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Aim and Scope

The Journal of ASEAN Studies (JAS) is an International peer-reviewed bi-annual journal that enriches understanding of the past, current, and future issues relevant to ASEAN and its circle of issues. The article shall address any research on theoretical and empirical questions about ASEAN. The Topics addressed within the journal include: diplomacy, political economy, trade, national development, security, geopolitics, social change, transnational movement, environment, law, business and industry, and other various related sub-fields.

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- **Scholarly articles**: The manuscripts should be approximately 5,000-8,000 words. The manuscripts must contain a review of the current state of knowledge on the research question(s) of interest, then share new information or new ideas that will impact the state of theory and/or practice in area of ASEAN Studies.

- **Review Article**: The manuscripts should be approximately 1,500-3,500. The manuscripts must contain the current state of understanding on a particular topic about ASEAN by analysing and discussing research previously published by others

- **Practice notes**: These are shorter manuscripts approximately 1,500-3,500 words that are of specific interest to practitioners. These manuscripts must present new development for the ASEAN.

- **Research notes**: Similar to practice notes, these are shorter manuscripts approximately 1,500-3,500 words that have specific implications for ASEAN. The manuscripts should employ rigorous methodology either qualitative or quantitative.

- **Book Review**: The manuscripts should be approximately 1,500-4,000. The manuscripts must contain a critical evaluation of book by making argument and commentary on the particular book discussed.

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Centre for Business and Diplomatic Studies (CBDS) is established as part of the International Relations Department, Bina Nusantara (BINUS) University. Our aims are to undertake and promote research and deliberation on diplomacy, business, international relations and developmental issues particularly in Indonesia, Southeast Asia and Asia Pacific.

We also commit to build, connect and share research and others kinds of knowledge generating activities for the betterment of life of the people and earth. Our immediate constituency is International Relations Department, BINUS University and the larger constituency is the broader academic community of the BINUS University and other universities and institutions both national and international as well as policy community.

CBDS publishes scholarly journal, working papers, commentaries and provides training and consultancies services in the areas of diplomatic training, negotiations, commercial diplomacy, conflict resolutions for business, business and government relations, promoting competitive local government in attracting foreign investment, and understanding impact of regional economic integration on development specifically toward ASEAN Community 2015.

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Greeting from the Journal of ASEAN Studies! We are pleased to present you our latest edition which represents our continuous hard work to improve the journal to meet and maintain the international standard for academic publication. We are proud that we are consistent on choosing the unique, important, and interesting aspects of the region theoretically and practically that we believe will broaden your understanding and contribute to the accumulation of knowledge on the region. We, at the same time, are delighted that in this edition, we have wider coverage both in terms of disciplinary, scope of issues, and level of analysis. We have articles both from IR and non IR disciplines, we have conventional and non-conventional issues, and we have articles from inter-regionalism to domestic affairs from individual member states. This, however, represents the richness of the current dynamics and complex entanglement in the region which deserved a highlight.

Our first article is written by Pawel Mariusz Pasierbiak entitled “Causes, Origins, and Possible Effects of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC)”. This article was chosen as our first article as it represents the conventional issues on ASEAN Regionalism, that is the problem of economic integration. Written by European scholar, this article represents outsider’s perspective on ASEAN integration. It is also interesting as it is critical towards the existing measurement used by regional actors to see the progress of ASEAN integration – issue that was rarely, if never, raised in the existing literature. The author, instead, uses the European experience to set the parameter for a common market. Of course, judging ASEAN using European standard has been widely criticized, but the author has been clear in stating that it is only in the context of common market and under condition that if ASEAN aims to go to that direction.

Apart from this debatable juncture of its economic integration, ASEAN integration is clearly distinct from that of Europe as it is driven quite influentially by bottom up or regionalization process. We are glad that we have Oliver Gill’s article in this edition as his article entitled “The Higher Education Dimension in East Asian Regionalism: A Two-tier Analysis of International Co-authorship Patterns in the ASEAN Plus Three” highlights the bottom up process of regional integration, and it focuses on education field which few have paid attention. Regionalization of education, as many have noticed, has played important role in forging mobility and exchanges among states with less intra-regional, compared to extra regional trade, which is important for regional integration. It is even more important in the context of Southeast Asia which have many challenges for regional integration. As discussed by Yanyan Mochamad Yani & Verdinand Robertua in their article entitled “Environmental Studies of English School: Case Study of Forest Fires in Indonesia and Transboundary Haze in Southeast Asia,” non-conventional issues such as transboundary haze pollution has been a continuous challenge for the region as it often provokes tension between neighboring states.

This has not mentioned the dynamics within state from each regional member. Ratu Ayu Asih Kusuma Putri, in her article “Political Leadership in South Korea’s Developmental State: A Historical Revisit” uses the case of South Korea to reflect indirectly the problem of
developmental state which apparently many Southeast Asian states, including Indonesia also adopts in certain period of its history. Christopher Ryan Baquero Maboloc with his article entitled “The Radical Politics of Nation-States: The Case of President Rodrigo Duterte,” on the other hand, highlights the problem of radical politics under President Duterte in the Philippines. While his article specifically discusses the case of the Philippines, but radical politics as apparent in the rise of strong leader or also nationalistic and populist leader, is not unique to the country. In fact, it is a concerning phenomenon across the globe even though occur in different level and style. Lastly, the article written by Alberta Natasia Adji, Diah Ariani Arimbi, Adi Setijowati, Nur Wulan, Kukuh Yudha Karnanta on “Confessing Love to the Nation: Audrey Yu Jia Hui’s Works and Identity Reconstruction” discussed the unsettled classical problem of majority-minority relations using the case of the Indonesia. The interesting point of their article is their approach to this ethnicity problem through reading on the literature work from the minority circle, an approach which is also rarely used in the existing literature.

Finally, given all the richness of the present articles in this volume, the editors believe it is part of our efforts toward a more inclusive International Relations. We would like to express highest appreciation for the authors for their valuable contribution to the journal. Last but not least, we also would like to thank the Indonesian Association for International Relations (AIHIII) for the continuous support for the journal and for our institution.

Jakarta, 31 August 2018

Prof. Dr. Tirta N. Mursitama, Ph.D.
Editor-in-chief
Causes, Origins and Possible Effects of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC)

Pawel Pasierbiak

Abstract

In 2007, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at its 13th summit decided to create the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). In assumptions, the common market was to be established by the end of 2015, and the introduction of free movement of goods, services, capital and skilled labor was to lead to an increase in the degree of market integration among member states. But the creation of a single market is not an easy process, as illustrated by the case of the European Community/European Union, where a process of single market creation has been implemented slowly and with numerous difficulties. On the other hand, if the process of a common market creation is successful, the integration brings benefits to the participating countries. The primary goal of this article is to indicate potential effects as well as to show the progress of the implementation and functioning of the common market in the ASEAN Economic Community. To achieve the objective, the author will analyze the theoretical implications of a common market and the real implications, taking the European Union as an example. Having done this part of the analysis, the author will try to indicate and evaluate the possible effects of the process of the common market creation in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

Key words: ASEAN Economic Community, regional economic integration, the European Union, Southeast Asia

Introduction

Regional economic integration is one of the most important processes in the contemporary global economy. Together with globalization, it is a significant tendency at the current stage of international economic relations development. The processes of regional economic integration take place in
virtually all geographic areas, while their scope, scale, and intensity vary due to the chosen model of integration.

In Asia, the regional economic integration is taking place, even though it has different characteristics from those in Europe. While in Europe, these processes are rather institutional and instrumental, in Asia, they are mainly bottom-up market processes, developing between individual traders. Although regional integration in Asia is principally motivated by economic factors, there are also some institutional initiatives. If one were to take into account intraregional initiatives only in Asia, the ASEAN should be put in the center. ASEAN is the most advanced East Asian regional grouping, seeking to pursue higher levels of economic integration.

One such initiative is the construction of an internal market, which would be a higher form of market integration. In 2007, ASEAN member states formally decided to roll out the establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) by the end of 2015. Free movement of goods, services, capital and skilled labor, would constitute a significant step towards improving the economic competitiveness of the group.

The primary goal of this article is to indicate potential effects as well as to show the progress of the implementation and functioning of the common market in the AEC. To achieve the objective, the author will analyze the theoretical implications of a common market and the real implications by taking the European Union as an example. Having done this part of the analysis, the author will try to indicate and evaluate the possible effects of the process of the common market creation in ASEAN.

To achieve the goal, the author predominantly used a critical review of the literature and the descriptive method. Furthermore, to a limited extent, statistical data analysis was used.

Regional economic integration in theory

The concept of regional economic integration has many definitions. The first of them were presented in the 1950s, but today the term continues to be newly defined vigorously. The very meaning of the term 'economic integration' infers a spectrum of definition and depends on the individual approach of the author. It is all about the presentation of the essence of integration, what elements are considered the most relevant, and whether the
definitions present all or only selected elements (Mucha-Leszko, 2012, pp. 16). These elements are: reasons, purpose, scope of integration, mechanisms of the functioning, model, the creation of common institutions and the creation of new international order. Thus, one can expect the definition of regional integration to vary from narrow to wide.

In the 1950s a definition was presented by J. Tinbergen (1954, pp. 95) as 'creation of the most desirable structure of the international economy, removing artificial hindrances to the optimal operation and introducing deliberately all desirable elements of coordination or unification.' This definition has been criticized as having too many evaluative terms, sometimes vague and ambiguous. Another definition, now recognized as a classic, was proposed by B. Balassa (1961). According to him, economic integration means the abolition of discrimination within an area. The author suggested that economic integration should be approached in static and dynamic manners. In the static approach, integration can be represented by the absence of various forms of discrimination between national economies. In the latter, integration encompasses measures designed to abolish discrimination between economic units belonging to different national states. B. Balassa claimed that regional economic integration is carried out in stages, taking several successive and increasingly sophisticated forms (free-trade area through customs union, common market, economic union up to complete economic integration). In the 1960s, the wide definition of international economic integration was presented by Z. Kamecki (1967, pp. 93–94) as the ‘formation, based on the developed single economic structure, of an economic organism comprising a group of countries, the organism which – due to the high degree of internal economic links and resulting from this internal economic cohesion – can be distinguished in a visible manner from the whole world economy.’

As mentioned, definitions of regional economic integration are also formulated today such as presented by P. Robson (1998, pp. 1), for whom international economic integration should be defined as the institutional combination of separate national economies into larger economic blocs or communities. This definition includes only one aspect of regional economic integration called
regionalism. Regionalism means a planned, top-down process of integrating various economies in the same geographical area, due to the signing of trade agreements and/or economic cooperation. The second aspect of regional economic integration is called regionalization, which is formed by the intensification of economic interdependence on a regional scale, but resulting from bottom-up (market) development of trade, capital, financial or production ties (Misala, 2005, pp. 434–435). In this case, we are dealing with the real component of integration (de facto integration). This distinction between de jure and de facto integration is essential from the point of view of the processes taking place in Asia as opposed to those in Europe. While in Asia economically driven integration dominates, in the case of Europe the process is more politically driven.

Theoretical analysis of regional economic integration would not be complete without a presentation of the benefits resulting from an accession to the grouping. In theory, authors try to identify the benefits and the costs of accession in various forms of integration. It should be noted, however, that joining the regional grouping realizes not only economic but also political and social objectives. Therefore, it is quite hard to find a quantitative measure of the ultimate combined effect of joining the grouping (Mucha-Leszko, 2012, pp. 17). In the short-term, benefits arise mainly from the increase in trade, but in the long run, they rely on the growth of production, factors of production productivity, GDP and GDP per capita growth.

J. Bhagwati and A. Panagariya (1996, pp. 82) believe that the theories of international integration passed through two phases of their development, each reflecting the current priorities of the different policy concerns. The first group of theories, so-called traditional ones, explains the possible benefits of integration and presents a static approach. On the other hand, the second group, taking into account the changing trade and economic environment, presents a dynamic approach to an analysis of economic integration.

The standard (traditional) economics of preferential trade agreements is founded on the work of Jacob Viner who introduced two basic effects arising from the establishment of a
free trade area or customs union: trade creation effect and trade diversion effect (Hosny, 2013, pp. 134). According to J. Viner countries will be willing to take regional integration in the form of a customs union when this action creates more static benefits than losses. In other words, the trade creation effect outweighs the effect of trade diversion.

The second group of theoretical concepts explaining the benefits of regional integration takes into account the dynamic effects of the process. These effects include economies-of-scale, technological change, the impact on market structure and competition, productivity growth, risk and uncertainty, and investment activity (Hosny, 2013, pp. 139). Since small markets increase costs, reduce the intensity of productive specialization, limit competition and weaken the tendency to technological progress, countries will likely seek to remove these disadvantages through the integration processes.

The selected theoretical concepts of regional integration presented above can be applied to real existing integration groupings, indicating effects of the cooperation between member states. This issue will be partly a subject of further analysis of this study.

Benefits of common market – a case of the European Union

The European Economic Community/European Union has gradually implemented the stages of market and monetary integration. Achieving the common market proceeded in stages, and the process has not always been smooth. The first stage was a formation of a customs union on 1 July 1968 (Watts, 2008, pp. 22) concerning trade in goods; however, agricultural products were still protected. Other freedoms (movement of services and factors of production), except for foreign direct investment, were not immediately provided. B. Eichengreen and T. Bayoumi estimated the effects of integration in the economic area. They found that the internal turnover within the EEC-6 as a result of the customs union creation increased faster by three percentage points on average (Mucha-Leszko, 2012, pp. 32). At the same time, the trade increase stimulated GDP growth by 3.1 percentage points per year. At the same time in the 1960s, the share of intra-trade within the group increased from 35% to 49%, which
is a clear manifestation of the growing integration of the EEC.

In the 1970s and 1980s, the integration of markets of member states faced severe difficulties. Even regressive tendencies were observed. The economic slowdown, rising unemployment and weakening international competitiveness, particularly in high technologies, as well as existing barriers to internal trade limited opportunities to benefit from integration. In order to overcome the above difficulties, the decision to create a genuine single market by the end of 1992 was made (Eichengreen, 2008, pp. 337). In 1985, the White Paper on Completing the Internal Market was published, which spelled out a program and a timetable for unifying European markets. The White Paper proposed an abolishing by the member states all remaining barriers to the free circulation of goods, services, persons and capital (European Commission, 1996, pp. 1). Elimination of internal barriers as a consequence of the Single European Market (SEM) was to lead to better resource allocation by improving comparative advantage and specialization. Also, it was expected to increase efficiency in many sectors, as the effect of the rationalization of the production resulting from greater use of economies of scale. In 1996 the European Commission presented a report on the overall effectiveness of measures taken so that the Single European Market could be created. The Commission (1996, pp. 1–11) analyzed the period of 1985-1995 and presented its assessment of the effects of the Single European Market:

1. The share of intraregional imports of industrial products increased by 6.7 p.p., from 61.2% (1985) up to 67.9% (1995). The share of intra-EU imports of services increased from 46.9 to 50%.

2. The impact of the SEM on foreign direct investment was higher than on trade – in the early 1990s, the EU was a destination for 44.4% of the global FDI inflow, while in the period 1982-1987 the share was 28.2%. Moreover, in the period from 1984 to 1992 intra-EU investments grew four times faster than intra-trade.

3. The share of intra-industry trade in the total exchange was increasing. In the years 1985-1992, it rose from 35 to 42% for products of different price and quality.

4. As a result of the SEM, there has been an increase in the GDP, which, depending on the model used, ranged
from 1.1 to 1.5 percentage points. The main reasons for this increase were the increase in competition/efficiency and the rise in the total factor productivity (TFP), each accounting for around half of the overall effect.

5. Increased efficiency and competition resulting from the implementation of the SEM were made possible primarily due to the significant restructuring of European industries. In the period of 1985-1993, the reduction of costs associated with the size of the company resulted mainly from achieving greater economies of scale.

6. Implementation of the SMP has had a significant positive effect on the degree of competition in manufacturing sectors. The data on the reduction of the margin between costs and prices confirm this phenomenon.

7. Changes in the structure and degree of competition in the market, resulting from the implementation of the SMP resulted in increasing price convergence in the EU between 1985 and 1995.

8. Estimates of the impact of the SMP on employment showed a positive relationship. Depending on the model, the introduction of SMP resulted in an increase of employment by 300,000 up to 900,000.

9. The introduction of the Single European Market Project has brought real convergence among some member countries. The statistical analysis confirms that Ireland, Portugal, and Spain showed higher average economic growth rates after 1987, which proves the effect resulting from the implementation of SEM.

The analysis of the various areas of benefits creation was carried out mainly for the European Union, but it could be used as well to analyze other integration groupings organized on the principle of the common market. The liberalization of economic flows deals with the free movement of goods, services, and factors of production. An openness of markets and increased competition, as well as an increase in the size of the market, internal trade and improving the allocation efficiency of labor and capital, are the tangible benefits of the common market. As a result, gains from liberalization of the movement of goods, services, capital, and labor make up for the effects of the accumulation of the common market, namely GDP and income growth, increased economic and competitive
strength of the region. There are also several mechanisms by which the common market also helps to improve the economic strength and competitiveness of the whole group in the world economy. It is because of more intense competition, which leads to higher efficiency and greater attractiveness of the internal market for foreign investors.

The benefits mentioned above can be achievable by the ASEAN Economic Community. At the same time, it must be emphasized that AEC is not a typical common market according to B. Balassa’s classification. Although it includes its essential elements, such as the freedom of movement of goods, services, capital, and people, this freedom is not full. AEC implements the ‘common market minus’ integration, which means that areas or sectors that are excluded from liberalization are still covered by joint actions (Soesastro, 2005, pp. 29). Additionally, the case of AEC is so interesting that it remains an attempt to move from the free trade area to the common market, bypassing the phase of the customs union.

**Reasons behind the AEC creation**

Economic cooperation between ASEAN member states intensified in the early 1990s, with the entry into force of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA). Other initiatives undertaken (including those on investment, or services) contributed to an increase of the integration level, but member states have concluded that the creation of a qualitatively new initiative will bring additional benefits. In addition to the benefits, there were also some risks, which could have been avoided by the AEC creation. Several primary reasons for the formation of the AEC can be identified.

First is a need to remain competitive in an increasingly growing global competition (Austria, 2012, pp. 142). The growing importance of China and India, increased the interest of the member states to achieve benefits from a larger and more integrated internal market (Sakane, 2018, pp. 12). The broader and more cohesive market, the higher are the possibilities of achieving economies of scale in operations, which increases the attractiveness of the ASEAN internal market (ADB, 2008, pp. 86). Reduction of transaction costs, the progressive unification of the rules of origin requirements, improving infrastructure
and logistics under conditions of global and regional value chains mean that the integrated market is easier to operate.

Second, the global trend towards regionalism has reinforced the need for more intensive economic integration. ASEAN had to start seeking investors and compete for their export markets much more actively.

Third, ASEAN must continue to maintain its credibility as the integration hub for FTA activities in East Asia (Austria, 2012, pp. 144).

Fourth, the implementation of increasingly sophisticated market integration would prevent excessive individual approaches to agreements by member states. This is a serious issue that has been called "noodle bowl syndrome." The creation of the AEC seeks to prevent further complications.

Fifth, the factors related to the external environment exert more pressure on ASEAN nowadays. Because the Asian crisis of 1997-1998, the Asian countries have realized the need to develop a common mechanism for achieving and maintaining economic stability and prevent future financial crises (Yean & Das, 2015, pp. 191). In addition, the crisis made countries realize that cooperation in both the real and financial spheres should grow together, and one of the conditions for achieving positive effects will be to ensure the free movement of skilled labor (Plummer, 2006, pp. 7).

Sixth, the competitive threat of China has become more significant. The accession of this country to the World Trade Organization resulted in the increase of its attractiveness as a place of investment and production location. ASEAN decided to strengthen internal cooperation to improve economies of scale resulting from the functioning of the domestic market and thus improve their position towards China.

The above-described factors made the ASEAN leaders consider the future of ASEAN. The experience of AFTA, the ASEAN Framework on Services and the ASEAN Investment Area, were positive and promising. However, they may not be enough to maintain a competitive advantage, and most of all, empowerment of the grouping in East Asia. Therefore, in 2003 it was decided to deepen integration through the ASEAN Economic Community creation. The AEC was to be
the area with freedom of movement of goods, services, capital and skilled labor.

**Scheme 1. The ASEAN Economic Community Milestones**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Birth of ASEAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) entry into force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>ASEAN Vision 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) signed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Bali Concord II (ASEAN Community)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Nov 2007, AEC Blueprint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA) entry into force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA) entry into force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>End 2015, Formal establishment of the AEC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>AEC Blueprint 2025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016-2025</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** (ASEAN, 2015a)

**Road to the ASEAN Economic Community**

The concept of the ASEAN Economic Community refers to the 1997 ASEAN Vision 2020, a document adopted in December 1997 at the summit in Kuala Lumpur. It marked the integrating countries and their long-term direction of actions. By 2020, ASEAN was to become the community based on three pillars: 1) ASEAN Security Community, 2) ASEAN Economic Community and 3) ASEAN Socio-cultural Community (Yean & Das, 2015, pp. 193). In October 2003 at the ASEAN Summit in Bali, it was decided to introduce AEC 2020 (Bali Concord II) (ASEAN, 2008, pp. 5). The primary objective of the AEC was ‘to create a stable, prosperous and highly competitive ASEAN economic region in which there is a free flow of goods, services, investment and a freer flow of capital, equitable economic development and reduced poverty and socio-economic disparities in the year 2020’ (Yean & Das, 2015, p. 193). In January 2007 at the summit in Cebu, the assumed date of entry into force of the community was
shortened by five years – the AEC was to be finalized by the end of 2015.

In November of 2007, an important decision was adopted regarding the introduction of a specific action plan with strategic steps in its implementation - the 2007 AEC Blueprint. The Blueprint is organized according to the AEC’s four objectives: 1) Single Market and Production Base; 2) Competitive Economic Region; 3) Equitable Economic Development; and 4) Integration Into Global Economy. Clearly defined objectives and a timetable for implementation were introduced. In 2015 the formal establishment of the AEC was officially announced, but not all of its goals have been achieved. As a result, a new plan, which outlines the vision for AEC in the next decade (the AEC Blueprint 2015), was prepared (ASEAN, 2015c). The AEC Blueprint 2025 is based and develops the AEC Blueprint 2015 and consists of five areas: 1) A Highly Integrated and Cohesive Economy; 2) A Competitive, Innovative, and Dynamic ASEAN; 3) Enhanced Connectivity and Sectoral Cooperation; 4) A Resilient, Inclusive, People-Oriented, and People-Centered ASEAN; and 5) A Global ASEAN.

Assumptions and progress in realizing of ASEAN Economic Community

As already mentioned, the decision about the realization of the ASEAN Economic Community was taken during the 9th ASEAN Summit held in Bali in 2003, but the concrete actions started in 2007 when the AEC Blueprint was introduced. The AEC’s pillars and core elements are presented in table 1.

What is unique is the fact that the AEC Blueprint 2015 set out measures and schedules for their implementation, that is, during four two-year periods: 2008-2009, 2010-2011, 2012-2013 and 2014-2015. The primary instrument of measuring the progress on the AEC implementation – The AEC Scorecard mechanism - was established in 2008. This is a self-assessment tool that monitors the achievement of milestones that were indicated in the Economic Blueprint’s Strategic Schedule (Menon & Melendez, 2015, pp. 1). In the first two periods of implementation of the community, the AEC Scorecards were published. In subsequent phases of implementation they were not.
Information about implementation appears in different places and in an unorganized way. For example, after the 26th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur held in April 2015, the chairman stated that the rate of implementation of the AEC Scorecard stands at 90.5% (458 out of 506 measures) (ASEAN, 2015b, pp. 43). But the progress on the implementation rates for each pillar was missing. The same situation was observed in the ASEAN Annual Report 2013-2014 when it stated that by end-2013 81.7% of the 229 AEC prioritized key deliverables targeted by 2013 have been implemented (ASEAN, 2014, pp. 35).

In the report on progress in the implementation of the AEC (ASEAN, 2015a), the ASEAN Secretariat explained the changes that have occurred in the
methodology of reporting progress towards the creation of the AEC. In 2012, at the 20th ASEAN summit adopted The Phnom Penh Agenda for ASEAN Community Building called for prioritizing high-impact activities and concrete, key measures to address the challenges and obstacles for realizing the AEC by 2015. As a result, two lists of prioritized key deliverables (PKDs) were created – one for implementation by 2013 and another for implementation by 2015. From mid-2013 through 2014 reports on the implementation of the AEC Scorecard focused on these PKDs. The Secretariat stated that the implementation of all, not only the priority instruments, was monitored continuously and presented to ASEAN sectoral bodies. It seems that the lack of information about the planned change has contributed to the lack of consistency of the analysis and the limited possibility of a comprehensive assessment. Below are the results of the AEC based on the information available. Table 2 presents detailed information on the implementation of the planned instruments in the first two phases (2008-09 and 2010-11).

The overall ratio for the two implementation periods listed in Table 2 reached 67.5%. Achievements in key areas have contributed to the overall ratio: ‘Single market and production base’ 65.9%, ‘Competitive economic region’ 67.9%, ‘Equitable economic development’ 66.7% and ‘Integration into the global economy’ 85.7%. The largest number of fully implemented instruments concerned the area of ‘Single market and production base’ (114 instruments in phase I and II). This area was however given only a 65.9% rate of implementation, because 59 instruments were not implemented, mainly in the area of services. In turn, the highest rate of implementation was observed in the area of ‘Integration into the global economy.’ In this case, 12 instruments were implemented, while the number of not implemented instruments was 2. The relatively high number of implemented instruments occurred in the area of ‘Competitive Economic Region’ (53), but the same was true for instruments not implemented (25). This provided the implementation rate of 67.9%.

What is rather worrying from the point of view of an implementation of the ASEAN Economic Community is that the implementation of measures was losing momentum. This can be seen in Table 2
when examining the indicators during different phases and areas.

Table 2. The AEC Scorecard for Phase I and Phase II (2008-2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specification</th>
<th>Phase I (2008-09)</th>
<th>Phase II (2010-11)</th>
<th>Total Measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fully implemented</td>
<td>Not-fully implemented</td>
<td>Fully implemented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single market and production base</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free flow of goods</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free flow of services</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free flow of investment</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freer flow of capital</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free flow of skilled labor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority integration sectors</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food, agriculture, and forestry</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total number of measures</strong></td>
<td><strong>61</strong></td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
<td><strong>53</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Implementation rate</strong></td>
<td><strong>93.8%</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.2%</strong></td>
<td><strong>49.1%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive economic region</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition policy</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer protection</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intellectual property rights</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mineral</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-commerce</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total number of measures</strong></td>
<td><strong>22</strong></td>
<td><strong>10</strong></td>
<td><strong>31</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Implementation rate</strong></td>
<td><strong>68.7%</strong></td>
<td><strong>31.3%</strong></td>
<td><strong>67.4%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equitable economic development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SME development</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAI</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total number of measures</strong></td>
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
<td><strong>0</strong></td>
<td><strong>5</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Implementation rate</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>0%</strong></td>
<td><strong>55.5%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration into global economy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External economic relations</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total number of measures</strong></td>
<td><strong>5</strong></td>
<td><strong>0</strong></td>
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Implementation rate</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>0%</strong></td>
<td><strong>78%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IAI – Initiative for ASEAN Integration

Source: Own preparations based on (ASEAN, 2012).

