

ARTICLES

Forced Migrants, Media, and Securitization: Making Sense of the Changing Representations of Transit Asylum Seekers in Indonesian Print Media

Antony Lee

Rethinking Refugees as Economically Isolated: The Rohingyas Participation in Informal Economy in Klang Valley, Malaysia

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The Effectiveness of De-Radicalization Program in Southeast Asia: Does It Work? The Case of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore

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Explaining the Fast-Growing Textile and Garment Industries (TGI) in Vietnam (2000-2015)

Sukmawani Bela Pertiwi

JOURNAL OF ASEAN STUDIES (JAS)

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JOURNAL OF ASEAN STUDIES

Volume 5 Number 2 2017

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Aim and Scope

The Journal of ASEAN Studies (JAS) is an International peer-reviewed bi-annual journal that enriches understanding of the past, current, and future issues relevant to ASEAN and its circle of issues. The article shall address any research on theoretical and empirical questions about ASEAN. The Topics addressed within the journal include: diplomacy, political economy, trade, national development, security, geopolitics, social change, transnational movement, environment, law, business and industry, and other various related sub-fields.

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- **Review Article:** The manuscripts should be approximately 1,500-3,500. The manuscripts must contain the current state of understanding on a particular topic about ASEAN by analysing and discussing research previously published by others
- **Practice notes:** These are shorter manuscripts approximately 1,500-3,500 words that are of specific interest to practitioners. These manuscripts must present new development for the ASEAN.
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Editorial

Greetings from the Journal of ASEAN (JAS) Studies. With the publication of this Volume 5 Issue 2, 2017, we are very grateful to stay on track in contributing to the Southeast Asian studies and providing an academic venue for scholars, practitioners, diplomats, businessmen, and larger stakeholders of the ASEAN region.

In this issue, there are five articles. The first two articles are on migrant and refugee issues. The first article is entitled, *“Forced Migrants, Media, and Securitization: Making Sense of the Changing Representations of Transit Asylum Seekers in Indonesian Print Media”* written by Antony Lee from *Kompas Newspaper*, Indonesia. Written from the perspective of a practitioner in the media business, the article is originally a summary of some parts of the author’s master thesis at Lund University, Sweden. The article aims to explain how and why the representations of transit forced migrants in Indonesian major print media had significantly shifted during the arrivals of the Indochinese refugees in 1975-1996 and in the period of the new generations of refugees from Middle Eastern and South Asian countries in 1997-2013.

The second article is entitled, *“Rethinking Refugees as Economically Isolated: The Rohingya Participation in Informal Economy in Klang Valley, Malaysia”* written by Andika Ab. Wahab from National University of Malaysia, Malaysia. The author is also a practitioner on the refugee issue, currently a project leader of business and human rights at The Forest Trust (TFT), Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. His article aims to analyze the relationship between the Rohingya refugees participation in the informal economy and their livelihood activities in the Malaysia.

Moving on from migrant and refugee issues, the third article is entitled, *“Regional Maritime Cooperation in Maintaining Maritime Security and Stability: A Test Case for ASEAN Unity and Centrality”* written by Angel Damayanti from Christian University of Indonesia. The article aims to elaborate the reasons why the region needs regional maritime cooperation and discusses challenges that ASEAN has to deal with in order to implement the ASEAN unity and centrality in promoting maritime cooperation and regional stability.

The fourth article is entitled, *“The Effectiveness of De-Radicalization Program in Southeast Asia: Does It Work? The Case of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore”* written by Yosua Praditya Suratman. The article aims to analyze the effectiveness of the de-radicalization program in Southeast Asia to propose some recommendations for Indonesian government in strengthening and reshaping its de-radicalization policies.

The last article is entitled, *“Explaining the Fast-Growing Textile and Garment Industries (TGI) in Vietnam (2000-2015)”* written by Sukmawani Bela Pertiwi from Bina Nusantara University, Indonesia. The article aims to explain the fast-growing textile and garment industries (TGI) in Vietnam from 2000 to 2015.

Finally, the editor-in-chief would like to express highest appreciation for the authors who have submitted their manuscripts as response from our invitation and call for papers. We also would like to thank the Indonesian Association for International Relations (AIHII) for

continuing support of this joint publication with the Centre for Business and Diplomatic Studies (CBDS) of the Department of International Relations of Bina Nusantara University.

Jakarta, 22 December 2017

Prof. Dr. Tirta N. Mursitama, Ph.D.

Editor-in-chief

Forced Migrants, Media, and Securitization: Making Sense of the Changing Representations of Transit Asylum Seekers in Indonesian Print Media*

Antony Lee

Kompas Newspaper, Indonesia

Abstract

This paper aims to explain how and why the representations of transit forced migrants in Indonesian major print media had significantly shifted in two timespans: (1) during the arrivals of the Indochinese refugees in 1975-1996 and (2) in the period of the new generations of refugees from Middle Eastern and South Asian countries in 1997-2013. Using media content analysis of 216 news articles from three major print media in Indonesia, this study has found out that the Indochinese refugees were given positive labels and they were mainly discussed in connection with the non-security themes. In contrast, the new generations of forced migrants were portrayed negatively, given labels such as 'illegal immigrants' and they were framed as security threats. Grounded within Securitization Theory, this paper thus argues that the changing representations were likely caused by the securitizing moves made by specialized agencies in Indonesia.

Key words: *transit forced migrants, refugees, asylum seekers, media representations, Securitization Theory, Indonesia*

* This paper is originally a summary of some parts of the author's master thesis at Lund University, Sweden, entitled "Securitization of Transit Forced Migrants: An Analysis of the Changing Representation of Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Indonesian Major Print Media".

Introduction

In the midst of the Indochinese refugee crisis in July 1979, the Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mochtar Kusumaatmadja when interviewed by reporters said, “if ASEAN countries refuse to provide protection for refugees then the third countries will use it as an excuse for not receiving the refugees” (*Kompas*, 14 July 1979). The minister used the term ‘refugees’ to represent people who flee their home country due to political instability and conflict. In line with this label, the government also discussed the issue of protection. Decades later, commenting on refugees stranded at the sea border between Indonesia and Australia – which created diplomatic tension between the two states – the Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs Hasan Wirajuda said, “They are illegal immigrants. Should we let them come in, even when our law does not allow it?” (*Tempo* magazine, 9 September 2001). Unlike the first statement, the second statement shows how the recent forced migrants were labeled as ‘illegal immigrants’. Thus, their attempt to anchor their boats in Indonesian soil should be prohibited. The changes in the way the forced migrants are discussed within those two timespans are very striking, which consequently leads to questions of how and why the changes happened?

How immigrants are perceived in the receiving or transit countries has become a central issue in the academic

world as well as in the realm of immigration policy. Categorizing immigrants contributes to different treatments among them as the different terms have social and political implications for people who are labeled within those categorizations (Brun, 2010, pp. 337-355). Moreover, ‘refugees’ and ‘asylum seekers’ have different meanings compared to ‘illegal migrants’, with the last term usually associated with crimes (Koser, 2006, p. 44).

Previous studies on how refugees and asylum seekers are perceived negatively by hosting countries have been conducted mainly in relation to Western countries. Those studies predominantly discuss how media and government represent refugees and asylum seekers negatively – as a security threat (Esses, Medianu & Lawson, 2013, pp. 518-536; Gilbert, 2013, pp. 827-843). KhosraviNik (2009) shows that the representations of refugees and asylum seekers can change in different socio-historical settings, though he does not intend to explain the crucial problem of why representations of forced migrants change. Studying the changes can contribute to knowledge on the possible socio-political drives behind the changes, thus providing a more comprehensive picture on the nexus between media representations and transit forced migrants.

This paper will try to fill this gap not only by analyzing how the representations have changed but also by seeking explanations on the causes of these changes.

Additionally, this study will also fill out another research gap, which is the representation of forced migrants in a transit state – since issues of border controls, asylum seekers management, and immigration policies' transfers from Australia to Indonesia have otherwise been dominating studies on refugees and asylum seekers in Indonesia (Missbach, 2013, pp. 281-306; Kneebone, 2014, pp. 596-618; Nethery & Gordyn, 2014, pp. 177-193).

This paper discusses how transit forced migrants² were portrayed differently in Indonesian print media within two different socio-political settings – during the arrivals of Indochinese migrants in 1975-1996 and during the influxes of new generations of international migrants in 1997-2013. This study uses media content analysis in order to see the patterns of forced migrants' representations. The results show that the forced migrants were portrayed differently. Indochinese migrants were labeled mainly with the positive term such as refugees, while the new generations of refugees were portrayed with more

² The transit forced migrants in the context of this paper means that the migrants did not actually intend to stay in Indonesia, but rather used Indonesia as a stepping-stone while awaiting their resettlement in a developed country, such as Australia. Additionally, Indonesia still has not ratified the 1951 United Nations Convention on Refugees, which means that the Indonesian government will not grant refugee status for foreign applicants and also will not offer permanent settlements for refugees. However, the Indonesian government allows United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to open an office in Indonesia and take care of refugees' applications.

negative labels, such as illegal immigrants. Securitization Theory is utilized in order to shed some light on the possible explanations behind the changing representations.

The paper is structured as follows. The first part provides a brief explanation on the arrivals of international forced migrant in Indonesia. The second part discusses the theoretical framework of this study, which is followed by a section discussing methods and data collections. The fourth part discusses the research result, while the fifth part is discussion section that will be followed by the last section – conclusion.

International Transit Refugees in Indonesia

The end of Vietnam War in 1975 was marked by the victory of the communist regime that caused massive outflows of Vietnamese-Chinese descendants who resisted the communist ideology. Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia were three countries in Southeast Asia that received the biggest number of Vietnamese refugees (see *Table 1*). Those countries were considered a transit location for the refugees who intended to stay in developed countries. According to an Indonesian historian, Asvi Marwan Adam, the inflows of Indochinese refugees to Indonesia can be divided into three periods (Swastiwi, 2012). First, the period of 1975-1978, which was marked by the use of refugee camps on several Indonesian islands. Second, the period of

1979-1989 which was marked by the establishment of a refugee camp on Galang Island. Additionally, this period was also characterized by the leniency in granting refugee status. Lastly, the period of 1989-1996, where forced migrants had to face stricter screening processes. Missbach (2013, p. 292) notes that after June 1989, refugee status, while initially granted to all of the Indochinese forced migrants, started to become assessed on an individual basis. In this sense, each asylum seeker had to provide evidence of his/her claim. A person who failed to provide substantial evidence would face repatriation.

The first group of Indochinese forced migrants that used Indonesia as transit country was recorded on 19th May 1975, when a group of 92 people arrived and then continued their journey to Singapore (Fandik, 2013). On 22 May 1975, a boat that carried 25 refugees anchored at North Natuna Island, Indonesia (Ismayawati, 2013). In the first quarter of 1979, the arrival of refugees to Indonesia rocketed to about 40,000 people. In comparison, however, the number of Indochinese refugees in Indonesia was a mere 2,800 people in 1978 (Ismayawati, 2013).

Table 1. Indochinese Refugees' Arrivals by Boat in Countries of First Asylum 1975-1995

Countries	1975-1979	1980-1984	1985-1989	1990-1995	Accumulation
Malaysia	124,103	76,205	52,860	1,327	254,495
Hong Kong	79,906	28,975	59,518	27,434	195,833
Indonesia	51,156	36,208	19,070	15,274	121,708
Thailand*	25,723	52,468	29,850	9,280	117,321
Others	30,538	48,139	25,200	3,076	106,953
Total	311,426	241,995	186,498	56,391	796,310

Source: UNHCR (2000: 98)

*Thailand received higher overland Indochinese refugees that reached 640,246 people in total from 1975-1995

During the same year, the Indonesian government also offered Galang Island as a refugee processing camp. The idea was warmly welcomed by those states in the international community who ended up donating money for the establishment and operational costs of the processing camp. This movement resulted in the international community applauding the

'humanistic' approach of the Indonesian government towards the transit forced migrants (*Kompas*, 19 June 1996). Initially, Galang Island Refugees' Camp was proposed to only last for 2-3 years from the first time it was established in 1979 (*Kompas*, 24 July 1981). However, it took 17 years before the Indonesian government closed the camp in August 1996. From the 121,708

refugees using Indonesia as transit location, 111,876 of them were resettled in third countries – with the vast majority of the refugees being resettled in the USA (Ismayawati, 2013).

Not too long after having dealt with the influx episode of the Indochinese forced migrants, Indonesia started to receive new generations of forced migrants who mainly came from some countries in the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia, such as Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and Sri Lanka. The first inflow of forced migrants from Afghanistan and Iran that arrived in Indonesia was recorded in 1996, 12 of which traveled by air (Missbach, 2013).

Unlike the Indochinese refugees who gained widespread public attention within Indonesia due to their significant volume in 1979, the new waves of forced migrants only began receiving attention after the MV Tampa incident at the end of August 2001. The Australian conservative government rejected a request by MV Tampa – a Norwegian ship – to dock in Australia. This was due to the ship having rescued 438 forced migrants that sought for an asylum in Australia. These migrants were initially onboard of an Indonesian ship that had sunk in the sea (McKay et al., 2011, pp. 607-626). This incident created diplomatic tension between Australia and Indonesia because both countries refused to receive the forced migrants.

Table 2. Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Indonesia 2006-2013

Year	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Refugees	301	315	369	798	811	1,006	1,819	3,206
Asylum Seekers	265	211	353	1,769	2,071	3,233	6,126	7,110
Returned Refugees	0	0	1	311	0	0	35	0
Others	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0
People on Concern	566	526	726	2,878	2,882	4,239	7,980	10,316

Source: UNHCR (2007-2014)

Unlike the Indochinese refugees who were accommodated on Galang Island, the ‘new generations’ of forced migrants live in several cities in Indonesia. Some of them have to stay in immigration detention centers while others can stay in cheap hotels

or rent rooms or houses from local residents. The majority of forced migrants that are allowed to live in open detention centers stay in Bogor, West Java, in Riau, Sumatera Island, or in Makassar, Sulawesi Island. The International Organization for

Migration (IOM) provides funding for food for refugees and asylum seekers who are detained in immigration detention centers at a cost of IDR 15,000-25,000 (USD 1.5 to 2.5) per person per day (Nethery et al., 2012, p. 102).

