the challenges of governing in multiparty presidential systems, where executive and legislative branches are separately elected, often leading to gridlock and instability (Linz, 1990; Mainwaring, 1993). Studies from Latin America demonstrate how fragmented legislatures make it difficult for presidents to enforce party discipline and advance policy agendas. The research applies these insights to Southeast Asia, particularly the Philippines and Indonesia. To address legislative resistance, presidents in multiparty systems rely on coalition-building. The research on coalitional presidentialism (Doyle, 2020; Taylor, 2020) explains how presidents negotiate with different factions, offering incentives like cabinet positions or policy concessions. In Indonesia, Jokowi formed broad coalitions to reduce opposition (Mietzner, 2017), while Duterte in the Philippines relied more on pork barrel politics and patronage to ensure legislative support (Thompson, 2022, 2023). The 'presidential toolbox' (Chaisty et al., 2018) conceptualizes the mechanisms presidents use to maintain coalitions, including legislative powers, cabinet control, partisan influence, budgetary authority, and political exchanges. This framework helps explain how Jokowi and Duterte navigated legislative challenges—Jokowi through inclusivity and Duterte through budgetary incentives.

This research also evaluates the impact of different coalition strategies on governance effectiveness in Indonesia and the Philippines. It compares the relative effectiveness of Jokowi's broad coalition model with Duterte's patronage-based strategy in mitigating executive-legislative conflicts and promoting political stability. Therefore, the research contributes to broader discussions on governability in multiparty presidential systems, particularly in Southeast Asia, by comparative analysis of how leaders manage coalitional governance and the risks of deadlock between the executive and legislature.

Research Method

The research applies a qualitative comparative case study to analyze the political strategies of Duterte and Jokowi in managing executive-legislative relations. The qualitative approach is used to explore and understand the various meanings within certain groups and individuals within the context of social or humanitarian issues (Creswell, 2017). Through this method, the research examines the implications of the coalition dynamics following the elections at the start of each administration. Also, this method allows an examination of the meaning behind the use of the presidential toolbox in response to these observed dynamics.

The research uses literature research as the data collection approach. This approach collects and analyzes relevant academic sources, policy documents, government reports, and news articles on multiparty presidentialism, coalition management, and executive-legislative relations in the Philippines and Indonesia. It focuses on the post-election periods of Duterte (2016-2022) and Jokowi (2014-2024) administration, examining how each leader formed, maintained, or adjusted their coalitions using available political tools.

The research applies conceptual and theoretical frameworks to interpret coalition dynamics. Multiparty presidentialism is to analyze executive-legislative relations (Linz & Mainwaring, 1993). Then, coalitional presidentialism and presidential toolbox are to examine how presidents use strategies like cabinet appointments, budget allocations, and legislative maneuvers to maintain coalitions (Chaisty et al., 2018). Then, a comparative analysis highlights similarities and differences in coalition management between Duterte and Jokowi. The findings are interpreted based on the political strategies, challenges, and outcomes observed in each case. The research concludes by identifying key patterns in coalition governance and their implications for democratic stability and executive-legislative relations in multiparty presidential systems.

Analysis

Rodrigo Duterte and Executive-Legislative Relations in the Philippines

The Philippine political system presents a unique challenge to the perilous presidentialism argument. While the Philippines is a clear example of presidentialism with a distinct separation of powers between the executive and legislature, the dynamics within the legislative branch are more nuanced. Senators, serving six-year terms, are less susceptible to presidential pressure compared to members of the lower house, who are elected for shorter two-year terms and have a more local constituency (Yusingco et al, 2023). This suggests that, while the overall framework of presidentialism persists, the legislative branch—particularly the Senate—may exhibit varying degrees of responsiveness to presidential influence and patronage. Nevertheless, informal political aspects of the Philippines often prevent significant gridlock between the executive and legislative branches.

The weakness of political parties in the Philippines helps prevent gridlock between the executive and legislative branches (Thompson, 2022). Philippine political parties are notably lacking in external and internal institutionalization. Externally, interparty competition is fluid, and voters or social groups do not see parties as essential to the political system. Internally, political parties in the Philippines suffer from a lack of strong societal roots and well-defined platforms, often resorting to vague statements (Fernandez, 2021). These parties are structurally weak, marked by factionalism, short-lived alliances, and dominance by the political elite, with a focus on personalities over cohesive programs or ideologies (Thompson, 2022). Political parties primarily function as electoral vehicles for candidates relying on client networks, with little incentive to invest in party organization or comprehensive platforms (Ufen, 2022). Party-switching is common, and multiple memberships are widespread, reflecting the parties' ephemeral and manipulable nature. This instability undermines the foundational role of political parties in a functioning democracy.