In ‘Single market and production base’ the indicator has declined from 93.8% (2008-09) to 49.1% (2010-11) in ‘Competitive economic region’ from 68.7 to 67.4%, in
‘Equitable economic development’ from 100 to 55.5%, and in the area of ‘Integration into the global economy’ from 100 to 78%. It seems that this situation resulted from the exhaustion of the ability to easily achieve the objectives. Initially, the easiest measures and indicators were implemented. Later, along with the more difficult changes, implementation indicators deteriorated. This was not an optimistic situation from the point of view of the subsequent stages of integration. Perhaps, the deterioration of the indicators has changed along with the way of presenting integration achievements.

A further complication was the expansion of the list of measures included in the AEC Scorecard. Initially, 316 such measures were identified, however, with the passage of time and updates to the agenda, their number increased to 611 (as of October 2016). The presentation of achievements took an aggregated form for the entire period and selected priority areas. One such presentation is shown in Figure 1, depicting the AEC Scorecard Key Deliverables for the period January 2008-March 2013. According to data from Figure 1, the overall level of implementation of the planned measures was 76.5%. For 229 Prioritized Key Deliverables (PKDs), the largest number has been implemented in Pillar 1, then under Pillars 2 and 4, and the least in Pillar 3. In turn, the highest level of implementation occurred in the area of ‘Equitable economic development,’ reaching 77.8%, and then ‘Single market and production base’ (77.2%). Unfortunately, as data is aggregated, one cannot discern the reasons for this level of implementation of measures in different areas.

Similarly, aggregated data were made public in 2015, while they relate to the period from January 2008 to the end of October 2015 and another group of measures. In the last year before the formal establishment of the AEC, an overview of not implemented Prioritized Key Deliverables was prepared. Based on the evaluation of their implementation possibilities by the end of 2015 and on their importance for the trade development, 54 measures were selected (high-priority measures – HPMs). Together with the measures implemented since 2008, HPMs form a group of 506 measures to monitor the implementation of the AEC (ASEAN, 2015a, pp. 9). Figure 2 shows fully implemented
ASEAN-wide and high-priority measures by the AEC Pillar for the period January 2008 – October 2015.

Figure 1. ASEAN Economic Community Scorecard Key Deliverables, January 2008-March 2013

![Graph showing implementation rates of different fields]

Source: (Menon & Melendez, 2015, p. 2).

According to data presented in Figure 2, the change in the number of measures under consideration has increased the overall rate of implementation in priority areas up to 92.7%. In the ‘Single market and production base’ 256 measures were implemented (92.4%), while the number of not fully implemented was 21 (7.6%). On the other hand, in ‘Competitive Economic Region’s 154 measures were implemented (90.5%) and 16 not implemented (9.5%). The other two fields were claimed to be fully implemented (ratio implementation was 100% in both cases).

An assessment of the degree of implementation of the AEC solely on the AEC Scorecard is subject to the risk of error (Menon & Melendez, 2015, pp. 2–3). First, there is no certainty whether the AEC Blueprint covers all needed measures so that the establishment of the common market could be possible. Second, as the

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1 When all the instruments declared earlier (611 in total) are considered, the implementation rate decreases to 79.5%, or 486 measures (ASEAN, 2015a, p. 10).
AEC Scorecard is a compliance tool that relies on self-assessment, there could be a willingness to give overestimated compliance and achievement (Jones, 2016, pp. 648). Third, the AEC Scorecard measures the aggregate process, and it does not take into account differences within individual countries. Fourth, the scorecard fails to capture differences in speeds of liberalization among member states fully. Fifth, the AEC does not analyze and explain results. Sixth, there is no efficient mechanism for exerting peer pressure on member states when the AEC targets are missed.

Taking into account the above, it is worth taking a closer look at the most crucial achievement of the ASEAN member countries in their quest to establish the ASEAN Economic Community. The most critical areas developed in the AEC Blueprint 2015 will be explored. The primary sources of information are documents such as: (ASEAN, 2015d), (ASEAN, 2015b), (ASEAN, 2014), (Menon & Melendez, 2015), (Chia, 2013).

Figure 2. Fully Implemented ASEAN-wide and high-priority measures by the AEC Pillar, 2008-2015, in %, as at 31 October 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Fully implemented</th>
<th>Not implemented</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single Market and Production Base</td>
<td>92,4%</td>
<td>7,6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive Economic Region</td>
<td>90,5%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equitable Economic Development</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration into the Global Economy</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>92,7%</td>
<td>7,3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (ASEAN, 2015a, pp. 9).
**Pillar 1. Single Market and Production Base**

Pillar 1 is the most critical element of the AEC. It includes items such as: free flow of goods, free flow of services, free flow of investments, free flow of capital and free flow of skilled labor. The most significant achievement in the area of free flow of goods is a reduction of tariffs among members. In 2014, the average ATIGA rate for all ASEAN member states stood at the level of 0,54%, while MFN average at the level of 6,9%. For ASEAN-6 tariffs have fallen to virtually zero, while for other countries (Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Viet Nam - CLMV) have been declining up to their planned elimination in 2018 (ASEAN, 2015d). According to Menon and Melendez (2015, p. 5) the progress was possible as achievements in Pillar 1 relate to ‘low hanging fruit.’ More sensitive areas of reforms remain – such as opening up the agriculture sector, steel, and motor vehicles. What is characteristic and not necessarily good for the assessment of the ASEAN free flow of goods, is the fact that utilization of the common effective preferential tariffs has been relatively low. There are some reasons behind this: difficulties complying with rules of origin (because of the high level of product fragmentation in the region, high import content of major export products, administrative costs of proving origin); lack of progress in reducing non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to intra-ASEAN trade.

Services market integration in the ASEAN is conducted under the 1995 ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS). Nine packages of commitments under AFAS have been concluded. Even though AFAS commitments have improved over time, liberalization in services was hampered by flexibilities introduced in the ‘ASEAN-X’ formula. This formula allows member states to liberalize according to each country’s readiness – this is one of the barriers in progress of liberalization process.

‘Free flow of Investment and Capital’ is one of the most important goals of the AEC. In the AFTA one of the key objectives was to remove barriers to trade to attract foreign direct investment in regional production networks. In 1998 the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) was established. While it was to facilitate FDI inflows, the scope of the AIA placed too much emphasis on intra-regional FDI. It
granted national treatment to ASEAN investors by 2010 and to non-ASEAN investors by 2020 (Chia, 2013, pp. 20). The full realization of the AIA was advanced to 2010 for ASEAN-6 and 2015 for CLMV. In 2012 the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement came into effect and superseded the earlier agreement (Yean & Das, 2015, pp. 195). The initiative is seen as a way toward enabling the most important investors (external as the EU, the US, China etc.) to be treated equally to national enterprises. The ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement offers investment liberalization, investment facilitation, investment protection and investment promotion.

The AEC Blueprint stated that strategic actions for a free flow of skilled labor are: facilitating the issuance of visas and employment passes, MRAs for major professional services, core concordance of services skills and qualifications. Mutual Recognition Arrangements are one of the most important instruments for skilled labor mobility in ASEAN. By date the MRAs were concluded for (ASEAN, 2015a, pp. 33): 1) Engineering Services (2005); 2) Nursing Services (2006), Architectural Services (2007); A framework for Surveying Qualifications (2007); Medical Practitioners (2009); Dental Practitioners (2009); A framework for Accounting Services (2009) replaced by MRA on Accountancy Services (2014) and Tourism Professional (2012). Although some actions and initiatives were introduced, the majority of labor flows occurs independently of these arrangements and is market-driven. Quite the opposite of assumptions, the overwhelming share of labor flows within ASEAN is in low- and semi-skilled labor.

**Pillar 2. Competitive Economic Region**

The second pillar of the AEC comprises such areas (among others) as: competition policy, intellectual property rights protection, consumer protection and infrastructure development (see table 1). Activities undertaken in all these areas lead to lowering production and transaction costs, encouraging more efficient allocation of resources and improving consumer welfare. Business climate improvements attract more FDI inflows. Several initiatives for competition policy were introduced in ASEAN such as a formation of the ASEAN Expert’s Group on Competition (2007), ASEAN Regional Guidelines on Competition Policy, Handbook on Competition Policy and
Laws in ASEAN for Business. According to Menon and Melendez (2015, pp. 9), five ASEAN member states have comprehensive competition policies and laws, while the others were working on the introduction of competition policy and law by 2015.

In the field of Intellectual Property Rights, some actions have been undertaken. For instance, the ASEAN Working Group on Intellectual Property Cooperation (established in 1996) was to assess the implementation of the ASEAN IPR Action Plan 2011-2015. Additionally, the Task Force on Trade Mark has been established to complete the Trade Marks related action lines by 2015. It seems that competition policy and intellectual property rights protections are sensitive areas of the ASEAN integration. Although the Blueprint mentions a commitment to integrate the regional economy, competition policy and IPR protection are national in application. Keeping in mind the differentiated level of development of the ASEAN member states, it does not appear that full uniformity in competition and IPR rules is possible soon.

Developments in physical and telecommunication infrastructure took place in ASEAN, but there is a lot to be done. The main problem is to coordinate different national needs with the regional vision and plans. Another issue is a huge need for financing. In ASEAN the wealthiest countries are the smallest, so there is a necessity to use different methods and sources for infrastructure development. Even if there are gains in infrastructure development, this can be challenged in the area of transport liberalization.

Pillar 3. Equitable Economic Development

The Third Pillar of the AEC Blueprint 2015 aims to address issues connected to intra-country development gaps and the development gap between ASEAN-6 and CLMV. Measures foreseen in the Blueprint consist of SME development and Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI). Under the Strategic Action Plan for ASEAN SME Development (2010-2015) a few projects have been realized: the ASEAN Business Incubator Network, the ASEAN SME Guidebook towards the AEC 2015, ASEAN Online SME Academy. The IAI was invented to be a framework for regional co-operation where more
advanced (richer) member states could contribute resources and expertise to the less developed ones.

**Pillar 4. Integration into the Global Economy**

In the fourth pillar of the AEC Blueprint, we can see the most significant progress. Multilateral and unilateral actions taken by ASEAN countries have led to a reduction of trade barriers in goods, services as well as investments. This has made the ASEAN one of the most open regions in the world economy (Menon & Melendez, 2015, pp. 12). On the other hand, since 2000 there is a proliferation of FTAs among ASEAN member states. However, these FTAs deal solely with tariffs and do not address regulatory and other non-tariff barriers such as product standards, services, investments, intellectual property rights, government procurement and movement of business people. ASEAN’s FTAs are not supportive of regional economic integration; they create many problems, usually described as the ‘spaghetti bowl.’ One of the examples is the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) which started to be negotiated in 2012. The ASEAN negotiates with six other countries (Australia, China, Japan, Republic of Korea, India and New Zealand), but the partnership will add to, rather than replace, existing ASEAN+1 FTAs. The RCEP also uses the ‘flexibility’ clause, which allows the inclusion of provisions for special and differential treatment and some provision for lesser developed countries. Differences in the detailed provisions of individual FTAs are another point of concern. For instance, rules of origin provisions can vary significantly from agreement to agreement. This elevates the level of difficulty in harmonizing agreements. This has not mentioned the negotiation of interregional agreements by individual member countries instead of the whole ASEAN such as agreements of Singapore and Viet Nam with the EU (Mazur, 2017).

The above-presented assumptions and achievements of the implementation of the ASEAN Economic Community allow for some assertions. The analysis of the various areas of integration shows that there is still much to be done. If the implementation of the AEC is measured by the implementation of the planned actions and activities, the AEC has not fulfilled its objectives (i.e., the culmination of the process by the end of 2015). Many
authors emphasize, however, that the aim of the establishment of the AEC should be considered as a milestone, not as an end of the process. If economic integration in ASEAN is to develop, this approach seems appropriate.

Possible effects and problematic issues of the process

Potential impact on the growth of wealth as a result of the establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community has been the subject of research, and the results have been presented in several publications. According to a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model presented by Plummer and Chia (2009), an additional increase of wealth as a result of the realization of the AEC would amount to 5.3 percentage points (Chia, 2013, p. 12). All member states would benefit from that, but Singapore would benefit the most (9.7 p. p.), together with Brunei Darussalam (7.0) and Cambodia (6.3). The lowest gains would be attributed to Viet Nam (2.8) and Malaysia (3.0).

Other estimates prepared by the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA) show that the effect of GDP growth as a result of tariff reductions would be small, but the most substantial impact would be from the reduction of barriers in the services sector and time savings associated with the introduction of trade facilitation and infrastructure improvement (Chia, 2013, pp. 12). In 2014, the Asian Development Bank together with the International Labor Organization conducted a study that showed that the full implementation of the AEC Blueprint 2015 would lead to an increase in regional GDP by 7.1% and create 14 million additional jobs by 2025 (ILO-ADB, 2014, pp. 39, 52). In most cases, this would include less economically developed ASEAN countries.

In turn, the McKinsey Global Institute in its report states that the introduction of the AEC could cause a shift of global manufacturing from China toward the ASEAN. As a result, by 2030, annual GDP for the entire grouping could increase from 280 to 615 billion USD, which would represent 5 to 12% of ASEAN’s GDP in 2030 (Woetzel, Tonby, Thompson, Burtt, & Lee, 2014, pp. 4).

The estimates presented above are subject to an error resulting from theoretical assumptions. However, they all show the benefits ASEAN could gain as a result of the AEC. However, those
benefits are not guaranteed. On the contrary, they can be hard to achieve. So far, it is said, that the AEC brought fewer benefits than had been expected. This is because there are some problems ASEAN faces. According to K. Sakane (2018, pp. 12–13), there are several significant obstacles to the AEC development, namely: still existing domestic non-tariff barriers; regulatory frameworks on transport facilitation (even if physical infrastructure developed); low integration of service sector in the region; difficulties with implementation of free flow of skilled labor; little progress of capital market integration. According to K. Sakane, due to these obstacles, the AEC is far behind the EU.

M. G. Plummer (2006) compared the creation of the AEC with the experiences of the European Union. He pointed out certain similarities and differences that can be summarized in a few points. First, the institutional environment in ASEAN is now much different from that of the European Economic Community (EEC) in the 1950s. The political and social motivations for economic integration in Europe were far different from ASEAN’s today. Institutional development in the ASEAN is difficult as: 1) nation-state formation was much later than in the European context; 2) divergence in socio-political institutions is larger than in Europe; 3) European institutions are successful in economic-related matters; 4) European institutions are rather costly and ASEAN’s budget much smaller. Second, the international economic environment is far different nowadays than in the 1950s. The global marketplace is much more open nowadays. This means that the current cost of the diversion effect resulting from the integration is significantly higher than in the past. Third, ASEAN faces much greater internal economic diversification. This results in the fact that the possibility of implementation of the AEC will be more complicated and difficult. Even the possibility of taking into account all the countries in the process will be difficult. This is expressed in the ‘flexibility’ approach, the example of which is the inclusion of ASEAN-X rules in the liberalization of services. Fourth, ASEAN is now much more open than the EEC was in the 1950s.

These different conditions make it impossible to transfer the European experience directly to the Asian theater. Nevertheless, there are some experiences
of European integration, which ASEAN can learn from. Firstly, ASEAN should not solely focus on the internal market and pursue a policy of inward-looking discrimination. This would be particularly disadvantageous, keeping in mind that as many as 75% of the total of ASEAN’s trade is directed outwardly. Secondly, the example of EEC/EU shows that trade and investment are strictly interconnected with the change of the economies’ structures. This is also the case for ASEAN. Thirdly, the European Union has gained from internal trade liberalization. The creation of a customs union and a single market was important because it led to the reduction of transaction costs. This resulted in a more efficient international division of labor in most of EU’s member states. ASEAN should focus on creating not only the internal market but on the creation of global economic relations.

**Prospects of the ASEAN Economic Community**

Most observers of integration processes in ASEAN have realized that the formal establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community in 2015 does not end the integration process. What is more, they treat the AEC as a milestone towards further integration. Also, decision-makers in the ASEAN realize that there is still a lot to do. All this resulted in the adoption of the new plan – the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2025 (ASEAN, 2015c). The document states that the overall vision articulated in the AEC Blueprint 2015 remains relevant. The new Blueprint builds on the AEC Blueprint 2015. The priority is to complete the unfinished Implementation of Measures under the AEC Blueprint 2015 by end-2016. As the Blueprint states, in the next decade, ASEAN will also provide a new emphasis on the development and promotion of micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) in its economic integration efforts (Bobowski, 2017). At the same time, ASEAN will likewise embrace the evolving digital technology as the leverage to enhance trade and investments, provide an e-based business platform, promote good governance and facilitate the use of green technology. For the monitoring and assessment of The AEC Blueprint 2025 implementation, The AEC 2025 Monitoring and Evaluation
(M&E) Framework was introduced (ASEAN, 2018).²

It should be remembered that the creation of formal plans is not sufficient to achieve real economic integration. It is necessary to convince the member states about the benefits that result from the deepening of integration and get their commitment. Sizeable internal diversity, conflict of interest and the Asian style of discussion can be reasons opposing a statement that economic integration within ASEAN will develop systematically. On the other hand, it shows that determining a particular date (2015, 2025) is mobilizing for (some) member states. Without such fixed date progress in the economic integration of ASEAN would be far lower.

Conclusion

At the end of 2015, the creation of the AEC was announced. Although the comparison with the Single European Market was automatically imposed, it is not entirely appropriate. The AEC is not a typical common market with features as pointed out in theory nor it is similar with that in the European Union. In ASEAN, a model called 'common market minus' is implemented. Moreover, in the integration process in ASEAN, it was decided to bypass the customs union as an intermediate form between the free trade area and the common market.

ASEAN realizes that deeper integration is needed, but because conditions are different, it uses other methods of intensifying cooperation.

Firstly, the much higher than in Europe diversity between countries (e.g., economic, political, religious, cultural, linguistic) causes that ASEAN Way is perhaps a reasonable strategy used in negotiations. However, it affects the effects of integration, its dynamics, and scope negatively. ASEAN countries are sensitive to even small attempts to limit their sovereignty, so they do not show a willingness to transfer of national competences (this is why there is no customs union because here it would be necessary to conduct at least a common external tariff). National interests are more important than those of the community, which means that integration is uneven. This is confirmed by data showing the stages of the AEC implementation. After a

² Due to difficulties in data gathering, the evaluation of the implementation of The AEC Blueprint 2025 will be of interest to the author in the future research.
relatively good beginning, the following years brought a weakening of the dynamics of change. This is probably the effect of 'low hanging fruits.' It is currently more difficult to implement increasingly advanced integration tasks. The effects of AEC are lower than assumed because barriers still exist. The lack of fulfillment of the conditions of the common market results in lower effects than expected in theory (lack of free flow of labor causes suboptimal allocation of production factors, which limits the increase in their productivity).

Secondly, integration within the AEC is carried out under different external conditions. If ¾ ASEAN trade is realized with third countries, it is difficult to expect strong promotion of internal integration, excluding third countries from the market. This would involve high costs of the trade diversion, especially under conditions of high dependence of ASEAN countries on the Chinese market.

To conclude, it can be said that the ASEAN Economic Community is an interesting initiative undertaken by ASEAN, however, different from the classic common market and the Single European Market. It is good that the initiative was formulated and implemented, but at the moment it is difficult to determine its effects reliably. This will be possible only in the future, and it will be of interest to the author of this study.

About the Author

The Author works in the Chair of World Economy and European Integration at the Faculty of Economics of Maria Curie Sklodowska University in Lublin, Poland. His main discipline is international economics and in particular regional economic integration in Europe and East Asia. He also researches on economic development and position of individual Asian countries as well as on economic relations between both countries and groups of countries.

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The Higher Education Dimension in East Asian Regionalism: A Two-tier Analysis of International Co-authorship Patterns in the ASEAN Plus Three

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Abstract

The AUN and ASEAN+3 UNet have both sought to promote the development of a distinct higher education research community within Southeast Asia and East Asia, respectively. The purpose of this paper is two-fold. Firstly, it aims to assess the success of these organisations in delivering against this aim, reviewed against inter-regional comparators. Secondly, the paper undertakes an assessment of which countries (if any) might be predominant in driving this agenda forward, at the intra-regional level. In both levels of the investigation, a statistical analysis of changes in international co-authorship patterns across time is utilised as the means of assessing the question at hand. In accordance with the paper’s core hypotheses, the findings indicate broad fulfilment of the AUN and ASEAN+3 UNet’s objectives, although it seems that efforts directed at building an East Asian research community have been comparatively more successful than those directed specifically at Southeast Asia. It is also found that, in a relative sense, South Korea is acting as a principal locus for higher educational regionalisation. The paper concludes by considering the implications of the analysis for East Asian higher education regionalism, with the contention being that the establishment of the aforementioned research communities provides a robust basis for the development of more formal integrative measures.

Key words: international co-authorship, higher education regionalism, higher education regionalisation, ASEAN University Network (AUN), ASEAN+3 University Network (ASEAN+3 UNet), Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organisation (SEAMEO)
Introduction

Recent developments in the global system of higher education have seen a significant increase in the degree of cross-border interaction, such that ‘[c]ooperation, international exchange and integration among institutions of higher education have become the new norm’ (Feuer & Hornidge, 2015, p.327). This international dimension in higher education manifests itself in many forms, noteworthy amongst which is a growing emphasis on higher education regionalism. This paper focuses on the evolution of collaborative networks within East Asia in the form of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Plus Three (ASEAN+3) grouping of nations. The purpose is to assess the progress of higher education regionalism in East Asia, with an emphasis on the question of whether the stated aim of developing a definable research community among ASEAN+3 member states is being realised and, if so, which countries are driving this agenda forward. In doing so, the ambition is to fill an identifiable gap in the literature; not only has ASEAN education been an ‘under-researched topic’ (Zeng, Adams & Gibbs 2013, p.324) but, additionally, the extant research tends to focus on an analysis of regional initiatives at the intergovernmental level, whilst being notably sparse in relation to whether these initiatives are having the desired integrative effect at the level of individual institutions. Indeed, as noted by Vögtle and Martens: ‘the mere fact that these initiatives have been launched does not provide evidence that reform efforts are actually under way’ (2014, p.256) and it is therefore pertinent to assess whether this is, in fact, the case.

This paper’s research is based on a statistical analysis of international co-authorship patterns with respect to scholarly literature, assessed across time. The Literature Review defines the concept of higher education regionalism and the regionalisation that underpins it, with a particular focus on how these concepts have been promoted in the context of ASEAN+3. Therefrom, the outcome of interest is derived. The Methodology establishes the two-tier (inter-regional and intra-regional) statistical process and associated controls that will be utilised to assess the statistical significance of East Asian co-authorship patterns. Finally, a review of the literature pertaining to East Asian higher education regionalism is
undertaken, which grounds hypotheses that a research community should be detectable within the data and that this is likely to be driven by two competitive dynamics (Malaysia vs. Singapore / China vs. Japan). In the Analysis, the data is analysed and the results is interpreted, with reference to the hypotheses. The Conclusion reviews the analytic output and expands on its implications for East Asian higher education regionalism.

**Literature Review**

In order to understand the significance of this paper’s outcome of interest, it is necessary to make a distinction between the concepts of regionalism and regionalisation. Regionalism refers to ‘those processes of regionally based co-operation and co-ordination that are self-consciously driven consequences of political activities’ (Beeson, 2003, p.252). Regionalism is, then, “top-down”, macro-level regional integration, as conceived and led at an intergovernmental level. In the higher education context, regionalism manifests itself in the form of formal agencies, agreements and collaborative programmes that target the harmonisation and integration of otherwise nationally-bounded systems. In contrast, higher education regionalisation is ‘the process of building closer collaboration and alignment among higher education actors and systems within a defined area or framework called a region’ (Knight, 2012, p.19). Thus, although regionalisation has broadly the same integrative ends as regionalism, it is distinguished from the latter concept by virtue of its being characterised by micro-level, “bottom-up” drivers. Higher education regionalisation is, then, a process led by individual institutions (e.g. universities) partnering with other such institutions, located in different countries within the region in question.

The most significant example of higher education regionalism at present is the Bologna Process, founded by way of the 1999 Bologna Declaration, to which 48 countries in the “wider” European area are presently signatories. The core goal was establishing a European Higher Education Area (EHEA) by 2010, so as to ‘increase the employment prospects and geographical mobility of European citizens; and enhance the reputation of European Higher Education globally’ (Campanini, 2015, p.741) through the harmonisation of the previously diverse systems of higher education. Inter-system
compatibility was to be built on six outcomes: easily readable and comparable degrees; a two-cycle system; credit transferability; student and staff mobility; cooperation in quality assurance; and a European dimension in higher education (EURYDICE, 2009).

The EHEA was realised in 2010, marking the successful fulfilment of the core objective of the Bologna Process. While the attribution to a “Bologna effect” is disputed by some (Huisman, Adelman, Hsieh, Shams & Wilkins, 2012), the implementation of the Bologna “model” has been accompanied by an increase in the absolute number and percentage of non-EHEA students within the total EHEA student population from 1.6% to 2.6% between 1999 and 2007 (Westerheijden, Beerkens, Cremonini, Huisman, Kehm, Kovač, Lažetić, McCoshan, Muzuraityte, Souto Otero, de Weert, Witte & Yağci, 2010, p.67), giving rise to the perception that it has increased the competitiveness of European higher education within the global marketplace (Chao Jr., 2011). Consequently, ‘the European harmonisation process is widely regarded as “the model” for other regions, which learn from the European harmonisation experience and adjust “the model” to suit their own regions’ (Yavaprabhas, 2014, p.81).

Of particular relevance to this paper are the Bologna-inspired attempts to establish higher education regionalism in East Asia, which have largely centred on ASEAN. Originally founded in 1967 between Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines, the initial purpose of ASEAN was ‘to promote regional peace and economic growth’ (Mustajarvi & Bouchon, 2014, p.219), against the backdrop of a recent colonial experience and the growth of communism in the region. Since that point, both the membership and scope of ASEAN has broadened, to the extent that it is now ‘often viewed as one of the most successful regional organisations in the developing world’ (Savage, 2011, p.219). In membership terms, ASEAN has been augmented through the addition of Brunei in 1984; Vietnam in 1995; Myanmar and Laos in 1997; and Cambodia in 1999, giving it a total membership of 10 Southeast Asian nations. Notable expansions in the scope of ASEAN include the 2003 ASEAN Concord II, which aims to establish a formal, tri-pillared ‘ASEAN Community’, as well the adoption of the ASEAN Charter in 2007, which served to
provide the necessary legal and institutional framework to underpin ASEAN as a legal entity (Rattanasevee, 2014).

In terms of higher education regionalism, the key development has been the formation of the ASEAN University Network (AUN). The AUN was created in 1995, incorporating leading universities from each of the ASEAN’s member states and growing in line with the growth of ASEAN itself, now comprising 30 such member institutions. The AUN provides a policy interface between ASEAN and the higher education sector and, together with the Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organisation (SEAMEO), has led on the development of initiatives targeted at the harmonisation of higher education in the region, ‘based on the four pillars of student-faculty communication, collaborative research, information sharing and ASEAN research promotion’ (Sugimura, 2012a, p.89). The AUN’s key achievements include the creation of ASEAN University Network-Quality Assurance (AUN-QA) in 1998, aimed at harmonisation through raising the level of higher education in the region as a whole (Umemiya, 2008), and the ASEAN Credit Transfer System (ACTS) in 2010, which supports regional student mobility. Alongside the work of the AUN, SEAMEO’s Regional Centre for Higher Education and Development (RIHED) has promoted the principle of establishing a Southeast Asian Higher Education Common Space, making explicit reference to the Bologna model as being ‘the way of the future’ (SEAMEO RIHED, 2009, p.12).