Forced migrants living outside the immigration detention center also get a monthly living allowance from the IOM or from other international organizations. Refugees and asylum seekers have to sign a certificate declaring their compliance before they are allowed to live outside immigration detention centers. The declaration consists of five points, including: “the refugees should stay within specific area designated by the Directorate General of Immigration; refugees are not allowed to be at the airport or seaport unless accompanied by an immigration officer, [...] and refugees should report to Immigration every two weeks for purposes of registering their presence” (Peraturan Direktur Jenderal Imigrasi Nomor IMI-1489.UM.08.05, 2010).

Theoretical Frameworks

This section discusses the nexus between media representations and securitization of transit forced migrants. Establishing the link between those issues is critical in order to provide a theoretical foundation to answer the questions of: how and why the portrayal of forced migrants in Indonesian major print media was different within two different time spans. This section is divided into two correlated parts.

The first part explains media representation theory that provides an explanation on what media representation means and how this, in turn, affects the forced migrants’ changing portrayals in media. The second part discusses Securitization Theory: key concepts, and how this theory can be useful in this study.

Media Representations

The way media portrays social groups, whether in connection with their sexes, races, religions or origins, is the primary concern of media representation theory (Levensen & Wien, 2011). According to Chavez (2001), media representation is closely connected to the construction of meaning. Referring to Hall’s notion of representation, he underlines that people “use symbols to communicate, or represent what we want to say about our feelings, beliefs, concept, plans, etc” (Chavez, 2001, p. 34). In this sense, the news articles do not merely consist of passive or neutral symbols or words; rather, they actively produce and convey ‘messages’. How media represent forced migrants has implications on the public perception of who forced migrants and thus, how to treat them.

On the one hand, public “discourse” influences media; on the other hand, media, in turn, influences the public through its role in reconstructing and developing “discourse” (Pettersson, 2006, p. 41). The former argument is in line with Geraghty’s (2000, p. 368) point of view on the importance of the media’s role in making

“realistic representations”. Geraghty furthermore argues that the representations will only work when they go along with the audience’s understanding of the object being represented. In a very extreme example, when the media represent a pigeon as a dangerous and deadly animal, the audience might refuse to accept those representations if society, in general, perceives the pigeon as a friendly and adorable animal. However, when the audience, hypothetically speaking, already believes in the possibility of the pigeon as a vector of avian influenza – a deadly virus – they might accept the representations of the pigeon as a dangerous animal.

Media representations of a particular social group do not reflect the “true nature” of the group being portrayed since media representations are inevitable social constructions. Moreover, Edgar and Sedgwick (2002) argue that representations have nothing to do with the interests of the represented groups or how the groups expect to be portrayed. A group, according to these scholars, “can be represented in a manner that might be conceived as stereotyping them” (Edgar & Sedgwick, 2002, p. 339). This argument fits well into the context of transit forced migrants. It is not in the interests of forced migrants to be represented as ‘outsiders’ or ‘illegal immigrants’. Instead, those representations are put forth as stereotypes that might jeopardize migrants’ interests. Therefore, what triggers media to represent something

as they represent it? Does it reflect society’s understanding of certain realities?

Krzyzanowski and Wodak (2009) as cited in Busch and Krzyzanowski (2012, p. 279) argue that several studies have shown the connection between media representations and political agenda on the issue of migration and asylum seekers. The argument is based on the concept of “chain of recontextualizations” in which the media and politics have dual directional relations. First, political discourses are taken by media through politicians’ statements or speeches. Second, discourses in the media are used by politicians (Bernstein, 1990; Wodak, 2000; cited in Busch & Krzyzanowski, 2012, p. 279).

Securitization Theory

The previous section in this part has led to two understandings: what is represented in the media is the construction of reality, and the media representations can arguably be influenced by political agendas which can construct an issue as a security problem. In that regard, Securitization Theory is helpful for this study in two ways: (1) it enables one to situate the issue of transit forced migrants in the realm of either security or non-security, and (2) it allows one to identify when an issue has or has not been securitized.

Securitization has become one of the prominent theories of security studies in the last few decades. This theory is closely

associated with a group of scholars referred to as the 'Copenhagen School', which consists of Buzan, Waever, and several others (Columba & Vaughan-Williams, 2010, p. 75). The theory provides for the possibility of widening the concept of security. This is possible because Securitization Theory does not subscribe to the understanding of security by objectivist's who assumes the existence of "objective" threats is outside of their social construction. For several decades, the realist-traditionalist's understanding of security has dominated security studies. This view presupposes the state as the most important aspect of security and thus situates the military sector as the main response to security concerns (Sheehan, 2005).

In contrast, Securitization Theory – grounded in a constructivist paradigm – challenges the objectivist understanding of security by arguing that security is socially constructed. However, the Copenhagen School does not offer a subjective construction of security that lies upon personal perspectives of threats because this might result in a radical relativist's way of understanding security. Instead, the Copenhagen School proposes a middle ground between objective-positivist and subjective-relativist. They highlight an "inter-subjective process" of the construction of security (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 30). According to Hansen (2000, p. 288), the "inter-subjective" understanding paves the way for the widening of the security

concept but is also able to hinder "unlimited expansion" that can make the security concept become meaningless.

Before further discussing the key concepts of Securitization Theory, I would like to highlight a crucial concept from the Copenhagen School that is central to this paper, which is "the spectrum of public issues". According to Buzan et al. (1998), public issues can be understood from a spectrum consisting of non-politicized, politicized, and securitized issues. The first point refers to an issue that is not debated publicly and therefore, the state has no involvement in the issue. When the issue is politicized, the state will have a role in it and the issue will receive public attention, which will then lead to debate. A securitized issue means that the issue is perceived as an existential threat to a particular object. Thus, an extraordinary response is employed (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 23-24).

Concerning the process of how an issue becomes a security concern, Ole Waever (1995, p. 55) argues that "security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real: the utterance itself is the act". His claim is based on the concept stating that security could be regarded as speech acts, where declaring something as a security issue is an act. It means that an issue or social groups can be securitized if actors enunciate to certain audiences that the intended issue poses an existential threat to one or more particular referent

objects and that therefore, in order to handle the issue, extraordinary measures need to be taken immediately (Waeber, 1995, p. 55; Buzan et al., 1998, p. 21). It is the dynamics of those components: actors, existential threats, referent objects, extraordinary measure, and audiences that are central to Securitization Theory. An existential threat generates a sense of urgency and therefore locates an issue on the top of the priority list that needs to be handled immediately, often using unusual measures. The securitization can only work if the object being presented is currently under threat or is considered as something fundamentally important (Buzan et al., 1998).

However, 'speech acts' – the epistemology of Securitization Theory – has mainly become the object of criticism by other scholars working with the widening of the security concept. Balzacq (2005, p. 181) claims that speech acts focus too much on the "internal" nature of threats, but negate "external threats" that have nothing to do with the discursive strategy of speech acts. In contrast, he argues that language influences people's perception of reality, but language does not construct it. In other words, language plays a role in the construction of meaning, but it is not the only thing that matters. His epistemological stance allegedly differs from that of the Copenhagen School, which Buzan et al. (1998, p. 204) claim as "radically constructivist". Drawing upon the case of securitization of migration in Greece,

Karyotis (2012) underlines a relatively similar problem on the inability of the 'speech acts' approach to illuminate the non-discursive process of the securitization of migration. As the consequence, he argues that speech acts fail "to capture the full dynamic of the complex process through which issues are raised on the security agenda" (Karyotis, 2012, p. 392).

Huysmans (2000) provides a suitable alternative theory that can illuminate the "complex process" of the securitization of migration presented in this paper. Huysmans highlights that 'speech acts' can impose securitization, but it is not the only possible way. Securitization can also be imposed through "restrictive policy and policing" (Huysmans, 2000, p. 751). The latter argument is developed to tackle the "weak" point of the discursive approach – that speech acts that only focus on political speeches in the public domain inevitably belittle the less visible, but still influential, works of "security experts", such as the police (Huysmans, 2006, p. 8).

In that context, I find the concept of "security continuum" that Huysmans developed from Didier Bigo to be useful for this paper. Security continuum is "an institutionalized mode of policymaking that allows for the transfer of the security connotations of terrorism, drug trafficking and money-laundering to the area of migration," (Huysmans, 2000, p. 760; Huysmans, 2006, p. 71). Huysmans further explains that the transfer of security concern

to the migration issue will work in the way that it would change people's perception on the initial meaning of migration issue or refugees' issue. Hammerstad (2014, pp. 268-269) also shares a similar idea to Huysmans by arguing that in many cases, refugees and asylum seekers are not directly referred to as "threats or enemies", but "they were lumped together with other more traditional scary trends such as international crime". In this paper, I include other types of crimes that, according to previous studies, are regularly connected to migrants, such as people smuggling, arms smuggling, human trafficking, global mafias, and arms smuggling (Sorensen, 2012; Curley, 2008).

In a nutshell, the theory is useful for this study in two ways. First, almost all public issues can be securitized, thus the way the media represent refugees and asylum seekers can contribute to securitization or it can also be a tool to analyze whether an issue is securitized or is not. Second, securitization can take the form of direct labeling to migrants as existential threats (Buzan et al., 1998). It can also take the form of lumping the migration issue together with frightening crimes (Hammerstad, 2014).

Methods and Data Collections

This study uses media content analysis as an analyzing tool. Media content analysis is a "message-centered methodology" (Neuendorf, 2002, p. 9, cited in Macnamara, 2005, p. 1) that is useful in

the analysis of a broad range of texts, from the contents of newspapers or newsmagazines to the content of films and television programs (Macnamara, 2005, p. 1). Hansen et al. (1998, p. 95) argue that this method is "by definition a quantitative method" due to its emphasis on identifying and counting topics or communication symbols in texts under scrutiny. This method is chosen for this study because it provides patterns of media portrayal over time on particular issues in large corpuses (Berelson, 1952; Gunter, 2000, cited in Levinsen & Wien, 2011, p. 842). In this sense, content analysis is used to establish representation patterns of the transit forced migrants in Indonesian major print media over the period of 38 years.

Before I designed my research, I first conducted a pilot test with small samples. This pilot test was intended to see whether this study is worth doing in the first place. The samples were *Kompas* newspaper articles with the distribution of 54 articles representing the period of the Indochinese refugees' arrivals, and 63 articles representing the period of the new generations of forced migrants. In that sense, the results shall be the basis for the overall design of this research.

In utilizing content analysis, this study subscribes to the procedure of Hansen et al. (1998, p. 98-99); (1) formulating research questions, (2) choosing samples, (3) constructing categories, (4) developing coding schedule, (5) testing the

coding schedule in small scale and readjusting it, and (6) conducting the full coding and thus analyzing the data. All of the steps are performed in a sequential order. The categories and the coding schedule are developed in parallel to one another by consulting to the pilot study, the literature review and also to the theoretical framework.

The news samples were taken from three prominent and influential media houses in Indonesia. Two of them are newspapers, namely *Kompas* and *Tempo*, while the other one is a newsmagazine named *Tempo*. There are some reasons as to why these three print media sources were chosen. First, two out of the three media sources were established before the arrivals of Indochinese refugees in 1975. *Kompas* newspaper was founded in 1965 while *Tempo* magazine was established in 1971. *Tempo* newspaper was established in 2001, but since it is under similar editorial management, it can be argued that the reports of *Tempo* magazine during the arrival of Indochinese refugees are somewhat comparable to the news articles of *Tempo* newspaper. This enables this study to access continuous reports on refugees from different time spans. Second, these three media sources are also the highest ranked Indonesian media in terms of their circulation. Additionally, those media also have an expansive national distribution, as well as nation-wide news coverage. Third, these media houses have high reputations for their good quality in Indonesia.

When the selection of media sources and time periods were completed, the next step taken was to select news samples in accordance with “relevant content” (Hansen et al., 1998, p. 104). The samples were chosen through relevant sampling design, with the use of certain keywords. Internal search engines from *Kompas* and *Tempo* were used since Indonesia does not have an integrated media archive. Searching for articles on Vietnamese refugees, the keyword combinations used were those of *pengungsi* (refugees), *Vietnam*, *imigran gelap* (illegal immigrants), *Indocina* (Indochinese). For the recent waves of refugees, the keywords were *imigran gelap* (illegal immigrants), *transit*, *Indonesia*, *pengungsi* (refugees), *suaka* (asylum).

As many as 256 entries were found in the data selection through relevant keywords for the Indochinese refugees and 298 entries for the time after the arrival of Indochinese refugees. In order to find samples that serve the purpose of this research, all of those articles were read and reselected. For the articles that only mentioned Indonesia, but no Indonesian sources were mentioned, the items were omitted. In total, there were 216 relevant samples³ that were coded for this study, with distributions of 129 articles from *Kompas* newspaper, 37 articles from *Tempo* magazine, and 50 articles from *Tempo*

³ Other studies that used media content analysis had various numbers of samples, ranging from 203 articles (Nolan et al., 2011) to 1,174 articles (Levinsen & Wien, 2011).

newspaper. For the articles distribution which was based upon the time span, 123 articles were published in time span of new waves of forced migrants (1997-2013), while 93 articles were published during the Indochinese forced migrants' arrival (1975-1996).

Results

The results show that the way transit forced immigrants were labeled and discussed in one period evidently changed in the other. The content analysis of the labels was conducted at the level of the entire article. Each article was only coded once. During the period of the arrival of the Indochinese refugees, the vast majority of the sample used positive labels. The label of 'refugees' appeared in 72 percent of the news samples. In total, the combination of positive representations such as 'refugees', 'mix-positive' and 'boat people' reached 89 percent. Mix-positive contains a combination of two or more of the positively connoted labels, such as 'refugees', 'boat people',⁴ and 'asylum seekers'. The use of negative terms, such as 'illegal immigrants', was very low. There was no single article that solely used 'illegal immigrants' to represent the migrants.

Instead 'illegal immigrants' was always used together with a positive label like 'refugees' (See Table 3 for details).

In contrast, the uses of labels dramatically changed in the second time span; negative labels dominated the major print media's representation of the transit forced migrants. The 'illegal immigrants' label appeared in 60 percent of all news samples, while the combination of positive labels – 'refugees', 'asylum seekers', and 'mix positive' – appeared only in 5 percent of the samples (see Table 3).

Changing Themes

The content analysis also scrutinizes the way transit forced migrants were discussed in the media reports. In this study, the unit of analysis was at the level of an actor's statement. Each actor's statement in a report was coded only once. In total, there were 209 statements coded from 93 articles in the period of Indochinese refugees and 278 statements coded from 123 articles in the second period. The number of statements is the same as the number of actors making the statement.