While often seen as a weakness for democratic accountability, the nature of political parties in the Philippines offers a potential advantage in addressing the challenges of presidentialism. Unlike many other presidential systems where gridlock between the executive and legislative branches is common, such gridlock is relatively rare in the Philippines owing to its fragmented party system. Political analysts have observed the ease with which politicians can shift allegiances or change party affiliations in the Philippine context (Thompson, 2022). This phenomenon explains why each presidential election since the Marcos era has secured a legislative majority, even when elected from a minor party.

After Duterte became president in 2016, party-switching became more evident. Despite his victory with a small party, the Partido Demokratiko Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan (PDP Laban), which had limited legislative representation, politicians quickly joined his coalition. Through post-election party-switching, Duterte assembled a large legislative majority to support his ally Pantaleon 'Bebot' Alvarez's bid for House speaker, and the sole PDP-Laban senator, Aquilino 'Koko' Pimentel Jr., was elected Senate President (Thompson, 2022). This mass defection occurred despite warnings from the once-dominant Liberal Party that Duterte intended to establish a dictatorship. It demonstrated how political parties, even those claiming programmatic agendas, yield to members' demands to benefit from presidential patronage in Congress (Teehankee, 2023).

The president can form a coalition of legislators by providing access to discretionary funds, such as pork barrel and special budgetary allocations. Kenny (2020) notes that the president's influence stems from controlling the disbursement of critical budgetary funds, including those allocated to individual legislators in Congress. The control over the distribution of funds gives the presidency significant leverage over both the Senate and House of Representatives, making them responsive to the president's initiatives and agenda. By controlling the budget, the president can incentivize legislators to support their policies and priorities, thereby consolidating power and influence within the legislative branch.

Although 'pork barreling' may raise ethical concerns, it does not explain why presidentialism is problematic in the Philippines (Thompson, 2022). Unlike other presidential

systems where gridlock between the executive and legislative branches leads to governance challenges, the Philippines experiences a different dynamic. The legislature and Congress are often perceived as working too closely with the executive branch, blurring the lines of checks and balances. Critics argue that Congress fails to adequately oversee executive authority, while the president is accused of using pork barrel allocations as legalized bribery to gain legislative support (Teehankee, 2023; Thompson, 2022).

While influenced by the United States, the Phillippines has also adopted a strong presidential model similar to those in Latin American countries. This divergence is primarily due to the significant fiscal and coercive powers vested in the Philippine president (Kreuzer, 2020). Unlike the United States, Philippine presidents have substantial formal authority, particularly in budgetary decision-making. Presidents also have the authority to suspend habeas corpus and declare martial law. However, these actions are subject to judicial and congressional oversight, especially after the fall of the Marcos regime. Moreover, Philippine presidents often bypass legislative and judicial checks on their power, exerting influence over nominally independent regulatory bodies.

Journalists characterize the Philippine political system as "hyperpresidentialism," highlighting the immense concentration of executive power in the precidency (Kenes, 2023). This view is supported by researchers who argue that the Philippine president stands out among presidential democracies for the unparalleled extent of their executive authority. Within the framework proposed by Mainwaring and Shugart (1997), the Philippines represents a prime example of the least functional form of presidentialism—characterized by strong presidential legislative powers combined with disorganized abd undisciplined political parties, which undermines effective checks and balances within a presidential system

Critiques argued that Philippine presidents wield overwhelming power, allowing them to sideline other branches of government, including the legislature, judiciary, and independent agencies. The president's ability to encroach on the authority of other government bodies undermines horizontal accountability, the system of checks and balances between different branches (Yusingco et al., 2022). As a results of their hegemonic authority, Philippine presidents can diminish the autonomy and influence of these constitutionally mandated bodies, despite their intended co-equal status. In practice, the president's dominance erodes the system of checks and balances established by the constitution.

The Philippine president's control over patronage resources is a significant factor enabling potential abuses of power. This concentration positions the president as the primary distributor of patronage, becoming the patron-in-chief (Thompson, 2022). Given the president's extensive authority over the national budget and the prevalence of clientelistic networks in Philippine politics, the ability to allocate patronage is a crucial tool for influencing legislative decision-making. The power derived from controlling patronage resources undermines public trust in government, as it often prioritizes private interests over the public good. This erosion of trust arises from the perception that government actions serve personal or factional gain rather than the public good (Ronas, 2016).

Furthermore, the weak system of checks and balances in the Philippine presidential system exacerbates this issue. Presidents often appear to operate above the law, facing minimal oversight and rarely being held accountable through impeachment, even in cases of misconduct. The president's influence extends to the military, which can be mobilized to enforce emergency rule or martial law, further consolidating presidential authority. Ultimately, the broad scope of authority wielded by the Philippine president permeates the entire state apparatus, raising concerns about accountability, transparency, and equitable resource distribution.