In tandem, ASEAN has also expanded its reach through the creation of ASEAN+3, which (in addition to the ASEAN core membership) incorporates the Northeast Asian nations of China, Japan and South Korea. ASEAN+3 emerged out of the 1997 ASEAN Summit, spurred by the need to find a collective resolution to the Asian financial crisis. Since this point, the remit of ASEAN+3 has expanded and the annual summit which serves as its core ‘has developed as a comprehensive forum to discuss economic, political and security issues in the region’ (Hidetaka 2005: 212). Critically, this expansion in remit has extended into higher education, marked by the formation of the ASEAN+3 University Network (ASEAN+3 UNet) in 2009, closely allied with and composed in a similar fashion to the AUN.
Although, as outlined above, the AUN and ASEAN+3 UNet have concerned themselves with activities to forge higher education regionalism, relative to the successes of Bologna, ‘[r]egional quality assurance, mutual recognition and harmonisation of higher education systems have not been adequately addressed’ (Chao Jr., 2014, p.560). It is understood that a key reason for the relative lack of progress is the historically disjointed nature of the higher education community in the region and, consequently, both organisations have sought to develop what Knight (2013) has referred to as the “functional” underpinnings of regionalism. That is, both organisations have seen the need to build the capacity for regionalism by nurturing micro-level regionalisation, as evident in policy documentation, which seeks to promote:

‘ASEAN regional research projects... undertaken jointly by scientists/scholars of more than one member state’ (AUN, 2017).

‘professional interactions and create research clusters among ASEAN+3 Universities’ (ASEAN+3 UNet, 2009).

These policies are both directed at the development of a distinct research community within the region in question and confirm the view that ‘regionalisation in East Asia is in progress in accordance with regionalism fostered by national governments’ (Sugimura, 2012b, p.62). The relative success of these organisations in developing research communities represents our outcome of interest. For the purposes of this paper, we shall measure the relative achievement of these goals in terms of the count of international co-authorships of publications, between academics from different nations. It should be acknowledged that ‘this mode of counting is only one among several possible measures of collaboration, and that... collaboration may lead to a number of outcomes of which the co-authored paper is only one’ (Wagner, Park & Leydesdorff, 2015, p.3). As such, there are limitations to this analysis that will be explored further in the Conclusion. Nevertheless, the availability of a uniform dataset over time and its directly quantifiable nature make this ‘the most tangible indicator’ (Jung, 2012, p.237) and therefore the one most commonly applied to measuring international scholarly
collaboration, as well as higher education collaboration in general.

Methodology

The Scopus database was used to collate the data on international collaborations. Scopus is the largest abstract and citation database of peer-reviewed literature, covering over 22,000 journals, across a broad range of disciplines. Searches for multi-authored papers were conducted, with each being restricted to a particular “pairing” of ASEAN+3 states and a specific year within the range of interest. An author’s home nation was based on the ‘Affiliation Country’ recorded within the database. The number of ‘document results’ produced by this method was taken as the number of collaborations for the given country pairing in the year in question. A document with three or more authors from distinct nations would therefore be counted more than once within the overall dataset. As we are seeking to measure the extent of collaboration, the extra weighting provided to such articles is not problematic. These searches were performed for each year in the 1985-2015 range, to provide a comparable amount of data ‘before’ and ‘after’ the creation of the AUN.

As there has been persistent general growth in international co-authorships across the time period considered (Wagner et al. 2015), the presence of such growth among ASEAN+3 nations since the formation of the AUN/ASEAN+3 UNet would not, in itself, necessarily be indicative of an “ASEAN effect”. Consequently, the analysis sought to determine whether there had been a change in the co-authorship growth rate among these countries before and after a specified year (i.e. piecewise regression). A statistically significant increase in the growth rate after the relevant driver had been initiated would, it is contended, provide evidence of its having an effect on the regionalisation process. For the AUN-specific analysis, it was determined that the effect should be measured from the first year after the establishment of the permanent secretariat in 2000. This also allowed for the fact that the last of the ASEAN states was incorporated in 1999. For the ASEAN+3 UNet-specific analysis, the effect was measured after the establishment of the body itself, in 2009. The end date of the analysis was set at 2015. The start date was set at 1985 for the
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AUN-specific analysis, so as to provide a balanced ‘before’ and ‘after’ dataset. As it was noted that there was a significant overall growth in collaborations since 2001, it was determined that better fitted regression coefficients for the ASEAN+3 UNet-specific ‘before’ growth rates could be derived by setting the start date at 2001, thereby broadly balancing the datasets in the process. The division of the analysis is summarised in Figure 1.

**Figure 1: Growth Rate Pivots**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test Area</th>
<th>Agent</th>
<th>Before</th>
<th>After</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN+3</td>
<td>ASEAN+3 UNet</td>
<td>2001-2009</td>
<td>2010-2015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The analysis was conducted over two tiers; inter-regional (tier 1) and intra-regional (tier 2). The purpose of the first tier was to consider the primary question of the paper, specifically, whether regionalism was driving the creation of a research community within East Asia, within ASEAN, measured in terms of co-authorships amongst the 10 ‘core’ ASEAN nations, and/or ASEAN+3, measured in terms of co-authorships amongst the ASEAN bloc and the ASEAN+3 bloc (discounting collaborations within the blocs themselves). Although the performance of a t-test on the ‘after’ relative to the ‘before’ coefficient would determine whether there had been a statistically significant increase in the growth of collaborations, this would be insufficient to evidence an ASEAN effect, since extraneous factors could have influenced such an increase. In particular, since 2001 there has been a ‘dramatic increase in… internationally co-authored papers… facilitated by the diffusion of Internet and email’ (Iammarino & Archibugi, 2005, p.38), which would directly inflate the AUN ‘after’ coefficient. It was decided to mitigate for such factors by analysing the ratio coefficient increase for two control cases and then applying this ratio to the ‘before’ coefficient of the test case, in order to provide a new hypothetical ‘after’ coefficient (the baseline for the null hypothesis), against which the actual ‘after’ coefficient could be tested for statistical significance. The model formulae for this calculation are provided in Appendix 1. The control cases selected were the collaborations for the test area (i.e. the ASEAN or ASEAN+3
bloc) with the United States and ‘Other Asian’ nations. The United States was selected as the first control owing to its being the predominant actor in international collaborations generally, accounting for almost 40% of all internationally coauthored papers within the National Science Board’s *Science & Engineering Indicators 2016*, and therefore representing a reliable ‘base’ control. The second control was added to account for potential confounding factors associated with other higher education regionalism drivers in the wider Asian area. Particularly noteworthy is the Brisbane Communiqué, signed by ministers of education from 27 Asia-Pacific countries in 2006. In addition to setting out “Bologna-like principles” (Rich, 2010), the Communiqué also sought ‘the development of strong research links, teacher exchanges and partnerships’ (APEM, 2006). As the majority of ASEAN+3 nations signed the Communiqué, any rise in collaborations between these countries could potentially be attributed to this process, rather than specifically East Asian regionalism. To account for this, India and Taiwan were selected to form the second control of ‘Other Asian’ nations. Of those countries that have been significant international collaborators, defined in the *Science and Engineering Indicators 2016* as countries involved with >1% of the total amount of international collaborations, India and Taiwan are the only countries outside of ASEAN+3 that are both likely subjects of wider Asian regionalism and signatories to the Brisbane Communiqué, making them ideally suited to this control.

On the assumption that the above research evidenced the formation of an East Asian research community, the purpose of the Tier 2 analysis was to assess whether there were any countries within the region that were contributing in an above average manner. In order to assess this, the above methodology was directly transposed. The collaboration growth rate for a given country represented the test case and the total intra-regional collaboration growth rate the control, thereby testing whether the increase in growth rate for a given country was significantly above/below the regional average.

Although current research does not directly address the question of whether a research community is materialising in East Asia, there is
pertinent literature upon which hypotheses can be based. A point commonly noted is that East Asia is marked by ‘immense variation... in national size and wealth, education resources, tertiary participation, research outputs and global connectedness’ (Marginson, 2011, p.589). This diversity in higher education capacity could feasibly be an impediment to building broad collaborative networks, especially when considered alongside the fact that membership of the AUN (and the ASEAN+3 UNet) is restricted to the “top” universities in each country, making it “somewhat self-limiting” (Hawkins, 2012, p.102) in this regard. In terms of co-authorship patterns specifically, a key influencing factor ‘is the location of graduate study; young researchers who have studied in another country are likely to co-author with their former professors’ (Cummings, 2014, p.48). Considering that international student mobility from the East Asia region has historically been directed towards the West and, in particular, the United States (Chan, 2012; Yonezawa, Horta & Osawa, 2016), it could be expected for this to translate into co-authorship dependence on Western institutions, thereby suppressing the development of a research community within East Asia.

However, to consider the matter purely in absolute terms would be misguided. Since we are concerned with the relative growth of co-authorship patterns, it may be that intra-East Asian collaborative networks are gaining ground, against a background of sustained Western hegemony. In this respect, it is noteworthy that ASEAN has ‘helped to build a sense of common purpose and identity’ (Stubbs, 2002, p.453) within East Asia (particularly Southeast Asia). This is manifesting itself in attitudinal change at the level of higher education institutions, with a number of researchers having detected ‘a distinct reorientation away from traditional centres of dominance to intra-regional collaborative networks’ (Kuroda & Passarelli, 2009, p.12). For example, in a review of the responses of 124 leading East Asian universities to the 2009 JICA-RI survey, Kuroda, Yuki & Kang (2010, p.31) reported that ‘high priority [is] placed by...[these universities] on building partnerships with other universities in the same region’. Particularly significant was the fact that Southeast Asian institutions’ second most preferred partner region for
cross-border higher education activities had historically been Western Europe (after Southeast Asia itself), but projected that this would shift to Northeast Asia in future. This provides a direct indication of forecast (positive) trends with respect to ASEAN+3 higher education collaboration for the ‘after’ period within this paper’s analysis. This is supported by student mobility data (UNESCO, 2010), with the growth rate in East Asian intra-regional flows significantly outstripping those directed outside of the region. This preferential shift is particularly in evidence within Southeast Asia, where eight of the ten countries now have another ASEAN state within their “top five” student destinations. For Cambodia and Laos, other Southeast Asian nations now represent the “top” international student destination (Thailand and Vietnam, respectively). In line with the aforementioned link between student mobility and co-authorship patterns, this preferential shift could potentially support the development of a research community in East Asia.

On the basis of the above, it is reasonable to hypothesise that, although collaboration with the West may still predominate in international co-authorship patterns, we should expect to see the development of a research community within East Asia, the relative growth in which should significantly exceed inter-regional comparators. The Tier 1 hypotheses are defined as follows:

\[
H1a: \text{The ‘after’ coefficient for intra-ASEAN co-authorship will be significantly greater (at the 5% significance level or better) than the hypothetical ‘after’ coefficient produced by both control cases.}
\]

\[
H1b: \text{The ‘after’ coefficient for ‘Plus Three’-ASEAN co-authorship will be significantly greater than the hypothetical ‘after’ coefficient produced by both control cases.}
\]

Should the development of an East Asian research community be confirmed, it is contended that this will likely have been disproportionately driven by the competitive dynamic between certain key countries to become regional “hubs” of education. At base, this competition is rooted ‘in the acquisition battle for international students’ (Sugimura, 2012b, p.48), within which other East Asian states represent the most accessible market. However, it is also understood that the purposeful positioning of these states at
the centre of regionally integrated higher education markets is a means of strengthening their ‘soft power’ in the region (Mok, 2011; Yang, 2012). Understood in this sense, it is clear that it necessitates the forging of a regional network, within which the hub’s influence is anchored. This, in turn, requires the development of greater international links between the hub’s universities and others within the region, thereby providing a fecund setting for international co-authorship. Within Southeast Asia, the consensus is that Malaysia and Singapore have been the two states that have most openly strived to become regional hubs of education (Clark, 2012; Mok, 2011; Yap, 2012). The strategy in both countries has been to partner with high-ranked universities abroad to develop transnational degree programmes, bringing a ‘branded’ offer to the region. Such was the motivation behind the Singapore’s Global Schoolhouse initiative (2002), as well as being a fundamental element of Malaysia’s National Higher Education Strategic Plan 2020, published in 2007. Within Northeast Asia, there is a parallel competitive dynamic between China and Japan for influence within ASEAN+3. This ‘Sino-Japanese rivalry’ extends into higher education, with China having sought to bolster the competitiveness of its offer through intensive funding of its leading universities under Project 211 and Project 985 (Li & Chen, 2011) and augment its ‘soft power’ in the region, via the proliferation of Confucian Institutes in ASEAN member states (Yang, 2012). For its part, Japan has sought ‘to balance China’s efforts by stepping up its... cooperative profile in the region’ (Hund, 2003, p.411). Bringing this together, it is hypothesised that these competitive dynamics will have provided a locus for the development of the wider research community and that, as such, the countries in question will demonstrate a significantly greater increase in international co-authorship growth rate than the relevant regional average:

**H2a:** The ‘after’ coefficient for Malaysia-ASEAN (and Singapore-ASEAN) co-authorship will be significantly greater than the hypothetical ‘after’ coefficient produced by the intra-ASEAN benchmark.

**H2b:** The ‘after’ coefficient for China-ASEAN (and Japan-ASEAN) co-authorship will be significantly greater than the hypothetical ‘after’ coefficient produced by the intra-ASEAN benchmark.
co-authorship will be significantly greater than the hypothetical ‘after’ coefficient produced by the ‘Plus Three’-ASEAN benchmark

Analysis

The results of this process are presented in accordance with the two-tier methodology1.

(i) Tier 1: Inter-regional

For Southeast Asia, the number of international co-authorships between ASEAN states were totalled for each year 1985-2015 and set alongside co-authorships between ASEAN states and: (i) the United States; and (ii) ‘Other Asian’ nations. A piecewise regression was undertaken, with the growth rate coefficients calculated for two (‘before’ and ‘after’) time periods, using SPSS v.22. The coefficients are presented in Table 1a, alongside the ratio coefficient increase (R) and associated hypothetical ‘after’ coefficients ($B_1^0$) for ASEAN-US and ASEAN-Asia (i.e. the two controls). To explain the application of the Methodology, ‘R’ is calculated by dividing the relevant control’s 2001-2015 coefficient by its 1985-2000 coefficient. $B_1^0$ is then produced by multiplying the 1985-2000 Intra-ASEAN coefficient by the ‘R’ statistic for the relevant control. Therefore, $B_1^0$ represents a test statistic, measuring the number of coauthorships that would be expected if the intra-ASEAN case had experienced the same level of relative collaborative growth as the two controls, between the two periods. The formulae underpinning the calculation of all test statistics are contained in Appendix 1.

The coefficients were used to perform a one-sided t-test on the null hypothesis ($H_0: B_1 = B_1^0$), where $B_1$ is the Intra-ASEAN 2001-2015 coefficient and $B_1^0$ was tested for both controls. As shown in Table 1a, the actual ‘after’ coefficient (214.46) is greater than produced by both the controls (94.79 for ASEAN-US / 205.79 for ASEAN-Asia). However, the t-tests evidence that this difference is not statistically significant with respect to the ASEAN-Asia case, due to the marginal difference between the coefficients, when factoring in the relatively large standard errors. Thus, in this instance, the t-value of the test (0.187) is below the critical t-statistic for the 5% significance level, at 54 degrees of freedom (1.674). On this basis, the t-test ‘fails to reject’ $H_0$ (i.e. the

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1 The summary dataset upon which this paper’s analysis was based is available on request.
hypothesis that intra-ASEAN collaborative growth is not significantly greater than would be predicted by the ASEAN-Asia control). That said, in the ASEAN-US case, the difference is shown to be statistically significant at the 0.1% significance level, providing substantial grounds for differentiation in this respect. Thus, there is some evidence for an ASEAN effect bolstering international co-authorship growth and, therefore, for the hypothesis that a research community is being developed specifically in Southeast Asia (H1a).

The East Asian dataset was produced by totalling international co-authorships between the Northeast Asian nations and: (i) ASEAN states; (ii) the United States; and (iii) ‘Other Asian’ nations, for the period 2001-2015. The piecewise regression and coefficient calculation were of the same form as the above methodology, except for the distinction in ‘pivot’ date, as shown in Table 1b.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Co-authorship Relationship</th>
<th>1985-2000</th>
<th>2001-2015</th>
<th>Ratio (R)</th>
<th>Null Hypothesis Baseline ($B_1^0$)</th>
<th>t-test Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intra-ASEAN</td>
<td>13.00</td>
<td>214.46</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.81)</td>
<td>(13.04)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN-US</td>
<td>66.29</td>
<td>483.34</td>
<td>7.29</td>
<td>94.79</td>
<td>Reject $H_0$  @ 0.1% sig.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7.45)</td>
<td>(19.50)</td>
<td>(0.87)</td>
<td>(17.40)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN-Asia</td>
<td>16.17</td>
<td>255.95</td>
<td>15.83</td>
<td>205.79</td>
<td>Fail to reject $H_0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.33)</td>
<td>(20.52)</td>
<td>(2.61)</td>
<td>(44.45)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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2 Standard errors shown in brackets.
Table 1b: ‘Plus Three’ International Co-authorship Coefficients

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Co-authorship Relationship</th>
<th>2001-2009</th>
<th>2010-2015</th>
<th>Ratio (R)</th>
<th>Null Hypothesis Baseline ($B_1^0$)</th>
<th>t-test Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plus Three-ASEAN</td>
<td>527.43 (15.38)</td>
<td>1223.00 (42.75)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plus Three-US</td>
<td>2729.65 (113.90)</td>
<td>5034.89 (94.03)</td>
<td>1.84 (0.08)</td>
<td>972.86 (52.76)</td>
<td>Reject H₀ @ 0.1% sig.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plus Three-Asia</td>
<td>426.42 (12.81)</td>
<td>809.06 (20.18)</td>
<td>1.90 (0.07)</td>
<td>1000.72 (48.77)</td>
<td>Reject H₀ @ 0.5% sig.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

T-tests were performed in parallel with the Southeast Asian case. The actual coefficient was statistically significantly greater than that produced by both control cases, providing strong evidence in favour of the hypothesis that ASEAN+3 is supporting the development of a research community in East Asia as a whole (H1b).

(ii) Tier 2: Intra-regional

For Southeast Asia, the growth in the number of co-authorships for individual ASEAN nations (with other ASEAN nations) was benchmarked against the growth rate in the intra-ASEAN total. Coefficients were calculated in a parallel fashion to the Tier 1a analysis, on the basis of the ‘Tier 2’ model formulae contained in Appendix 1. Thus, this involved the application of the intra-ASEAN coefficient ratio (R) to the ‘before’ coefficient (1985-2000) for each country (producing $B_1^0$) and using this hypothetical baseline to test the relative collaborative growth represented by the actual ‘after’ coefficient (2001-2015). The results are shown in Table 2a.

There is an even split between those countries with above average growth rate increase (Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia and Myanmar) and those below this measure (Brunei, the
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam). There are no clear patterns in this split, in terms of the scale/capacity of the higher education systems involved. Moreover, the t-tests\textsuperscript{3} show that the difference between the actual and hypothetical coefficients is only statistically significant for Cambodia. As Cambodia’s absolute contribution to total regional co-authorships is comparatively small, this does not provide a robust basis for claims with respect to its driving collaboration in the region. The evidence contradicts the hypothesis that Southeast Asian collaboration is being driven by the competitive dynamic between Malaysia and Singapore (H2a), especially as the latter’s coefficient (in the 2001-2015 period) is smaller than both Indonesia and Thailand’s, by absolute measure.

For East Asia, the growth in co-authorships for each ‘Plus Three’ nation (with ASEAN nations) was benchmarked against the equivalent growth rate for the Plus Three-ASEAN total. The coefficient calculation paralleled the Tier 2a analysis, with the Plus Three-ASEAN coefficient ratio (R) acting as the basis for calculating the hypothetical baseline ($B_{10}^0$), as shown in Table 2b.

The actual ‘after’ coefficients for China and South Korea are above their hypothetical benchmark, whilst Japan’s is below. Of these results, the Japanese and South Korean cases are statistically significant. Thus, at 22 degrees of freedom, the t-value of the test for South Korea (3.479) is the only one to exceed the critical t-statistics, doing sufficiently well to pass at the 1% significance level (2.819). Otherwise expressed, South Korea has outperformed its regional partners in terms of ‘relative collaborative growth’ (i.e. the growth rate coefficient ratio between the two time periods analysed). Japan, on the other hand, is shown to have relative collaborative growth that is significantly lower than the Plus Three-ASEAN benchmark, passing the relevant t-test at the 0.1% significance level. Taken together, this evidence effectively discounts the hypothesis that the competitive dynamic between China and Japan has driven the development of the East Asian research community (H2b).

\textsuperscript{3} Two-sided t-tests were performed for the second-tier analysis, since the test coefficients could be expected to be both above and below the benchmark.
### Table 2a: Intra-ASEAN International Co-authorship Coefficients

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Co-authorship Relationship</th>
<th>1985-2000</th>
<th>2001-2015</th>
<th>Ratio (R)</th>
<th>Null Hypothesis Baseline ($B^0$)</th>
<th>t-test Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intra-ASEAN</td>
<td>13.00 (1.81)</td>
<td>214.46 (13.04)</td>
<td>16.50 (2.51)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunei-ASEAN</td>
<td>0.54 (0.11)</td>
<td>6.93 (1.31)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>8.83 (2.31)</td>
<td>Fail to reject $H_0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia-ASEAN</td>
<td>0.36 (0.10)</td>
<td>15.09 (1.13)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>5.89 (1.86)</td>
<td>Reject $H_0$ @ 0.1% sig.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia-ASEAN</td>
<td>3.37 (0.49)</td>
<td>76.31 (5.96)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>55.66 (11.66)</td>
<td>Fail to reject $H_0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos-ASEAN</td>
<td>0.46 (0.13)</td>
<td>10.15 (0.98)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>7.57 (2.41)</td>
<td>Fail to reject $H_0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia-ASEAN</td>
<td>5.19 (0.68)</td>
<td>114.59 (7.27)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>85.59 (17.20)</td>
<td>Fail to reject $H_0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar-ASEAN</td>
<td>0.33 (0.10)</td>
<td>6.82 (0.99)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>5.36 (1.81)</td>
<td>Fail to reject $H_0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines-ASEAN</td>
<td>3.25 (0.55)</td>
<td>31.37 (1.83)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>53.68 (12.20)</td>
<td>Fail to reject $H_0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore-ASEAN</td>
<td>4.29 (0.63)</td>
<td>61.95 (3.54)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>70.84 (14.95)</td>
<td>Fail to reject $H_0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand-ASEAN</td>
<td>5.94 (0.86)</td>
<td>71.63 (4.74)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>97.94 (20.57)</td>
<td>Fail to reject $H_0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam-ASEAN</td>
<td>2.28 (0.42)</td>
<td>34.09 (2.58)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>37.55 (8.94)</td>
<td>Fail to reject $H_0$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rather, it seems that there is a case for arguing that South Korea has had the critical effect in this respect, to the extent that its regionally-relevant collaborative research growth is moving it close to displacing Japan from a previously secure
Table 2b: ‘Plus Three’-ASEAN International Co-authorship Coefficients

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coauthorship Relationship</th>
<th>2001-2009</th>
<th>2010-2015</th>
<th>Ratio (R)</th>
<th>Null Hypothesis Baseline ($B_{1}^{0}$)</th>
<th>t-test Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plus Three-ASEAN</td>
<td>527.43 (15.38)</td>
<td>1223.00 (42.75)</td>
<td>2.32 (0.11)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China-ASEAN</td>
<td>254.03 (9.50)</td>
<td>673.97 (46.67)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>589.04 (34.70)</td>
<td>Fail to reject $H_{0}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan-ASEAN</td>
<td>196.13 (6.35)</td>
<td>307.48 (17.63)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>454.79 (25.40)</td>
<td>Reject $H_{0}$ @ 0.1% sig.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea-ASEAN</td>
<td>77.27 (5.19)</td>
<td>241.54 (10.49)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>179.17 (14.54)</td>
<td>Reject $H_{0}$ @ 1% sig.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

second position, even in absolute terms (i.e. 241.54 vs. 307.48). This is not to discount the role of China, which has retained and augmented its status as the principal agent of East Asian research growth (its 2010-2015 coefficient being significantly greater than its comparators, at 673.97), although this is perhaps to be expected, owing to its capacity.

(iii) Overarching Comparative Analysis

It is now possible to draw the four-part analysis together and consider what it tells us as a whole. It seems clear that there is strong evidence in favour of the Tier 1 hypotheses, but that we should discount the framing of intra-regional interactions indicated by the Tier 2 hypotheses. Nonetheless, the fact that the Tier 1 results are not statistically significant in the case of intra-ASEAN relations, relative to the ASEAN-Asia control, merits further exploration. In this respect, the evidence indicates that the form of higher education regionalisation that is being developed between the ‘Plus Three’ and core ASEAN nations is, comparatively speaking, stronger than that which has evolved solely within Southeast Asia. Perhaps counter-intuitively, then, it would seem that, since the respective commencement of integrative efforts, institutions within the ‘Plus Three’ have placed a stronger
emphasis on collaboration with Southeast Asian institutions (and vice-versa) than this latter grouping has placed on collaboration with each other. In light of this, it is worth reappraising the idea that co-authorship patterns are (in part) being driven by a competitive dynamic. Indeed, it should be acknowledged that, owing to its greater capacity, Northeast Asia is the dominant partner in ASEAN+3 higher education relations. This relative strength in higher education capacity has its basis in the fact that ‘higher education and research are central to the global strategies of these nations’ (Marginson, 2011, p.596). This national-level policy-drive is evident in the aforementioned Project 211 and Project 985 in China, as well as the 1998 Brain Korea 21 Program (aimed at nurturing globally competitive research universities) and Japan’s 2009 Global 30 Project (focused on actively promoting the internationalisation of Japan’s top universities). Understood within this context, the fact that Plus Three-ASEAN regionalisation is more pronounced than intra-ASEAN relations may be reflective of the ‘Plus Three’ actively driving integration, so as to make inroads into the ASEAN market.

If we are to reappraise the concept of collaboration-as-grounded-in-competition, it is necessary to reconsider the principal agents of this dynamic, since the Tier 2 hypotheses were determined to have missed the mark in this respect. In an absolute sense, Malaysia and China have maintained this role within Southeast and Northeast Asia, respectively. However, from the perspective of relative collaborative growth, the most marked shift is seen in South Korea. Accordingly, if one looks outside of the ‘Sino-Japanese rivalry’ that is perceived to dominate the socio-political landscape of Northeast Asia, it is clear that South Korea has itself ‘been developing and implementing internationalisation policies with the main goal of establishing Korea as an academic centre in East Asian higher education’ (Cho & Palmer, 2013, p.292). The South Korean government’s 2007 Strategic Plan for Internationalisation of Higher Education focusses on achieving this through the regional educational hub model, built on partnering with esteemed foreign institutions (McNeill, 2008) and increasing the number of international faculty and students (Gress & Ilon, 2009). Critically, the wider strategy also sets a 2020 target of South Korea ranking at least 9th
worldwide in the number of journal articles published. This paper’s analysis indicates that the implementation of these policy objectives is also serving to drive East Asian international co-authorship growth. Thus, we may transition to the Conclusion by asserting that South Korea is rapidly moving to a position of acting as a principal agent for higher education regionalisation within the dominant interface in this respect (i.e. the Plus Three-ASEAN dynamic).