⁴ In this study, I categorized "boat people" as a positive label. I was aware that it might be problematic to categorize "boat people" as a positive label since in developed countries, it has negative connotation. However, for Indonesians, "boat people" shows the plight of the forced migrants that had to leave their country on an unsafe vessels and with limited resources. Therefore, it evoked local people's sympathy.

Table 3. Representations of Transit Forced Migrants in Indonesian Print Media

Labels	Indochinese (1975-1996)		Post-Indochinese (1997-2013)	
	Frequency	(%)	Frequency	(%)
Refugees	67	72	2	2
Mix positive	14	15	3	2
Mix positive-negative	8	9	40	33
Fugitive	2	2	0	0
Boat people	2	2	0	0
Illegal Immigrants	0	0	74	60
Immigrants	0	0	2	2
Mix negative	0	0	1	1
Asylum seekers	0	0	1	1
Total	93	100	123	100

N = 216

Table 4. Themes of Transit Forced Migrants Discussion

Themes	Indochinese		Post-Indochinese	
	Frequency	(%)	Frequency	(%)
Non-Security	186	89	41	15
Security	22	11	179	64
Non-conclusive	1	0	58	21
Grand Total	209	100	278	100

Table 4 shows that the themes of the statements in the two timespans were very different. In the period of Indochinese refugees, the non-security theme was dominant, contributing to 89 percent of 209 statements. This theme incorporates discussion on the plight of refugees, living conditions, and solutions. In contrast, in the time span of the new generation of forced

migrants, the security issue dominated the statements, with the frequency of 64 percent of 278 statements. The non-security themes dropped to 15 percent.

Changing Actors

Regarding the actors who made the statements, the Indonesian government officials appeared most frequently within

both time spans. In the period of the Indochinese refugees' arrivals, the government officials' statements contributed to 48.3 percent of 209 statements. Various international actors appeared at 28.7 percent. The category of 'refugees' statements' was in the third place with 11 percent (see Table 5). The domination of the government officials

increased significantly in the second timespan. In the period of the new waves of forced migrants, the Indonesian government officials contributed to 70 percent of the overall statements (see Table 6). In this time span, the presence of international actors reduced to third place, with the forced migrants' voices increasing to the second place.

Table 5. Actors in the Period of Indochinese Refugees Influx

Actors	Total	(%)
Indonesian government	101	48.3
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	43	20.6
Ministry of Defense/Military	29	13.9
Local Government	6	2.9
Police	4	1.9
President	3	1.4
Members of parliament	8	3.8
Ministry of Information	3	1.4
Other government officials	1	0.5
Immigration	2	1.0
Ministry of Social Affairs	1	0.5
Port authority	1	0.5
Refugees	23	11.0
Local people	15	7.2
International actors	60	28.7
UNHCR	15	7.2
Vietnam	11	5.3
Australia	10	4.8
The USA	8	3.8
Others	7	3.3
ASEAN (collective)	2	1.0
Malaysia	6	2.9
IOM	1	0.5
Media	8	3.8
Others	2	1.0
Total	209	100.0

Although the statements by the Indonesian government were dominant in both time spans, there were some shifts in sub-categories within the Indonesian government category. During the time of Indochinese refugees' arrival, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense/Military were the two most dominant institutions. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs contributed to 20.6 percent of the overall statements, while the Ministry of Defense contributed to 13.6 percent. These compositions changed drastically in the second time span. Those two institutions dropped to third and fourth

place respectively during the time of the new waves of forced migrants. Their roles were replaced by DGI and INP. The DGI voices in the media reached 27.3 percent, while the INP contributed to 26.3 percent of the overall 278 statements.

In addition, changes in compositions also occurred in the international actors' category. During the Indochinese refugees' arrival, UNHCR, Vietnam, Australia, and the USA voiced concerns regarding the care of Indochinese refugees. In the period of the new waves of forced migrants, the USA's voices disappeared. In contrast, Australia's voices became dominant.

Table 6. Actors in the Period of Post-Indochinese Refugees

Actors	Total	(%)
Indonesian government	195	70.1
Immigration	76	27.3
Police	73	26.3
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	17	6.1
Ministry of Defense/Military	17	6.1
Local government	4	1.4
Members of parliament	2	0.7
Others government officials	2	0.7
Port Authority	2	0.7
President	1	0.4
Ministry of Social Affairs	1	0.4
Refugees	33	11.9
International actors	25	9.0
Australia	11	4.0
UNHCR	7	2.5
IOM	5	1.8
Others international actors	2	0.7
Local people	7	2.5
Media	7	2.5
Academician/experts	6	2.2
Others	4	1.4
Smugglers	1	0.4
Total	278	100.0

Discussion

Using media content analysis, this study has identified different representations of the transit forced migrants in Indonesia within two different time spans. They were labeled differently and the themes of the discussions also changed. Those changes led to one major question: why were the Indochinese refugees portrayed with positive labels and were discussed in non-security theme, while the newer generations of forced migrants were represented with negative labels and thus framed as security threats? The theoretical framework chapter has provided tools for answering the question. Referring to Buzan et al.'s (1998) spectrum of public issues, this paper can argue that the different representations were because of the issues being situated at different points of the spectrum.

During the Indochinese refugees' arrival, transit forced migrants were allegedly situated in the zone of a politicized issue. In contrast, the issue of the new generation of forced migrants was in the process of moving from the politicized zone to the securitized zone. This section will further establish empirical evidence to support these arguments. The issue of the Indochinese refugees was discussed widely in the print media, and thus, the government regulated the migrants (Buzan et al., 1998). In 1979, the Indonesian government established a refugee

processing camp in Galang Island. Within the same year, the Indonesian President Suharto issued a Presidential Decree Number 38/1979 concerning the Coordination for Solving the Vietnamese Refugees Problem in Indonesia (Keputusan Presiden RI 38/1979). The decree becomes the only presidential decree to regulate international refugees transiting in Indonesia (Taylor & Rafferty-Brown, 2010, p. 144).

Content analysis in the previous sections has shown that in the period of the Indochinese forced migrants, almost 90 percent of the samples show the use of positive labels towards the migrants. In addition, about 89 percent of 209 statements made by the actors in the samples of news articles can be grouped into the category of non-security issues. It means that even though the issue was debated in the public sphere, the migrants were not securitized. Graph 1 shows that almost 60 percent out of 186 statements with the non-security theme in the period of Indochinese forced migrants' arrivals discussed refugees in relation to an effort to solve the problem. This theme includes the establishment of a refugee processing camp, their resettlement, repatriation, and international cooperation in handling refugees. The second most common theme was the humanity theme incorporating the living condition of the forced migrants, the refugees' plight while in the journey to Indonesia, the refugees' basic needs, and their waiting time in

Indonesia. The opportunistic behavior of refugees⁵ was in third place.

The newer generations of forced migrants that came from Middle Eastern countries and South Asian countries were labeled mainly with negative terms, such as “illegal immigrants”. Labeling transit forced migrants as “illegal migrants” cannot be separated from states’ efforts to govern migration as it is not only a matter of categorizations (Scheel & Squire, 2014) – it represents an underlying way of the states’ thinking that inevitably contributes to why the refugees and asylum seekers are handled through tougher measures. Furthermore, the previous section shows that 64 percent of 278 statements in the period of post-Indochinese refugees’ arrivals discussed refugees along with security concerns.


In arguing that these changes serve as signs that the issue has been securitized, it is necessary to answer the following questions (Buzan et al., 1998; Waever, 1995): What existential threats are associated with the transit forced migrants? Who are the actors? What extraordinary measures are available to deal with the threats? In regards to threats and extraordinary measures, this study, as mentioned in the theoretical chapter, also takes into account

the argument which states that forced migrants do not need to be directly referred to as threats, but to associate them with traditional or transnational crimes (Huysmans, 2000; Hammerstad, 2014).


Graph 2 provides empirical evidence for the aforementioned argument. Approximately 57 percent of 179 statements – categorized as security theme – discussed the migrants along with a transnational crime theme. The crimes include people smuggling, human trafficking, and drugs trafficking. The second security issue associated with forced migrants was the illegal status of their presence in Indonesia. About 25.7 percent of the statements contributed to this discussion. In total, those two threats contribute to 148 of 179 statements. In general, the transnational crimes and the illegal statuses of migrants can be categorized under traditional physical threats (Innes, 2010).

⁵ This theme of opportunistic behavior was not categorized under ‘security issues’ because it was mainly statements from the Vietnamese authority saying that the refugees fled their country due to their failure to adapt with the communism’ style of life. It was not considered a threat for Indonesians who are also against the communist ideology.

Graph 1. Details in Non-security issue, Indochinese Refugees' Arrivals



Graph 2. Threats Associated to Transit Forced Migrants



However, the societal and economic threats that appeared quite frequently in developed countries (Innes, 2010) evidently are not the case in Indonesia. It can be due to the fact that Indonesia is a very diverse

nation consisting of hundreds of ethnicities, languages, and cultures. All of those ethnicities are united by the political

ideology of *Pancasila*⁶ – the five principles – that also includes the idea of multiculturalism. In a sense, there is no homogenous identity of ‘being Indonesian’ that might be harmed by the presence of these forced migrants in transit. Furthermore, the economic threat is apparently insignificant because of two reasons. First, the basic needs of the forced migrants are provided by international organizations such as IOM and UNHCR – not by the Indonesian government. Second, while waiting in Indonesia, the refugees and asylum seekers are not allowed to work, which means that they cannot compete in the local job market (Peraturan Direktur Jenderal Imigrasi IMI-1489.UM.08.05, 2010).

Regarding the actors who make the securitizing moves, Huysmans (2000, p. 758) argues that in the European Union context, the securitization of migration includes “multiple actors such as national governments, grass roots, European transnational police network, and the media”. I, too, agree that securitization is a complex process. Therefore, it might be problematic to refer the actors of the securitization of migration to particular persons or institutions. However, the

empirical materials of this study provide evidence that INP and DGI⁷ were the two dominant securitizing actors, making the most frequent statements in the media (see Table 6). Moreover, Table 7 shows those two actors were mainly giving statements concerning the illegality of transit forced migrants’ statuses and other statements that linked transit forced migrants with transnational crimes. In total, those two institutions contributed to 104 statements of the overall 148 statements referring to transnational crimes and illegal statuses of the migrants.

Police and Immigration officials gain legitimacy in securitizing the issue due to their nature of being “specialized agencies” (Watson, 2009) or “security professional” (Huysmans, 2000). According to Watson, their main audiences – who need to be convinced on the nature of the threats and the solutions that need to be taken – are “the governing elites” (Watson, 2009, p. 20). In that sense, their statements in the media shall be understood as not to get public approval of the securitizing move, but rather, they will be seen as part of “symbolic measures” (Bigo, 1998, p. 158) in order to establish an image that they have done something to handle the refugees’ issue, although they do not have to

⁶ *Pancasila* is the Indonesian national ideology consisting of five principles, respectively: (1) belief in one God, (2) just and civilized humanity, (3) Indonesian unity, (4) democracy under the wise guidance of representative consultations (5) social justice for all the peoples of Indonesia. I borrowed a translation of the five principles from *Encyclopedia Britannica* <http://global.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/440932/Pancasila>

⁷ INP and DGI consist of various individual actors from national, provincial, and district levels. The reason for lumping them together as actors at the institutional level is due to the chain of command nature of those two institutions. It is unlikely for police officials to show dissenting opinion about transit forced migrants against their institutional policy.

necessarily solve the problem. In other words, the aim is to gain “moral support” from the public, while they achieve “formal

support” from the elites (Balzacq, 2005, p. 184).


Table 7. Actors and the Security Framing of Transit Forced Migrants

Actors	Total	Percentage
Police	58	55.8%
Transnational crimes	48	46.2%
Illegality status	10	9.6%
Immigration	46	44.2%
Transnational crimes	19	18.3%
Illegality status	27	26.0%
Total	104	100.0%

The arguments thus relate to the extraordinary measures they offer. In *Graph 3*, from 179 statements on threats associated with transit forced migrants, the vast majority offer no concrete solutions. In addition, 22.9 percent suggest severe law enforcement as a way to deal with the threats. This includes investigation into the smuggling cases and also the idea to increase punishment for people who are involved in the smuggling process. The idea of severe punishment has been implemented after the Indonesian government issued a revision of the Immigration Law in 2011. People who are involved in the smuggling process, whether ‘directly’ or ‘indirectly’ can be convicted to 5 to 15 years in prison (Article 120 of Law

Number 6 of 2011,). The law has a massive impact on refugees and asylum seekers in transit in Indonesia. With the new regulation, any kind of assistance given in connection with an alleged people-smuggling network can lead to imprisonment.

This part has offered securitization as an explanation to understand the different representations of transit forced migrants in Indonesian print media within the two timespans. Yet, the argument still has a big “hole”. Immediate questions would be revolving around: why were the Indochinese refugees not securitized? And why were the new generations of refugees securitized?

Graph 3. Solutions Offered to Handle the Migrants' Threats

Even though the Copenhagen School is clear in providing the operationalization framework on the process of securitization, they fail to offer a comprehensive tool to analyze the reasons why an issue is securitized, while other issues are not. Further analysis using additional theoretical guidance other than securitization theory is needed to scrutinize the actors' decision to securitize or not to securitize the migrants. In this context, studies conducted by Karyotis (2012) can be useful. He argues that the motivation of actors to securitize or not to securitize transit forced migrants can be explained through the notions of subconscious drives and cost-benefit calculations.

Additional reading towards the materials using the concepts of subconscious drives and cost-benefit calculations, combined with some domestic

and global political constellations, might provide some possible explanations. The materials suggest that the decision to not securitize the Indochinese forced migrants was to provide a good image of Indonesia in the international community after the Indonesian military invasion of East Timor in 1976. Ever since the invasion, Indonesia had been seen by the international community as an abuser of human rights.

In addition, it was also intended to attract resources and maintain legitimacy, which was possible because it corresponded to the global perception of the forced migrants. During the 1970's the international community showed willingness to provide financial aids as well as to accept refugees. The subconscious drive was allegedly connected to the hatred of communism in Indonesia after the 1965 failed coup, for which the communist party

was accused of being the mastermind behind it. Therefore, the Indochinese refugees were seen as the victims of the communist regime in Vietnam that deserve assistance from Indonesians.

The next generations of forced migrants coming to Indonesia had no connection to communist regimes. In addition, the experiences of handling the Indochinese refugees contributed to the understanding that following a 'soft' approach might cost too much while securitizing the migrants can instead attract more resources. Again, this was in line with global or regional perceptions on the issue of forced migration. States have been more reluctant to accept forced migrants. Additionally, securitizing forced migrants can also serve to maintain legitimacy by showing to the public that the government conducted harsh policies to deal with the aliens. Still, these plausible explanations need to be explored more.