Philippine presidents frequently consolidate extraordinary power due to various factors. A key factor is the expectation among influential political oligarchs supporting a presidential campaign that they will be rewarded with patronage once the presidential candidate assumes office (Teehankee, 2023). These oligarchs, who wield significant influence in local and regional politics, provide crucial support to presidential candidates during elections, anticipating favors and benefits. Consequently, the president feels compelled to fulfill these expectations by allocating patronage resources to their supporters, solidifying political alliances, and ensuring continued backing.

Moreover, the strength of the presidency is justified by the fragmented and particularistic nature of Philippine politics, which is characterized by the influence of diverse local elites and interest groups. In this complex political landscape, the president assumes the role of the patron-in-chief, serving as a unifying figure capable of bridging divides and forging alliances across disparate factions. The president becomes crucial in consolidating support from diverse quarters, utilizing patronage to reward existing allies and enticing potential collaborators.

For newly elected presidents, the imperative to repay their chief supporters while simultaneously expanding their support base through patronage is a paramount concern. This dual role, acting as a debtor to loyal backers and a unifier seeking to expand their political coalition, underscores the intricate dynamics of Philippine presidential politics. It highlights the complex interplay between personal loyalty, political indebtedness, and the pragmatic pursuit of power and influence in a fragmented political landscape. As a result, Philippine presidents are often tempted to exert their informal authority in ways that challenge democratic principles and potentially undermine democratic institutions. Some presidents have notably sought to wield power in an authoritarian or illiberal manner, disregarding the rule of law and threatening those who oppose their ambitions.

Rodrigo Duterte's presidency has raised significant concerns about the state of democracy in the Philippines. While democratically elected, Duterte has exhibited authoritarian tendencies (Fernandez, 2021), including disregard for legal norms, human rights violations, and extrajudicial killings in his controversial anti-drug campaign. Even before his presidency, Duterte was rumored to have enlisted individuals to eliminate lawbreakers and political opponents while serving as the mayor of Davao City (Alami et al., 2022).

Additionally, Duterte has declared martial law in certain regions and threatened to expand it nationally, raising concerns about the erosion of civil liberties (Thompson, 2022).

Comparisons have been drawn between Duterte's leadership style and the martial law regime of Ferdinand Marcos, which led to a deterioration of Philippine democracy. Many observers view Duterte's presidency as the most serious threat to Philippine democracy since the country's transition to democracy in the late 20th century. The consolidation of power in Duterte's hands and his willingness to circumvent legal constraints have raised alarms about the future of democratic governance in the Philippines.

Duterte's presidency has extended his influence beyond the legislative branch to the judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court, which has been pressured to align with his agenda. In one case, the Supreme Court acquiesced to Duterte's demands during a confrontation over a list of judges allegedly involved in drugs, despite the list was later proven to be erroneous. Duterte's threat to declare martial law if the court opposed his drug war further underscored his willingness to assert authority over the judiciary (Jerusalem & Ramos, 2016).

Despite being democratically elected in 2016 and adhering to most political liberties, Duterte's administration has raised concerns about the erosion of liberal values through its widespread extrajudicial killings of alleged drug offenders. While Duterte maintains constitutional legitimacy, his illiberal governance, including the encouragement of extrajudicial violence, presents a paradox in his rule. Although democratically elected, his administration is characterized by open illiberalism, challenging traditional notions of democratic governance (Thompson, 2022).

Duterte's presidency in the Philippines exemplifies the risks of a powerful executive in a multiparty presidential system lacking robust checks and balances. This case demonstrates how the presidency's substantial authority can enable patronage networks and authoritarian abuses. Duterte's administration exploited the Philippine political system's institutional weaknesses, leveraging the presidency's extensive powers to consolidate control and pursue illiberal policies. This serves as a cautionary example regarding the dangers of unchecked presidential power within a multiparty framework, underscoring the necessity of strong checks and balances to prevent the erosion of democratic norms and the concentration of power in a single individual or institution.

Joko Widodo and Executive-Legislative Relations in Indonesia

In Indonesia, the relationship between the president and legislature has not posed a significant threat to political stability (Hanan, 2012). Since the post-Suharto era, presidents have relied on broad coalitions with limited opposition to secure legislative cooperation. However, critics argue Indonesia's political system is an informal cartel of key parties, creating an exclusive system that undermines electoral accountability (Tambunan, 2023), as voters struggle to distinguish between aligned parties. Like the Philippines, the executive's distribution of patronage to the legislature has contributed to system stability. This patronage mitigates political tensions and promotes stability, ensuring electoral losers receive a share of power and resources.

Moreover, Hanan (2012) suggests that the presidential system can function effectively. By acknowledging potential conflicts between the executive and legislative branches, some challenges can be addressed through formal and informal institutions that link the political bodies. However, Hanan's (2012) analysis does not explore the pragmatic behavior of political parties. Additionally, Mietzner and Honna (2023) highlight the emergence of catch-all parties in pragmatic environments. Their findings suggest coalition formations in parliament may not endure, as political parties in opposition or support remain flexible, driven by the pursuit of benefits. In such environments, compromises and accommodations among involved parties are common.