**Conclusion**

This paper has analysed the development of higher education regionalisation within East Asia, measured in terms of the level of international co-authorship growth amongst ASEAN+3 nations. The evidence presented indicates the fulfilment of the policy objectives of the AUN and ASEAN+3 UNet, with respect to the development of a research community within Southeast Asia and East Asia, respectively. As this “functional” underpinning of regionalism has been successfully established, it may provide a sufficiently robust platform upon which to build a more thoroughgoing formal framework for higher education integration within East Asia, including ‘the establishment of regional institutions related to mobility, quality assurance, and mutual recognition’ (Chao Jr., 2014, p.573). Although initial steps have been made in this direction (e.g. ACTS, AUN-QA etc.), when compared to the successes of Bologna, progress has been slow; piecemeal; and typically focussed on Southeast Asia, rather than extended to the wider East Asian region. As this paper has shown, although comparatively recent, efforts to nurture higher education regionalisation in East Asia as a whole have so far been met with success and, consequently, there should (in theory) be no greater practical barrier to achieving formal forms of regionalism at this level, than purely within Southeast Asia. The issue with formal regionalism, of course, is that it is prone to political impediments such as the above referenced Sino-Japanese rivalry. However, if regionally-minded policy-makers can build on collaborative efforts such as the ASEAN+3 UNet, as well as the evident micro-level integration demonstrated in this paper, then further integration is certainly realisable.

Returning to the above noted discrepancy between Southeast Asian and
East Asian regionalisation, although no direct comparison is possible between the two (owing to the different time periods involved), the fact of intra-ASEAN co-authorship growth not achieving statistical significance relative to the ‘Asian’ control leads to the conclusion that efforts directed at building an East Asian research community have been comparatively more successful than those directed specifically at Southeast Asia. This should represent an important finding for the AUN. In particular, if the achievement of a specifically Southeast Asian research community remains a key objective, then consideration should be given to the success of the South Korean regional education hub model in promoting this and whether elements of this model (such as the article publication target) are directly translatable to the context of the two aspirant education hubs of Malaysia and Singapore.

Nonetheless, a number of limitations should be acknowledged. Firstly, it is worth restating that co-authorship patterns do not necessarily provide an exact map of international research collaboration as a whole and, as such, appropriate caution should be exercised when considering the generalisability of the analysis to this wider field. Moreover, it is important to note that there are numerous factors influencing co-authorship growth within East Asia other than the collaborative drives initiated by the AUN and ASEAN+3 UNet. In this respect, whilst a large portion of these factors will have been appropriately accounted for in the US and ‘Other Asian’ controls utilised in the analysis, it is likely that a few of these factors are wholly (or, at least, largely) specific to the East Asia region and have not thereby effectively been controlled for. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to speculate as to the precise nature of such factors, it would seem likely that the difference between the actual and hypothetical growth rate coefficients within the Tier 1 Analysis are not wholly attributable to an ASEAN effect. That said, although the calculated differentials may be somewhat inflated, the strength of the statistical significance in three of the four cases (0.1%-0.5%) should be sufficient to allow for the influence of other factors, whilst still showing evidence of an ASEAN effect.

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4 See Katz & Martin (1997) for a detailed exposition of this point.
In addition to consideration of these limitations, factors other than research collaboration need to be considered in informing the policy recommendations indicated by this paper and further research is merited in this regard. In particular, there are many other facets to higher education regionalisation (e.g. academic and student exchange programmes), as well as instances of (more complete) forms of higher education regionalism (e.g. Bologna) within which the regionalism-regionalisation dynamic can be tested and both represent fertile avenues for future research. The findings of this paper should, therefore, represent a beginning, rather than the end point for research with respect to this interface.

About The Author

Oliver Gill obtained his BA in Philosophy & Politics from The University of Warwick and MA in Philosophy from The Open University. He has since transitioned to specialise in the education field and has obtained an MA in Comparative Education from University College London. His current research focus is principally on education reform movements, studied from both a national and comparative international perspective.

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Appendix 1 – Model Formulae (Tier 1)

Hypothesis:

\[ H_0: B_1 = B_1^0 \]
\[ H_1: B_1 > B_1^0 \]

Hypothesis Test:

The test statistic is

\[ t = \frac{B_1 - B_1^0}{\sqrt{s_{b_1}^2 + s_{b_1}^0}} \sim T(n_1 + n_1^0 - 2) \]

Where \( B_1 \) is the intra-ASEAN / APT-ASEAN \( (t_2) \) slope coefficient and
\[ B_1^0 = R(B_2) \]

Where \( B_2 \) is the intra-ASEAN / APT-ASEAN \( (t_1) \) slope coefficient and
\[ R = \frac{B_3}{B_4} \]

Where \( B_3 \) is the ASEAN-Asia/US / APT-Asia/US \( (t_2) \) slope coefficient and \( B_4 \) is the ASEAN-Asia/US / APT-Asia/US \( (t_1) \) slope coefficient.

Consequently

\[ n_1^0 = n_2 + n_3 + n_4 - 6 \]

and

\[ s_{b_1}^0 = B_1^0 \left[ \sqrt\left( \frac{s_r}{R} \right)^2 + \left( \frac{s_{b_2}}{B_2} \right)^2 \right] \]

Where

\[ s_r = R \left[ \sqrt\left( \frac{s_{b_3}}{B_3} \right)^2 + \left( \frac{s_{b_4}}{B_4} \right)^2 \right] \]

Appendix 1 – Model Formulae (Tier 2)

Hypothesis:

\[ H_0: B_1 = B_1^0 \]
\[ H_1: B_1 > B_1^0 \]

Hypothesis Test:

The test statistic is

\[ t = \frac{B_1 - B_1^0}{\sqrt{s_{b_1}^2 + s_{b_1}^0}} \sim T(n_1 + n_1^0 - 2) \]

Where \( B_1 \) is the country-ASEAN \( (t_2) \) slope coefficient and
\[ B_1^0 = R(B_2) \]

Where \( B_2 \) is the country-ASEAN \( (t_1) \) slope coefficient and
\[ R = \frac{B_3}{B_4} \]

Where \( B_3 \) is the intra-ASEAN / APT-ASEAN \( (t_2) \) slope coefficient and \( B_4 \) is the intra-ASEAN / APT-ASEAN \( (t_1) \) slope coefficient.
Consequently

\[ n_1^0 = n_2 + n_3 + n_4 - 6 \]

and

\[ s_{b_1}^0 = B_1^0 \left[ \sqrt{ \left( \frac{s_r}{R} \right)^2 + \left( \frac{s_{b_2}}{B_2} \right)^2 } \right] \]

Where

\[ s_r = R \left[ \sqrt{ \left( \frac{s_{b_3}}{B_3} \right)^2 + \left( \frac{s_{b_4}}{B_4} \right)^2 } \right] \]
Environmental Studies of English School: Case Study of Forest Fires in Indonesia and Transboundary Haze in Southeast Asia

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Abstract

Despite of its advantages in social dimension, English School still has limited articles on environmental issues. Many global ecological crisis has been dealt with constructivism and green theory because the failure of English Scholars to adopt new norms such as climate responsibility, sustainable development and environmental justice. This article would like to highlight the synthesis of the normative tensions and the regional studies within the environmental studies of English School using the case study of Indonesia ratification to ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution. Pluralism and solidarism will be the conceptual instruments in criticizing the blindness of environmental analysis in the English School communities and also constructing the environmental-friendly English School theory. There are two main conclusions in this article. Firstly, Indonesia ratification of ASEAN Agreement of Transboundary Haze Pollution, the emergence of domestic environmental legislation and the adoption of environmental responsibility marked the end of pluralist hegemony in environmental studies. Secondly, Indonesia ratification of AATHP is one of the foundations of regional environmental governance in Southeast Asia.

Key words: pluralism, solidarism, transboundary haze, Southeast Asia
Introduction

Forest fires and transboundary haze are man-made disasters in Southeast Asia. This disaster has been a controversial topic between ASEAN members. ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution was signed in 2002 with the aim to collectively combat the fires using joint resources and continuous dialogue (ASEAN, 2002). ASEAN has many arrangements in dealing with environmental issues collectively such as ASEAN Strategic Plan on Environment and Jakarta Declaration on Sustainable Development with the purpose to strengthen inter-governmental cooperation in tackling and preventing regional environmental issues (L. Elliot 2012, 46).

Dauvergne (1998) mentioned that Indonesian government was systematically destroying the forest for transmigration project, palm oil plantation and paper and pulp companies. In 1990s, Suharto government escalated national economic growth through agriculture industrialization and then the need for converting the forest land was inevitable. In the Suharto era, many corporations that were closed to Suharto’s families received huge areas of concessions and forest fires and other clear-cutting forest method were widely used as a tool for land conversion (Barber & Schweithelm, 2000, p. vi). After Suharto regime was toppled down, province and district government have bigger authority in many public sectors including the forest management. However, provincial leaders and district leaders of the new democratic government didn’t show their effective leadership in preventing deforestation, forest fires and transboundary haze. Berenschot (2015) called this phenomenon as the haze of democracy.

The worst impact of haze was happened in 1997-1998. The haze harmed people’s health and stopped public activities for weeks in Indonesia and other five countries namely Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippine (Tay, 2001). Indonesia suffered significant loss of human lives, forests area, endangered species and biodiversity loss, financial damage meanwhile Singapore and Malaysia peoples also were exposed to toxic gas. Malaysia and Singapore had deteriorating air quality to dangerous level. In Kuching, Sarawak, Malaysia, pollution standard index (PSI) hit to 839 (Tay, 2001, p. 5). A reading of
PSI over 100 is considered unhealthy and above 300 is hazardous (Cotton, 1999, p. 332). PSI evaluated the healthiness of air based on the presence of four main elements namely sulfur dioxide, oxides of nitrogen, ozone and carbon monoxide. Dauvergne (1998, p. 13) mentioned that more than 200,000 peoples in Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore were seeking medical treatment due to the air pollution. It is also noted that almost a quarter of Indonesia’s peat forest was gone due to the fires (Dauvergne, 1998, p. 13).

Forest fires, transboundary haze, and other ecological crises were rarely discussed within the English School communities. Sanna Kopra (2016) wrote a dissertation regarding China’s climate responsibility using English School and Robert Falkner (2017) discussed the critics toward the blindness of English School theorists toward environmental issues using pluralism-solidarism continuum and climate change politics. None of English School scholars spotted the urgency of building environmental studies of English School based on massive destruction of forest fires and transboundary haze in Southeast Asia.

The absence of environmental studies in English School is a great disadvantage. Jones (1981) is the first scholar giving the label of English School to the thinking of Charles Manning, Herbert Butterfield and Hedley Bull. The founder of English School was critical toward the domination of classical Realism and focused to the importance of diplomacy, international law and international organization. English School gained revival after the incoming of new scholars including Barry Buzan, Richard Little, Andrew Hurrell. They relaunched the School on a global scale and successful in attracting and inviting new scholars and English School become an established tradition in IR communities (Jorgensen, 2010, p. 105).

The primary reason of the revival of the school is the emphasis on the social dimension. Barry Buzan (2004, 1) said that “after a long period of neglect, the social (or societal dimension) of the international system is being brought back into fashion within the International Relations by the upsurge of interest in constructivism”. This social emphasis enabled researcher to see the complexity and the paradox of many contradicting phenomena. The collapse of Berlin Wall, the break-up of
Soviet Union, the increasing significance of multinational corporations, and global environmental crisis provided impetus for social theories of International Relations.

It is also evident that regional organizations have evolved significantly in their ability to deal with complex issues as shown in the context of the European Union. In his book *From International Society to World Society*, Buzan (2004) devoted a special chapter urging scholars to give greater attention to regional studies. According to Buzan (2004), regional studies can bring significant contribution to the diversity of ideas and concepts of English School tradition. However, there is a gap between regional studies and environmental studies. This article argued that the complexity of regional studies can be enriched with the environmental studies. A combination of environmental studies with regional studies is the aim of this article.

To achieve the aforementioned goal, the authors have to tackle two main problems. Firstly, English School scholars mostly focused to develop the concept of pluralism of English School (Falkner, 2017; Buzan, 2004). The domination of pluralism within the English School will not develop the environmental regional studies (Buzan, 2004). Using differentiation between thin and thick, Buzan argued that English School scholars still has lack of discussion regarding the concept of solidarism of English School (Buzan 2004, p. 140). Solidarism is key criteria to have “thick” environmental studies of English School.

Secondly, there are problems of English School methodology. Case-based study has great potential to theorize key concepts of English School. Jackson (2009, p. 21) said: “theory is a creature of practice and not the other way about, as is often assumed”. In order to evaluate the pluralism and solidarism in English School scholars can use specific cases that are relevant to the English School theoretical development. According to Jackson (2009), there are two criteria to select cases. Firstly, it is pluralistic and secondly, the authors are detached.

According to Jackson (2009), case selection in English School theoretical development is based on pluralistic approach. Pluralistic approach highlighted the key character of normative inquiry within a specific case that
consisted of contradiction, paradox or dilemma. After in-depth investigation using pluralistic approach, researchers deliver their new theoretical construct. Secondly, Jackson emphasized that case selection should give more benefit to the theoretical development than the author’s personal values. The role of English School theorists is to provide interpretation based on reasonableness and logical consistency (Jakson 2009, 26).

In this article, Indonesia ratification to AATHP is used as the case to evaluate the domination of pluralism within English School discussion. AATHP and the handling of forest fires provided a complex issue involving the conflicted interest of Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia. There is also a perpetual clash between palm oil industry and environmental activists regarding the clearance of forest.

**English School Environmental Blindness**

Indonesia’s policies to pursue forest-based developmental strategy are parallel to the blindness of IR theories toward the environmental responsibility. This is anthropocentric view of International Relations. Scholars denied the importance of non-human nature, the needs of future generations and unfair distribution of ecological harms (Eckersley, Green Theory, 2013, p. 267). Eckersley (2013) said that the interests of future generations, the poor and the weak and the non-human nature are invisible and hidden from the global decision-making process. The hegemony of sovereignty is not balanced by other institutions such as civil society and multinational corporations. Without the ecological crisis as shown by forest fires and haze, anthropocentric view of International Relations will be intact.

The philosophy of anthropocentric views started from the assumption that the Earth can support unlimited economic growth (Clapp & Dauvergne, 2005, p. 5). Technology and engineering can manipulate and modify the ecosystem to suit the interest of the human being. The role of governments is to enhance the advancement of science and engineering through financial support. Scientific achievements have the purpose to repair and mitigate the impact of environmental problems (Clapp and Dauvergne 2005, 6). The environmental responsibility is then closely connected with technology.
Anthropocentric approach has some parallels to pluralism of English School. Pluralism advised for state-centric mode of governance, the primacy of great power, and the pursuit of national interest (Buzan, 2004). Meanwhile solidarism prefers to embrace new ideas and values into the existing international order such as human rights, democracy and environmental responsibility.

The purpose of the dichotomy of solidarism and pluralism is to uncover the complexity surrounding an issue. English School provided a continuum that solidarism and pluralism have equal and fair place that enabled researchers to understand the contradicting and dilemmatic situation. However, solidarism didn’t attract much attention of English School scholars which caused the failure of the School to establish its environmental studies.

Hedley Bull is one of English School founder and supporter of pluralism. He developed international order on the basis of pluralism. According to him, there are three components of international order. Firstly, there is a goal of preservation of state-centric society and the independence of states. Secondly, avoidance of violence and lastly, respects for property (Bull, 1977). Bull is very critical to the idea of integrating environmental responsibility to international order due to his perception that environmental justice can be serious threat to state and its independence. Bull denied the importance of civil society and other non-state actors because they are not appointed through legitimate political process. If a tyrant and authoritarian regime are elected through legitimate process, then they reserved for their right to control the government. Bull said:

“And the idea of the rights of the individual human being raises in international politics the question of the right and duty of persons and groups other than the state to which he owes allegiance to come to his aid in the event that his rights are being disregarded - the right of the Western powers to protect the political rights of the citizens of Eastern European countries, or of Africans to protect the rights of black South Africans, or of China to protect the right of Chinese minorities in South-east Asia. These are questions which, answered in a certain way, lead to
disorder in international relations, or even to the breakdown of international society itself” (Bull, 1977, p. 80).

Bull’s statement confirmed the immutability thesis of material structures of International Relations. In the case of forest fires and transboundary haze, it is the interest of non-human nature, the poor and the indigenous peoples that has been invisible and undermined by the existing theorization of pluralism. Aljazeera (2017) reported that Indonesia is home to an estimated 50-70 million tribal people, but most of them do not have formal title to the forest land. Pluralism neglects the interest of non-human nature, tribal groups and the normative goal of environmental responsibility. Forest fires and haze are the main consequences of this inaction.

Buzan explained the factors of the failure of English School scholars to construct the solidarism studies. Buzan said that the hierarchy of pluralism over solidarism was largely pragmatic. In Buzan’s opinion, Hedley Bull’s support to pluralism was based on the assumption that “the state-based approach provided both the only immediately available pathway to a degree of achievable international order, and also a valuable via media between the extremes of realism and liberalism” (Buzan, 2004, 36).

Liste (2017) argued that English School scholars can’t take the pluralism as the taken-for-granted norms. English School is also a critical movement toward the hegemony of pluralism in environmental studies of English School. There are already many evidences and phenomenon indicating irrelevance of pluralism in environmental politics. The presence of various multilateral environmental agreement, public-private partnership and green global movement urged the transformation of state-based pluralism into complex governance beyond the state (Hurrell, On Global Order: Power, Values and the Constitution of International Society, 2007). Sustainable development was used as global development platform for policy-makers (Bernstein, 2001). This is the main challenge for English Scholars. It is important to construct solidarism that is sufficient to answer the ecological challenge such as the emergence of sustainable development.
Andrew Hurrell (2007) mentioned that there are three ecological challenges. First challenge is related to the failure of states in dealing with global environmental crisis. Secondly, states are also failed in dealing with local and national environmental problems. Lastly, there are impetuses for creation of a form of non-territorially based political identity. Solidarism has immense potential in answering these challenges by borrowing the concepts environmental justice, sustainable development and climate responsibilities within the English School discourse. English School scholar Sanna Kopra (2016) has written about climate responsibilities and Verdinand Robertua (2016) has written about sustainable development. It is important to further these researches looking the relevancy of solidarism in answering environmental problems including transboundary haze and forest fires. By combining case study with theoretical framework, Environmental Studies of English School has a stronger foundation in International Relations theories.

**Regional Environmental Governance**

The hierarchy of pluralism over solidarism can also be seen in the construction of the concept of regional environmental governance. Varkkey (2012) has developed the regionalism of environmental issues using the case studies of forest fires and transboundary haze in Southeast Asia. She argued that ASEAN Way was hampering the establishment of effective haze mitigation mechanism. Varkkey said “This difference in emphases of sovereignty explains why environmental regionalism in Europe has been successful while environmental regionalism in Southeast Asia has not” (Varkkey 2012, 81).

The inhospitality of ASEAN Way and haze prevention mechanism was happened due to the interest of Indonesian palm oil industry which contributed significantly to Indonesian national income. Economic interest was prioritized in the Southeast Asia multilateral negotiation including the priority agenda of internationalization of palm oil and forest-related products (Varkkey, 2012, 77-8).

Southeast Asia regionalism is founded on the basis of traditional market model. ASEAN was intended to bring welfare and profit through market liberalization. Integration project was
evaluated on the basis of monetary value of goods and services. All states are assumed to seek material gain (Miller, 2008, pp. 18-19). Economic integration obtained higher priority due to the perception that the economic integration will bring greater economic values to individuals (Amador, 2011). Meanwhile environmental integration received lukewarm attention due to lack of economic incentives to the states.

Meanwhile Elliot also offered similar arguments stating the ineffectiveness of ASEAN’s regional environmental governance. She said:

“Regional environmental structures under ASEAN have generally failed to offer effective channels of communication for and among a wide range of stakeholders, including local communities and sub-national units. Commentators have pointed to the importance of engagement with civil society for robust regional environmental governance structures and processes” (Elliot, 2012: 62).

The case study of the Indonesia ratification to ASEAN Agreement of Transboundary Haze Pollution is an interesting attempt to evaluate the comments above. Buzan (2004) urged English Scholars to devise regional analysis of English School and regional environmental governance is a promising arena for English School-based regional environmental governance.

Forest Fires and Transboundary Haze in Indonesia and Southeast Asia

Forest fires in Indonesia and transboundary haze in Southeast Asia has transformed ASEAN’s meeting into a debate forum for Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia. Due to the forest fires, Singapore had significant decrease of income on tourism industry and industrial investment. It is estimated that 1997’s fires had burdened Singapore’s economy around US$ 9-10 Billion with additional US$ 1.5 Billion for assisting fire-fighting in Indonesia (Forsyth, 2014, p. 18). In a more moderate figure, Varkkey (2011, p. 87) mentioned the data of Singapore’s damage around US$ 97.5 Million during 1997’s forest fires crisis. In 2006, Singapore’s Changi airport was forced to closed due to low visibility and disrupt Singapore’s mega events such as F1 race and APEC forum (Varkkey, 2011, p. 87).
Due to the deadly threat of haze to human health, Malaysia declared state of emergency in the state of Sarawak and prepared evacuation plan for two millions of its inhabitants (Barber & Schweithelm, 2000, p. 20). Schools and factories were closed. There were 65% increase of asthma cases and other acute respiratory cases among adults and children (Barber & Schweithelm, 2000, p. 20). Sarawak is very close to the source of haze of Kalimantan islands in Indonesia. In August 1997, there were public demonstration in front of Indonesian embassy office to Malaysia in Kuala Lumpur stating their anger toward the failure of Indonesian government preventing and mitigating the fires and the haze (Wahyuni, 2011).

In response to public demand, Singapore and Malaysia expressed their interest to have collective anti-haze efforts under the framework of ASEAN. Singapore government questioned the seriousness of Indonesian government and offered assistance using ASEAN’s framework. Indonesian government rejected the assistance by saying that the mitigation of forest fires was the sole authority of Indonesian government (Nguitragool, 2011).

Varkkey (2009) argued that Indonesia’s persistence of rejecting ASEAN framework was caused by the trauma of IMF’s experience, the hand-over of Indonesian’s islands to Malaysia, Indonesia’s vulnerability of internal conflict, and colonial history. Nguitragool (2011) and Dauvergne (1998) added that Indonesian government had internal friction regarding the cause of the fires resulted into contradicting policies between Ministry of Forest and Ministry of Environment. Former Head of National Committee for Disaster Management Azwar Anas stated that forest fires were due to natural phenomenon of El-Nino which was hardly mitigated and prevented (Nguitragool, 2011). Meanwhile Minister of Environment Sarwono Kusumaatmadja complained that corporation didn’t seriously consider environmental impact of forest fires because they had political protection from Suharto’s ruling family (Dauvergne, 1998).

However, Indonesian Environment Minister also accused that Malaysian companies were also responsible toward the forest fires. Tempo (2013) reported that there were eight Malaysian companies suspected of causing fires in Riau and Jambi. The police
discovered burnings in the concessions owned by Malaysian companies (Tempo, 2013). The rivalry of Indonesia with Singapore and Malaysia indicated the debate of the effectiveness of state-centric system in overcoming of the impact of environmental crisis. The absence of effective prevention mechanism of transboundary haze was partly due to the primacy of sovereign government over the interest of the nature.

The persistence of sovereignty of Indonesia in dealing with fires has some parallels to Indonesia foreign policy toward ASEAN. For Indonesia, ASEAN should work based on the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention including in discussing environmental problems. ASEAN Way is reflecting Indonesia foreign policy that adopted a consensus, non-legalistic binding and informal approach (Acharya, 1997). For Varkkey (2011), it takes longer time to solve environmental problems using ASEAN Way rather than using binding approach as used by the European Union.

In his comparative studies, Varkkey (2011) claimed that ASEAN Way has hampered effective prevention mechanism of transboundary haze.

ASEAN Way is a manifestation of pragmatic, self-interest and gradualist development of governments (Acharya 1997). Meanwhile The European Union has built an effective cooperating institution using the Convention of Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution in dealing with acid rain with regional scope. Moreover, the EU has authority to impose punishment for any abuse of power that leads to ecological crisis (Varkkey 2011). Effective prevention of haze and fires needs regional responsibility with the focus of improving commitment toward the nature, ecosystem and environment.

The transboundary haze and forest fires indicated the normative tension between sovereignty and the interest of non-human nature and future generations. Forest fires and transboundary haze are the main effect of Indonesia’s policy to focus to exploit the natural resources and exchanged it for massive infrastructure development in health and education services as well as other public facilities such as roads, airports, and seaports. In the leader’s view, forests can bring financial benefits to the host states by trading the timber and converted the land into palm oil or pulp plantation. Indonesian government has
also distributed mass hectares of forests land to the local community through transmigration program (Dauvergne, 1994).

Sovereignty is a primary institution of International Relations and this primacy has destructive consequences on ecosystem and the Earth. Ozone depletion, water scarcity, air pollution and oil spill are just few disasters related to industrialization and modernization. Moreover, this situation is immutable (Eckersley, 2005). The recurring pattern of environmental crisis seems confirming the immutability thesis that states will not give up their national interest in exchange for ecological thought (Laferrière & Stoett, 1999). Falk explained the factors of immutability:

“A world of sovereign states is unable to cope with endangered-planet problems. Each government is mainly concerned with the pursuit of national goals. These goals are defined in relation to economic growth, political stability and international prestige. The political logic of nationalism generates a system of International Relations that is dominated by conflict and competition. Such a system exhibits only a modest capacity for international co-operation and co-ordination. The distribution of power and authority, as well as the organization of human effort, is overwhelmingly guided by the selfish drives of nations” (Falk, 1971, pp. 37-38).

Falk’s classical text above is a perfect illustration of the pessimism of power-political continuum. The priority of national interest and hard power competition put the interest of the Earth and the ecosystem aside. In the anarchic international system, governments can’t expect superior agency in protecting their territory and the power from external aggression. Government will use diplomacy and all related instruments to protect their territory and their peoples. Governments will not compromise their goal for the achieving ecological interest.

**ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution (AATHP)**

The immutability of pluralism was tested after Indonesia ratified ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution (AATHP). It needs 13 years for
Indonesia to ratify the agreement. During the ratification process, many articles showed pessimism of Indonesia’s commitment to ratify the agreement. Nguitragool (2011) argued that AATHP was seen as a threat to Indonesian sovereignty meanwhile Purwaningtyas (2007) claimed that Indonesian parliament didn’t support AATHP due to lack of short-term incentives.

Varkkey (2009) showed that nationalist sentiments played an important role in Indonesia’s long process of ratification of AATHP. AATHP also provoked internal dispute between Indonesian cabinet that Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Environment supported the ratification meanwhile Ministry of Forest were pessimist toward the prospect of AATHP (Nguitragool, 2011). The neglect of AATHP within the Indonesian parliament and the government’s agenda gave few reasons to develop environmental studies of English School.

The absence of commitment to integrate environmental responsibility into Indonesian foreign policy agenda didn’t provide foundation and background to develop sustainable development, climate responsibility or environmental justice into English School discourse. However, the ratification of AATHP is a surprise that negated this pessimism. From the case study of transboundary haze, Indonesia’s ratification to AATHP in 2015 is a symbol of importance of solidarism-based environmental studies of ES. AATHP has the normative ambition to realize forests as the public goods for future generations. With this kind of ambition, AATHP endorsed win-win solution such as AATHP fund, joint coordination on forest fires combat or ASEAN Humanitarian Agency.

The ratification of Indonesian government of AATHP is a breakthrough of the environmental studies because it changed the priority of government from high politics issues such as security and welfare toward the forestry issues. This is closely related to the new presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. From the beginning of his leadership, environmental issues along with anti-corruption program emerged as the priority agenda. In 2010, the president also signed the REDD+ letter of intent with Norwegian government by issuing moratorium for forest conversion
Yudhoyono government received one Billion US Dollar from Norwegian government for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation. The bilateral agreement indicated that Indonesian government are looking to change their meaning of sovereignty not based only on the narrow definition of material gain but also including environmental justice and sustainable development.