Conclusion

Drawing upon the Indonesian case, the paper shows how the representations of transit forced migrants at the time of Indochinese refugees in 1975-1996 were remarkably different compared to that of the new generations of refugees from Middle Eastern and South Asian countries that came to Indonesia in 1997-2013. The former were portrayed with positive labels and discussed with a non-security approach, whereas the latter, by contrast, were framed as a security threat. I have

shown the different portrayals of forced migrants using media content analysis on 216 articles from Indonesian major print media. This paper thus places the different media portrayals within the spectrum of public issues from the Copenhagen School. This paper establishes the argument that the Indochinese refugees were situated as a politicized issue, but they were not securitized. Therefore, the portrayals of refugees at that time were still positive. Even though they were considered a humanitarian burden, they were not framed as threats. In contrast, the new generations of forced migrants were shown as being lumped together with transnational crimes. They were also often labeled as 'illegal immigrants'. In this sense, I argue that the issue had been securitized.

Even though this paper has tried to answer not only "how" the issue was portrayed differently but also "why" it was portrayed differently, further research is still necessary. The "why" aspect is still worth scrutinizing more by exploring the reasons why the actors decided to not securitize Indochinese migrants and decided to securitize new waves of forced migrants. At the end of the discussion part, this paper suggests possible explanations by exploring domestic and global political constellations. However, the arguments still need to be explored more using different theory and methods.

One of the weaknesses this paper appears to have is that it has not been able

to dig deeper on the implications of moving the issue from the realm of a politicized issue into the realm of a securitized issue. Did it actually solve the problem – or was the securitization of forced migration only a “symbolic” gesture? Only through further research can we gain more knowledge by answering this question. In addition, this study only divides the period of over 30 years into two-time spans simplifying the complex nature of media representations. However, in each timespan, there were also different dynamics, which cannot simply be explained through the spectrum of the public issue. For example, the label that was generally used in the period of 1975-1996 was consistent, with almost no mention of “illegal immigrants”. However, in the 1990’s the way it was discussed was a little different, with more emphasis on repatriation efforts.

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Acknowledgement

Since this paper is originally a summary of some parts of the author’s master thesis at Lund University, Sweden, the author thanks his supervisor from the Department of Political Science, Lund University, Erik Ringmar for his insightful inputs and also his examiner, Katarina Jönsson, for her encouraging and constructive comments.

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Rethinking Refugees as Economically Isolated: The Rohingyas Participation in Informal Economy in Klang Valley, Malaysia

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Abstract

Unlike economic migrants, the refugee population is often portrayed as a burden to hosting government. They are seen to be economically passive, and highly dependent on the generosity of the hosting government and international organizations. In Malaysia, the refugee population including the Rohingyas is not living in sprawling tents, isolated villages or any refugee settlement in remote areas. They live in semi-urban and major city areas in search of economic opportunities – to make a living while waiting for durable solutions accorded to them. The absence of the right to work, coupled with the mounting pressure to make a living forces the Rohingyas to engage in informal economy, by undertaking various types of occupation and income-generating activities albeit risks of arrest and exploitation. This study aims to analyze the relationship between the Rohingyas participation in informal economy and their livelihood activities in the country. Resulting from two series of field works engaging the Rohingyas in Klang Valley between 2013 and 2016, the study found that despite the absence of their right to work, the Rohingya respondents persistently entered into informal labor market as temporary, unskilled and low wage workers in various sectors such as trade, services and automotive. For the self-employed Rohingya respondents, they tend to engage in small-scale and unregulated income generating activities. The active participation of the Rohingya respondents in informal economy has collectively strengthened their social interactions, influenced their ways of life, and increased their contribution towards community development. This study hence argues that the Rohingyas active participation in informal economy is an attempt to be independent or to be less dependent on the UNHCR assistance and government generosity in order to create and maintain their livelihood activities. This debunks the misconception that the Rohingya population in Malaysia is physically and economically isolated from the domestic economic structure.

Key words: *Rohingya, refugees, informal economy and livelihood*

Introduction

Generally, refugees in Malaysia are not allowed to enter labor market in any sectors of economy. This restriction applies to all refugee population in Malaysia including the Rohingyas, in which majority of them (70%) are residing urban areas (Equal Rights Trust, 2014; Kassim, 2015). Due to mounting pressure to make a living coupled with limited access to humanitarian aids, the Rohingyas are persistently entering the informal sectors, undertaking a variety of occupations and income-generating activities – albeit risks of arrest by enforcement personnel, and various forms of exploitation by unscrupulous employers and local community (Equal Rights Trust, 2014; Wake & Cheung, 2016; Hoffstaedter, 2016). Existing studies also indicate that due to the absence of their right to work, the Rohingyas are working in hazardous, poorly paid and with no protection working environment (Equal Rights Trust, 2014; Kassim, 2015; Wake & Cheung, 2016; Hoffstaedter, 2016).

This study aims to analyze the relationship between the Rohingyas participation in informal economy and their livelihood strategies. In particular, this study seeks to explain how their involvement in informal economy would enable and strengthen their livelihood activities in Malaysia. Prior to analyze this symbiotic relationship, it is important first to understand the Rohingyas participation in informal economy. For the Rohingyas who are employed in informal economy, this study aims to understand the types of occupation they engage, wages, period of employment, number of working hours, availability of social protection as well as their skills and working experience. For the Rohingyas who run their own income

generating activities (or self-employed Rohingyas), it is important to understand the way they run their activities including the size of their business operation, sectors, income and the hiring of workers or assistants. To best address the variety of factors contributing to the Rohingyas participation in informal economy and their livelihood activities, this study refers to the broad-based livelihood framework as advocated by Chambers and Conway (1991).

Research Method

This study adopts triangulation research method, combining three research techniques, namely a survey, an in-depth interview and a focus group discussion. The use of triangulation research method has enabled the author to crosscheck information and to relate them when analyzing the relationship between the Rohingyas participation in informal economy and their livelihood.

The primary findings in this study are derived from two series of field works conducted in 2013 and 2016. The first series of field work was conducted in 2013, targeting the Rohingyas residing in Klang Valley (Kuala Lumpur and Selangor), the central region of Peninsular Malaysia. Klang Valley is the most populated area among the Rohingyas in Peninsular Malaysia (Kassim, 2015, p. 183). A total of 48 Rohingya respondents were surveyed and interviewed between 2 January 2013 and 30 April 2013. This study used purposive sampling technique to determine respondents with the assistance of Rohingyas' community-based organizations (CBOs) in Klang Valley.

The second phase of the field work was undertaken between June and August 2016, targeting Rohingya community

leaders and activists in Klang Valley. A total of 10 interview sessions were conducted, using semi-structured interview questions. For the purpose of this study, only selected interview scripts relevant to this study were used. For security reasons and to prevent any unintended consequences, the personal details of the respondents and key informants have been kept anonymous and their names replaced.

Informal Economy, Refugees Livelihood & the Rohingyas in Malaysia

Informal Economy in Malaysia

The 1993's Resolution of the 15th International Conference of Labor Statisticians defines that persons employed in at least one informal sector enterprises – regardless of their status of employment, and whether it was their main or second job – are considered to be in informal economy (Hussmanns, 2004). According to International Labor Organization's (ILO, 2015), activities in informal economy may include enterprises who are unregistered under specific forms of national legislation, small-scale in terms of workforce involved, private unincorporated enterprises, no complete accounts available, goods and services produced for sale or barter as well as engage in non-agricultural activities.

In Malaysia, informal economy includes informal sector enterprises that are not registered under the Companies Commission of Malaysia (CCM), and with less than 10 workers (Institute of Labor Market Information & Analysis, 2015). Agricultural sector and any other activities related to agriculture that are operating for their own consumption are nevertheless excluded from the definition of informal sector in Malaysia.

Meanwhile, informal wage employment refers to all jobs that lack contractual rights, legal status, social protection, health benefits and labor law privileges (Institute of Labor Market Information & Analysis, 2015).

Official information on informal economy in Malaysia is captured through the Malaysia's labor force survey (LFS) conducted by the Department of Statistics Malaysia (DOS) on an annual basis. It was first captured in 2012. In 2012, it was estimated that one million individuals participated in informal non-agricultural activities (UNDP, 2013, p. 96). The key measure for gauging employment in the informal economy is the total number (actual) of persons employed in various informal sectors, as well as in percentage of the non-agricultural employed workforce.

Information on informal economy can be further disaggregated by gender, age group, educational attainment, status of employment, industry, state, and strata. While these data may be further disaggregated by type of citizenship (between citizen of Malaysia and non-citizen), but it cannot be disaggregated by the different types of non-citizens such as migrant workers, domestic workers and refugees – among the non-citizen participants.

Refugees Livelihood and Livelihood Framework

Participation in informal economy is one of the very important livelihood strategies for many segments of society. Yet, it is not the only aspect to consider when it comes to refugee population. Crisp (2003) stressed that refugee livelihoods are the issue of their fundamental human rights, fundamental liberty and protection. In fact, human

rights and livelihood are complementing each other (De Vriese, 2006). In other words, respect for refugee rights would strengthen their livelihood.

Other studies also indicated that the absence of civil, social, and economic rights is the key root causes that restrict refugees to establish or maintain their livelihood (Jacobsen, 2002). In many parts of the world, refugees suffer from the lack of their right to freedom of movement, freedom of speech, fair trial, decent work, and access to education and health-care treatment (De Vriese, 2006).

Self-employment is another common livelihood strategy among the refugee population. In Uganda, for instance, the provision of agricultural land to select refugee groups by the Government of Uganda to develop the land has resulted in refugee population become productive members of their community, and subsequently contributed in national development and poverty alleviation (Sebba, 2005). In Kenya, existing studies indicate that the limited freedom of movement coupled with the absence of access to agricultural land have caused many refugee population involved in informal sector (Jamal, 2000; Horst, 2001).

The above literatures illustrate the complexity of livelihood issues facing refugees from around the world. Even when refugees are legally allowed to work, it does not guarantee their employment due to poor economic conditions in certain countries. In countries where refugees are formally recognized, xenophobia and prejudice towards refugees, remoteness of refugees settlement, language barriers, lack of skills - collectively impede them from meaningfully participate in the labor market (De Vriese, 2006).

There are existing livelihood frameworks used predominantly by development actors such as Oxfam, Migration Policy Institute (MPI) and Transatlantic Council on Migration to study various forms of strategy used by the refugee population in order to sustain their livelihood in urban and rural settings. Other intergovernmental organizations have their respective livelihood framework and strategy dealing specifically with different segments of society. The livelihood framework of the UNHCR, for instance, is defined broadly to include activities that allow refugees to cope with, and to recover from stress and shocks, to maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets to provide sustainable livelihood opportunities for the next generation (De Vriese, 2006, p. 3).

De Vriese (2006) notes that most refugee households do not limit their livelihood strategies, but rather diversify such activities attempting to make the most opportunities available to them. De Vriese (2006), groups the common livelihood strategies employed by the refugee population into nine core activities, namely; (i) seeking international protection as a livelihood strategy; (ii) receiving humanitarian assistance; (iii) relying on social networks and solidarity; (iv) rural refugee livelihoods - falling back on subsistence farming; (v) urban refugee livelihood; (vi) engaging in trade and services; (vii) investing in education and skills training; (viii) falling back on negative coping strategies; and (ix) adopting new gender roles.

Despite the growing number of literatures concerning refugee livelihoods across the globe, there is no mutually accepted livelihood framework that could be adequate given the varying

circumstances and challenges facing the refugee population in different context of destination and transit countries. According to Chambers and Conway (1991), a sustainable livelihood means the capability of individual, or household to cope with and to recover from stress and shock; to maintain and enhance their capabilities and assets; and a means used to maintain and sustain their life. Although they clearly distinguish the components of livelihood framework into three categories, namely the capability, asset and activities for a means of living – there is a potential overlap between these categories. Hence, this study refers to a broad-based livelihood framework as advocated by Chambers and Conway (1991), without categorizing them into the three components. This serves as the conceptual guidance, and would enable the study to contextualize the issues and activities employed by the Rohingyas in Klang Valley, resulting from their participation in informal economy.

Rohingya Refugees in Malaysia

At the outset, the term “refugee” is a legally defined status in international refugee law, and as such, owing particular status and rights as enshrined in the 1951 Refugee Convention. According to the convention, refugee is defined as, “...owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion... is outside the country of his nationality...” However, as Malaysia has yet to accede to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, the term ‘refugee’ and rights stipulated under such convention are not recognized.

As a non-state party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, the existing national laws including the Malaysian Immigration Act 1959/63 – do not distinguish between

the undocumented immigrants (or irregular migrants) and refugees. As of the end of October 2016, a total of 150,669 refugees and asylum seekers from various countries of origin were registered by the UNHCR in Malaysia (UNHCR, 2016). This includes a total of 54,856 Rohingyas. Under the Immigration Act 1959/63, the Rohingyas and other refugee population, regardless of their refugee status are considered as “undocumented migrants”, and punishable by a fine not exceeding RM10,000 (approximately US\$ 2,500) and/or maximum of five years of imprisonment, and up to six strokes of cane.

As a result of continued persecution and discrimination facing the Rohingyas back in the Arakan state of Myanmar, (Ullah, 2011; Azharudin & Azlinariah, 2012; Equal Rights Trust, 2014), the Rohingyas persistently risk their lives crossing international borders in order to seek asylum in neighboring countries such as Bangladesh, Thailand and Malaysia. In Malaysia, the historical presence of the Rohingyas could be traced as early as 1970s (Kassim, 2015). Other studies indicated that the first Rohingyas arrival may be between late 1970s and early 1980s (Letchamanan, 2015; Irish Centre for Human Rights, 2010).

The Rohingyas are only found in Peninsular Malaysia, mainly in the states such as Kuala Lumpur, Selangor and Penang (Kassim, 2015, p. 183). For the new arrivals of Rohingyas, they tend to live in an ambulatory lifestyle, moving from one place to another in search of employment or any income generating activities. A study published by the International Rescue Committee (IRC) in 2012 showed that arrest and detention resulting from the lack of proper travel document among refugee population in Malaysia is rampant

(Smith, 2012), and that inevitably lead the Rohingyas to adjust their lifestyle, social participation and appearance in public areas.