Asrinaldi and Yusoff's (2023) analysis of Indonesian political party coalitions during the 2014 presidential election found that ideology was not a significant factor. Instead, coalitions were mainly driven by political interests and the pursuit of power and resources, a phenomenon known as "office-seeking" behavior. The authors identify two key reasons for this tendency. First, many Indonesian parties lack the financial resources to sustain themselves independently, making coalitions a practical necessity to pool resources and enhance electoral prospects. Second, parties are reluctant to remain in opposition, as they desire access to power, state resources, and opportunities for patronage.

The Indonesian political landscape is shaped by the pragmatism of political parties, particularly after the 2014 presidential election (Wasisto, 2021). Unlike in some countries where ideological divergences drive political tensions, Indonesian parties are primarily driven by their own interests and positions within the legislature. This case illustrates how party pragmatism can shape the dynamics of political conflicts and coalition formations, underscoring the significance of comprehending the specific motivations of political actors. Despite Jokowi's attempts to form a cooperative coalition in the early of his administration year, many parties are reluctant to commit unconditionally. Instead, they sought to maximize their influence and benefits. As a result, Jokowi had to accommodate opposition parties such as the United Development Party (PPP), National Mandate Party (PAN), and the Party of Functional Groups (Golkar). This pragmatic strategy is essential to manage the complex political environment in which parties prioritize immediate interests over broader ideological goals.

Ufen (2023) examines the dynamics between the President and the House of Representatives, focusing on coalition management. The analysis highlights Jokowi's challenges in forming a cohesive, programmatic coalition. The political instability in the early years of his administration complicated efforts to maintain a coalition based on shared ideology and policy objectives. These perspectives underscore the complexities of Indonesia's multiparty system, which often requires strong presidential leadership to navigate diverse political interests and alliances. The need for the President to have dominant political power becomes evident in this context, as it enables effective governance amidst the fluidity of the political landscape.

Meanwhile, Mietzner (2017) and Beso and Rahmawati (2021) offer insights into the challenges confronted by Jokowi during the initial years of his administration. He sought to

achieve political stability amid legislative opposition pressure. Consequently, Jokowi's primary strategy was to integrate opposition groups into the government. Although this approach assisted Jokowi in securing legislative backing, it raised concerns about the potential weakening of effective opposition oversight within Indonesia's democratic system.

The 2014 presidential election in Indonesia was a critical moment that tested the resilience of the country's democracy. Prabowo Subianto's candidacy, marked by his controversial background and authoritarian tendencies, posed a significant challenge to Indonesia's democratic trajectory. However, Jokowi's victory helped maintain democratic stability despite Prabowo Subianto's populist appeal (Lee, 2021).

Following his election, Jokowi faced challenges in navigating Indonesia's multiparty political landscape. Despite opposition within his party and the legislature, Jokowi demonstrated adeptness in building coalitions and overcoming gridlock. By leveraging his outsider status and focusing on economic reforms, particularly infrastructure development and deregulation, Jokowi consolidated his authority and maintain high approval ratings by mid-2016. In contrast to some other presidential systems, Indonesia avoids political gridlock through effective leadership, building coalitions, and prioritizing tangible policy results. Jokowi's successful navigation of Indonesia's political terrain underscores the importance of pragmatic governance and consensus-building in sustaining democratic norms and institutions (Power & Warburton, 2020).

Jokowi's early presidency faced internal conflicts within his party, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP), as well as challenges from political opponents. Megawati Soekarnoputri, former president and PDIP chairperson, expected Jokowi to follow her terms, with noncompliance risking a rift in their relationship. PDIP's initial support for Jokowi's candidacy was lukewarm, with Puan Maharani, Megawati's daughter and a key party figure, endorsing him only towards the end of the campaign. This internal discord within PDIP significantly contributed to the difficulties Jokowi encountered during the early phase of his presidency. Additionally, Jokowi's populist program, focused on addressing poverty and inequality, was not fully aligned with PDIP's internal agenda.

Despite these internal tensions, Jokowi also faced opposition from political opponents. His pro-poor policy did not receive full support from parliament, with only 37% backing. This discrepancy between Jokowi's priorities and PDIP's plans led to demand to align with the party's agenda. Nevertheless, Jokowi employed strategic maneuvers behind the scenes to regain political control, such as leveraging his prerogative right to intervene in internal conflicts within other parties like PPP and Golkar, to bolster his support base and consolidate his authority (Mietzner, 2017). Jokowi overcame internal opposition and strengthened his political position through strategic maneuvers. His sharp political approach allowed him to assert leadership and advance his agenda despite initial challenges.