Yudhoyono government emphasized the importance of keeping the forest for future generations and this policy has parallel to sustainable development global developmental platform advising a “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generation to meet their own needs” (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987). Sustainable development requires changes in patterns and levels of production and consumption, protection and promotion of biodiversity, inter- and intra-generational equity (Baker, Kousis, Richardson, & Young, 1997, p. 9). Forest, then, is a critical element in sustainable development that it provided rich biodiversity ecosystem and resources for future generation. REDD+ is a sustainable development policy as it promoted and protected forest.

After published by World Commission on Sustainable Development, sustainable development was a key concept in Rio De Janeiro Conference in 1992 with the focus to be the platform of cooperation between developing and developed countries for addressing global environmental problems (Bernstein, 2001). Sustainable development was also used as main topic for Johannesburg Conference with the focus of inclusion of corporation and private entities in state-led regional environmental governance. Multi-stakeholder initiative is one of the results of Johannesburg negotiation and can be considered as a derivative of sustainable development (Robertua, 2017).

Not only about Indonesia’s ratification to AATHP, environmental studies are stronger after significant change in domestic environmental legislation. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has established National Climate Change Council in 2008 that oversee the implementation of Indonesian’s climate change policy (McLellan, 2015). In 2009, the new environmental protection legislation law
is signed. The law required all national, provincial and city governments to develop environmental management plans. Indonesia also returned the forest to the local indigenous communities.

As mentioned earlier, Indonesia has 50-70 million tribal people and 8.2 million hectares of forest belong to them (Aljazeera 2017). Through the national law of Forest in 1987, Indonesian government grabbed all the land into the ownership of the state. However, Indonesia’s Constitutional Court ruled in 2013 that the tribes have the right to manage forests and the government should return the customary lands to tribal communities (Aljazeera, 2017). Tribal group’s victory is not only the victory for minority but also for the solidarism pillar that advised for significant shift to adopt non-state actors in the environmental politics.

Indonesia’s ratification to AATHP showed that the inclusion of environmental responsibility in the environmental studies of ES did not obstruct the primary institution of sovereignty. The contradiction of anarchy and environmental responsibility is not necessary in the construction of solidarist environmental studies. The ratification of AATHP, the emergence of domestic environmental legislation and the adoption of environmental responsibility marked the end of the immutability thesis.

The attention toward new actors marked the beginning of environmental studies without avoiding the decline of states. Multinational corporations and civil society are new actors in International Relations because they have similar goals to the states that contributing to peace, non-violence and property rights. In the case of transboundary haze and forest crisis, corporation and civil society are building alliance in campaigning for environmental-friendly products by introducing the green-label. The alliance is monitoring whether the activities of corporations comply with the standards of environmental-friendly products. Some notable examples of these alliances are Roundable Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) and Forest Stewardship Council (FSC).

RSPO and FSC are important tools in the campaign on the harmful impact of forest fires and haze. They set the environmental standards for corporation and monitoring the compliance and appreciating the achievement as well. The
main purpose of RSPO and FSC is to promote sustainable development and environmental responsibility for corporations beyond the narrow self-interest (Moog, Spicer, & Bohm, 2015).

As stated by Falkner, Stockholm Conference, Rio Conference and Johannesburg Conference were empowering pro-environmental actors within government and created a complex interaction regarding treaty commitments, institutional linkages and actors networks (R. Falkner, Global environmentalism and the greening of international society 2012, 516). In Stockholm Conference, there was a rift between developed and developing which need 20 years to fix the rift. 20 years from Stockholm, developed and developing countries agreed on the environmental responsibility (Dauvergne, 2008, pp. 454-459). There is a shift of the debate whether developed or developing countries that are responsible into the debate on the form of new global economy that supported the non-human nature and the weak groups in a society.

To be able to explain the role of RSPO, environmental studies of ES must reject the immutability of the inhospitality between order and justice. The argument is that international order is compatible with environmental justice. Therefore environmental studies of ES will be inclusive combining state with non-state actors that have the same goals of preserving the ecosystem and the Earth. The assumption of environmental studies is that global crisis is happening and it is the result of excessive use of natural resources. Globalization accelerated the exploitation and the way forward is transformation from anthropocentric view into new global economy that promoted local wisdom, environmental justice and internationalization of non-human life (Clapp & Dauvergne, 2005, pp. 14-15).

Environmental Studies of English School

As mentioned earlier, the rivalry of order and justice is the main hindrance of environmental studies of ES. If there is a rivalry of order and justice, it is hard to think about environmental justice, climate responsibility and sustainable development. The previous Bull’s quote confirmed the victory of this argument. However, using the case study of Indonesia ratification to AATHP, the shift from rivalry mode to the cooperation mode is evident.
Environmental justice didn’t exclude sovereignty but enhanced the new meaning of sovereignty. Robin Eckersley said that sovereignty is not only about the territorial defender but also environmental protector, trustee or public custodian of planetary commons (Eckersley, 2004, p. 209). Interestingly Bull has a doubt on the environmental movement itself. In the end of his book, he mentioned that:

“It is obvious that if all men were as willing to co-operate in the pursuit of common goals as the crew of a spaceship, these threats to the human environment would be easier to meet than they are … First, what inhibits a common global plan for action in relation to the environment is not the existence of the system of states but the fact of human disagreement and conflict in the ecological realm itself … To avert a universal ‘tragedy of the commons’, all men in the long run may have to learn to accept limitations on their freedom to determine the size of their families, to consume energy and other resources and to pollute their environment, and a state system that cannot provide these limitation may be dysfunctional” (Bull, 1977, 283).

Therefore, English School is not only theories of sovereignty, war, balance of power and diplomacy but also theories of environmental justice, climate responsibility and sustainable development. Environmental studies of ES was established by looking the interaction between these institutions. Environmental studies is looking for the cooperation between these institutions. This research disagree that these new institutions are contradicting with Bull’s primary institutions. It is possible and recommended for having cooperation between these institutions as shown in the case of Indonesia ratification of AATHP.

AATHP is followed by significant change in Indonesia environmental legislation. As said before, Yudhoyono government has established National Climate Change Council and environmental protection law that have been hailed as the hallmark of Indonesia’s commitment to cut the emission through preventing the forest fires. Indonesia also signed letter of intent with Norwegian
government to reduce emission through REDD+ framework. AATHP has indirect impact in changing the perception of Indonesian government toward more proactive in embracing environmental values.

Environmental studies of English School started from the assumption of the domination of pluralism. In the case of AATHP, Indonesia’s initial rejection to ratify AATHP symbolized the hierarchy of pluralism over solidarism. However, Indonesia ratification of AATHP marked the end of pluralist domination in the environmental studies. It gives possibility of end of pluralism and transformation toward increasing role of solidarism in environmental studies of English School.

Indonesia ratification to AATHP showed that European Union-based regional environmental governance is not relevant to ASEAN regional environmental governance. Elliot (2012) and Varkkey (2011) wanted stronger institutionalization of AATHP with harsher punishment and professional secretariat. Despite of the absence of direct intervention from Singapore and Malaysia, transboundary haze and forest fires have become important political issues for Indonesia. Solidarists argued that it is not necessary to have EU model in implementing regional environmental governance.

Solidarists defined regional environmental governance based on the cooperative relationship between sovereignty and environmental protection. In the case of AATHP, the inclusion of environmental responsibility did not destruct the primary institution of sovereignty. Solidarists argued that regional environmental governance consisted of state and non-state actors. From the case study of AATHP, civil society and corporation are increasing their attention and effort to mitigate the forest fires and transboundary haze.

AATHP has inspired Indonesia to build effective national haze prevention system. ASEAN still emphasized the norm of non-intervention but adopted the norms of sustainable development and environmental responsibility. It is in line with Eckersley’s inclusive sovereignty. Indonesia still obtained their sovereignty but changed their legislation toward a more friendly approach toward environmental issues. Eckersley said:
“Indeed, over the last four decades environmental organizations, movements, and citizens’ initiatives, along with progressive states and certain international organizations, have played a key role in helping to transform the mutually informing international and national discourses of legitimate state conduct in a greener direction, while also introducing a new layer of domestic state functions and practices ... Many of these achievements are merely rhetorical in the sense that the new discourse of sustainable development outstrips the shift in actual practices, but the environmental and broader green movements have nonetheless changed public expectations and provided new standards by which state behavior is to be judged and called to account” (Eckersley, 2005, p. 168).

The pessimistic view of Varkkey and Elliot in dealing with Southeast Asian environmental problems was negated by Indonesian people and Indonesian people who wanted to stop Indonesian government policies that destroy the forest and the environment. ASEAN haze fund and ASEAN center on transboundary haze has assisted Indonesia in dealing with forest fires. ASEAN’s commitment in enhancing national institution and network, data and information management, research and development and education and training have pressured indirectly Indonesian government to seriously combat and mitigate the forest fires and haze (Lian & Robinson, 2002).

Solidarists wanted to have regional environmental governance that emphasized trust, learning and transparency. Despite of the absence of punishment of violation for multilateral environmental agreement, Hurrell and Kingsbury (1992, 24-5) stated that there are two positive outcome of non-binding and soft agreement. Firstly, international law provided expectations that states will be involved in long-term cooperation and in a wide-range of issues. In the case of AATHP, Indonesia is still active in ASEAN’s meeting regarding the haze and involved in the holistic haze prevention mechanism. Secondly, international law provided means for learning and contributed to a greater degree of transparency. To conclude, this article
would like to quote Hurrell and Kingsbury’s statement:

“Further, it leads to modifications in perceptions of state interests, with states coming to be more aware of the dangers of environmental degradation and the costs of non-agreement. In sum, environmental regimes facilitate co-operation because of functional benefits which they provide in form of an order based not on coercion, but on coordination of interests and of patterned expectations” (Hurrell & Kingsbury, 1992, pp. 24-5).

**Conclusion**

Hurrell and Kingsbury’s statement above illustrated the solidarist approach toward the current regional environmental governance. State-led regional environmental governance provided foundation and powerful insights for building a new architecture of the future’s global environmental governance. Indonesia ratification to AATHP is a case confirming the shift from pluralism to solidarism.

Forest fires and transboundary haze are perpetual disasters in Southeast Asia. This man-made disaster has been topic of dispute between ASEAN on how to mitigate the impact of forest fires. This article concluded that Indonesian response toward forest fires and transboundary haze pushed the new architecture of Environmental Studies of English School. The domination of pluralism perspective of English School was transformed into solidarism in response to the contemporary roles of international environmental law.

ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution and Indonesia’s ratification of AATHP are examples of the shifting perspective from pluralism into solidarism that more sufficient to accommodate sustainable development, climate justice and environmental ethics. It is also the foundation for regional environmental governance that marked a new importance of civil society and non-state actors in the environmental negotiation.

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Political Leadership in South Korea’s Developmental State: A Historical Revisit

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Abstract

South Korea under President Park Chung Hee underwent rapid industrialization and experienced phenomenal economic growth making the country one of the Asian Tigers alongside Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore. Had suffered by the long-standing Japanese colonialization, South Korea’s development strategies in its incipient economic venture, interestingly, postulate unforeseen similarities with those imposed by Japan primarily during the phenomenal industrial revolution of the Meiji government (1868-1912). Exponential modernization in South Korea was substantially forged by the implementation of ‘developmental state’ model. The term was initially coined by Johnson (1982) to explain the pacification of government policies – rather than market – to achieve successful economic rejuvenation of post-war Japan. In light to this historical paradox between South Korea and Japan, this article attempts to revisit the embarking point of South Korea’s rapid economic development beginning in the 1960s by drawing attention to the importance of leadership as one of the major components of the developmental state model. It concludes that Park Chung Hee’s strong Japanese linkage combined with his pretext for imposing ‘hard authoritarianism’ is particularly influential in determining South Korea’s pragmatic development trajectory.

Key words: developmental state, South Korea, Park Chung Hee, modernization, leadership

Introduction

The behind-the-scenes animosity of South Koreans to Japan is inevitable. Despite the shared cultural heritage and close geographic positions, some unpleasant contacts since the ancient period culminated during the annexation of Korea in 1910 emotionally afflicted the two countries’ view of each other and led...
to a prevailing sense of rivalry even until today. The harsh colonial rule, ‘Japanization’ policy, and ruthless exploitation of Koreans by the Japanese had consequently built a deep hatred amongst Koreans toward Japan. Conversely, as Lee (1985) points out that most Japanese are disdainful and intolerant of Korea, do not understand and are insensitive to the feelings of Koreans, and do not wish to be involved with anything related to Korea, unless, there are rational reasons for doing so. Although there has been a significant shift toward the much better relationship between the two, these emotions are not easily extinguished especially amongst the old generation and the more conservative population. Japanese and Korean can form lasting friendships and working relationships at the individual level, yet there is no sense of genuine friendship at the collective or societal level.

Despite the bitter relationship, South Korea’s successful development policies in the 1960s demonstrate striking similarities with those imposed by Japan during the Meiji’s industrial revolution and Japan’s post-war economic renaissance. Once pronounced as one of the poorest countries in the world after suffering from the devastating Korean War, South Korea emerged as a global economic power in a relatively short period. Albeit being on the American side, South Korea demarcated from the market-based liberal economy and instead imposed an ‘interventionist state pattern’ to boost its economy, a pattern first instituted by the Meiji government during the industrial revolution in Japan (Kim & Jaffe, 2010). The pattern demonstrates a state-centric development or state-driven economic growth in which state utilizes its effective control of the national economy to pursue their global economic interests (Johnson, 1982; Amsden, 1989; Tønnesson, 2017). The pattern distinguishes the East Asian model of development in comparison to the Western model that supports minimization of state intervention.

In the early stage of its rapid economic expansion, South Korea emulated the ‘developmental state’ model, pioneered by Japan, to a significant degree. In addition to placing the centralized state as the engine powering the industrialization, most notable similarities can be seen on the prominence of military power to ensure internal and external stability; its focus on heavy and
chemical industries; and the interlocking relations between the state and the business groups (chaebol, similar to Japan’s zaibatsu) that were given incentives by the government to develop industry deemed vital to development and state’s interests. South Korea’s economic take-off began during Park Chung-hee’s rule (1961 –1979) after a military coup he initiated against Chang Myon’s administration. Immediately after assuming power, Park imposed some policies oriented to the goal of rapid industrialization such as the nationalization of country’s financial assets, including the banking system; and the acceleration of foreign loans inflow to the chaebol with both the principle and interest were guaranteed by the government (Minns, 2001).

Park’s administration had significantly been inspired by the Meiji government’s principle of “rich state and strong army policy” (fukoku kyohei). In the early 1970s, Park shifted its industrial emphasis from light manufacturing towards heavy and chemical industries. The shift was exponentially driven by the US retrenchment post-Vietnam War and its détente with the Soviet Union that consequently decreased its reliability. Park imposed the Heavy and Chemical Industry Plan (HCIP) to provide the capability for self-defense and focus on the production of steel, petrochemicals, electronics, and shipbuilding (Minns, 2001). To ensure internal stability, the regime ensured order and stability through a nationally organized and centrally responsive police and intelligence structures as instruments of rule (Cumings, 1984). Opposition parties were effectively banned during the Fourth, and Fifth Republics and their leaders were subjected to harsh treatment, including imprisonment. Any opposition should be suppressed to keep the whole aspects of state under its control. Moreover, control over the media has been stern (Eckert, 1991). On the other words, Park defaulted on the Western bloc’s most cherished ideas of free elections, liberal democracy, fundamental human and political rights. The South Korean modernization is characterized by particularly acute tensions and discrepancies between effective strategies of development and ideological hypocrisy (Kim K., 2006). The U.S. approach of supporting the Global South’s undemocratic and authoritarian regimes during the Cold War, nevertheless, was common and unsurprising. The need to
contain the spread of communism became the strategic imperative to tolerate the atrocious rule of such regimes and to justify their postwar economic reconstruction effort (Wong, 2004). In turn, these regimes accommodate the United States to gain benefits from aid, investments, and market access and eschew from becoming targets of its hostility (Tønnesson, 2017).

Against this backdrop, this article aims to elucidate the historical paradox between South Korea and Japan through a micro-analysis of political leadership focusing on the role of Park Chung Hee as the developmental state elite. In the next section, I will elaborate on the developmental state model and how the role of political leadership is prominent when applying the model. The sections thereafter will explain the features of the Japanese developmental state model particularly during the Meiji restoration and the ‘presumed’ Japanese legacies prevalent to South Korea’s subsequent development. Lastly, this article will explore the role of Park Chung Hee in actualizing the Japanese developmental state formula to South Korea by reflecting on his personal and professional ties with Japan.

### Developmental State Model: The central role of political leadership

Many observers illustrate the successful modernization process in some countries in East Asia using the developmental state paradigm. The term developmental state is coined by Chalmers Johnson (1982) in his seminal work on Japan’s post-war development. The Japanese formula has been described as ‘plan rational state’ or ‘plan-oriented market economy’ to substantially elucidate the intimate relationship of state with the private sector and the intensity of its involvement in the market (Johnson, 1982). Beeson (2009) posits that unlike “market rational” state that concerns with simply establishing the rules of the economic game, the “plan rational” states sought to formulate and pursue substantive social and economic goals. A developmental state model is defined by some significant components which include a determined developmental elite who effectively conceives executive dominance, creates bureaucratic unity, and a powerful, competent and insulated economic bureaucracy; selective and strategic use of resources and instruments; the effective management of non-state economic interests; and the use of
repression, legitimacy and performance which in corollary sustain a weak and subordinated civil society (Johnson, 1982; Amsden, 1989; Haggard, Kim, & Moon, 1991; Leftwich 1995; Tønnesson 2017). A developmental state is also characterized by the path dependency, institutional cohesion and the interlocking patterns of political and economic power that are such a ubiquitous and distinctive part of development in East Asia (Beeson, 2009).

The core component of the developmental state is political leadership that accentuates executive dominance and embodies determined developmental elite. A developmental state has to be governed by determined and economically oriented elite. Political leadership is central in choosing and realigning economic policies by political rationality and ‘developmental ideology’ (Johnson 1989; Amsden, 1989; Moon & Prasad, 1994). Leader’s motivations and calculations are the vital clues to priority shift and policy change that usually require a perceived crisis among the population and for the new priorities to resonate with the emotional needs of public opinion (Moon & Prasad, 1994; Tønnesson, 2017). Sakata & Hall (1965) on their study about Meiji Restoration argue that study of the motives of the political leaders is a formidable task to explain the figures who were to lead the way in the creation of a new structure of state and society. Leadership style, therefore, determines how the executive dominance in a developmental state is being enforced (reigning vs. ruling). Amsden (1989) suggests the importance of ‘learning’ rather than invention or innovation as the basis of industrialization which is relevant to the context of South Korea. Manufactures were initially developed and competed from borrowed technology which later optimized. They created products similar to those internationally available but with improvements in the specification and lower price thus enhance competitiveness (Amsden, 1989).

Other incremental features of determined developmental elites include the intimate linkage of their civil and military bureaucracy and high political components; and the strong patron-client relations that eventually prompted the practice of corruption, technocratic economic management, patrimonialism, and coercion. Leftwich (1995) further asserts the importance of the executive head of government who plays an instrumental role in establishing the
developmental regime and its culture. Moon & Prasad (1994) examines the bureaucratic-executive nexus in the countries where executive dominance prevails. They posit that in such case, policymaking is profoundly top-down, and bureaucrats hardly have autonomy and power. For instance, South Korea during Park Chung Hee regime, the nexus was rigidly vertical in which the President controls the concentration of administrative and personnel power. Korean bureaucrats were structurally dependent on and vulnerable to the President (Moon & Prasad, 1994). In the East Asian context particularly during the Cold War, the emergence of ‘hard authoritarian’ regimes were the common historical precondition for developmental state model to take place. Hard authoritarian regimes penetrate and prevail over civil society, and organized, subsidized, and controlled social groups (Moon & Prasad, 1994). Most of such regimes in East Asia commonly obtained their political source of the relative state autonomy through military coup d’état or forced transmission of state power (Leftwich, 1995). Traditionally, developmental regimes use the historical mission to deter communist forces to justify their concentration of power and nondemocratic practices hence legitimate the state’s intervention in a wide array of civil society’s activities.

The Unbroken Lineage between South Korean and Japanese Developmental State?

This section will examine the features of the Japanese developmental state model notably that implemented during the Meiji Era, and the Japanese colonial legacies which presumably had laid a necessary foundation for South Korea’s development. The locus of this study is Meiji restoration, and the subsequent modernization of Japan as the foundational establishment of the Japanese developmental state model occurred during the period. Even the Japanese post-World War II economic development indicated a replication of the reform formula of Japan’s Meiji era (Tønnesson, 2017).

Distinctive Features of Japanese Developmental State Model in the Meiji Era (1868-1912)

What makes the Japanese development model – particularly that of the Meiji era – different from the Western
model? The Japanese model of development is recognized as the developmental state system where the state has dominant control over economic development. The government involvement in economic affairs is following ‘the command and control’ mode. The command and control mode demonstrate the extent of the military organizations’ reliance on the hierarchy and direct commands as well as central planning in which bureaucrats set production targets and quotas for farms and manufacturing firms (Mosk, 2008). At an early stage of its industrial development Japan was so poorly endowed by raw materials to support industrialization. The strategy to overcome this was to become an exporter of industrial goods to ensure foreign exchange availability which can be used to import raw material and to meet the cost of imported technology and expertise required to ‘catch up’ with other industrial countries (Breen, 1997).

The Japanese model of development can be understood by observing the historical, political and social aspects that establish the distinctive features of this model. The Japanese unprecedented rapid development was led by the Meiji Restoration (Meiji Ishin) starting in 1868 through the restoration of the imperial rule in Japan. Some historians argue that the breakdown of feudal economy and weakening defense capability during the late period Tokugawa had led to the increased threat of foreign invasion by the Western powers and caused widespread resentment against the shogunate (Sakata & Hall, 1956). The restoration was trademarked as a ‘revolution from above’ to modernize and maintain independence from a threatening West. After the coup which ended the Tokugawa rule, the Meiji oligarch leaders, consisting of those from Satsuma and Chōsū, launched a rapid program of industrialization emphasizing economic development as the key of security and to escape the country from backwardness (Ginsburg, 2001). The Restoration led to enormous changes in Japan’s political and social structure which marked as the starting point of Japanese modernization. It created an immensely powerful central government; abolished warrior privileges and open the administration office to anyone with the required education and skills; and instituted a compulsory military service
system and universal public education to all people (Mosk, 2008).

Meiji restoration has some distinctive features in its way of modernizing Japan. First, the most crucial element of the Meiji period was the principle of fukoku kyohei (enrich the country, strengthen the military) which explicitly aimed at absorbing Western technology and institutions in political, economic and military affairs with the ultimate aim of resisting the pressure of and subsequently repelling the Western power (Mosk, 2008). Macpherson (1987) posits that this xenophobic nationalism apparently dictated Meiji’s rapid industrialization. As the industrialization became an economic underpinning of military power, the state particularly encouraged the import – then followed by the production – of indigenous technology and industry in fields such as steel, machine tools and shipbuilding (Alexander, 2008). Japan began to adopt the Western military technology, build arsenals and shipyards, establish technical schools, and invite foreign military advisers (Hacker, 1977). While internally, the politics of the early Meiji period were dominated by the need to extinguish domestic opposition particularly by the disgruntled samurai. Until domestic unrest could be squished, it would be difficult for the government’s authority to effectively institute policy and force the public to comply with it.

Secondly, one of the corollaries of fukoku kyohei was the shokusan kogyo (encourage the manufacture and promote industry) led to the emergence of zaibatsu in Japan. It demonstrates a close interaction between government and manufacturing as well as between economic policy and industrial development. The government at all levels should assist industry by coordinating it, by taking a long view of development rather than the short-run emphasis on making annual profits characteristic of decentralized “invisible hand” capitalism, that can appreciate the input-output connections between different sub-sectors of manufacturing (Mosk, 2008). They see that the manifestation of shokusan kogyo could be achieved through the emergence of zaibatsu and the financial groups who controlled diversified economic empires, ranging from banking to insurance to international trade to textiles to iron and steel to shipbuilding to iron and steel manufacture. Through these strategies formulated by the Meiji oligarchs, Japan
jumped rapidly into the phase of capital monopoly. On the other hand, Mosk (2008) argues that this strategy had a detrimental consequence to the emergence of a military-bureaucratic class who monopolizes capital in the form of the *zaibatsu* operating hand in glove with the authorities. The nation was hijacked by a tiny elite consisting of influential militarists and capitalists taking advantages from the government absolute power over the economy. The Japanese system is unique due to this compact system of networks between state agencies, and business firms coined as ‘crony capitalism’ which portray collusion between all parties rather than competition. Furthermore, in Japan’s case, the state possesses the strength to penetrate and mobilize the society using the development narrative (Evans, 1995). This relative autonomy, as Evans (1995) described, includes bureaucratic agencies that were not only capable and coherent but also manipulation of the society and close ties with the economic actors who in turn support the policy implementation and the ‘guided’ development.

*Presumption of ‘Japanese Colonial Legacies’*

There is still an ongoing debate amongst Koreans – and scholars – about the Japanese colonial legacies on Korean development. Some argue that the Japanese colonization transformed Korea into a developmental state through the production-oriented policy and establishing a business-government alliance that facilitated industrialization (Kohli 1994; Kohli 1997; Kohli 2004; Cumings 1984). The colonial economy experienced steady growth and industrialization, but it also became rather heavily export-oriented, including exports of manufactured products. Besides, the colonial imposed brutal repression and systemic control of the lower classes in both the cities and the countryside. The cumulative impact of these state-class configurations was to create a framework for the evolution of a high-growth political economy (Kohli, 1994). Eckert (1991) further asserts that there is a continuity between colonial and post-colonial Korean economic structure, noting the common elements in both the development models: ‘the pivotal economic function of the state, the concentration of private economic power in the hands of a few large business groups or *chaebol* (*zaibatsu* in Japanese
the emphasis on exports, and the threat or actuality of war as a stimulus for economic growth.

Conversely, some skeptics argue that amidst a claim of economic growth in the colonial Korea, the record was relatively modest. Furthermore, there were restrictions on indigenous business activity, limited employment opportunity in both public and private sectors for Koreans, agricultural surplus and investments were primarily directed to military rather than economic imperatives (Haggard, Kang, & Moon, 1997). There was a period gap between the end of Japanese rule and the beginning of Korea’s economic takeoff in which Korea suffered from fundamental policy change and war. Much of the Japanese-financed capital was destroyed during the war. Lastly, the Japanese involvement in the emergence of Korean firms and entrepreneurs in the interwar period is questionable. Some of the current chaebols, like Samsung and LG (formerly Lucky-Goldstar), had ostensibly begun their operations during the Japanese rule (Breen, 1997). It is argued that irrespective of Japanese colonialization, such firms would have emerged, although the Korean acquisition of Japanese assets had contributed to the rise of some economic groups in the 1950s (Haggard, Kang, & Moon, 1997).

Why does the Japanese legacy become so essential in discussing the Korean model of development? As a starter, it is necessary to understand the nature of Japanese colonization in Korea. Japan’s annexation policy toward Korea was driven by its desire to become the hegemonic power in the region by building a mighty military might with the supports from the annexed states (Kim K., 2006). Thus, any ‘modernization’ policies and infrastructure built by the Japanese in the colonial Korea were selfishly motivated and most Koreans did not obtain any benefits from them (Kohli, 1997). It can be argued that leaving vital resources to support the future development in Korea is not of the prudent intention of Japan when colonizing the peninsula but merely an ‘unintended’ result of Japan’s expansionist policy.