The presence of UNHCR office in Malaysia has not always been regarded as helpful by certain groups of refugee population in the country. While some refugees view UNHCR as a source of help, others tend to consider them as being unhelpful and toothless to advocate the rights of refugees (Wake & Cheung, 2016). Such views derived partly due to the lack of access among certain groups of refugees to many UNHCR services and livelihood programs such as refugee registration, resettlement program, medical services, health insurance, community grant and educational opportunity.

The existing social network such as the Rohingyas' CBOs plays very important role to fill the protection gaps due to the limited role of the UNHCR as well as the absence of the governmental protection. In general, the Rohingyas' CBOs provide informal protection, livelihood support, shelter, lending or giving money and finding informal jobs for the Rohingyas in Malaysia (Wake & Cheung, 2016). However, such voluntary services often inadequate due to financial incapability, poor administration, lack of leadership and education among the Rohingya community leaders and activists.

The Rohingyas Participation in Informal Economy

A total of 48 Rohingya refugees and asylum seekers were surveyed between 2 January 2013 and 30 April 2013. 17 respondents (35.4%) are employed and self-employed in various sectors (refer Table 1). However the vast majority, 31

respondents (64.6%) are unemployed. Despite the availability of many employment and income-generating opportunities in urban and semi-urban areas, this study found high rate of unemployment among the Rohingyas in Klang Valley. The study also found that the majority of the unemployed respondents are the new arrivals of Rohingyas who arrived in Malaysia between one and three years (between the years 2010 and 2012). As the new arrivals, these unemployed Rohingya respondents hold neither UNHCR card nor asylum claim letter, and have limited ability to speak local language, making it difficult for them to find employment.

Given the absence of the right to work among refugees in Malaysia, the Rohingyas participation in all types of occupation and sectors of economy (as shown in Table 1) are considered to be "informal employment", making them liable to varying penalties under various domestic laws such as Immigration Act 1959/63, Employment Act 1995 and Companies Act 1965. However, often enforcement personnel turned a blind eye when they receive report or encounter with the Rohingyas who are illegally working, or running their unauthorized businesses, while some other unscrupulous enforcement personnel would take the opportunity to extort them. It is generally observed that public awareness and sympathy among Malaysian citizens towards the Rohingya population in the country has been steadily growing recently. It may be due to the extensive media coverage concerning human rights exploitation facing Rohingyas in Myanmar, and the influx of the Rohingya boat people in various countries in the region, including Malaysia.

On the aspect of income, there are two key observations can be made. First, there are two Rohingya respondents (12%) inform that they have received monthly income between RM500 and RM1,000 (refer Table 1). This suggests that despite having the opportunity to get employed, their monthly income has not reached the minimum wage as set by the Government of Malaysia in 2016 (RM1,000 per month or above). Secondly, all self-employed Rohingya respondents (eight respondents or 47% of the total 17 respondents) have received a monthly income of RM1,500 and above. This suggests that self-employment offers relatively higher income, well beyond minimum wage in comparison to the employed Rohingyas.

For most of the employed Rohingya respondents, their monthly income is determined by their hard work, willingness and ability to work overtime. For example, one Rohingya respondent informs that his monthly income is determined based on how many extra working hours he works during regular days, and working overtime during public holidays (Rafee, personal communication, 14 July, 2013). As a kitchen assistant in a Malay-owned restaurant in Kuala Lumpur, Rafee can easily receive between RM1,400 and RM1,500 a month.

Apart from income, informal employment of the Rohingyas in Malaysia has a symbiotic relationship with other critical issues. One of them is the irregular nature of their employment. This study found that all Rohingya respondents who are employed (nine respondents) – are considered to be undocumented workers given the fact that they do not possess a legally recognized travel document and working permit as required under the Immigration Act 1959/63. The irregular nature of their employment leads to other

labour rights issues such as the absence of social benefits, compensation and protection from any forms of labour exploitation. This study also found that there are Rohingya respondents (two respondents) who are employed on a seasonal or temporary basis. For instance, one Rohingya respondent who works as a general cleaner at Kajang Municipal Council (Selangor) is only hired when his service is required. This type of occupation often being temporary, and lasts for a short period (between six and twelve months).

Majority Rohingya respondents also inform that they prefer to work at a place nearby their neighborhood. They work for 12 to 14 hours a day. Some Rohingya respondents inform that they work overtime without proper overtime pay given to them. In addition to that, there is no social protection provided including insurance coverage and compensation in any case of injury. Despite the absence of academic and vocational (technical) certificates, some Rohingya respondents inform that they are hired for technical positions in sectors such as automotive and construction. Their capabilities in these technical positions are built upon self-learning or their previous working experiences either in Malaysia, Myanmar or any transit countries such as Thailand and Bangladesh.

This study also uncovered that some self-employed Rohingya respondents are involved in unregulated income generating activities, which are not legally registered with the authorities such as Companies Commission of Malaysia (CCM) and district councils, whose portfolios are dedicated to register and provide licenses to businesses to operate within their respective territory.

Table 1. Type of Occupation by Sector, Status of Employment and Estimated Monthly Income among Rohingya Respondents

Type of Occupation	Respondents (No. / %)	By Sectors	Status of Employment*	No. of Respondents according to their Estimated Monthly Income			
				RM500 - RM1,000	RM1,001 - RM1,500	RM1,501 - RM2,000	RM2,001 & above
Grocery / Wet Market Assistant	3 (18%)	Trade	Employee	1	2		
Food Stall / Restaurant Assistant	3 (18%)	Trade	Employee	1	2		
General cleaner	1 (6%)	Service	Employee		1		
Workshop Worker (Small Scale)	1 (6%)	Automotive	Employee		1		
Community Worker / Teacher	1 (6%)	Service	Employee		1		
Grass Cutter	2 (12%)	Service	Self-Employed		1	1	
Recycle Items Collector	3 (18%)	Trade	Self-Employed		1	1	1
Sub-Contractor	1 (6%)	Construction	Self-Employed				1
Informal Money Transfer Agent	1 (6%)	Trade	Self-Employed				1
Grocery Trader	1 (6%)	Trade	Self-Employed				1
Sub-Total				2 (12%)	9 (53%)	2 (12%)	4 (24%)
Total	17 Respondents (100%)						

Source: Survey 2013

This study also found that there are Rohingya respondents who have been renting trading license from local traders. For instance, Ahmad, a Rohingya refugee informs that he runs a grocery trading, and pays about RM350 per month to a Malay businessman who has kindly offered his trading license for him to run his grocery shop (Ahmad, personal communication, 13 July, 2013).

Rohingya respondents also inform that many of them involve in small-scale income generating activities. To run these economic activities, they require start-up capital sufficient to start their business. In some cases, Rohingya respondents manage to access microfinance facility offered by various non-governmental organizations – in order to start their economic activities. However, majority of them borrow money from relatives and friends. For Rohingya respondents who have started their small-scale economic activities, they hire between two and five workers – mostly among the Rohingya refugees themselves, or other refugee groups from Myanmar such as Burmese Muslim, as well as members of other migrant communities (for example, Indonesian migrant workers).

Apart from providing work opportunity to the Rohingyas, and other groups of migrant community, the Rohingya respondents who are self-employed also offer their goods and services well beyond the needs for the Rohingya community. In other words, their end-products and end-services are offered to a larger extent of consumers consisting of other migrant groups as well as local population. For example, Ahmad sells his grocery items to migrant workers from Indonesia and Bangladesh, as well as the

members of local community who are residing nearby their neighborhood at Sri Kembangan, Selangor (Ahmad, personal communication, 13 July, 2013). Another Rohingya respondent informs that he has been providing his grass cutting service to the members of local community mainly in the housing areas and government facilities such as schools and government buildings in various locations such as Kajang, Puchong and Serdang in Selangor (Syawal, personal communication, 27 June, 2013).

Rohingyas Participation in Informal Economy and their Livelihood Activities

The previous section has discussed the participation of Rohingya respondents in informal economy. This section analyzes the relationship between their active participation in informal economy and day-to-day livelihood. By referring to the broad-based livelihood framework as advocated by Chambers and Conway (1991), this study found that their active participation in informal economy has strengthened social interactions (remittances, access to education for their children, administrative activities and faith-based / welfare activities), influenced their ways of life (access to healthcare, formation of family), and increased contributions towards community development (entrepreneurship).

Remittances

The active participation of the Rohingya respondents in informal economy has enabled them to support the livelihood of their parents and family members who are still in the Arakan state of Myanmar or in transit countries such Bangladesh and Thailand - through remittances. Many

Rohingyas in Malaysia still have their parents or siblings live in the Arakan state of Myanmar or in other transit countries such as Thailand, Bangladesh and Saudi Arabia. The ability to remit money to their parents means they are able to maintain such relationship by supporting their parents and family members' daily expenditure, schooling of their children and healthcare treatment.

Muhamad Kasim, a Rohingya respondent informs that he usually remits about RM5,000 on average every year, in one or two transactions (Muhamad Kasim, personal communication, 22 February, 2013). The money he remits will be used by his parents to purchase daily needs, medical and livestock. Muhamad Kasim notes that RM2,500 is sufficient to maintain his parents' annual expenditure, unless there is a case of emergency that requires additional financial support. Sending money back home is relatively safe. A few options that the Rohingyas can choose to send money back home. These include remittance through informal money transfer agents (individuals), formal banking institutions (such as AYA Bank) and money transfer through non-banking institutions such as Western Union (Rafique, personal communication, 23-25 July, 2016).

Access to Education

Income received by the Rohingya respondents has enabled them to support and maintain the informal education of their children. All refugee children in Malaysia including the Rohingyas are not eligible to enter formal schooling due to administrative restriction. As of January 2015, there were a total of 126 informal learning centers across Peninsula Malaysia

(UNICEF, 2015). A total of 31 learning centers were dedicated for Rohingya children with minimal cost of educational fee between RM20 and RM50 for each Rohingya child per month.

Most Rohingya parents send their children to Rohingyas learning centers located nearby to their neighborhood for many reasons. Among them is to reduce transportation cost. For Rohingya parents who have more than one child, they would have to bear more educational cost for their children such as school fees, transportation, foods and other educational learning materials. According to Rafique, some Rohingya children has dropped out from attending learning centers after a few years of learning because parents lost their job and subsequently unable to cover the cost of their children education (Rafique, personal communication, 23-25 July, 2016). Hence, wages or any forms of income received by the Rohingya parents are pivotal to ensure they are able to support and maintain the educational expenditure for their children in Malaysia.

Administrative Activities

Income received by the Rohingya respondents is also used to cover their administrative expenditures in dealing with UNHCR office in Kuala Lumpur, as well as other administrative matters with government agencies such as Immigration Department and Royal Malaysian Police (RMP). Generally, the Rohingyas in Malaysia are expected to cover the cost of various administrative matters such as registration of refugee status and interview for resettlement – which require more than one-time walk-in (physical visit) to the UNHCR office in Bukit Petaling, Kuala

Lumpur. However, most Rohingyas in Klang Valley reside at the outskirts of Kuala Lumpur and Selangor – and hence require substantive transportation costs to enable them to travel to the city center where UNHCR office is located.

In addition to the physical visit to UNHCR office in Kuala Lumpur, some Rohingya respondents use email and fax to apply refugee status (Aslam, personal communication, 25 July, 2016). This can be done before or after their physical visit to UNHCR office. If their refugee status application is not responded by the UNHCR office, the Rohingyas will usually bring the matter up to the attention of local NGOs – majority of which are also located geographically far-off from many Rohingya neighborhoods. This would require further transportation and communication costs for the Rohingyas to reach out to these NGOs.

For the Rohingya respondents who are requested for a walk-in interview at the UNHCR office – as part of their resettlement requirement, they are also expected to cover their own travel expenditures to Kuala Lumpur city center. These expenditures are varied from one refugee to another, depending on where they are temporarily residing, their period of resettlement interview and attendance for physical resettlement courses – for which require their frequent visit to UNHCR office in Kuala Lumpur.

Faith-Based and Welfare Activities

Income received by the Rohingya respondents is also used to enable them to participate and contribute in various faith-based and welfare activities. The Rohingyas in Malaysia are an active community,

engaging in various types of faith-based, welfare and community activities. These activities are often organized by, and within the Rohingya community itself, or in partnership with local NGOs and community. The Rohingyas participation in these activities would enable them to contribute to the community development and empowerment through religious-related events, social innovation and livelihood programs. They also utilize the same platforms to contribute financially to the Rohingya community in Malaysia, and in the Arakan state of Myanmar (Rafique, personal communication, 23-25 July, 2016).

Some Rohingya respondents take the advantage of these gatherings to share information on current issues in Myanmar, expand their network and strengthen solidarity among themselves. To meaningfully contribute in these activities, the Rohingyas are expected to contribute financially to the Rohingyas' CBOs, community leaders or representatives for community development and welfare purposes.

A Rohingya respondent notes that every each Rohingya in Malaysia has the social responsibility, and therefore is encouraged to contribute in the creation of emergency fund for the Rohingyas in the Arakan state of Myanmar (Jamal, personal communication, 29 July, 2016). Individual Rohingyas are also encouraged to contribute financially to any development programs for Rohingyas in Malaysia in order to reduce dependency to local and international NGOs to support their livelihoods in the country. Hence, employment and self-employment in informal sector is pivotal in ensuring continuous contribution of the Rohingyas to

support the community development in Malaysia, and their fellow Rohingyas who are still trapped in poverty and human rights persecutions back in the Arakan state of Myanmar.

Access to Healthcare

The Rohingyas active participation in informal economy has enabled them to purchase basic medicals and access healthcare treatment. Accessing healthcare treatment at government premises such as general hospitals and government clinics requires proper documentation such as UNHCR card or valid passport. Unable to show their UNHCR card or any other travel documents, Rohingyas may be denied to access any form of healthcare treatment at government facilities. Unlike government facilities, accessing private healthcare treatment is relatively easy for Rohingyas, even without proper travel documents on the basis of “everyone has the right to healthcare”. However, most Rohingyas are financially incapable to access healthcare treatment from private institutions due to the higher costs of healthcare treatment at private health institutions.

In 2013, the Ministry of Health (MOH), Malaysia released a circular indicating that all registered refugees with UNHCR including the Rohingyas are given 50% discount of healthcare treatment fee from the total fee imposed to non-nationals (<http://www2.moh.gov.my/circulars>). In the same circular, all refugees including the Rohingyas are also given the privilege to access healthcare treatment for free, but not more than RM400 (or US\$ 100). However, in this case, Rohingyas are required to get permission and official letter from the UNHCR prior to their visit to any

government health facilities. For Rohingya asylum seekers who have yet to get their refugee status from the UNHCR, they are required to pay similar fee imposed to non-nationals. Hence, wages and any form of income received by the Rohingya respondents are important to enable them to access healthcare treatment mainly at government facilities.