Jokowi's strategic use of presidential powers—often referred to as the presidential toolbox—facilitated the defection of major opposition parties such as PPP, Golkar, and PAN into his governing coalition. This involved Jokowi engaging in political outreach and communication with opposition party leaders, fostering dialogue, and building rapport to

create an environment conducive to political realignments (Wasisto, 2021). Jokowi likely offered incentives and concessions, such as promises of ministerial positions, access to resources and patronage networks, or policy concessions, to persuade these parties to join the government coalition. By leveraging his presidential authority and employing these tools, Jokowi successfully orchestrated the realignment of key political forces, strengthening his administration and consolidating his political position.

Jokowi's strategic use of presidential powers led major parties like PPP, Golkar, and PAN to support his administration. This relationship is mutually beneficial, as Jokowi and the parties gained political advantages. This dynamic aligns with theories proposed by Chaisty et al. (2018), which suggest that distributive politics in parliaments involve cabinet authority, exchange of favors, and pork-barrel politics to secure support. The shifting of parties to support Jokowi can be understood as strategic political exchanges between the executive and legislative branches. By utilizing the presidential toolbox, Jokowi sought to gain parliamentary support for his agenda. In return, the parties likely received concessions and benefits such as access to resources, patronage opportunities, or policy concessions aligning with their interests. This arrangement allowed Jokowi and the supporting parties to gain power.

Jokowi's strategic outreach and negotiations with opposition parties are crucial for building a coalition to support his presidential agenda. By offering these parties key positions in his administration, Jokowi attracted parties that had previously backed his opponent, Prabowo, during the 2014 election. This process of political realignment, involving parties like PAN, Golkar, and PPP, demonstrates Jokowi's adept use of the 'presidential toolbox' to navigate the complex multiparty system in Indonesia. The distribution of cabinet positions and other resources was a key aspect of Jokowi's efforts to maintain harmony and secure political support within the coalition. These actions exemplify the intricate dynamics of coalition politics in a presidential system, where the president must strategically leverage executive power and distribute political resources to strengthen the government's position and ensure its stability and effectiveness (Chaisty et al., 2018)

Jokowi's strategic use of the presidential toolbox, such as offering ministerial positions to opposition parties, aligns with the concept of cabinet authority proposed by Chaisty et al. (2018). This approach transforms coalition benefits into tangible roles within the administration. By appointing ministers from opposition parties, Jokowi aimed to solidify government support and promote political stability. This utilization of the presidential toolbox reflects the pragmatic efforts required to maintain stability in a complex political landscape. In practice, the presidential toolbox is often employed to allocate coalition benefits, such as ministerial roles, to members of opposition parties that join the government. Jokowi offered ministerial positions to representatives from parties like PPP, PAN, and Golkar, who then supported his administration. This strategy underscores the importance of coalition-building in presidential systems, where the president must navigate diverse interests and forge alliances to govern effectively. Through the strategic allocation of cabinet positions, Jokowi fostered cooperation and consensus among political factions, thereby enhancing the stability and functionality of his government.

Indonesia's multiparty presidential system necessitates coalition-building for effective governance. In this political landscape, no single party holds a dominant position. Consequently, the president must negotiate and compromise with parliament, particularly when policy decisions diverge from the president's party preferences. This dynamic was evident early in Jokowi's presidency. The executive branch wields significant power, especially over the state budget and financial resources, making these positions highly coveted by political parties seeking to influence policy and resource allocation. Jokowi's administration strategically leveraged its bargaining power to attract opposition parties to join the government coalition. The shifting parties sought positions in key ministries to manage the state budget. This case shows how Indonesia's multiparty presidential system shapes political dynamics. Cooperation and compromise between the executive and legislature are crucial as parties position themselves to maximize influence and access resources.

Comparative Discussion: The Presidential Toolbox in Practice

The Philippines and Indonesia offer insightful case studies of presidentialism, characterized by a clear separation between the executive and legislative branches. This separation aligns with early theories on presidentialism, which argue that presidential rule tends to be more unstable than parliamentary systems. However, the concept of the presidential toolbox sheds light on the dominant position of presidents in both countries (see Table 1). Despite weakened checks and balances, presidents in the Philippines and Indonesia wield significant political leverage. Populist leaders such as Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines and Joko Widodo (Jokowi) in Indonesia have effectively used this leverage to advance their respective agendas. While there are similarities, notable differences exist between Duterte and Jokowi. Duterte has heavily relied on pork barrel politics and patronage to maintain his political dominance, using discretionary funds to secure support from legislators and other actors. In contrast, Jokowi prioritizes a coalition-building strategy, forming a broad alliance with opposition parties in parliament. This strategy allows Jokowi to consolidate power and navigate Indonesia's complex multiparty system. As part of this strategy, Jokowi has also allocated pork barrel funds to parliament members, reinforcing support for his administration and advancing his policy agenda.