Before the Japanese annexation, Korea had been experiencing domestic instability due to some political riots as well as unequal agreements with foreign powers mainly Japan, China, the U.S.,
Germany, Russia, Italy, and France which resulted in weakening sovereignty of the country. These agreements significantly reduced Korea’s control over ports, railways, and many other vital assets. Besides, corruption had become the common practice of the government officials and rigid social structure widened the economic gap between the higher social class and the lower class that consequently fueled resentment by the commoners against the government. After the assassination of Queen Min in 1895 by the Japanese and their Korean followers, political unrests were culminated and fueled by the increasing Japanese domination following the murder. Russia took advantage of this situation by forcing King Kojong to submit to the Russian legation in the hope that the foreign power can help deter the Japanese. However, after Japan’s victory over Russia, the Treaty of Portsmouth assured Japan effective supremacy in Korea. Furthermore, the Agreements of 17 November 1905 and 24 July 1907 arbitrarily gave the Japanese government the rights to interfere in Korea’s domestic affairs signaling the beginning of Japanese occupation (Kleiner, 2001). Kohli (1994) argues the ‘modernization’ experience was the most plausible – if not instrumental – legacy of the Japanese colonialism. Korean capitalism learned from the provided framework established during the colonialization. The colonial power emphasis on building not only military and police forms of control but also the development of the peninsula under strong state auspices is a particularly instrumental lesson for the future Korean developmental elite. Japan had brought the access to modern technology and management. Managerial practices were changed in agriculture, industry, transportation, and government. For instance, Japanese government’s deliberate promotion of modern agricultural practices such as irrigation, improved seeds, and the use of fertilizer had pushed productivity growth in colonial Korea (rice production rate of 2% per annum) (Kohli, 1994). Japan also introduced and utilized the “mighty trio” formula of the developmental state which is a coalition of the state bureaucratic organization, central banks, and zaibatsu conglomerates to industrialize Korea and parts of Manchuria (Cumings, 1984). Japan also located various heavy
industries – steel, chemicals, hydro-electric power – in Korea and built an extensive network of railways in Korea (Cumings, 1984). However, much of those infrastructures were destroyed during the Korean War.

Japanese imperialism differs from its Western counterpart in several fundamental respects. Japan always sought to exercise a more intensive form of control over its colonies than European powers and to integrate its colonies into its economic structures. To facilitate economic exploitation and political control, the Japanese constructed a highly repressive, efficient, modern state in Korea. It exercised a pervasive and highly intensive form of control over all aspects of social and economic life in Korea (Piric, 2008). Japan distorted the structure of Korean society by replacing Confucian and other indigenous teachings into a disciplined colonial bureaucracy education. Other influences of the Japanese colonialization to the Korean education include large-size classes, a heavy emphasis on academic – rather than vocational – studies, moral education, deep respect for the authority of the teacher and a government-managed system of examinations for entrance to the high school and university (Mason, 1980).

It has been argued that the Japanese transformed a relatively corrupt and ineffective traditional state into a modern one that was capable of transforming the society. One could argue that the Japanese Empire had significant contribution in liberating Koreans from the backwardness and stagnation, in which Koreans were otherwise unable to generate political and economic change (Palais, 1995). However, Eckert (1996) asserts that the authoritarianism that for decades epitomized South Korean politics after the Korean War owed much to the political character of the various Korean elites generated during the late-colonial period.

**Political Leadership of Park Chung Hee (1961-1979) and South Korean Developmental State**

Following the end of World War II, the relationship between the two countries develops in an intricate pattern. Japan and Korea (North and South) were engulfed in the post-war political realm as the world entered the tumultuous Cold War period. Korea was divided into the communist North and the ‘nominally’ liberal democratic South. Meanwhile, Japan began its pacifism era in which it
drastically diminished any armed forces with war potentials. In the wake of Korean War (1950-1953), Japan and South Korea were awkwardly unified under the security patronization of the United States and inherently be an integral part of the global political contestation between the superpowers. South Korea and Japan had connected another link in their future where both countries are to prepare to enter the battlefield side to side, regardless their past chronicle, if the truce with North Korea is broken.

In the immediate aftermath of Korean War, South Korea evidenced the fall of Syngman Rhee, an anti-communist independence figure who was elected as South’s first president, due to the widespread discontent of his iron-hand and corrupt government. A nation-wide protest eventually took place but was responded by police shooting which led to a subsequent chaotic mass riot. Rhee was ultimately ousted and replaced by Yun Bo-Seon as the President and Chang Myeon as Prime Minister. Despite the exit of Rhee, the political and economic instability persisted which provided a political opportunity for the military coup d’état, carried out by Park Chung Hee in 1961. Park was a high-rank military officer who had long initiated the establishment of the Military Revolutionary Committee within the military corps to plan the coup. The coup brought Park into power, and the subsequent approval and official recognition from the United States gave him the legitimate leadership status after that. Under Park administration, South Korea experienced a ‘miraculous’ modernization that turned the country from one of the poorest one in the world into one of the global economic powerhouses.

Essentially, Park Chung Hee has a significant Japanese influence in his life. Park Chung Hee had the primary education at Kumi Elementary School and Taegu Normal School, both of them using the Japanese educational system. There is a notion of Park Chung Hee being a cold and self-centered realist. It was reflected in his elementary school days where he always carefully calculated his strategy and enjoyed exercising the authority given to him. He also had a great attraction to soldiering since a very young age. After spent some years becoming a teacher in Munkyong, he got a chance to be an army by receiving Japanese military education in Japanese-occupied Manchuria and Imperial Japanese Army Academy for
several years. This Japanese experience was seen as a vital component in the character of Park's future rule. Not only was he exposed to Japanese military planning, but he and his fellow Korean officers were imbued with the Japanese attitude of placing the interests of the group and nation before personal or family interest. In this sense, they were much less typically Korean than the preceding generations. Even after he became the President of South Korea, he still showed the mentality and behavior of a Japanese (Breen, 1997).

It was observed that Park Chung Hee, mentally, was obliged to think “Japanese,” by devoting to the Yamato spirit of “one hundred million hearts beating as one,” and giving the loyalty and self-sacrifice to the emperor (Kim H.-A., 2004). Park Chung Hee was even accused of being a pro-Japanese due to his action of submitting the Oath of Allegiance demonstrating his devotion to the Japanese Empire (Hankyoreh, 2009). Park was also seen as having the ambition to reinvent his identity as a ‘victorious’ Japanese Army officer. Within just three months of being in the army, Park voluntarily Japanized his name to Takaki Masao. It was described that Park Chung Hee looked like a Japanese soldier from the way he sat and stood to his actions characterized by his accuracy, speed, decisiveness and his action-oriented based character. Park graduated from the military academy with an excellent record and the Emperor of Manchuria Henry P’u-Yi awarded Park a gold watch for his academic excellence (Kim H.-A., 2004).

There are some policies and development strategies imposed by Park Chung Hee demonstrating the significant influence of his Japanese experience. Had it not been Park Chung Hee, it could be unlikely for South Korea to adopt the Japanese developmental state model to an unprecedented degree. The most fundamental policy was the normalization of South Korea-Japan relations in 1965 in exchange for Japanese aid and investment. By February 1964, just a little over a month after Park’s presidential inauguration on 27 December 1963, normalization talks between Japan and Korea began. Normalization of Korea’s relations with Japan had also been part of the US policy from 1947 as part of the US containment strategy, which was designed to make Japan a partner in the Cold War against communism. The US policy regarding normalizing Korea-Japan
relations demonstrates a shift from demilitarization and democratization toward economic rehabilitation to create a dominant anti-communist force in North-East Asia. In contrast to Syngman Rhee’s anti-Japanese stance, Park Chung Hee made a bold move to support this normalization idea. He visited Japan’s Prime Minister Ikeda in Tokyo in November 1961 and talked not only with Ikeda but also many Japanese business leaders. Although Park’s primary interest was economic, this move shows his flexibility in dealing with Japanese compared to the former regimes.

Park Chung Hee was seen to be greatly inspired by the Meiji Restoration’s principle that emphasizes the need of economic development to strengthen the military in order to resist the potential threat (*fukoku kyohei*). Park’s “Administrative Democracy” or “Koreanized Democracy” was the public rationale for his military-style administration, which, he claimed, was necessary to root out the past and to construct a new generation of national leadership comprising former military officers, technical engineers and other experts with professional qualifications (Kim H.-A., 2004). Park Chung Hee mentioned that:

“I want to emphasize, and re-emphasize, that the key factor of the May 16 Military Revolution was to effect an industrial revolution in Korea…I must again emphasize that without economic reconstruction, there would be no such things as triumph over Communism or attaining independence.” (Park Chung Hee) (Kim H.-A., 2004)

This statement demonstrates how the potential threat from the North drives the economic development view of the South Korean leader. His regime rejected the use of force against North Korea and instead stressed the need to build national strength and security through economic modernization. In this manner, Park wished to win over the communist in the North.

The ‘mighty trio’ formula of Japan’s Meiji was replicated during Park Chung Hee regime with the presence of the Economic Planning Board (EPB), state’s control over the nationalized banking system, and the role of the chaebol. Only months after he assumed power, Park nationalized the banking
system and controlled 96.4% of the country financial assets by 1970 (Luedde-Neurath, 1988). Economic planning was taken seriously in South Korea during Park Chung Hee administration where he set up the Economic Planning Board (EPB), the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry as the core economic bureaucracies. These ministries held the responsibility to combine the budgetary and planning powers and had tremendous power over economic decision-making (Haggard, Kim, & Moon, 1991). Organized business groups are regularly consulted on matters affecting the private sector, but it is evident that such groups exercise no influence on the country’s decision-making (Mason, 1980). Institutions are structured to facilitate this participation, and there is ample testimony that President Park and his economic secretariat in the Blue House were fully engaged in the process. Park subjugated bureaucrats under his grip and dictated virtually every policy detail (Moon & Prasad, 1994).

The South Korean pattern of development has a strong sense of nationalism on it which demonstrates another similar pattern with the fundamental factor driving the Meiji restoration. While the threat of Western invasion ostensibly drove the Meiji regime’s modernization policy, South Korea’s economic development was defined to address the threat from the North. Unlike Western companies, whose raison d’etre is to increase the wealth of their shareholders, Korean firms were substantially established and existed for nation-building. Thus, Korea appeared to be a capitalist country on the surface, whereas on the inside its practices and attitudes made it look much more socialist (Breen, 1997). It was during the Park Chung Hee regime that business conglomerate structure (chaebol) gained its momentum. Park particularly wanted firms that could compete internationally with the Japanese. He thought that, as Koreans were not hard workers, and, as businesspeople and politicians were corrupt, a few loyal and capable lieutenants would be more effective than the vast army of small and medium business people. There was a risk that the development of large, powerful groups could provide power bases for ambitious tycoons to challenge his authority. However, Park Chung Hee thought he was able to control the chaebol with his
hard authoritarian and militaristic approach (Breen, 1997).

Another similarity between Park Chung Hee’s strategy and the Meiji regime was the use of Western economic and technological advance without necessarily adopting the Western model of development. The developed West, in general, was crucial to the Koreans for its technological import. Korean growth was possible because Korean workers were cheap and disciplined, and educated enough to learn how to use or copy foreign machines (Breen, 1997). Although independence is the main emphasis in Park Chung Hee’s idea of economic development, he understood the importance of the alliance with the U.S. for Korea’s growth. The U.S. government provided a security shield against possible renewed conflict with North Korea, and a market for Korean products. There have been tensions and difficulties, but the benefit to Korea was that it was both in American strategic interest and a natural consequence of American values as a nation born in opposition to imperialism, that its client state grows economically and politically from near-total dependency to equal partnership.

Ultimately, following the path of the Meiji government on extinguishing the corrupt Tokugawa rule, Park Chung Hee also had been enforcing the resurrection of Korean national character, primarily those in support of economic development since the national character on his view was – to some extent – had been polluted during the Choson Dynasty era, the last dynasty of Korea prior to the Japanese annexation. During his presidency, Park Chung Hee was known as a supporter of anti-elitist and anti-populist ideals, which were manifested in the self-restrained and disciplinary atmosphere (Han, 2004). Park was one of the most financially disciplined dictators in history showed his strictness in handling political funds in an attempt to prevent corruption, especially within the elite circle. Immediately after taking power, he launched an anti-corruption campaign.

**Reflection on Indonesia’s Past and Present**

South Korea’s developmental state model somewhat mirrors Indonesia’s experience during the New Order regime led by Suharto (1967-1998). Both Park Chung Hee and General Suharto had a military background and rose into power
through a military coup in around the same period. Suharto’s regime, dubbed as the New Order, also combined a successful economy-first policy with hard authoritarianism and harsh internal repression. Upon assuming power, Suharto deliberately abandoned his predecessor’s confrontational policy against Malaysia and instead formed the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967 with the former enemy. Furthermore, he sought rapprochement with Japan, Indonesia’s former colonial. Indonesia experienced remarkable economic growth and development throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Industrialization was undertaken by conglomerates, mostly of Chinese-Indonesian descendants, who dominated the nation’s economy even until now. Suharto was consolidating both his power over the army and bureaucracy and the Indonesian developmental state by winning over support or buying off opposition (Leftwich, 1995). However, this strategy consequently provided a fertile ground for the high-level corruption which contributed to the regime’s downfall in the late 1990s. Following the economic crisis in 1998, the regime was unable to sustain the domestic political unrest and the wave of democratization which subsequently ended the regime 31-year rule.

Amidst demonstrating similar patterns, Indonesia failed to reach South Korea’s level of modernization. It can be argued that Indonesia has lost the momentum to modernize the country due to the regime’s inability to control corruption and sustain the emerging domestic political forces. The question is whether the developmental state is still relevance in the current political and economic context? Indonesia’s bitter experience with the authoritarian regime makes it difficult to maintain the old developmental state model which imposes the authoritarian political system. In a democracy, civil society and business sectors are more willing to criticize the government policy or challenge it. Moreover, greater trade and financial integration with other countries can hinder the state from taking full control over the state’s economic process and financial assets. However, Hayashi (2010) argues that the developmental state is not necessarily extinct. The developmental state in the era of globalization needs to accommodate the global market strategically while maintaining the
proactive role of the state. To achieve this trajectory, according to the developmental state formula, the political leadership should be assumed by determined developmental elite with a visionary economic orientation.

Conclusion

Despite its hatred and negative sentiments toward Japan due to the colonization experience, South Korea seems to adopt the Japanese model of development. This condition is contradictory with what South Korea was expected to do if it considers this negativity. With its close ally with the United States, there was a high possibility that South Korea could adopt the Western model of development instead of the Japanese one. As we could see that the main difference between the Japanese and Western model can be seen in the level of the state’s role in the development process. While the Western model supports the market rational with less interference from the state, Japanese model implements a developmental state model in which the state holds effective control over the development process. By referring to the political leadership element within the developmental state concept, I argue that the role of Park Chung Hee is instrumental in South Korea’s adoption of the Japanese developmental state model. Had it not been Park Chung Hee, it would be unlikely to happen. Park Chung Hee was a central figure that could make this paradoxical condition plausible due to his Japanese linkage and his trajectory about South Korea’s modernization in its conjunction with the threat from North Korea.

About the Author

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References


The Radical Politics of Nation-States: The Case of
President Rodrigo Duterte

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Abstract

The advent of terrorism in the midst of political conflict requires an understanding of local context and history. Anti-establishment leaders like President Rodrigo Duterte expose the limits of liberalism. By applying the critical distinction between “politics” and the “political,” we can imagine an alternative framework in our desire to unravel the narrative of Duterte’s communitarian style. Disruption is not simply meant to put into question the status quo. The goal of progressive leadership is to transform society in ways that will improve the difficult lives of the people. While the president’s critics say that he is authoritarian, it will be argued that radical means are needed to overcome the failures of Philippine democracy.

Key words: radical democracy, President Duterte, terrorism, disruptive politics

Background

Is President Rodrigo Duterte’s radicalism a sign of the imminent end to elitist politics in Philippine society? Vicente Rafael (2016) believes that the Philippine president belongs to “an older world of authoritarianism that draws on fascist discourse and revolutionary martyrdom to do away with any constraints.” The historian thinks that Duterte is angry at his detractors, especially those from the West, because the president “feels that such critics, by speaking out, are themselves violating his rights as the sovereign embodiment of the people – rights that include the right to violate the rights of some in order to protect the lives of others” (Rafael, 2016). Rafael appears to be saying that a leader who oppresses the powerless cannot be the liberator of his people. But Duterte is a living paradox. Though some sectors in Philippine society chastise him, Duterte remains extremely popular because Filipinos have faith in the idea that the
present occupant of Malacañang possesses the important leadership attributes that previous presidents lacked. Without argument, Philippine society is witnessing a progressive approach to governance that the country has never seen before.

Rodrigo Duterte, the 16th president of the Philippines, was born in Maasin, Leyte on March 28, 1945. He finished his elementary at Sta. Ana Elementary School, in Davao City. The son of a former governor of the undivided Davao Province, Duterte went to Holy Cross College of Digos (now Cor Jesu College) to complete his secondary education, after having been expelled from the Ateneo de Davao University for misconduct. He graduated with a degree in political science in 1968 at the Lyceum of the Philippines and a Bachelor of Laws in 1972 from San Beda College. He passed the bar exam in the same year.

Karl Gaspar, a prominent anthropologist from Mindanao, was a schoolmate of Duterte in high school. Gaspar was incarcerated during Martial Law. Both met again some years after their graduation when Duterte was assigned as the prosecutor in the case filed against him by the Marcos regime. During an interview, Gaspar said: “I did not vote for him…When he won, I was hoping you know that change would come. I was a bit optimistic regarding how he could function as president and truly proud that we have somebody from Davao, from Mindanao who finally made it as the President of the Republic of the Philippines” (Basallajes and Dejito, 2018). But Gaspar was disappointed when Duterte allowed the burial of Marcos in the Libingan ng mga Bayani. He is still hopeful, however, that the president will fulfill his promise to end corruption, bring peace to Mindanao, and embrace a truly independent foreign policy (Basallajes and Dejito, 2018).

This study problematizes the style of leadership of Duterte. It will be argued that the linear approach to nation-building will not work given the reality of political discord in nation-states. But this inquiry also examines the role of solidarity in the attempt of charismatic leaders to reverse the fortunes of people. Duterte thinks that his radical means are necessary to alter the destiny of the Filipino people. But more than anything else, the non-traditional ways of his governance reflect the anti-establishment sentiment that now grips the order of things in the world.
To achieve its modest goal of explaining the meaning of Duterte’s radical approach, this study employs critical analysis in Philosophy as a research methodology. Philosophy does not have a singular approach. The search for the truth depends on the rigor of critical thinking. But it is nonetheless concerned with profound questions. While philosophical thought abstracts from the real world, it also seeks answers to those questions that have implications to human life. While philosophical reflection is not a prominent way of doing research in Philippine studies, it is helpful if people understand their self-identity.

To elaborate this issue, the research firstly discusses the advent of terrorism and shows how the same is bred in nation-states like the Philippines. It begins with the Marawi Crisis since how Duterte has quelled the rebellion is suggestive of his strong leadership. Second, the meaning of radical politics in nation-states is considered under which the paper explores whether Duterte’s style of leadership fits the description. Third, while the progressive approach of the current Philippine president is seen as disruptive, the paper argues that it is crucial in transforming Philippine politics. Fourth, this study examines the root cause of the Bangsamoro problem and argues that Duterte’s radical leadership is crucial in addressing the historical injustices done against Muslim Filipinos. Finally, the paper reveals a gap in personalistic politics and proposes that strengthening basic institutions is paramount in achieving the ends of social justice.

The Marawi Crisis and the Advent of Terror

On May 23, 2017, a terrorist organization called Dawlah Islamiyah, locally known as the Maute Group, raised the ISIS Flag in Marawi City, a bustling urban center in western Mindanao, 506 miles away from Manila. On the same day, while on an official State Visit to Russia, President Duterte declared Martial Law on the whole island of Mindanao. The Maute Group had one aim – to establish the first Islamic caliphate in this part of Southeast Asia. Led by two brothers, Omar and Abdullah Maute, the group made an alliance with another terror organization – the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). Five months after quelling the violent siege in Marawi, the Armed Forces of the Philippines reported that 802 militants, 160 government forces, and 47
civilians have been killed (Fonbuena, 2017). Duterte’s leadership was critical in ending the rebellion. The president visited Marawi during combat to boost the morale of soldiers on the ground. No Philippine president in more than half a century has done the same.

The Abu Sayyaf group is infamous for the Sipadan hostage crisis. The notorious terrorist organization was organized by a mujahideen, Abdurajak Janjalani. Its links to Al Qaeda can be traced to the fact that Janjalani fought alongside Osama Bin Laden against the Russians during the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It was reported that the terrorist received six million dollars from Bin Laden to establish the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). The militant organization, which bombed the Superferry 14 passenger vessel in the Philippines in 2004, killing 116 people in the process, follows the Wahhabi doctrine of Sunni Islam. The ASG has attracted young Muslim Filipinos, mostly from the provinces of Basilan and Sulu.

Before the US 9/11 attacks, Bin Laden was consolidating power as the great leader of Al-Qaeda (Bergen, 2011). He inspired his disciples who often described the experience with the terrorist as a spiritual awakening. Peter Bergen (2011) wrote that the first encounters with Bin Laden by his followers were found to be awe-inspiring and felt with God-like reverence. Though born with an enormous fortune, being the son of a rich Saudi contractor, Bin Laden gave up a life of luxury. He was viewed as an extraordinarily charismatic man (Bergen, 2011). The terrorist was not just the titular head of the Al Qaeda organization – he was the symbol for Jihad or Holy War against the enemies of Islam (Bergen, 2011).

Extremist groups showcase their war as the struggle against what they claim as US hegemony in the world. Terrorist leaders persuade their young recruits to wear suicide vests by presenting to them a type of an unjust socio-political order in which US imperial interests allegedly undermine the rights of Muslims. But terrorists have no ideology to speak of. They sow fear and only intend to disrupt normal civilian life. Nick Fotion (2004, pp.46) thinks that “there are, of course, degrees of innocence and guilt; but terrorists who choose all their victims in a random or near-random fashion cannot
help but victimize people who are innocent of any political wrongdoing.”

The random killing of innocent civilians is the conceptual trait of terrorism (Fotion, 2004). Walter Laqueur (1987, pp.143) believes that “terrorists...assume that the slaughter of innocents would sow panic, give them publicity and help to destabilize the state and society.” The above point is the standard explanation. However, our task is to examine the reality of terror further in the tension between modern liberalism and the communitarian nature of politics in nation-states. This is indicative that at the heart of modern liberalism “is the problem of peaceful co-existence among people with different conceptions of the good” (Mouffe, 2009, pp.2).

Francis Fukuyama (1992) thinks of liberalism as the finality of history since authoritarian regimes have been collapsing. However, societies are marching into new forms of political enmity. The most contentious issue confronting modern democracy is the question of cultural hegemony. The oppression of millions has taken a radical turn. The political dichotomy between the bourgeois and the proletariat is no longer the greatest threat to the global order. Samuel Huntington (1996, pp.33) explains that “at a more general level, conflicts between rich and poor are unlikely because, except in some special circumstances, poor countries lack the political unity, economic power, or the military capability to challenge rich countries.”

The poverty of peoples is the least of the West’s concern. The war of cultures is the dragon that will slay modern day liberalism. In various parts of the world, a form of non-traditional state-building is unfolding. After the US invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, the latter established liberal institutions along tribal lines that are constantly challenged by a crippling extremist insurgency (Schaeffer, 2016). Liberals did not anticipate the rise of radical states. Progressive movements came into the picture to challenge the central tenets and the universal appeal of liberal values. Iraq to this day is still marred by lawless violence, a consequence of a failed Western experiment that insists on a brand of democracy that the Iraqi people find alien to their own way of life.
The political struggles in the second half of the past century have become the stress test for Marxist theory. The idea of hegemony points beyond its Marxist interpretation. History cannot be dissolved as some of form a totality (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001). In fact, the homogenous way of understanding the struggles in the peripheries of society should be rejected. Our historical situation says that we have to look beyond the grandeur of liberal concepts. Modern society and capitalism are in such a quandary that the rich-versus-poor divide is no longer sufficient to understand the complexities of modern day politics. We need to underscore the relevance of culture and history to unveil the solid reasons behind the emergence of progressive styles of governance in the world that appear to eschew established political norms.

**The Radical Politics of Nation-States**

Chantal Mouffe’s *The Return of the Political* is an important work in which she explains the distinction between politics and the political. For her, politics is concerned with structures and institutions while the political refers to the reality of conflicts in socio-political relations. Radical democracy does not presuppose any moral position but rightly distinguishes the political from the moral. Mouffe thinks that conflict is the unavoidable characteristic of the political. In this sense, agonistic politics is grounded in the belief that society is not a uniform set of identities. While citizens desire to achieve the common good through a shared vision, the reality is that there are hierarchical differences in the polity.

Deliberative democracy suggests that human reason should be operative and foundational in the conduct of the affairs of the state. Consensus is viewed as the basis for the possibility of harmony in society. But the idea of social harmony is ironical since it is the dominant majority that often imposes its will. This implies the permanence of dissension or disagreement (Mouffe, 1995). The powerful sees as a necessary birthing pain the sacrifice of the people to achieve a certain form of socio-political order. But the idea of a consensus is no more than a cover up for the protection of the self-serving interests of the elite. For instance, Indigenous Peoples (IP) in the Philippines have been displaced and many are forced
out of their ancestral homes due to extractive mining activities (Ty, 2010).

Mouffe (1995) thinks that modern liberalism failed to recognize the value of the political. Social cooperation for liberals is rooted in a neutral starting point. But the vision of a well-ordered society is no more than a theoretical innovation. Liberals seem to suggest that conflicts can be done away with through a negotiating process (Mouffe, 1995). However, Mouffe (1993) says that any well-ordered society does not leave enough space for disagreement. In contrast, there is a need to imagine conflict as a condition for establishing pluralism in society (Mouffe, 1993).

Radical democracy embodies the politics of nation-states. Tom Nairn and Paul James (2005) explain that ethno-nationalism emanates from small-town narratives. The tension in nation states necessitates leaders to act as martyrs for the people. Macario Sakay is a primary example (Ochosa, 2005). The colonial government had labeled him a bandit. The reality was that the revolutionary simply continued the fight against the Americans. The story of Miguel Malvar, for instance, reveals that an interesting trait of heroes is that as a leader they have acted like a father-figure whose main task was to protect the people (Ochosa, 2005). In such a context, local folks find the soul of their community by way of blood ties.

Given a unique culture, history, and belief system, a nation-state is bound to form its own conception of the good. Thus, the politics of nation-states defies a common logic (Mouffe, 1995). For example, a leader like Duterte would demand that no foreign country should interfere in his decisions. It is for this reason that he is perceived as unconventional. Duterte’s unprecedented pivot to China and his open admiration of the kind of leader that Vladimir Putin is do not mean that he wants to be influenced by those two world figures. Rather, his move is an act of defiance from the established global order.

The prevailing international human rights regime, which is liberal in scope and practice, appears to have no impact on Duterte’s frame of mind. Duterte’s radicalism translates to divisive policy decisions. But Duterte, it can be argued, does not oppose the universal concept of human rights, although he thinks that protecting the lives of the
people is on top of his agenda. Duterte has not categorically said that he wants to do away with due process. What he has suggested during his speeches was that the police have the right to defend themselves if there is a threat to their lives in their pursuit of criminals.

But the mystique in Duterte’s style of leadership indicate how he has effectively captured the imagination of the majority of the Filipino people. Duterte is paradoxical because while he is accused of violating human rights, people continue to believe in his cause of protecting the public from hardened criminals. Although he curses prominent personalities, including Pope Francis, the predominantly Catholic country has not wavered in their support for Duterte’s tough approach to politics and governance. Duterte has plenty of critics who point out the controversial appointments of some personalities to official posts, but the president popularity has not waned because he has also instantly fired public officials who are allegedly involved in corruption. He is accused of machismo, but he remains endeared to women in his sorties because of his ability to charm his way into the hearts and minds of the masses.