Formation of Family/Marriage

Income received by the Rohingya respondents is also pivotal to enable them to form a family through marriage especially for the Rohingya males. According to Kassim (Kassim, 2015, p. 188), marriage among the Rohingyas is a necessary union for Rohingya adult, men and women, preventing them from immoral activities and sexual misadventure.

Many Rohingyas prefer to marry within their own ethnic group especially between members of a kinship originated from the same village or districts (Rafique, personal communication, 23-25 July, 2016). However, due to the lack of Rohingya females in Malaysia, some Rohingyas are forced to spend huge amount of money in order to bring their future wife from the Arakan state of Myanmar, often through pre-arranged marriage by their respective family. The amount of money spent to bring a future wife from Myanmar to Malaysia may reach to RM20,000 (Kassim, 2015, p. 188). Hence, Rohingyas who intend to marry Rohingya women from Myanmar have to work harder, undertaking more than one job at one time – in order to raise money for his marriage.

Worth noting that despite the ability to form a family, the Rohingyas cannot

register their marriage in any relevant government agencies including the religious department in Malaysia. In other words, their marriage is not officially recognized by the Government of Malaysia. Most often, Rohingyas approach their respective community leaders and religious heads to proceed with their marriage, and hence issued with a marriage certificate by the Rohingya community.

Entrepreneurship

Many Rohingyas in Malaysia aspire to be entrepreneurs. It is in their blood, and they are talented, according to a Rohingya community leader (Rafique, personal communication, 23-25 July, 2016). However, not all Rohingyas are capable to achieve their dream to be an entrepreneur. Certainly, to become entrepreneurs, these individual Rohingyas need to have sufficient knowledge, skills and financial ability to enable them to run and maintain their business. In many cases, Rohingya entrepreneurs (respondents) begin by working informally in various informal sectors – to enable them to keep money as start-up capital, gain experience and a variety of skills such as the ability to speak local language, determine business opportunities and create relationship with the members of the local community, before running their own business.

According to Rafique, the Rohingyas usually think and act as entrepreneurs naturally (Rafique, personal communication, 23-25 July, 2016). They have the ability to communicate the local language very well, build relationship with local people and know how to negotiate and to take advantage of any business opportunities mainly in their neighborhood.

Rafique adds that the good relationship between the Rohingyas and the local community such as the head of villagers or members of local committees would enable them to set up and run their small businesses in the neighborhood, without much disruption by the local authority.

Another Rohingya respondent notes that changing a career from an employee in informal sector to become an entrepreneur requires financial capability, at least an amount of start-up capital, sufficient to set up and run his business (Mohd Karim, personal communication, 23 February 2013). According to Mohd Karim, he starts his recycling business with a RM2,000 start-up capital. The start-up capital is important to enable him to buy a used motorcycle from a local teacher – whom he works closely for a community project at his neighborhood. The motorcycle is an essential asset to enable him to transport his recycling items from various locations to recycling centers. Mohd Karim settlings in Malaysia for more than 10 years, fluent in local Malay language and has good relationship with the local community mainly the head of villagers, government servants and businessmen – that collectively facilitate his business activities at his neighborhood.

Another Rohingya respondent opens his grocery trading, with a limited start-up capital of RM3,000 in 2009 (Ahmad, personal communication, 23 February 2013). In order to run a grocery trading, Ahmad rents a trading license and a shop lot from a local businessman in Kajang, Selangor. Other than the Rohingyas themselves, local people from nearby neighborhood are also buying daily groceries from Ahmad's shop. Therefore, it is important for Ahmad to

speak local language fluently, and build good relationship with their customers.

To briefly conclude, these livelihood activities are the result of their active participation in informal economy. This study does not argue that the Rohingya refugees who are unable to participate in any informal economy, would unlikely to undertake these livelihood activities. But their participation is certainly limited. Additionally, this study concludes that these livelihood activities are complementary in nature, or else interlinked in a domino effect. For instance, a Rohingya who wants to be an entrepreneur would need a combined knowledge and skills (as their capability) and capital (as an asset) in order to start his business. This situation fits into the broad-based livelihood framework as suggested by Chambers and Conway (1991) earlier in this study.

Conclusion

The inability of the majority of the Rohingya respondents to participate in informal economy is due to many factors. This includes the absence of their right to employment, lack of knowledge, skills and social interaction, as well as their migration history (for example, the Rohingyas new arrivals). However, there are groups of Rohingya respondents who are able to participate in informal economy, undertaking various types of occupation and income generating activities – albeit risks of legal repercussion. This study reiterates the key findings of this study that their active participation in informal economy has enabled them to pursue their various livelihood activities such sending remittances; access to education;

administrative activities; faith-based and welfare activities; access to healthcare; formation of family; and entrepreneurship. These activities have collectively strengthened their social interactions, influenced their ways of life, and increased their contribution towards community development.

Their active participation in informal economy also suggests that these Rohingya respondents are making effort to be independent, or to be less dependent on assistance from the hosting government and international organizations such as the UNHCR - in order to pursue their livelihood activities. This indirectly debunks the misconception that the Rohingya population in Malaysia is physically and economically isolated from domestic economic structure. Although the Rohingyas are still squeezed into communal settlements, their participation in informal economy has benefited communities beyond their very own. This also suggests that their economic contribution goes beyond safeguarding their own livelihood, but to a larger extent, domestic economy and hosting community. Hence, the Rohingyas can be seen as an active population that value adds to the domestic economic development as well as to meet the communal market demands.

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Regional Maritime Cooperation in Maintaining Maritime Security and Stability: A Test Case for ASEAN Unity and Centrality

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Abstract

Southeast and East Asian regions have emerged as global strategic waters. Yet, the seas in the regions remain vulnerable with overlapping claims on sea borders, piracy attacks, and other transnational challenges at sea. For these purposes, some major powers in the region, such as the U.S., China, and Indonesia, have launched their respective strategies in securing the maritime areas for their interests. To harmonize these various interests, ASEAN with its counterparts in the East Asian region needs an ASEAN-led, inclusive, and comprehensive regional maritime mechanism and strategic partnership between ASEAN member states and its dialogue partners to maintain good order at sea. In November 2015, the East Asian Summit eventually launched a joint Statement on Enhancing Regional Maritime Cooperation to justify the centrality of ASEAN and to counter the failure of ASEAN Defence Minister Meeting. In such case, ASEAN member states need to manage their disunity to minimize hindrances of the realization and implementation of the plan. This paper mainly elaborates the reasons why the region needs regional maritime cooperation and discusses challenges that ASEAN has to deal with in order to implement the ASEAN unity and centrality in promoting maritime cooperation and regional stability. To explain the maritime strategies of ASEAN and its dialogue partners, this study uses qualitative methods and utilizes states' documents as well as ASEAN statements particularly on maritime issues.

Key words: *ASEAN, maritime security, maritime cooperation, regional stability*

Introduction

Globalization depends on the free trade system that relies on the secure and free flow of goods on sea-based shipping. The seas are therefore essential and become symbol of globalization for goods to be distributed, sold, and consumed worldwide. Moreover, international shipping underpins the prospect of further beneficial growth in economic and world trade. But to have that effect, it needs to be predictable, traceable, compliant with detailed pick and delivery schedules, stable, and secure (Till, 2009). Having said that, the emergence of Southeast and East Asian regions as the strategic center of maritime transport is also associated with an increasing numbers of both traditional and non-traditional threats, which particularly happen at sea (Prabhakar, 2006). For this reason, some countries in the regions, such as China and Indonesia, have published their respective initiatives to secure and maintain the stability of their sea territories. This is in addition to U.S. Rebalancing Strategy in Asia-Pacific launched in 2011, which is mainly aimed to secure the U.S. access in passing through the Strait of Malacca and South China Sea (Bradford, 2011; The White House, 2011; U.S. DoD, 2012).

To respond the U.S. strategy, in September 2013 Chinese President Xi Jinping initially introduced the Silk Road Economic Belt concept, followed by the initiative to build a close and strategic cooperation between China and ASEAN Community, particularly in maritime cooperation (Xi, 2014). This is important as China proposes the construction of a 21st Century Maritime Silk Road to promote regional interconnectivity and economic integration (Xinhua, 2015). A

year later, in front of ten ASEAN member states and its counterparts – namely China, the U.S., Japan, India, South Korea, and Australia – Indonesian President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) launched the idea of making Indonesia as the Global Maritime Fulcrum. Jokowi's doctrine is mainly derived from the idea that the geo-economic and geo-political world is shifting from the West to the East and with the strategic position of Indonesia, the role of Indonesian seas will be important (Widodo, 2015).

To harmonize the abovementioned strategic maritime policies, this paper accordingly supports an ASEAN-led, inclusive and comprehensive maritime cooperation between ASEAN member states with its counterparts, mainly the U.S. and China, that has been initiated in November 2015 East Asia Summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. "Inclusive" means that this partnership should be open and give opportunities to all states in Southeast and East Asian regions to become strategic partners and enjoy mutual benefit in all seas and oceans in the region. Whereas, "comprehensive" means that this maritime cooperation aims to resolve traditional threats related to sea management as well as to counter non-traditional challenges that mainly happen at sea, such as transnational organized crimes and natural disaster. Such cooperative mechanism is vital as Southeast and East Asian countries mainly have common concerns to protect their seas and to enjoy benefits from them without harming other states' interests.

Therefore, this paper also elaborates the role of ASEAN, as the institution has become a primary driving force that is responsible to maintain peace, prosperity, security, and stability, particularly in Southeast and East Asian

regions. However, the disunity amongst ASEAN member states – as has happened in ASEAN summit in Phnom Penh, July 2012 due to the issue of South China Sea management and due to China's economic and military support towards some ASEAN members on one hand and the U.S. support on the other hand – is likely to hamper the initiative and the implementation of such maritime cooperation. Therefore, ASEAN needs to initially enhance the unity amongst its member states by fostering cooperation through regional mechanism and ensuring that cooperation on bilateral basis does no harm to other member states.

To deeply understand the issues, this paper conducts qualitative methodology, particularly the case study approach, as it allows us to see certain phenomenon not in a single event but always linked to other phenomenon. The method often involves interaction effects among many structural and agent-based variables, path dependencies, and strategic interaction among large numbers of actors across multiple levels of analysis with private information and strong incentives to bluff or deceive other actors. (Bennet & Elman, 2006-2007; Mahoney & Goertz, 2006). Therefore, to understand the logic behind certain maritime strategy of several states, this paper utilizes their white papers, their leaders' speech, as well as other policies and analyzes their behaviors from those materials. This paper is divided into four parts: introduction, the significances of regional maritime cooperation, the role of ASEAN and how the association unites its member states, and eventually conclusion with recommendations.

The Significances of Regional Maritime Cooperation

W. Lawrence S. Prabhakar (2006) confirms in his article "Maritime Strategic Trends in the Asia-Pacific: Issues and Challenges" that the Asia-Pacific region is a globalized maritime environment. His idea implies that in the last decades Asia-Pacific region has emerged as a global strategic maritime area. Nevertheless, the region and its seas are also vulnerable from both traditional and non-traditional threats. This part accordingly explains at least three notions to confirm the significance of the region and its maritime area that accordingly calls the Southeast and East Asian states for an open and comprehensive collaboration on maritime management.

First, the Asia-Pacific waters, covering the western part of Pacific Ocean specifically Strait of Malacca as well as the East and South China Sea, have an abundant inventory of natural resources that is surely advantageous for the island countries. However, this situation is also vulnerable at the same time as a significant number of transnational organized crimes happen in the region, particularly at sea. Second, the need to protect the maritime resources and the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in the Indo-Pacific Ocean, along with the increase of national economic prosperity, has encouraged some states to modernize their navies. However, this situation in turn provokes security dilemma¹ and

¹ Charles W. Kegley and E. Wittkopf in their book *World Politics Trend and Transformation* (2001) define security dilemma as "the central problem faced by all sovereign states in an anarchic global system in which a state's arming for ostensibly defensive purposes provokes other states to arm in response, with the result that the national security of all

creates instability in the region. Eventually, there are common concerns amongst Asia-Pacific states on their national economic development as well as regional and global stability and security maintenance materialized in their maritime strategic policies. Accordingly, Asia-Pacific states need a joint mechanism to arrange and harmonize their interests.

With regards to the abundance of oil and gas in South China Sea, there are some assumptions and estimation on the numbers of undiscovered oil and gas resources, confirming the richness of western part of Pacific Ocean. In 2010, for example, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) estimated that the South China Sea might contain anywhere between 5 and 22 billion barrels of oil and between 70 and 290 trillion cubic feet of gas. The Chinese National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) was more optimistic to estimate the potential resources in South China Sea. Using their own research project, in November 2012, they estimated that the area held around 125 billion barrels of oil and 500 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Moreover, in 2013 the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) launched an estimation of approximately 11 billion barrels of oil reserves and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves in the area (U.S. EIA, 2013).

In addition to oil and gas reserves under the sea, the abundance of fish and other marine resources in the South China Sea certainly benefits states that are located nearby the sea. In 2010, for example, China's total aquatic production reached more than 60 million tons from its Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ). The

declines as their armaments increase." See also Robert Jervis (1976), *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, Princeton University Press.

production significantly increased from 7.5 million tons in 1999, and 47.5 million tons in 2004 (FAO Fisheries & Aquaculture, 2011). The number increases every year, as in 2015 Chinese fisheries production reached 65.2 million tons and more than 14 million tons aquatic plants captured from its maritime areas (FAO Fisheries & Aquaculture, 2017). From the table below, we can see the massive South and East China Sea marine production that benefits the Southeast and East Asian countries.

With its EEZ covering the Strait of Malacca and the southern part of South China Sea, Indonesia gained more than 10 million tons of fisheries and more than 11 million tons of aquatic plants in 2015. This captures made Indonesia became the second biggest country enjoying the benefits from South China Sea fisheries resources after China. Vietnam also enjoyed the massive South China Sea marine production as it gained more than 6 million tons of fisheries, both captured and aquaculture fisheries. The Philippines gained nearly 3 million tons for fisheries and more than 1.5 million tons for aquatic plants, while Thailand gained nearly 3 million tons of fisheries. The massive production of South China Sea undoubtedly becomes an endowment for countries located nearby the waters.