Duterte and Jokowi each utilize executive powers to address the political dynamics in their countries. Duterte's approach in the Philippines involves distributing pork barrel funds and offering patronage to members of parliament. By allocating resources and favors to legislators, Duterte secures support for his policies and a majority in the legislature. This practice of pork barrel politics allows him to manage the ongoing needs and demands of the legislative branch, reducing potential conflicts and gridlock. In contrast, Jokowi's administration in Indonesia has adopted a strategy of appointing members of opposing parties to key ministerial positions in the government. By accommodating these parties within his cabinet, Jokowi expands his coalition and garners support from a broader political spectrum. This approach strengthens his legislative support and facilitates the passage of his policy agenda by fostering a cooperative parliamentary environment. Duterte and Jokowi use

coalition advantages and pork barrel politics to mitigate political tensions within the parliament. Through these tactics, both leaders create a symbiotic relationship between the executive and legislative branches, exchanging resources and political positions for support and cooperation. These practices contribute to the overall political stability and enable the smooth functioning of the government and policy implementation.

Table 1 The Presidential Executive Toolbox between Philippines and Indonesia

No	Key differentiation elements of Presidential Toolbox	Philippines (Duterte)	Indonesia (Jokowi)
1	Legislative power	Direct influence	Coalition building
2	Powers over the cabinet	Appointed loyalists	Shared cabinet positions among coalition partners
3	Partisan power	Exploited the weak of party system	Negotiated with an institutionalized system; limited partisan control
4	Budget authority	Used pork barrel politics extensively	Used budget allocation strategically
5	Exchange of favors	Relied coercions and patronage	Relied more on political bargaining

Source: Author's compilation

This research shows that the effective use of the presidential toolbox allows leaders to manage coalitions and prevent legislative gridlock, despite the "perils of presidentialism" argument. The findings indicate that presidents can use tools like patronage, pork barrel politics, and coalition-building to maintain stability, challenging the view that presidentialism necessarily weakens democracy. The success of presidentialism depends on the president's strategic use of political tools, rather than being inherently problematic.

Furthermore, this research moves beyond the traditional "perils of presidentialism" framework, showing how leaders can actively mitigate instability through strategic coalition-building and patronage politics. While previous research has explored coalitional presidentialism in Latin America and Africa, this research applies the framework to Southeast Asia—specifically through a comparative analysis of Indonesia and the Philippines—thus addressing a notable regional gap in the literature. Unlike prior research that characterized Indonesia's coalition-building as a structural feature, this research compares it to the Philippines, where Duterte relied more on pork barrel politics and patronage than broad coalitions. By highlighting these differences, the research refines existing analytical frameworks, showing different applications of the presidential toolbox; Duterte used coercion and patronage, while Jokowi used coalition incentives. This research expands the coalitional presidentialism literature by demonstrating how different presidents employ varied strategies from the presidential toolbox to achieve stability.

Conclusions

The research examines multiparty presidentialism in the Philippines and Indonesia. Both countries have complex political landscapes, with multiple parties vying for power within a presidential system. The differences in party structures between the two countries suggest further study on how they shape executive-legislative relations in a multiparty system. This could lead to institutional reforms to enhance the president's control and accountability within their governance frameworks. In such systems, the president's party may differ from the legislative majority, potentially causing gridlock and policy implementation challenges. However, Duterte and Jokowi have successfully navigated these complexities by using the presidential toolbox to manage political relationships and build coalitions. By leveraging this toolbox, they forged alliances with various parties, avoiding divided government and enabling smooth governance and policy implementation. Their leadership and coalition-building skills are crucial in mitigating the risks of multiparty presidentialism and enabling effective governance despite fragmented political landscapes.

Presidents Duterte and Jokowi rely on the presidential toolbox to build broad political coalitions. This allows them to navigate the complexities of coalition politics and manage relationships with various political actors. These coalitions play a critical role in shaping decision-making and governance within multiparty presidential systems, as evidenced by the cases of the Philippines and Indonesia. Moreover, these coalitions help bridge the gap between the executive and legislative branches, facilitate cooperation, and enable policy implementation.

Furthermore, this research highlights the importance of effective coalition-building frameworks in fragmented political environments. The ability of Duterte and Jokowi to govern effectively demonstrates the value of flexible political strategies and tools that facilitate collaboration between the executive and legislative branches. Policymakers in multiparty presidential systems aim to strengthen coalition management, reduce legislative gridlocks, and enhance governance stability.

The research also underscores the importance of adaptable leadership in managing the risks of multiparty governance. Future leaders may benefit from similar strategies but should ensure coalition-building practices do not compromise democratic accountability and transparency. A balance between executive power and legislative oversight is important to prevent unchecked presidential power and democratic backsliding. Future research should examine additional factors that impact the success of coalition-building in multiparty presidential frameworks, such as public perceptions of presidential coalitions and their effect on public confidence in the government.