Modern politics cannot be dictated by absolute norms. Modern democracy cannot be limited to rational discourse (Mouffe, 1995). Modern societies recognize the right of the people to express dissent against the government. The crowd in street protests are considered as part of informal democratic interactions. Politics goes beyond parliamentary deliberations. Alan Finlayson (2009, pp.13) says that while modern democracy reveals the “accommodation of various identities and interests,” the reality is that “radical democracy emphasizes how these are permanently contested in ways that transform them.”

Reynaldo Silvestre (2016) says that, “Mr. Duterte is radical because, as empirically defined, he opposes the established political structure, wholly or partly.” Laclau and Mouffe (1985) argue that radical democracy is dependent on difference-politics. The Filipino people agonize from the inequalities in the socio-political and economic structures of the country. Many do not see hope. His supporters think that only Duterte can defy the powers-that-be stationed in the capital. Silvestre (2016) says that it is Duterte who “opposes a unitary and
highly centralized political structure that had crafted myopic public policies.” Silvestre (2016) points out that the radicalism of Duterte is “a deliberate and persistent thrust toward a qualitative change in the socio-political status quo.”

**Disruptive Politics and Personalistic Leadership**

Duterte has been criticized for targeting human rights, freedom of the press, and the Catholic Church. The president appears to be obliterating his opposition. Sen. Leila de Lima, a vocal critic, is in jail. Supreme Court Chief Justice Ma. Lourdes Sereno, an appointee of the past administration, was booted out from office in a *quo warranto* case. Indeed, Duterte’s brand of politics is perceived as nothing short of being disruptive. The Philippine president disdains protocols and veers away from the established traditions of the office. Mustafa Dikec (2017) says that disruptive politics is not only for the sake of disruption. Disruption is necessary in the attempt to question the status quo.

Duterte’s presidential campaign capitalized on the failures of the Aquino government. By exacerbating the suffering of the people during Typhoon Yolanda due to his impersonal approach, President Aquino just showed proof of his inept and weak leadership. In contrast, as one of the earliest to go to Tacloban City, Duterte presented himself as the hope of the people. Duterte was seen as a caring father figure. This highlighted the incompetence of the former administration. Such complemented the feelings of disillusionment in the minds of many Filipinos.

In fact, Duterte’s personalistic leadership has become a legend to many who idolize him. What is the source of the Duterte legend? First, his popularity may be anchored in his boldness in addressing the problem of criminality. He has threatened drug personalities in public when he was mayor. Duterte views the world using lenses that have an impact in the mindset of the people. For him, the duty of a leader remains singular – to protect public order. The ethical way, it appears, is not part of his political equation. For the majority who knows the troubles of Philippine democracy, it is the political will of a leader that matters. President Aquino lacked courage. In a country that is wanting in discipline, Duterte succeeded in presenting himself as the true champion of law and order.
Second, the development of Davao City reflects the huge confidence of the public in Duterte. Between 1980 and 1986, the city was a picture of chaos and a violent insurgency. Duterte changed this situation when he became mayor. Duterte promised that he can also achieve the same result for the whole country. Deterring criminals is one of the instruments that the president thinks will bring discipline and public order. Davao’s story is not a miracle. It is a product of strong leadership and the kind of discipline that Duterte inculcated in the local population. Duterte’s governance centered only on one thing – his peace and order campaign. But while this is the case, Davao has since achieved real progress and development. For Duterte, the job of a politician is not to be a preacher.

Religious critics say that Duterte is terrorizing the poor. The Catholic Church’s opposition to his “War on Drugs” is grounded on the claim that many of the victims of summary executions belong to the poor. According to Fr. Daniel Franklin Pilario (2017, pp.160), “the only cries we hear are the wailing of mothers, widows, and children as they see the bodies of their beloved now bloodied and lifeless.” Fr. Pilario is expressing the pain felt by the victims of summary executions, most of whom lived in poor neighborhoods. Extra-judicial killings are wrong, but the victims remain voiceless because they are stricken with the fear of more violence. The poor, Fr. Pilario (2017) continues, “painfully suffers in silence.” Still, the president has remained unperturbed. He even vowed to pursue a relentless campaign against illegal drugs.

In another front, Duterte is also waging war against the country’s oligarchs. It seems to be the case that the traditional elite in the capital are shocked by the unpredictability of Duterte. The president has challenged prominent individuals. He has forced big time tax evaders like Mighty Corporation to settle its obligation amounting to thirty billion pesos, the biggest tax settlement ever in the country’s history. Hence, the trust and confidence of the Filipino people in Duterte remain high because they think that he delivers on his promises.

The problem is that the critics of the president express things without realizing that their judgments appear to be impositions of standards that are bred in the West. Such is ignorant of the history
and context that local folks share. Moralizing the political is tantamount to painting a homogenous world order that is overly dependent on Western rationalizations. It disregards the reality that such external standards also preclude people from determining the importance of their communal values. While ideals and universal values are good on paper, the reality on the ground is different given the context of culture and history that people are situated in.

In the politics of nation-states, it is critical to see how local folks have interacted with their own leaders. The social bond is stronger. The relation between the leader and his constituents is beyond the formality of public discourse. For example, Duterte deals directly with ordinary people, goes to the wakes of fallen soldiers, and uses a language that the common tao (human person) can understand. Western-bred politicians are impersonal. But local politics is always personal. The people’s deep sense of belonging naturally arises from the solidarity within one’s group. This type of unity often ignites the drive that characterizes the quest for self-determination.

There is resistance to the licentious approach of Duterte. However, local context is important to demonstrate Duterte’s disruptive style. Millions of Filipinos have long been repressed by an old order that continues to ignore the plight of the poor. It is not just the rising middle class that pushed Duterte’s prominence to a higher level prior to the national elections. Rather, it is the failure of the second Aquino administration to recognize the just demands of ordinary Filipinos that paved the way for all the troubles that we find in contemporary Philippine politics.

The unique feature of politics in nation-states, including the traditions and cultures in which societies are embedded, encourages people to believe that democracy should embrace difference. This is the only way for Philippine society to escape the totalizing gaze of an oppressive political order that is rooted in its colonial history. Decentering politics necessitates the collapse of the present political terrain. As a leader, Duterte is unafraid of the repercussions of his decisions to his future in office. This type of aggressiveness renders the judgment that the president is in fact sincere in his desire to change the course of the nation’s
fate. Filipinos trust the president because they have been fed up by a rotten system that only caters to the elite but has deprived the ordinary citizen the opportunity to enjoy one's entitlements and socio-economic rights.

**Tracing the Root of the Bangsamoro Problem**

The rebellion in the Bangsamoro must be differentiated from the Philippine Revolution. In fact, according to Orlino Ochosa, the revolution against Spain “was national and democratic in form but not in outlook since the leadership was predominantly middle-class Tagalog” (Ochosa 2005, pp.11). The unity in early Philippine society was an alien thing. But it was not the Filipinos who caused this social fragmentation. The Spaniards imposed their “divide and conquer” rule to serve their selfish colonial goals. The “Magdalo” and “Magdiwang” faction of the *Katipunan* was a clear example, with the *ilustrado* Emilio Aguinaldo ordering the execution of Andres Bonifacio, the founder of the *Katipunan*, who was a *masa* (common folk).

The Americans instituted a patronage system that created the division between national and provincial elites. As a result, the centralized government that Americans instituted guaranteed the domination of the Tagalogs in Manila. This created not only the rich-versus-poor or elite-versus-masses dichotomy, but also a profound Christian-Muslim divide. For Salah Jubair (2007, pp.9) the truth was that the “Philippine government refuses to solve the problem in Muslim Mindanao to the satisfaction of the Moros because most of the implementers do not have sympathy for the Moros.”

The series of events that led to the outbreak of the war in Mindanao all started with the 1968 Jabidah Massacre (Gloria, 2014). In the island of Corregidor, a group of young Muslim military trainees in the Armed Forces of the Philippines were executed by their comrades after protesting the non-payment of their monthly allowance. Recruited by then President Marcos for a clandestine plan to infiltrate Sabah, the murders ignited the political feelings of Muslim Filipinos. Despite the reality of being neglected by Manila, Filipino Muslims had no prior interest in politics. For Jubair (2007), many Muslim Filipinos in Mindanao carry profound grievances against the government. He says that “when the very survival of the Moros was threatened by
this ‘ethnic cleansing’ they were forced to react, organize and fight back to survive, which later shaped into a revolutionary struggle with ideology, political and military machinery.” (Jubair, 2007, pp.10).

Abhoud Shed Lingga (2015) says that Muslim leaders think that Mindanao should have been excluded from the Treaty of Paris because the Spaniards have never subjugated the island. Renato Constantino (1974) explains that the isolation of Muslim Mindanao allowed it to preserve its local culture and religion. He also points out that “throughout the Spanish occupation, the Muslims were not considered part of the developing society and was treated a foreign territory” (Constantino, 1974, pp.6). Francisco Lara Jr. (2015) writes that before the Spanish colonizers arrived in the country and attempted to conquer Mindanao, the region has already been under the control of Muslim sultanates.

The political and social division in Mindanao is rooted in the exclusion of the Bangsamoro. Muslim Filipinos resent their poverty (Rasul, 2007). The Muslim Filipinos have persisted in their struggle for political freedom (Lara, 2015). Past administrations have failed to find a lasting solution to the Bangsamoro problem. The subjugation of Muslim Filipinos continues because the majority benefits from the socio-economic divide. In this sense, the unity in the Bangsamoro has become so elusive, “even if that unity is meant to refer only to unity in overarching purpose, not organizational structure” (Ferrer, 2015, pp.126).

The rural South in the country often yields a sad picture of a mansion that is surrounded by shanties whose occupants live in dire or abject misery. Such has become the image of the economic and political backwardness of the Bangsamoro for decades. Millions have remained poor due to the malevolence of social and political domination (Maboloc, 2017). For the people in Manila, the Bangsamoro is nothing but a breeding ground for terrorist organizations like the ASG. Wataru Kusaka (2017) says that the president’s strong appeal among Muslims is evidenced by his timely call to recognize the rights of Muslims as the original inhabitants of Mindanao.

The economic injustices committed against Muslims is apparent in view of the inability of the national government to
allocate enough resources for the basic services of the people. In this regard, the struggle for recognition is a question of how a historical wrong can be corrected by means of radical leadership. Recognizing the rights of Muslim Filipinos means that the state must enact laws that support their welfare – sufficient income, enough food, and decent shelter.

Discrimination silences the capacity of human beings to expand their freedoms and live the kind of life they value. The prejudice against Muslim Filipinos means that the youth in Basilan and Maguindanao have lesser chances or nothing to attain a life that is truly worth living. Being hopeless, some young Muslims are forced to take up arms to rebel against the government or join extremist groups. Duterte hopes to reform the old social dynamics in a radical way by spending his political capital exorcising the evil spirit of a colonial past.

The root of the Bangsamoro problem, thus, is historical injustice. The Bangsamoro Organic Law, which has been approved recently, is meant to rectify the mistakes of the past. It sets aside a block grant of 100 billion pesos. The law is anchored on the concept of wealth sharing and self-rule. Duterte is determined to give Muslim Mindanao their genuine autonomy, including the power to control and exploit the natural resources in the territory. Shariah courts will also be recognized, giving Muslim Filipinos the right to pursue the administration of their own justice system, subject to limits set in the Philippine Constitution.

Strong Leader, Weak Institutions

Duterte inherited a position that was hungry for someone with the bravery to determine the destiny of a people weakened by regional divide, hopelessness, and confusion. The president thus emerged as a strong leader who is afraid of nothing. Nations that are former colonies often suffer from the stigma of an extractive economic system that has impoverished the lives of the people. The Philippines falls fittingly into that description. Given this, in the minds of many, someone who has the will to do what is necessary to dismantle systemic injustices is the kind of leader that people need.

But the problem of Philippine democracy is not just a question of leadership. For the longest time, Filipinos have been deprived of their sense of
identity, having been subjected to colonial rule. The vast majority do not control their future. The oligarchs and political elite define for the people the meaning of their existence. A poor child born in the province is forced to think that human poverty is a no more than a curse. The lack of inclusiveness in the domain of the public sphere means that people are powerless.

The point is that focusing on Duterte’s personality glosses over the real issue that the Filipino people has to face – their lack of unity. Of course, a society should be able to determine how it can benefit from the political will of a leader. Duterte has a huge appeal because the Philippines as a country needs discipline. This lack of discipline may be partly blamed on colonial history. But if the country must inoculate its future generations from the ignominy of the past, then it must pursue institutional reforms collectively.

Strong leaders appear to be necessary because institutions are weak and undemocratic. When dysfunction is entrenched in the bureaucracy, the inefficiency of the government system is no more than a reflection of the pervasiveness of structural inequalities. It is of course wrong to say that Duterte’s alleged lack of decorum has no impact in the moral lives of the people. But any analysis must move beyond Duterte’s persona. Political commitments can be shattered by some contingent interests anytime. The primary duty of citizens is to strengthen the basic structure if as a society they so desire to serve the ends of justice.

**Conclusion**

Let us draw some conclusions. The first has something to do with terrorism and its relation to politics. Terrorism has arrived upon Philippine shores in part due to the Muslim insurgency. But if the Filipino people were to confront it, then beyond the need for strong leadership which Duterte has shown in his resolve to quell the Maute rebellion, it is necessary to uproot the consciousness of the people from the desire for homogeneity. Following the analysis of Mouffe, a universal moral order will only bring more problems.

The second has something to do with the meaning of democracy. Democratic institutions are never perfect. Duterte is seen as the kind of leader that
Filipinos need. The context of post-colonial politics in the country is important. For Duterte, the protection of the public is what the common good is all about. The problem, in this regard, is not the vitriolic language of the president. While the country is a communitarian society, it can be argued that institutional mechanisms to political reform must remain relevant.

The third suggests that people cannot overestimate the value of consensus and it is wrong to underestimate the reality of conflict and antagonism. Radical democracy insists that people must be emancipated from the dictates of cultural hegemony, which is the original intent of Laclau and Mouffe. The Western point of view cannot and must not dictate how local folks are to determine the political values that they embrace. These are intangible things that people share by reason of history and blood ties. Radical politics, in this way, is historically rooted.

The fourth concerns the struggles of the Bangsamoro. Duterte is in an opportune time to be able to advance the interest of Mindanao and finally liberate it from the claws of Manila’s imperial rule. The domination of the Muslims by the Christian majority is obvious. Massive poverty plagues the people in the Bangsamoro. The historical context of Mindanao cannot be put aside. Mindanao was not subjugated by foreign rulers. Duterte knows that such plays a crucial role in understanding the importance and purpose of his radical leadership.

Lastly, weak leaders, as shown by the failures of President Aquino, are disastrous for any society. Charismatic leaders have firm commitments to a cause. The antagonistic nature of politics may be disruptive by nature, but such is necessary to achieve concrete changes in the lives of the people. The radical means of Duterte appear to be non-negotiable. But the bigger challenge lies in the fact that to sustain meaningful transformations under the present administration, institutional reforms should be seriously pursued.

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Confessing Love to the Nation: Audrey Yu Jia Hui’s Works and Identity Reconstruction

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Abstract

This article addressed identity reconstruction through an analysis of two of the most prominent fictional works by one of the Chinese Indonesian young writers, Audrey Yu Jia Hui. In encompassing the idea of identity rewriting, I addressed Hui’s second and third novels respectively, Mellow Yellow Drama (2014) and Mencari Sila Kelima (Searching for the Fifth Principle, 2015), through the post-structural concepts of Derrida’s deconstruction, and also in relation to cultural studies views on identity. The works were analyzed through close-reading technique. The novels were published during the Reformation (Reformasi) era, where politics had served to be a profound aspect that directed the cultural identity and social attitude of the society. In a range of aspects, from narrative structure to their deeper themes, Hui’s literary works were found to draw on a distinguishable set of strategies which enabled Hui to establish her own identity as someone who was liberated, culturally accepted and free to embrace local colors. This article also showed that Audrey Yu Jia Hui’s narratives have served as an acceptance of an individual’s multiple identities, which often depends on the problem at hand as well as the context of choices.

Key words: contemporary Chinese Indonesian literature, Audrey Yu Jia Hui, identity reconstruction, deconstruction, postmodern narrative
**Introduction**

By and large, the Chinese Indonesians have mostly been viewed for their powerful stronghold in the economic sectors which accounted for more than 70% of the elite business in Indonesia – a condition which at the same time often makes them object of controversies and scapegoats for political dissatisfaction (Suryakusuma, 2013, pp. 91-92) (Anggrani, 2010, pp. 113-114). This, however, is hardly followed by acknowledgement of their roles in other fields such as politics and literature, with the latter was deemed to have emerged in around 1918 by the end of World War I.

The Indonesian Chinese literature or *Sastra Melayu Tionghoa* was initially part of the Chinese Malay literature in 1870, but it did not receive the same level of acknowledgement as that of its Indonesian literature counterpart (Alisjahbana, 1957, pp. 57). At that time, *Sastra Melayu Tionghoa* was kept in a separate category from *Sastra Indonesia*. Despite its repressed honor, Chinese Malay literature continued to provide colorful aspects to readers for its diverse genres and problematic issues of Dutch colonization. It later joined the Indonesian literature after the country officially gained its independence in 1945, and known as the contemporary Indonesian literature, of which it is commonly known today.

This research focused on how the works written by Audrey Yu Jia Hui, *Mellow Yellow Drama* (2014) and *Mencari Sila Kelima* (*Searching for the Fifth Principle*, 2015), presented ideas on identity reconstruction from a young Chinese Indonesian woman writer. This research was important based on the following reasons. First, *Mellow Yellow Drama* and *Mencari Sila Kelima* were among the first books to have revealed “new” ideas of identity reformation from a Chinese Indonesian millennial, who was born during the reign of the New Order and was raised during the Reformation era. While other Chinese contemporary authors after Reformasi write about metropolitan romance and interest of studying abroad, Jia Hui writes about her concern of Indonesia and issues regarding national identities of its citizens.

Second, in tandem with the first reason, if one had looked at the role of Chinese Malay literature as the earliest “crystallization” of Indonesian history...
which represented the events occurring during the era of Dutch colonization but received little acknowledgement from Balai Pustaka, the leading Indonesian Board of Literature Committee at that time (Bandel, 2007, pp. 189), it could be seen that Chinese Malay literature was a crucial chain to view the whole “face” of the growing contemporary Indonesian literature. Hui’s works in this case represented minority’s perspective on the condition of Chinese Indonesians at that time, who were discriminated and segregated during the colonization, and only limited on the economic sector.

So far, Audrey Yu Jia Hui’ viewpoint as an author and structural elements found in *Mellow Yellow Drama* (2014) had been explored using Goldman’s Genetic Structuralism approach, a theory that analyses literary works based on the authors’ worldview and social background. It results in some standpoints that: 1) the upheld theme is the dimension of egoistic and social levels, 2) the extrinsic element described in the narrative is the interrelation of historical background which makes for the social depiction in the narrative, 3) Audrey Yu Jia’s views consist of the values of humanism, existentialism, nationalism, and religiosity (Fernando, Mulawarman, and Rokhmansyah, 2018). The weakness of this study is that Genetic Structuralism only viewed Jia Hui’s works according to her social and cultural background (which constructed her worldview), but it missed to notice the text’s instability and “other” meaning found within the text, which could be slightly different from the author’s intended worldview.

In this article, the researchers would like to discuss the identity reconstruction in Audrey Yu Jia Hui’s works in which she tried to redefine her identity as a part of a minority in Indonesia using Derrida’s deconstruction approach. Compared to using Genetic Structuralism, using Derrida’s approach has several advantages. First, it can view the instability and the “other” perspective found in both texts that were barely visible when they were analyzed using Genetic Structuralism perspective. Secondly, it can prove more about Jia Hui’s transformed identity and its dynamics. It was done so by examining the detailed descriptions when Jia Hui as the main narrator faced rejections to her love of her country and her will to be of use to her surroundings.
To fulfill this purpose, the researchers specifically focused on two titles of Audrey Yu Jia Hui’s works, which were *Mellow Yellow Drama* (2014) and *Mencari Sila Kelima* (*Searching for the Fifth Principle*, 2015). After the introduction part, the researchers discussed Derrida’s deconstruction theoretical exposition, conceptualization of identity, a brief outlook on the emergence of contemporary Chinese Indonesian literature, Audrey Yu Jia Hui’s life chronologies from the two books, the literary elements found in them, then the main discussion regarding deconstructing Audrey’s identity and the idea of Indonesia-ness, and finally, conclusion.

**Theory and Method**

The research of this study, which was based on three printed texts in total, was conducted in 2017. The focus of the study was on analyzing two textual sources written by a contemporary Chinese-Indonesia author, Audrey Yu Jia Hui. This study primarily used the close-reading technique. The data, which consisted of direct quotations of both texts, was elucidated using Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction theory.

Through identifying binary oppositions, the power of centralization toward aspects or categories which were previously considered ‘dominant’ such as men, ratio, and progressivity could be seen to possess their own inconsistencies, and thus the order can be rearranged. In that way, one can understand what kind of thoughts that lurk behind any expression delivered from one party to another, and then be able to unravel them. Being skeptical and questioning become the primary purposes from deconstruction in any existing text reading. Interestingly, Derrida showed that in any text itself, there are forms of inconsistencies which emerge naturally through word parables, choices of sentence, and partiality (Haryatmoko, 2016, pp. 134).

For Derrida, the text is the life itself, “... *has no stable identity, no stable origin, no stable end*” (Derrida, 1974, pp. xii), which is consistently open to any kind of interpretation. Other than that, a tradition expressed in a text, when it is viewed through the eyes of deconstruction theory, can reveal new forms of interpretation which have never been thought or known before. Haryatmoko provided an example that the concept of ‘*pribumi*’ in Indonesia, which refers to ‘the
natives’, can possess a gap that even migrants can be categorized as the natives since they did ‘arrive’ and ‘settle’ first than the children of the ‘real pribumi’ (Haryatmoko, 2016, pp. 134). This kind of discourse concept was the one that was continually applied by Derrida, “Deconstruction is inevitable or it is nothing at all; ... Its process involves an affirmation, this latter being linked to the coming [venir] in event, advent invention” (Derrida, 1992, pp. 337).

Derrida saw that meaning or understanding from everyday languages is actually a trace/track, which is the search/tracking of meaning concept in mind that is grasped because of the game between the signifier and the signified working all this time (Aminuddin, 2002, pp. 177-178) (Tyson, 2006, pp. 253). This mental trace works best at speech or writing level, but for performative written texts, retrace or reconsideration can be done to probe complete new perceptual possibilities. Interestingly, those texts will later establish a number of new relations/connectivity with other texts so there can be found a repetition/alterity, escapement, and eventually displacement, which can alter one image concept to another (Aminuddin, 2002, pp. 179).

The ultimate concept coined by Derrida was différance, meaning delay or reversal, which is the approach that strives to delay the establishment of signifier and signified as well as reverse binary oppositions found within his predecessor’s approach, Saussure’s structuralism (Haryatmoko, 2016a, pp. 217). Word suffix ‘ance’ was deliberately used by Derrida to represent two verb meanings at once, which is différer. The word was derived from English words, ‘defer’ and ‘differ’. Though when pronounced the sound is just the same as ‘difference’, with the election of the term, Derrida wished to prove that what can be understood by one of the five senses (of which the concept is none other than the ratio) actually cannot grasp what is truly operating behind it, that one mere word does not mean literally in black and white.

According to Haryatmoko, an expert of discourse analysis from Indonesia, the first step of Derrida’s deconstruction is undécidable, which is the disassembling of the metaphysical hierarchy (Haryatmoko, 2016a, pp. 218). What is meant by metaphysical hierarchy is none other than binary opposition; hence one can consider what kind of ideology that is at play behind a text.
Therefore, *undécidable* is a strategy logic which no longer takes side in black or white area. However, this initial strategy is still inside the logo centric limitation because it is still bound to the previously established concept, so a continuing step is necessary to neutralize the relationship of those logo centric forces (Haryatmoko, 2016a, pp. 221).

The second step is the dissemination. Contrary to the Saussure’s structuralism which highlights syntaxes and metaphors, dissemination views that texts are no longer texts, and that materials are no longer matters that are bound to the previous hierarchical relation, but it is also not super-writing or super-material (Haryatmoko, 2016a, pp. 222). Metaphors, which were founded by philosophers, apparently still exist within the braided Western logic so they are unable to get out of logo centric network. In this sense, metaphors are understood as interpretation which has myriad faces or meanings, as well as being unstable in text reading, which can overthrow the hierarchy of concept-metaphor (Haryatmoko, 2016a, pp. 223). Through the syntax of metaphors which provide acknowledgement toward the other, deconstruction resolute that texts are no longer fixated on absolute truth.

In this study, Derrida’s deconstruction approach is applied to prove that identity is not something that sticks to every individual from birth, with particular characteristics which originated from the social construction. The approach would show that a person can see him/herself to be belonging to a variety of groups altogether. More importantly, Derrida’s deconstruction would highlight that each of the mentioned identities can be of importance to the person, based on the existing complications, the context of importance to the person, based on the existing complications, the context of choice as well as the his/her own sense of values.

**Audrey Yu Jia Hui’s Life Chronologies**

In *Mellow Yellow Drama*, Audrey Yu Jia Hui recalled her childhood memories when the death news of her *akung* (grandfather) reached their family twenty years ago. Being a spoilt four-year-old girl, an only child from a very affluent merchant Chinese family in Surabaya, she remembered being shocked to the core for having ‘lost’ both of her grandparents in less than a month, despite her *akung* still
had been in a perfectly good health several weeks previously. Jia Hui noted that while her *ama* (grandmother) was still in comatose after a road accident and awake later after her grandfather’s death, her *ama* was permanently defected and had to live the rest of her life as a cripple. Upon learning the hard truth that life is indeed short and fragile, Audrey was determined to make her life meaningful.

Unfortunately, Jia Hui’s “off-limit” perspectives were deemed too early for her age and she was always bullied by her peers and relatives. This condition had gone on for several years until Jia Hui entered elementary school, when she learned and memorized everything about Pancasila, *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, Indonesia Raya*, and other philosophical concepts. Jia Hui confessed to have fallen deeply in love with them that they stayed everlastingly in her heart for years. Yet, most of the sneering’s and rejections Jia Hui had received ensured her that a Chinese Indonesian, let alone a young woman of a well-to-do family background, should not entitle herself to the matters of a country which were ‘owned’ only by those who called themselves the natives or *pribumi*.

Audrey’s worries were soon confirmed when she was just about 10 years old, as the news of the 1998 Riot in Jakarta finally opened her eyes. She saw how many Tionghoa girls and women had become victims of rape, arsoning, and murder at the downfall of Soeharto’s New Order regime. From then on, Jia Hui had instilled a feeling of self-hatred toward every physical attribute that made her Chinese and the social status gap which divided the locals from the Tionghoa people.

To distract herself, Jia Hui developed a fondness for reading English classics, learning foreign languages (English and French) and watching international news as preparations for studying abroad. Yet, to Jia Hui’s disdain, her mother began to introduce her to the circle of Chinese elites in the hopes that one day Audrey would marry one of the sons of their business conglomerate acquaintances. Jia Hui finally escaped these marriage arrangements as she got accepted in a special program for gifted young women at Mary Baldwin College, Virginia, USA. After a year, she transferred to College of William and Mary for her undergraduate studies; majoring Physics while also taking social
courses in various fields of study. Jia Hui obtained her bachelor’s degree with a summa cum laude, as well as getting elected as a member of National Society of Collegiate Scholars (NSCS), Golden Key International Honor Society, and eventually Phi Beta Kappa. When she finally returned to Indonesia, Jia Hui joined an NGO to volunteer to teach and help unfortunate children for a brief period before her parents restrained her from those activities as they were deemed ‘dangerous’ toward her safety as a Chinese woman.