With a proper management, maritime countries will enjoy economic development from their waters. However, the abundance of marine production may trigger illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing and other transnational organized crimes threatening any island countries that lack control and are weak at protecting their waters and its marine resources. According to the Indonesian Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, Indonesia

lost about US\$23 million per year due to illegal fishing (Politik Indonesia, 2015). In order to protect its marine production and perform deterrence from illegal fishing vessels, the current Indonesian Ministry for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries under leadership of Minister Susi Pudjiastuti has firmly arrested more than 35 vessels with Chinese, Vietnamese, and Philippines

flags by September 2015 (CNN Indonesia, 2014). However, this robust policy has become a concern for the Chinese, Vietnamese, and the Philippines governments and forced them to settle negotiation with the Indonesian government accordingly.

Table 1. Southeast and East Asia Fisheries and Aquatic Plants Production, 2015

No	Countries	Fisheries (tons)			Aquatic Plants (tons)		
		Capture	Aquaculture	Total	Capture	Aquaculture	Total
1	China	17,591,299	47,610,040	65,201,339	261,770	13,924,535	14,186,305
2	Japan	3,460,168	703,915	4,164,083	93,300	300,300	393,600
3	South Korea	1,648,993	479,360	2,128,353	7,826	1,197,129	1,204,955
4	North Korea	220,000	64,150	284,150	-	489,000	489,000
5	Indonesia	6,485,320	4,342,465	10,827,785	78,230	11,269,341	11,347,571
6	Malaysia	1,491,974	246,205	1,738,179	-	260,760	260,760
7	Philippines	2,151,502	781,798	2,933,300	367	1,566,361	1,566,728
8	Vietnam	2,757,314	3,438,378	6,195,692	-	11,822	11,822
9	Thailand	1,693,050	897,096	2,590,346	-	934,800	934,800
10	Singapore	1,645	4,971	6,616	-	-	-
11	Brunei	4,000	711	4,711	-	-	-
12	Myanmar	1,953,510	997,306	2,950,816	-	2,324	2,324
13	Cambodia	639,468	120,055	759,523	-	-	-

Source: FAO (2017), World Fisheries and Aquaculture Production

The second notion about the importance of Asia-Pacific maritime area is that the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca are not only important for their marine outcomes, but also for their strategic position in connecting states and for its SLOCs. This is to confirm that the South China Sea, passing the Strait of

Malacca, is significant for transportation and connectivity as well as trading system. Stretching from Singapore and the Strait of Malacca chokepoint in the southwest to the Strait of Taiwan in the northeast, the South China Sea is one of the most important energy trade routes in the world. The United Nations Conference

on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) confirmed that in 2013 approximately 30% of the world's sea-based trading (UNCTAD, 2013) and nearly 60% of oil products and global liquefied natural gas (LNG) traveled from the Strait Hormuz and Strait of Malacca to South China Sea (U.S. EIA, 2013).

The report from U.S. EIA (2013) also justified that more than 15 million barrels oil per day flowed from the Persian Gulf, through the Strait of Malacca and South China Sea, to East Asian countries as well as the U.S. In comparison, the world's most important chokepoint for maritime transit, the Strait of Hormuz between the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea, had an oil flow of about 17 million barrels per day in 2011. The number of 15 million barrels per day significantly increased from the last two decades. In 1993, according to the Center for Naval Analysis, about 7 million barrels per day of oil and petroleum products, which was equivalent to 20% of world seaborne oil trade, passed through the Strait of Malacca. Moreover, the Strait of Malacca plays important role since it is the main entrance and the shortest sea route from the Persian Gulf to East Asia.

However, the globalized maritime area not only endows states with increase in economic development, but also triggers transnational organized crimes, which mainly happen at sea. Thachuk and Tangredi (2002) define transnational organized crimes as crime activities perpetrated by non-state actors that not only go beyond national borders but also have global impact. They distinguish transnational crime perpetrators into two types of non-state actors, namely terrorist groups and organized criminal groups. With regards to terrorist groups, their activities nowadays are more intensely

carried out, publicly targeted, and globally directed. They also use the same methods conducted by organized crime groups to finance their organizations, such as drugs trafficking, arms smuggling, money laundering, human trafficking, and piracy. In the case of maritime Asia-Pacific, terrorist attacks have become an issue since some Southeast Asian states have to deal with radical and terrorist groups, such as Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines.

In relation to piracy threats, as reported by the International Chamber of Commerce's International Maritime Bureau (ICC-IMB), there were 576 pirate attacks in the Strait of Malacca, Singaporean, Indonesian, and Malaysian coastal waters in 2004-2009 (ICC-IMB, 2004-2009), nearly 36% of all piracy attacks in all seas around the world. However, the ICC-IMB in 2011 reported that the number of piracy crimes in the Strait of Malacca, Singapore, Indonesian, and Malaysian coastal waters had dropped into 240 attacks in 2007-2010 (ICC-IMB, 2007-2009). This might have happened because the littoral states – Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore – had conducted joint patrols to protect the Strait of Malacca since July 2005. Despite the joint patrols, the piracy numbers increased into 631 incidents in 2010-2015 (ICC-IMB, 2010-2015). The increasing number of pirate attacks off the coast of Indonesia, Strait of Malacca, Malaysia, and Singapore Strait confirms the need of ASEAN littoral states to protect the security of their waters.

To assure the free flow of goods and to safeguard the oil and petroleum supply, as well as to protect marine productions and sea territory, Asia-Pacific states continuously develop their naval power. Along with the increase of

economic prosperity, some states in the region are modernizing their military power and enhancing their military budget. As China's 2015 Defense White Paper confirms that the threats for China's maritime areas surely come from state and non-state actors, the Chinese government plans to gradually shift its People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)'s focus from "offshore waters defense" to the combination of "offshore waters defense" with "open seas protection". As its economy has grown over the last decade, the Chinese authority allows PLAN to build a combined, multi-functional, and efficient marine combat force structure. This is to conclude that PLAN will enhance its capabilities for strategic deterrence and counterattack, maritime maneuvers, joint operations at sea, comprehensive defense, and comprehensive support.

However, PLAN modernization and an increase in China's military spending with the justification of its security and defense have provoked similar reaction from the unhappy, threatened neighbors. The lack of navies' arrangement coupled with their naval capacities in the region has also become another concern, as there is no mechanism to supervise the naval power development of Asia-Pacific states. Regarding this, Rousseau argues that the weak position of one's military power increases the perception of threat that leads to security dilemma and military competition (Ng, 2005). In turn, military competition, as noted by Stephen Walt (1987), may trigger military alliances as states' response to threats and attempt to prevent stronger powers from dominating them. This situation accordingly intensifies the tension amongst Asia-Pacific states. This is true as in the case of Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines that

have conducted joint military exercises with the U.S. as they have problem with China in their overlapping claims on the East and South China Sea.

Eventually, the importance of South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca for sea-based trading system and SLOCs as well as the increasing number of transnational crimes endangering the economic prosperity in Asia-Pacific states have become common concerns mainly for Asia-Pacific states. This is not to mention the instability in the region due to arms dynamic. Their common concerns are derived from the willingness to maintain their national economic development as well as regional security and stability. For this reason, major powers in Asia-Pacific and Southeast Asia such as the U.S., China, and Indonesia have launched their strategies either to safeguard their water territories and interests or to guarantee their access through the waters.

In front of the Asia-Pacific leaders during East Asia Summit in November 2011, U.S. President Obama initially explained the U.S. rebalancing strategy in Asia-Pacific to secure and protect their vital interest in the region. To reflect his intention, the U.S. 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance justifies the U.S. military to continue their leadership in promoting stability and security regionally and globally by building stronger partnership with capable allies. According to U.S. authorities, the aim of this partnership is to reassure that the presence of U.S. military personnel and capability in the region is to maintain peace and stability collaboratively, as well as to safeguard the access and the use of global commons through seas. The partnership is not only of the U.S. interest, but also of Asia-Pacific states' interests (U.S. DoD, 2012).

This strategy continues under the Trump administration. The U.S. remains focused on the growing importance of the region, particularly for its seas and the freedom of navigation operations. The American Defense Chief, Secretary Mattis outlines the U.S. effort to achieve a rebalance to the Asia Pacific region. Some of the efforts are to strengthen alliances, encourages strong and responsible partners and strengthen U.S military capabilities in the region. Those are in addition to less formal networked security cooperation or interconnected region, to include bilateral, trilateral and multilateral exchanges, exercises and arms transfers. (Cronin, 2017)

As a response to the U.S. initiative in the maritime Asia-Pacific, which partly is also performed by joint military operations, China has launched its counter-balance strategy. Since Chinese government is still locked in sea border disputes with Japan and four of ASEAN members – Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei Darussalam, and Malaysia – Chinese President Xi Jinping firmly declared his disapproval of the involvement of external powers, mainly the U.S. In the 2014 Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), President Xi Jinping proposed a new “Asian Security Concept” which argues that Asian problems should be resolved by Asian people and that Asian security should be protected by Asian people: “...it is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia and uphold the security of Asia. The people of Asia have the capability and wisdom to achieve peace and stability in the region through enhanced cooperation” (Xi, 2014).

Previously, in September 2013, the Chinese authorities also proposed a

framework and cooperation mechanism to bring China, Central Asia, Russia, and Europe, as well as Southeast Asia together to build “Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st century Maritime Silk Road”. With regards to Southeast Asian countries, in front of Indonesian parliament members in October 2013, President Xi stated the Chinese government’s initiative to finance infrastructure construction and promote regional interconnectivity and economic integration by establishing the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). This initiative is particularly focused on the China-ASEAN maritime partnership, with the basis of mutual trust and good-neighborliness, win-win cooperation, togetherness, mutual understanding and friendship, openness, and inclusiveness (Xi, 2013).

Similarly, the newly elected Indonesian President Joko Widodo declared his intention to bring Indonesia to become the Global Maritime Fulcrum at his first speech before East Asian leaders in November 2014 (The Jakarta Post, 2014). The Fulcrum consists of five components, which are: (1) rebuilding the Indonesia’s maritime culture, (2) maintaining and managing marine resources, (3) developing maritime infrastructure and connectivity, (4) enhancing maritime diplomacy, and (5) developing maritime defense forces. With the fact that Indonesia lies strategically between the Indian and Pacific Oceans passing the Strait of Malacca and South China Sea, Jokowi’s Global Maritime Fulcrum doctrine shortly provoke China and the U.S. to approach Indonesia. Both countries are proposing comprehensive strategic partnership with Indonesia particularly in maritime cooperation (The Jakarta Post, 2014).

The U.S., China, Indonesia, and other ASEAN member states' respective maritime strategies are likely to provoke mutual contention in the region. Yet, their various policies also show their common concerns with regards to their maritime territories as well as regional security and stability. Despite their different stances and capabilities regarding the issue of East and South China Sea management, all countries in the region believe that cooperation is vital in maintaining regional as well as global peace, prosperity, security, and stability. The abundance of natural resources – including fisheries, oil, and gas reserves – coupled with the need to secure their SLOCs and sea trading system in Asia-Pacific waters from both traditional and non-traditional threats have called these states for cooperative management on such common concerns. From their defense white papers, we can conclude that ASEAN member states as well as the U.S. and China express their needs for a cooperative and comprehensive integrated action as well as a series of confidence-building measures and self-restraint in achieving mutual interests.

The Role of ASEAN and Challenges

ASEAN, as one of regional associations in the Southeast and East Asia regions whose aim is to promote regional peace, prosperity, and stability, has a great opportunity to facilitate and accommodate its member states' interests on one hand and external powers' interest on the other hand in such collaborative way. Although ASEAN was initially established to enhance the economic, social, and cultural cooperation among its members as written in its 1967 Bangkok Declaration, security has greatly remained at the core of its existence (Severino, 2006). Indeed, former Singaporean Prime

Minister Lee Kuan Yew also mentions in his memoirs that in its development, ASEAN was banding together more for political objectives, stability, and security (Lee, 2000). His statement is true as in the case of South China Sea dispute.

As a contending issue between China and four ASEAN members – Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei Darussalam – South China Sea overlapping claims have threatened the regional peace and stability as well as the economic development. In the name of protection of sea territory and natural resources from both traditional and non-traditional threats, claimant states subsequently enhance their naval activities. Moreover, the Chinese government's rejection against the decision of international tribunal regarding the case of South China Sea arbitration brought by the Philippines seemingly failed to resolve the problem on the legal basis. At this point, ASEAN should play its central role in maintaining security and stability in the region.

ASEAN has actually put its effort to discuss the issue in many summits and dialogues. The first workshop initiated by Indonesia was conducted in 1990 to manage potential conflict in the South China Sea. Afterwards, the issue of South China Sea and its management has been discussed every year in ASEAN leaders' joint communiqués and chairmen's statements. In 1992, ASEAN as a united posture eventually succeeded to bring China to sign the Declaration on the South China Sea, and then followed by the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC). Both agreements essentially called for a peaceful resolution of jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means without resorting to force, the exercise of self-

restraint, possible cooperation in maritime safety, marine environmental protection, search and rescue operation, action against transnational crimes, and the application of the principles of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation as the basis for a code of conduct for the South China Sea dispute. This was also to confirm that ASEAN had become a primary driving force institution that was responsible to maintain peace, prosperity, security, and stability, particularly in Southeast Asia and Asia-Pacific region.

With regard to its responsibilities in maintaining peace, stability, and security in the region, ASEAN also has several mechanisms where all members may have dialogue and consultation on common political and security issues, as well as significantly contribute towards confidence building and preventive diplomacy. Such mechanism is implemented in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM), and ADMM-Plus Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Russia, and the U.S. as ASEAN counterparts. They are complement to the ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF) and Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF). In these forums, ASEAN member states and their counterparts conduct dialogues on defense and security issues, and the latter is particularly for maritime issues.

Such dialogues and security mechanisms are effective to build the confident between ASEAN members and its counterparts. Nevertheless, during the 2012 ASEAN Summit in Cambodia the ASEAN leaders, for the first time, failed to reach an agreement on how to manage the South China Sea dispute. The debate continued as during the 2015 ADMM-Plus forum, the ASEAN counterparts including

Australia, China, India, Japan, and the U.S. also failed to reach a declaration on the same issue (Reuters, 2015). Besides, a prolonged processed of South China Sea Code of Conduct are of signals that the division amongst ASEAN members regarding South China Sea management remains problematic. The partnership of ASEAN member states with different counterparts in Asia-Pacific as described in Table 2 is very likely to exacerbate the disunity of ASEAN.