Acknowledgement

This article is supported by the 2022 PUTI Postgraduate Grant from the Universitas Indonesia with the contract number NKB-117/UN2.RST/HKP.05.00/2022.

About The Authors

Aditya Perdana is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Universitas Indonesia. He holds a PhD from Universitaet Hamburg, Germany, and specializes in governance, elections, civil society, and gender politics.

Muhammad Imam is a faculty member in the Department of Political Science at the Universitas Indonesia. He pursued postgraduate studies at Sciences Po Paris in France. Imam's research interests encompass public policy, geopolitics, security, and environmental issues.

Syafril Effendi holds a doctoral degree in political science from the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences at the Universitas Indonesia.

References

Abofarha, E. A.., & Nasreldein, R. I. (2022). Explaining presidential instability in Latin America: Evidence from Brazil, Argentina and Ecuador. *Review of Economics and Political Science*, *7*(1), 56-70

Akarçay, E. İ. (2022). Unraveling presidentialism: Learning from the Latin American experience. *Alternatif Politika*, *12* (1), 204-227

Alami, A. N., Luong, D. N. A., Prihatini, E., Ramadhani, E., Go, J. R. R., Hafidzah, N., & Atiyah, U. (2023). Democratization in the Digital Era: Experience from Southeast Asia. *JAS (Journal of ASEAN Studies)*, *10*(2). https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v10i2.9361

Asrinaldi, & Yusoff, M. A. (2023). Power consolidation and its impact on the decline of democracy in Indonesia under President Jokowi. *Cogent Social Sciences*, *9*(1). https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2023.2232579

Beso, A. J., & Rahmawati, R. (2021). Hubungan eksekutif dan legislatif pada era Presiden Joko Widodo periode 2014-2019. *Jurnal Polinter: Kajian Politik dan Hubungan Internasional*, *6*(2), 89-112.

Borges, A., & Ribeiro, P. F. (2023). Presidents, prime ministers and legislative behaviour: The conditional effect of presidential legislative powers on party unity. *Government and Opposition*, *58*(2), 227–248. https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2021.45

Chaisty, P., Cheeseman, N., & Power, T. J. (2018). *Coalitional presidentialism in comparative perspective: Minority presidents in multiparty systems*. Oxford University Press

Chaisty, P., & Power, T. (2023). Does power always flow to the executive? Interbranch oscillations in legislative authority, 1976–2014. *Government and Opposition*, *58* (1), 61-83. https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2021.29

Cheeseman, N. (2024). Blondel's African Presidential Republics: Proof presidentialism can perform even in the most challenging contexts? *European Political Science, 23* (4), 567-580. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41304-023-00466-1

Creswell, J. W., & Creswell, J. D. (2017). *Research design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches.* Sage Publication Inc.

De Micheli, D., Sanchez-Gomez, J. T., & Roberts, K. M. (2022). Tenuous pacts and multiparty coalitions: The politics of presidential impeachment in Latin America. *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 54, 283–311. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X22000219

Doyle, D. (2020). Breakdown, cooperation, or backsliding? A Return to presidents and legislatures in Latin America. *Latin America Research Review, 55*(1), 168-175. https://doi.org/10.25222/larr.886

Fernandez, G. B. (2021). Rise of illiberal democracy, weakening of the rule of law, & implementation of human rights in the Philippines. *The American University International Law Review*, *36*(2), 181-230.

Hanan, D. (2012). *Making presidentialism work: Legislative and executive interaction in Indonesian democracy*. Ohio State University

Horne, W. (2024, January 9). *How multiparty coalition governance moderates partisan hostility*. New America. https://www.newamerica.org/political-reform/reports/the-realistic-promise-of-multiparty-democracy-in-the-united-states/how-multiparty-coalition-governance-moderates-partisan-hostility-will-horne

Junior, A. M., & Pereira, C. (2020). How valuable is a presidential cabinet? Measuring ministries' political attractiveness in Brazil. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 62(1), 25-45. https://doi.org/10.1017/lap.2019.44

Kenes, B. (2023, June 14). *The Philippines: From 'People Power' to democratic backsliding*. European Center for Populism Studies. https://www.populismstudies.org/the-philippines-from-people-power-to-democratic-backsliding/

Kenny, P. D. (2020). Why is there no political polarization in the Philippines? In T. Carothers & A. O'Donohue (Eds.), *Political polarization in South and Southeast Asia: Old divisions, new dangers* (pp. 81-94). Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Kerevel, Y. P., & Bárcena Juárez, S. A. (2022). Informal coalitions and legislative agenda setting in Mexico's multiparty presidential system. *Latin American Politics and Society*. 64(1), 1-22. https://doi.org/10.1017/lap.2021.51

Kreuzer, P. (2020). *A Patron-Strongman who delivers: Explaining enduring public support for President Duterte in the Philippines*. Peace Research Institute Frankfurt.