For the next four to nine years, Jia Hui was unable to take a job or start a new life, until the time she went to Singapore that she encountered Chinese Singaporeans who loved their country, but were able to keep their original Chinese names and still spoke Mandarin freely as their vernacular tongue. Later, in order to return some of her lost ‘parts’ of identity, Jia Hui changed her name legally from ‘Maria Audrey Lukito’ to ‘Audrey Yu Jia Hui’, although she feared that her new name would probably cause more sentiments and obstacles in the future. Along the way, Jia Hui met an old friend of her father, Dr. Zhang Qi Wen, who shared her ideas about loving Indonesia and Chinese cultural heritage.

In Mencari Sila Kelima, Jia Hui had taken a job in Changzhou, China, in an international machine factory where she translated documents from Mandarin to English and vice versa, as well as teaching English to employees. Audrey expressed her genuine admiration toward the present-day tradition of Chinese people which was ingrained so deep in their ancient philosophies and literary works. Jia Hui constantly compared the situation in China to the one in Indonesia, and concluded that Indonesia would need to revise its educational root system in order to advance itself in the world.

**Literary Elements of Mellow Yellow Drama and Mencari Sila Kelima**

*Mellow Yellow Drama* (2014) told Audrey Yu Jia Hui’s life story from her childhood, school days in Indonesia (from kindergarten to high school), college years (in College of William and Mary, Virginia, USA), and her meeting with Dr. Zhang Qi Wen, who instilled her interest in learning Mandarin language. On the other hand, *Mencari Sila Kelima* (2015) told the continued life story of Audrey, with her taking a job as an English translator and
teacher in China. Jia Hui also narrated her days as she was enrolling in Qinghua University, majoring in Marxism studies.

The choice of title for *Mellow Yellow Drama* was interpreted as such: ‘mellow’ referred to Jia Hui’s melancholic state in falling for her Indonesia but at the same time feeling lost and abandoned as nobody supported her love, while ‘yellow’ stood for her Chinese identity as part of the ‘yellow-skinned people’, and *drama* referred to Jia Hui’s emotional upheavals in which her patriotic enthusiasms were met with rejections from both her Chinese acquaintances and the *príbumi*. Meanwhile, for the title choice of *Mencari Sila Kelima*, ‘mencari’ is the Indonesian word for ‘looking/searching for’ and *sila kelima* referred to the fifth principle of *Pancasila* which declared “Social justice for all of the people of Indonesia”, inferring a clear irony of the long-term political situation which has often degraded the position of the Chinese/Tionghoa minority. The genre of both books was fiction, and the content was autobiographical, based on the author’s life background.

The narrative structure of *Mellow Yellow Drama* was separated into eighteen sequences, with seventeen of them are linear one after another, and one retrospective sequence which served as the trigger as well as the strong reminder for Audrey in pursuing her dreams and ambitions for her birth country, Indonesia. It can be seen in Table 1.

**Table 1. The Narrative Structure of Mellow Yellow Drama**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>The Unit Content of Plot in <em>Mellow Yellow Drama</em></th>
<th>Sequence</th>
<th>Aspect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1   | Audrey’s description about her first time of falling in love with national symbols and motto:  
1.1 “My nationality is Indonesian. The symbol of my country is the Garuda bird (eagle). On its chest, the five principles of *Pancasila* are plastered...” (Jia Hui, 2014, pp. 14) | Linear   | Love for the nation |
2 | Audrey’s description about her school days:  
   2.1 “Growing up, I slowly came to realize that my questions about the country and the nation, as well as life, though deemed unfit for a child my age, were seeds of nationalism. However, I thought that people around me were the ones who were not ready to deal with a shrewd and opinionated child like me” (2014, pp. 17)  
   Linear | Audrey’s experience as she felt that she was marginalized and as a citizen, she has the right to question the nation.  
   | Contradiction of reality

3 | Audrey’s description about the incompatibility of Pancasila teaching in education with the real social condition:  
   3.1 “Growing up, I realized the misuse of national ideology in the education system would only bring catastrophe to the nation. [...] All of the Pancasila idealisms are rubbish if they are used as propaganda tools. Meanwhile, there is still ethnic, religious, and racial discrimination” (2014, pp. 20)  
   Linear | Contradiction of reality

4 | Audrey’s description about her experience during the May 1998 riot:  
   4.1 “During my stay in Indonesia, I have to be careful to protect myself since I am a Chinese woman. Women like me are weaker than the locals. My parents told me this in a fearful and earnest tone that I knew that they were not lying” (2014, pp. 45)  
   Linear | Identity

5 | Audrey’s description about the deprived ethnic Chinese identity:  
   5.1 “The Chinese no longer possess any pride except their money. Name shaved, culture seized. Orientation to financial profit as well as hard work ethic which are the culture of the traditional Chinese  
   Linear | Confiscated Identity
immigrants have become a double-edged sword in Indonesia” (2014, pp. 56)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>6</th>
<th>The description of atmosphere when Audrey was musing about herself:</th>
<th>Linear</th>
<th>A result from New Order Regulation in suppressing Chinese identity. It worked on Audrey, but she later chose to remain Chinese-Indonesian.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.1 “I was also shy and angry about being Chinese. In a school where the majority of its students were Chinese, I was not interested in any of the guys whatsoever. Every time I looked at myself in the mirror, the only thought that came to my mind was “Chinese, Chinese, Chinese” (2014, pp. 56)</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>7</th>
<th>The confession from Audrey about Indonesians which she obtained from the US:</th>
<th>Linear</th>
<th>Love for the nation that provides equality to every citizen.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.1 “No friend or lecturer ever felt that I was weird when I revealed my opinion about my country. They even admired me. A non-American female student with such sublime achievement who truly loved her country” (2014, pp. 66)</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>8</th>
<th>The rejection received by Audrey from her friends:</th>
<th>Linear</th>
<th>Gap in economy, and it reflects the stereotypes toward the Chinese Indonesians.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8.1 “For many local Javanese friends I have ever encountered, I was a spoiled pretty Chinese girl. They thought I knew nothing about the sorrow of the people. That’s what they said. ‘It’s so easy for you to say things such as loving your country. Your parents can pay for your college abroad’” (2014, pp. 94)</td>
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</table>

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>9</th>
<th>Audrey’s description toward her refusal to marry one of her kind:</th>
<th>Linear</th>
<th>Audrey’s reluctance to date Chinese men due to their patriarchal thinking and preference to</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9.1 “When the reverend asked my reason, I could not explain that I did not want to date a Chinese guy. The reason was that, I was often degraded carelessly</td>
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</table>
by people from my ethnic group. Whereas, I had never been treated like that in a foreign country” (2014, pp. 99)

Westernized men (as they allow women to raise their voices).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>10</th>
<th>Audrey’s decision to legally change her name:</th>
<th>Linear</th>
<th>Identity Reclaiming</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>“From my birth name Maria Audrey Lukito to be Audrey Yu Jia Hui. [...] As Chinese, I wanted to reclaim my identity with a Chinese name. Some thought I was joking. Some threatened me in the name of God” (2014, pp. 114-115)</td>
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*Confessing Love to the Nation*

*Linear*  
*Identity Reclaiming*

*Mellow Yellow Drama* presented how Audrey struggled with her concepts of being a woman and a minority from a young age. Audrey’s experience with the death of her grandparents (Audrey’s grandmother had been put in a comma due to a hit-and-run, and her grandfather died very suddenly) became the trigger of her endless questions about death and the fragility of life. When she asked her mother what it meant to live, Jia Hui received a rude-awakening answer that people should just have fun as long as they live until it is time for them to die. Horrified, Jia Hui vowed to live her life worthwhile and create meaning by helping others. The older members of Jia Hui’s family were Totok Chinese who spoke little Chinese and mostly Indonesian language.

Jia Hui decided to pursue her undergraduate studies in the United States, being under the impression that if she could prove herself worthy in another country, she would be accepted wholeheartedly in Indonesia. During this period, Audrey also narrated her school days in Virginia as she had to adapt to the Western education system and culture. Yet, though her friends and most American people regarded her patriotic ideals, she could not help feeling alien to their culture. Audrey kept on hoping that soon after finishing her studies, she could serve her country and then be considered equal to her *prabumi* counterparts.
Meanwhile, the narrative structure of *Mencari Sila Kelima* was divided into seventeen sequences, with three retrospective and linear sequences, as seen in Table 2.

**Table 2. The Narrative Structure of *Mencari Sila Kelima* (Searching for the Fifth Principle)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>The Unit Content of Plot in <em>Mencari Sila Kelima</em></th>
<th>Sequence</th>
<th>Aspect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The description of Audrey’s emotion when she was still living in Indonesia:</td>
<td>Retrospective (Flashback)</td>
<td>Identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.1 “All my life living in Indonesia, never once had I ever felt to be considered as tong bāo (in Mandarin: ‘born from the same womb’ or ‘fellow citizens’) (Jia Hui, 2015: ix). I had always been perceived as different” (Jia Hui, 2015: ix).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Audrey’s account about her prejudice which she brings since she was little:</td>
<td>Linear</td>
<td>The Fight against Prejudice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.1 “You probably think that my big love to the nation automatically makes me unprejudiced, having none of it all. It’s not true. I am well aware of every seed of prejudice implanted in me since I was very young. Every day I try to fight it by acting the opposite” (2015, pp. 17).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Audrey’s account about the danger of prejudice:</td>
<td>Linear</td>
<td>The Danger of Prejudice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.1 “Well, the greatest danger of prejudice is the closing of conscience. Actually, those who teach prejudice perhaps mean well. It could be that he/she has just experienced a quite unpleasant incident so he/she teaches that prejudice to other people (to his/her friends, children or family) with the hope that they would not experience the same thing in the future” (2015, pp. 19).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 4  | Audrey’s account about the prejudices common in Indonesia:  
   | 4.1 “The second prejudice, which is common in Indonesia is the prejudice against different tribes. There were many times when I became an object of prejudice like this, just because I was born Chinese! And, why should I be called Chinese? Because my ancestors were from China and my face resembles theirs. Therefore, I was judged to have certain traits, which were not completely true (that’s why they call it prejudice!). My heart, which loved Pancasila, loved the nation, became invisible that I lost count how many times I have been the object of this prejudice” (2015, pp. 22).  
   | Linear | Prejudice |
| 5  | Audrey’s accounts about religion:  
   | 5.1 “One of the religious misuses emerges in the problem of absoluteness” (2015, pp. 23).  
   | Linear | Religious Misuse |
| 6  | Audrey’s description about the absence of identity of the nation’s young generation:  
   | 6.1 “Why do many youngsters who are highly educated, fluent in English, search for their identity not from figures who love their country? Instead they search it from actors or actresses who lack morality, live recklessly and aimlessly, then later their outfit, outlook, movements, words are copied?” (2015, pp. 33).  
   | Linear | The Young Generation was Neglecting the Significance of the Nation. |
| 7  | Audrey’s description about her stay in Liyang, Changzou, People’s Republic of China:  
   | 7.1 “Frankly, I was very happy in Liyang. It was solely because I felt for the first time embraced by the  
   | Linear | Multiple Identities |
country. What I meant as ‘country’ certainly not the PRC government; instead it was the ancestors’ very beautiful cultural tradition, which was so great, so engrossed, until I was almost in high spirits although my health condition generally worsened” (2015, pp. 47).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>8</th>
<th>Audrey’s description about her heartfelt experience while living in China: 8.1 “In Indonesia I had always (once again, without realizing it) viewed myself as part of a certain group: I was Chinese, a Christian, a graduate from an abroad university, et cetera. However, in China all of the variations seemed to have vanished and I was forced to dig deeper, to erase all of them” (2015, pp. 62).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Audrey’s memory when she was still in Indonesia: 9.1 “Later I was reminded of my love toward <em>Pancasila</em> and the country, an unrequited love of mine. I remember the first time I fell in love with it, there was a shame that I was born Chinese. I even rejected all cultural traditions and language of my ancestors which actually truly attracted my heart” (2015, pp. 117).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Audrey’s description about the current condition and situation of Indonesia: 10.1 “Living in Indonesia, I didn’t feel like living in a <em>Pancasila</em> country. On the contrary, I felt like I was living in colonial feudalistic era, when every social system had seemed to be ‘designed’ to simplify the lives of the wealthy” (2015, pp. 128).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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8 Linear Identity Reconstruction
9 Retrospective (Flashback) Multiple Identities
10 Linear The Problem of Unfinished Nation-Building and the Weakened Rule of Laws that Challenge Indonesian Democracy
In *Mencari Sila Kelima*, Audrey accepted an English teaching job in Changzhou, People’s Republic of China, and even got accepted to enroll in Qinghua University. She described how different the attitude of the Chinese was from Indonesian when it came to studying, since she considered the Chinese were mostly diligent and serious about their studies regardless of age or occupation. She often compared the educational system between both countries as to perceive the upsides and downsides of their international advancement.

**On Deconstructing Audrey’s Identity and the Idea of Indonesia-ness**

In *Mellow Yellow Drama*, in order to return some of her lost ‘parts’ of identity, Audrey tried to follow this step by changing her name legally from ‘Maria Audrey Lukito’ to her Mandarin one, but still kept her nickname ‘Audrey’, which is an old English Christian name, into ‘Audrey Yu Jia Hui’; although she worried that her new name would probably cause more sentiments and obstacles in the future. Many of her relatives reacted to her name-changing decision by using words such as ‘stupidity’, ‘God will not be happy’ to demean and condemn Audrey’s effort to regain her identity, implying further difficulties with the major Javanese society and the government if she continued to flaunt her ‘Chinese-ness’. However, phrases such as ‘have everything’, ‘no right to be miserable’, ‘God will surely be sad’, and ‘He will despise your attitude’ did not only present judgmental traits; they also revealed a sense of ignorance and superficiality toward Audrey’s personal issues. It also implied that all these years her family, relatives, friends, and counterparts of church congregation had only accepted the discriminatory practices without struggling to negotiate them or adjust themselves more to the ways of the local culture and traditions in order to gain respect and achieve mutual understanding in the society.

Contrary to what most people believed, to Audrey, her identity as Chinese descent was somewhat ‘invisible’ to the eyes of the society. She sharply pointed out that her physical Chinese attributes were actually not that different from those of President Soeharto, the second Indonesian president who formed the New Order regime, whose physical characteristics actually did resemble those
of most Chinese-Indonesians. Audrey’s perception about her ethnic identity coincided with Chris Barker’s idea that identity touches both aspects of similarity and difference, meaning that one can be ‘similar’ to the rest of his/her cultural group, but at the same time he/she can become ‘different’ from the majority of the society (Barker, 2003, pp. 220). This not-so-stark-contrast fact about the similar physical traits of President Soeharto with that of Chinese-Indonesian boosts Audrey’s confidence that although being a member of the minority, she was in fact not that different from the rest of the ruling majority. Her narration, above all, showed that Audrey was well aware of the hidden truth about the discrimination she and her people were up against, which was despite the intense adversity, she and her people could still negotiate the social conformities hedging them in order to rise and prove multiple identity, and inclusiveness within Pancasila.

In tandem with the previous argument, many of Audrey’s native friends still tried to belittle her ambition and achievements by pointing the fact that Audrey’s ancestors literally came from China, therefore she was still somehow labeled as immigrant. Although identity is indeed fluid and flexible (Barker and Galasinski, 2001, pp. 29), in Indonesia this was still considered a significant issue since identity is perceived as something fixed, homogenous and monolithic, coinciding with Western past essentialism ideals (Budiman, 2011b, pp. 233). Thus, this automatically made it difficult for its people to treat any aspect of difference coming up with sympathy or understanding, since most of them were already set to think that they had to corner and push things that were ‘alien’ to them; in this case, people with different ethnicity. Based on the KBBI (Big Vocabulary of Indonesian Language, Kamus Besar Bahasa Indonesia), the word ‘real’ native meant ‘no alloys’, ‘pure’, ‘no doubt on its origins’, and ‘inborn sense of quality’ (KBBI, accessed on April 11, 2017).

According to Barker and Galasinski, identity is most significantly shaped from the existence of language, since it is the main ‘glue’ which interlinks someone with the cultural attributes he/she adheres to (Barker, Chris and Galasinski, 2001, pp. 29-30). Also, based on the Amendment of the 1945 Constitution Article 6 Paragraph 1 Year 1999-2002, the use of the phrase ‘real Indonesian people’ or ‘real prabumi of
Indonesia’ in mass media has been avoided since it was considered no longer relevant to the current Indonesia’s socio-cultural condition (Artharini, 2016). Therefore, it is clear that Audrey’s native peers deliberately underscored her ethnicity, trying to alienate her and labelling her as an additional member of the country. It was merely to tone down her predominating achievements and distinct prodigy since they realized they could neither catch up nor compete with her academically. This was also strengthened with the following quote from Audrey, about her father’s perspectives about the country and her friend’s further reaction to her ideals:

My Papa despises it most whenever I start talking about the nation. Papa himself experienced the era when many people vanished suddenly. The security officials were even like dogs that turned to the sheeps. Houses were plundered. My Papa often says that Pancasila is “bullshit”. By working hard, earning a living for his family, actually Papa has felt to be indirectly contributing to the country’s economy. Papa believes it to be much more useful than my shallow ideas of loving Pancasila. (Jia Hui, 2014, pp. 94)

The paragraph of the statement above revealed that the elder generation of Chinese-Indonesian born in the 1950s, in which Audrey’s father belongs to was still deeply traumatized and hurt by the discriminatory and repressive treatment of the New Order. This explains why Audrey’s father has never had much patience for her aspirations about the country, since he and the rest of his generation had instilled a fixed mindset that their flawed relationship with the government and the Javanese majority could never be mended.

In most of the eyes of my pribumi friends that I talk to, I am a beautiful Chinese girl who is spoilt by her parents. I was considered not knowing anything about the misery of the small people. This is what they say. “Of course, you can say these pretty things about loving the nation. Your parents could pay for your schooling in America.”

I am confused and furious inwardly for getting that kind of reaction. What is the relevance
between loving the nation and studying abroad? Many people who study abroad have no any regard at all to the condition of Indonesia. None of my friends can understand it. They listen to my explanation while shaking their heads. “We do not get it, though.”

Both paragraphs explained that Audrey Yu Jia Hui was trying to fit in and demand inclusiveness for the Chinese Indonesians. It was also revealed that Audrey’s *pribumi* friends had secretly resented their own birth country since they were not given equal rights in many aspects such as family, health and educational welfare. Although they were considered the ‘true’ or ‘pure’ citizens of Indonesia, they could not completely hide the ironical fact that they had hardly benefitted from that supposedly ‘privileged’ status.

In relation to what Jia Hui has narrated about the turbulent situations in Indonesia, Benedict Anderson’s multiculturalism believed that a nation is in truth not a ‘political community’ but an ‘imagined political community’ that is depicted as ‘imagined as sovereign’, ‘imagined as limited’ and ‘imagined as a community’ where the majority of the people have hardly met one another in groups or being able to see the geographical borders of their nation with their own naked eyes, but they can sense the togetherness that the people across the seas are also part of their nation, and that they can have the feeling of limited border which places the location of their country (Anderson, 2001, pp. 8). He also explained that these ideal practices should constitute as an everlasting continuum for they are the foundations that put an entire nation strong together. As nations are built upon the patriotic and nationalism spirits of the people; indeed, there should always be a vast portion of space where it can accommodate myriad differences among the citizens itself, be it one’s religious faith, cultural background and tradition, gender, sexual orientation, political views, and so on.

The term multiculturalism indeed first emerged in the social studies as there were marginalized communities who wished to obtain acknowledgement of equal rights and obligations as part of a country. They demanded that the country they inhabited provide them not only with the land space and job sources, but also a legal acknowledgement from the
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government that guarantees their social position and identity in it (Dasgupta, 2016, pp. 1-2). From this point, it can be concluded that a nation should protect, value, and celebrate their essentials as colorful ways of life that should be respected and upheld (Willet, 1998, pp. 3-4). As Indonesia has claimed itself to be a civic nation instead of an ethnic nation, the country has a permanent duty to underline the unity values in terms of citizenship instead of concerning religious, race, ethnic and certain community matters (Santoso, 2016). Therefore, Indonesian multiculturalism fundamental ideology has to follow its only way to deal with its people’s differences, which is through embracing them as the pillars supporting the existence of the country in the global world (Parekh, 2000, pp. 3).

With these ideals in mind, it can be understood that in Mellow Yellow Drama, Jia Hui strived to remind her people that Indonesia still has not completely accepted their position and status as a permanent part of the country. Their long and various contributions in many aspects (except in economy) have often gone unmentioned and reluctantly acknowledged, with their presence in media and daily matters tended to be mostly depicted in a negative social perspective rather positive. As she was aware that both communities, the pribumi and the Chinese, needed each other for support, Jia Hui struggled to prove those who opposed her nationalist aspirations by advancing herself in education abroad. She later realized that the only way to regain her pride and full identity as a Chinese who loved her country is to study her original cultural backgrounds closely, accepting them as part of her ‘old world’ so that it would help her face the ‘new world’. As her acts mutually coincided with the profound points of multiculturalism perspectives, we can conclude that Jia Hui offered a personal narrative reflecting the private journey for re-establishing a multicultural identity that had not been solely applied in the real life of her birth country. Her continual acts to embrace her cultural roots by studying Mandarin language fluently, aspiring to take further study in her ancestral country of People’s Republic of China, and spreading the analects of Confucius in her book to introduce people toward the ancient Chinese philosophy, have all been considered as the necessary steps for
anyone who was part of a marginalized community to reconstruct her identity.

While constantly sharing ideas about the nation she loves, Audrey also criticized her upbringing in which since a young age, she had been constantly surrounded by people who were not only righteous but also repressive to other ways of life and thinking. Audrey used words such as ‘lost defiant’ and ‘threatened’ to define her and a few others who dared to speak out against the church authorities. This explicitly implies that the church officials whom she had long been acquainted with were simply ignorant and close-minded people who had never felt the need to adjust their religious teachings to real-life practices, especially how to negotiate the injustices and the damaged relationship between the Chinese and the natives. At the same time, they declared that they were the people who did not need to keep questioning themselves and their actions but rather attack and corner those who did not adhere to their ways. Unfortunately, this kind of thinking only sparked bigotry, hatred, and misunderstanding.

In the midst of her troubled adolescence, Audrey also criticized the rapid growing trend in the emergence of ‘international’ schools as a setback which only generated higher social rift between the stereotypical affluent Chinese and the pribumi. In Indonesia, this practice apparently overlapped with the process of being Westernized, thus automatically served as the means for the elites to reinforce their power to the society (Tanu, 2014, pp. 579). Somehow, the cultural reproduction of the elites only strengthened the glass ceiling which separated the have and the poor. Thus, the possibility of creating a larger social gap in Indonesia has increased and therefore made it more prone to inter-ethnic prejudice and violence. Audrey quickly saw the lurking danger in this system and implicitly tried to warn readers that the best remedies for any mistreatment from the majority toward the minority are the awareness to nurture mutual understanding between each other as well as the willingness from both parties to blend in with one another.

Looking back, although it has been numerously claimed that Indonesia is the most plural nation in the world with so many differences, we cannot neglect the fact that it is prone to inner attacks from the hardening religion-based
organizations. First of all, by relating to what Jia Hui has written so far, Reformasi of Indonesia has failed to withstand its promise to eradicate corruption, collusion, nepotism (KKN) from political practices. On the contrary, these ‘classic’ traditions spread much quicker and far worse than during the reign of President Soeharto as freedom of democracy sets in (Magniz-Suseno, 2015, pp. 56-57). Disruptions rose to power as many hardline extremist groups are now threatening the unity and diversity of Indonesia by condemning the use of ‘pluralism’ and ‘multiculturalism’ terms in many chances whilst at the same time preferring to sharia laws instead as the country’s sole anchor (Magniz-Suseno, 2015, pp. 58-59). What is more dangerous is that these people are keen on using force and violence to fulfill their ends. Indeed, it is the right time for Pancasila to come back into the light as a reminder of what is actually has been decided as Indonesia’s basic foundation. Audrey Yu Jia Hui’s Mencari Sila Kelima was written for this pressing urge as an answer to her people’s ignorance toward the country. Sila Kelima here referred to the fifth principle of Pancasila that says: “Social justice for all of the people of Indonesia”, in which Jia Hui noticed as the very missing principle in the everyday practices of Indonesian people, albeit her concern for the other four silas that were generally left dormant. Indeed, we can agree that justice often presents itself as a privilege for the rich and powerful, with the opposite that it displays itself as some luxury that the poor and the powerless can hardly afford.

Through examining the views of Audrey Yu Jia Hui that were inclusive and liberal, it was crucial to look at her socio-cultural background as a Chinese Indonesian who was born in the era of New Order regime and was raised in the Reformasi era. Among many other literary works written by contemporary Chinese Indonesian authors, Jia Hui was one of a few who was persistently consistent in presenting her identity as a ‘new’ member of the minority, unbound by shadows of the Dutch and Japanese colonization and barely touched by the then-ruling New Order. From the very start of her writing, Jia Hui has never shied away from the spotlight; she continued to use herself, her own identity, as the primary homologic symbol of the discriminated voiceless. The most interesting aspects of her published writings were her perspectives that strive to break stereotypical attributes and
embrace diversity and multiculturalism in which the Chinese and the *pribumi* could blend in and adjust themselves to one another.

Compared to other writings produced by other Chinese-Indonesian writers of her generation, one can immediately see that Jia Hui held her Chinese ancestry and heritage at such high regard, not as a way to reinforce her stereotypical cultural exclusiveness but to fully comprehend her cultural roots and therefore prepare her to embrace and combine her still-incomplete identity with the Indonesian culture she had received since childhood. Jia Hui spoke of prejudice, hatred, and stereotype with a clear, dramatic language that put the blame on the ignorance of the adults who chose to live exclusively and apart from their local culture. This was indeed different from many other writings by her counterparts which were mostly concerned in the ‘lighter’ themes of love, fantasy, mystery and more. In this way, Jia Hui has also made her statement (via her own narration in both books) that she has accepted her multiple identities as part of the values she held and evaluated over and over, as well as the pressing social pressures she faced.

**Conclusion**

This article has demonstrated that, as a contemporary Chinese-Indonesian author, Audrey Yu Jia Hui has become a distinctive figure in voicing out her reflection as a suppressed and stereotyped member of a minority group in Indonesia. By applying Derrida’s deconstruction to the analysis, Jia Hui’s works could also be seen as an extension as well as illumination toward what was actually occurring behind the long-going misunderstanding and glass-ceiling segregation between the Chinese and the *pribumi*, especially the reluctance of the majority of the Chinese to blend in with the rest of the society. Their submission to the discrimination and their reinforcement of their exclusiveness were considered by Jia Hui as flaws rather than accomplishments since they would only lead to more embittered ethnic conflicts in the future.

Through the lenses of deconstruction, Audrey (the books’ character) was seen as a prism that reflects the current Chinese Indonesian millennials who were still in search of their hybrid identity. Instead of throwing away her ‘much-prejudiced’ heritage in
order to embrace the local culture completely, Audrey did the opposite by studying and retracing her Chinese ancestry in philosophy, language and literature; even going as far as living, working and taking up college in People’s Republic of China. Although all of these might seem to be re-strengthening her embedded stereotypical exclusiveness, the step was necessary as it was the most first basic foundation in constructing a new identity for any country citizen. With this in mind, Audrey also highlighted the importance of embracing and adhering to multiculturalism values in day-to-day practices as these were the most conducive for Indonesia’s diversity principles, Pancasila and Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (Unity in Diversity). Therefore, once again, Audrey Yu Jia Hui has managed to state her own acceptance of her multiple identities as part of the response toward the problem and the context of choice at hand.

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