Lee, S. Y. (2021). An urban explanation of Jokowi's rise: Implications for politics and governance in post-Suharto Indonesia. *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, *40*(2), 293–314. https://doi.org/10.1177/1868103421990853

Linz, J.J. (1990). The perils of presidentialism. *Journal of Democracy*, *1*(1), 51-69

Lijphart, A. (2023). The perils of presidentialism: Juan Linz's analysis and further reflections". *Revista Chilena de Derecho y Ciencia Politica, 14*(1), 1-8. https://doi.org/10.7770/rchdcp-v14n1-art325

Llanos, M., & Pérez-Liñán, A. (2021). Oversight or representation? Public opinion and impeachment resolutions in Argentina and Brazil. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, *46* (2), 357-389. https://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12281

Mainwaring, S. (1993). Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy: The Difficult Combination. *Comparative Political Studies*, *26*(2), 198-228. https://doi.org/10.1177/001041409302600

Mainwaring, S., & Shugart, M. S. (1997). Juan Linz, presidentialism, and democracy: A critical appraisal. *Comparative Politics*, *29*(4), 449-471

Martin, L. W., & Vanberg, G. (2020). Coalition government, legislative institutions, and public policy in parliamentary democracies. *American Journal of Political Science*, *64*(2), 325-340. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12453

Mietzner, M. (2017). Jokowi's Presidency between elite consolidation and extra-parliamentary opposition. *Asian Survey*, *57*(1), 165–172. https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2017.57.1.165

Mietzner, M. (2023). *The coalitions presidents make: Presidential power and its limits in democratic Indonesia*. Cornell University Press

Mietzner, M., & Honna, J. (2023). Elite opposition and popular rejection: the failure of presidential term limit evasion in Widodo's Indonesia. *South East Asia Research*, *31*(2), 115–131. https://doi.org/10.1080/0967828X.2023.2236542

Müller, W. C., Bäck, H., & Hellström, J. (2023). Coalition dynamics: advances in the study of the coalition life cycle. *West European Politics, 47*(1), 1–30. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2023.2249316

Pereira, C., Bertholini, F., & Melo, M. (2023). 'Congruent We Govern': Cost of governance in multiparty presidentialism. *Government and Opposition*, 58(4), 843–861. https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2022.15

Power, T., & Warburton, E (Eds.). (2020). *Democracy in Indonesia: From stagnation to regression*? ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute

Raile, E. D., Pereira, C., & Power, T. J. (2011). The executive toolbox: Building legislative support in a multiparty presidential regime. *Political Research Quarterly, 64*(2), 323–334

Santos, P. G. F. (2023). The competence of the national congress in Brazil to decide on policy domains marked by a high degree of technical complexity. *Journal of Economics and Political Economy*, *10* (2), 40-53.

Tambunan, D. (2023). The intervention of oligarchy in the Indonesian legislative process. *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics*, *8*(2), 637-653. https://doi.org/10.1177/20578911231159395

Taylor, M. M. (2020). Coalitions, corruption, and crisis: The end of Brazil's third republic? *Latin American Research Review, 55*(3), 595–604. https://doi.org/10.25222/larr.1264

Teehankee, J. C. (2023). *Beyond nostalgia: The marcos political comeback in the Philippines*. Saw Swee Hock Southeast Asia Centre.

Thompson, M. R. (2022). The Philippines: Imperiled and imperious presidents (but not perilous presidentialism). In M. Bunte & M. R. Thompson. *Presidentialism and Democracy in East and Southeast Asia*. Routledge.

Ufen, A. (2022). Weak party systems and idiosyncratic policies in Southeast Asia. Georgetown *Journal of Asian Affairs*, *8*, 31-36

Ufen, A. (2023). Indonesia: Tales of presidentialization. In M. Bunte & M. R. Thompson. *Presidentialism and Democracy in East and Southeast Asia*. Routledge

Umanailo, M. C. B. (2020). Reduce the multi party for the stability of national development.

Wasisto, A. (2021). Patterns of cabinet formation in Indonesia: The case of Yudhoyono and Widodo's cabinets. *Kajian*, *26*(1), 21-34

Yusingco, M. H. Ll., Mendoza, R. U., Mendoza, G. A. S., & Yap, J. (2022). A Philippine Strongman's Legislative and Constitutional Reforms Legacy. *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, *42*(1), 63-89. https://doi.org/10.1177/18681034221122265

JOURNAL OF ASEAN STUDIES

WWW.IR.BINUS.AC.ID/JAS

ISSN 2338-1361 (print) / 2338-1353 (online)

Volume 12 Number 2 December 2024

JAS JOURNAL OF ASEAN STUDIES Volume 12 Number 2 December 2024