From the table below, we can see that almost all ASEAN countries have made their respective bilateral and/or multilateral agreements on economic, defense, and maritime issues with various external partners such as the U.S., China, and Japan. Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand for example have maritime cooperation and military exercise in the Exercise RIMPAC with the U.S., Australia, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, India, Canada, and the UK, without China and other ASEAN member-states in it. In trade, investment, and economic, Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam are in cooperation with Australia, Japan, and Canada in Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)-11, whereas Myanmar, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Philippines, and Thailand prefer to join the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) with China in the scheme. These partnerships contribute positively to ASEAN countries' economic development and security, but also provoke contention and competition at the same time due to clash of their and their partners' interests.

Interestingly, the East Asian Summit (EAS) in November 2015, couple weeks after the ADMM-Plus, prevailed to launch a joint statement on Enhancing Regional Maritime Cooperation. This

statement confirmed the centrality role of ASEAN and ASEAN-led mechanisms in maintaining the peace, stability, safety, and security in the region, particularly at its seas and oceans. This was also to confirm that both ASEAN and major powers in Asia-Pacific needed to realize the establishment of Regional Maritime Strategic Partnership and Cooperation, in which ASEAN becomes the primary driving force. This regional maritime strategic partnership can be an initial step for South China Sea dispute management.

The Regional Maritime Strategic Partnership and Cooperation launched in November 2015 mainly discussed on comprehensive issues focusing on safety of navigation and sea dispute

management as a way for confidence buildings measures. In further steps, the forum should also harmonize the diverse interests and make into realization of the regional maritime cooperation including activities such as information sharing; technological cooperation; exchange of visits of related authorities; maritime connectivity and capacity building; infrastructure and equipment upgrading; seafarers' training; marine-science research; marine environment protection; eco-tourism promotion; disaster relief; illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing countermeasures; illicit small arms; drugs trafficking; and people smuggling combat; as well as security at sea and ports.

Table 2. ASEAN Countries' Partnerships

Partnership	ASEAN Countries	ASEAN Counterparts	Area of Cooperation
Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC)	Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand	The U.S., Australia, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, India, Canada, Chile, Colombia, France, Norway, Peru, Mexico, Netherlands, Tonga, and the U.K.	Maritime and military exercises
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) - 11	Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam	Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Chile, Mexico, and Peru	Trade, investment, and economic
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)	Brunei Darussalam, Myanmar, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam	Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand.	Trade, investment, and economic
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)	Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam	Australia, Canada, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, the U.S., China, Mexico, Papua New Guinea, Chile, Peru, and Russia	Economic, free trade agreement proposal
East Asian Summit (EAS)	Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam	Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea, and the U.S.	Forum to discuss economic cooperation, energy, climate change, and internal ASEAN issues.

With such scope of cooperation, a regional maritime strategic partnership is important to enhance stability in the region. There are at least three reasons why ASEAN member states need to realize this regional maritime partnership. First, it strengthens mutual trust amongst ASEAN countries, as it will be a mechanism in which ASEAN countries speak as one united actor. Second, the partnership builds common perception between ASEAN countries and its counterparts in Asia-Pacific, particularly with China regarding the South China Sea management. Eventually, with mutual trust and common concern between all parties, the partnership gradually reduces the tension in the region relating to South China Sea issue and other maritime managements, as they will collaboratively resolve the problems, both traditional and non-traditional challenges.

Nevertheless, this regional maritime partnership can be a test case for ASEAN unity and centrality. As a regional organization, ASEAN's main task is to accommodate its diverse member states' interests and capabilities. Moreover, as a unified actor in the region, ASEAN needs to harmonize its member states' interest with external powers' interest. It is complicated for ASEAN especially after experiencing its first years of ASEAN Community. In such case, ASEAN member states need to build a common perception amongst them related to conflicting issues with a basis that they have common concern on the same issues. Besides, as an organization, ASEAN needs to ensure that its member states' respective bilateral and/or multilateral cooperation do no harm to other ASEAN member states' interests.

Conclusion

The importance and vulnerability of Southeast and East Asia region, coupled with its maritime security, has urged major powers in the region to launch their respective maritime and defense strategies which are important to promote national prosperity and security as well as regional stability. As a united actor in the region, ASEAN should also play its role according to its responsibilities by looking at common concerns of its members and counterparts. With regards to the South China Sea issue, ASEAN has conducted some internal mechanisms to resolve the problem, yet it failed to achieve an agreement on the issue. However, external ASEAN-led mechanisms can be utilized to resolve the sea dispute. To speak as one united actor, ASEAN should perform its leadership and centrality in Regional Maritime Partnership and Cooperation, involving other pacific states and ASEAN counterparts, mainly China, South Korea, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and the U.S. By this, ASEAN needs more confidence-building measures to build common perception with common concern amongst its member states and to ensure its member states get no harm from their respective bilateral and/or multilateral partnership with external powers.

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The Effectiveness of De-Radicalization Program in Southeast Asia: Does It Work? The Case of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore

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Abstract

The counterterrorism approach is still harnessed to tackle the spread of radical movement and it is deemed to be a soft strategy for a long-term purpose. In the several past years, the government has been conducting de-radicalization program in attempt to bring the terrorist inmates safely to social life after the prison release. This program commonly conducted in the prison while the inmates serving the jail time for terrorism-related offences. Nevertheless, debates rise due to the fail of the program results which prove some recidivists appear to execute another terror attack. An opinion of prison environment which is considered as a potential breeding ground for radicalization aggravates the government effort to reintegrate the prisoners into normal society. This worsened by the activities like recruiting other prisoners and supporting extremist groups from prison which still often occur in Indonesia. Taking two examples from international scope, France has announced to close its de-radicalization program, meanwhile United States under Trump's leadership prefer to heightened the sentences related to terrorism and to ban Muslim migrants excessively. Meanwhile, Indonesia still convinces that de-radicalization program is one of the most strategic approaches in fighting terrorism, and it is deemed as a soft strategy with a long-term oriented. Therefore, this paper will analyze the effectiveness of the program through theories, facts, and phenomenon. Thus it will yield some recommendations for Indonesian government in strengthening and reshaping its policies.

Key words: *terrorism, radicalization, de-radicalization, and counter-radicalization*

Introduction

Terror attacks still happen in some countries in Western Europe, Turkey, and Southeast Asia and it is worsened by the calls as a genuine message from Islamic State (IS) whose followers have been urged to execute terror attacks in their home country. This leads to the increase number of terrorist inmates in the prison in several past years. Unfortunately, the prison has served as recruitment center and headquarters for ideological extremist (Mulcahy, Merrington, & Bell, 2013). In addition, according to Neuman (2010), prisons are places of vulnerability which produce identity seekers, protection seekers, and rebels in a greater number than other environments. Prison also often gives extremist a chance to regroup and preach their radical ideologies, so that many prisoners who were not radical prior to imprisonment become radicalized through the prison environment (Johnston, 2009, p.3). Now, the challenge is how the government deals with the imprisoned extremist who cannot be assured to reintegrate with the society after the release. According to Ismail and Sim (2016), in 2013, the National Agency for Combating Terrorism (BNPT) said that 25 out 300 terrorists released from prison had gone back to their old terror habits, and it estimated that the recidivism rate to be at least 15 percent now. This number is not counted yet for some who just went to Syria to join IS after release, which more convincing that prison does not change their extremist beliefs.

Some questions like – where will they go? Who will monitor them? Will they re-offend? Or whether they will be turned away from terrorism after the release from the prison will be challenged (Horgan & Braddock, 2010, p.268). The

matter is there is no valid program that is claimed to be a success in running de-radicalization, and there are still many factors such cultural, psychological, and educational are involved. In Australia, consequently, programs have been deemed pointless and criticized by some influential Muslims (The Guardian, 2016). The de-radicalization approach seems to fail to build a constructive thought in battling the extremist idea, which causes more funds are used without any significant results. There is still a debate in the word of the “de-radicalization” itself because there is no consensus on what it really means and ends. In contrary, Hikam (2016) argued that the Indonesian government should still depend on the de-radicalization program because it is a soft approach that involves public participation. Therefore, this paper wants to assess whether the de-radicalization program in Southeast Asia is effective or not. There are three ASEAN countries chosen for the objects in this paper, those are Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. According to Kurlantzick (2018), both countries are considered as the leader at a regional level whose population is Muslim majority and has been helping up as a global example of democratization. Meanwhile, Dr. Kumar Ramakrisna, head of policy studies in RSIS (S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies), claims that terrorist (ISIS) is going a step further to consider carrying out the attack in the strategic hub and international port in Singapore’s territory. Moreover, Singapore considered as one of the countries in the “crusader coalition” that terror group was battling (Cheong, 2017). These reasons have limited the range of objects into only three countries at the regional level.

Theory

De-Radicalization

Ashour (2008) defines de-radicalization as a process in which radical group reverses its ideology and de-legitimizes the use of violent methods to achieve political goals while moving towards an acceptance of gradual, political and economic changes within a pluralistic context. In addition, according to Rafique and Ahmed (2013), the de-radicalization program is the process of abandoning an extremist worldview and concluding that it is not acceptable to use violence to affect social changed-radicalization. It should not be considered soft, but strategic because de-radicalization aims to prevent further escalation of violence (Dechesne, 2011; p.288). This makes de-radicalization is different with disengagement because it involves an approach to build a conductive dialogue the inmates. Therefore, many claims that de-radicalization is a significant strategic tool in tackling terrorism, and unsurprisingly conducted by many countries.

Based on Dechesne (2014; p. 179 – 180), there are four strategic uses of the de-radicalization, *firstly*, it is excessively used in its response against a more flexible and agile opponent that can hide in a larger crowd (*civil society*); *secondly*, it highlights the difference between de-radicalization, military, and repressive way; *thirdly*, it can occur spontaneously; and *fourthly*, it pertains to the cognitive side of radicalism comprising attitudes, values, and belief. In the case of Indonesia, according to Rabasa, et al. (2010), the de-radicalization has an approach which operates at two levels, *first*, it seeks to develop intelligence on the terrorist network and second is to

return detainees to society, thus the key objective does not to change the terrorist's mindset, but to obtain intelligence on the terrorist network in order to disrupt it and prevent the terrorist attack.

Indonesian government prefers to use cultural aspect as a tool to find a solution to urgently change the mind-set of terrorist prisoners. The cultural approach has been used due to a humane way and developed bonds, which are believed by each other to disrupt the spread of radical ideology and mitigate the extremist character inmates in prison (Martin, 2007). Unfortunately, the debates on the de-radicalization still appear and are due to the no effective outcomes. Istiqomah (2011) said that the de-radicalization program in Indonesia still needs to be evaluated and improved due to limited knowledge and understanding from the apparatus personnel about how to de-radicalize terrorist inmates. This sometimes worsened by the lack of inclusiveness means of it and how to run a clear de-radicalization program in prisons.

Radicalization

Before continuing the analysis of a soft and strategic power which is represented by the de-radicalization program, the concept of radicalization needs to be analyzed further. Payne (2009) claimed that radicalized ideology leads the subject in having extreme ideas and it is deemed as the "battle of idea", not "war on terror", and yet the ideas are still believed as the questions of which ideas, among whom, and at what level of extremism continue to be debated. Alonso et al. (2008) argue that the radicalism is also an ideology that challenges the legitimacy of established norms to lead to violence act, but there can be also radicalism without the advocacy of

violence to strive for the relations of social change.

There are four steps that people turn to be radicalized person. Silber and Bhatt (2007) said that the four levels are (1) pre-radicalization phase; (2) self-identification phase; (3) indoctrination phase; and (4) *jihadization* phase, in which each phase consists a different condition, particularly on the leverage of the subject itself before they already become a perpetrator. The first stage of the radicalization process shows that the condition of the individual is normal before they start to involve in the militant activities. The second stage is self-identification, which the individual keen to learn and understand the radical ideology which indirectly leads them to form irrational ideas. The third stage shows that the individuals tend to learn the radical ideology, and the last stage points the individuals accept and obey the leader command in *Jihad* participating (Aslam, Othman, & Rosili, 2016; p. 154).

Moreover, radicalization emerges when an individual has adopted an extremist worldview that is rejected by main-stream society (Hafez and Mullins, 2015). Therefore, they often legitimate the use of violence as a method to affect societal change. Recently, the radicals often act to be connected with the Islamist extremist. Borum (2011; p.13) stated that opinion is hardly rejected due to the facts that many violent acts are committed by those who support Islam extremist. This is because of Islamist ideology that might pose a security concern, particularly those that are anti-democracy and often blame the West for all Islam's problem, and may support directly or indirectly, or condone the acts of terrorism. Lastly, Hikam (2016) claimed that radicalization is the ideological process which is very vital,

thus its spread must be halted earlier when the government wants to cut or at least to mitigate the radicalization issues. It is not surprising that not many countries face the threats of radical views from their own citizens who now tend to be affected easily. One of the critical cases is the rising of ISIS ideology which boosts the number of radicals groups and supporters.

Counter-Radicalization

While the de-radicalization program focuses on rehabilitating radicalized people in order to re-integrate them into the society, counter-radicalization has an anticipatory action. As quoted by (Schmid, 2013, p.50), it seeks to prevent members from the non-radicalized population from being radicalized, and it comprises in three ways namely, (1) *counter-grievance*, (2) *counter-ideology*, and (3) *counter-mobilization*. *First*, most of the terrorist often legitimate their grievances (Krauter, 2015) due to the economic, social, and political issues, thus the effort of counter-radicalization has the purpose to tackle these grievances which quite often become the reasons why some people become terrorist. *Second*, before terrorist group promoting their extremist ideology, the security apparatus must counter it to prevent its spreading. Previously, Rana (2008) emphasize the importance to neutralize the extremist narrative before becomes a popular theme in public. Once it becomes popular, the ideology will become an encouraging drive in rising of radicalism movement. *Third*, countering-mobilization helps the people to disconnect extremist networks and knowledge.

As Powell (2016, p. 58) claim that counter-radicalization is a prevent strategy, thus a multi approaches are

needed. Not only social and economic approaches but surveillance and intelligence strategies, including military, are important too. In the polarized debate of counter-radicalization theory, there are two major views, *first*, the group who sees social and economic (soft strategy) and *second* is the group who emphasizes the importance of counter-intelligence and coercive action. (Taspinar, 2009, p.75).

The approach of counter-radicalization still avoids the *hard strategy*, because the strategy itself is empowering the community itself. In other words, the resilience of the community is strengthened by the proper understanding of ideology, religion, and even culture. Again, Schmid (2013, p.50) states that to strengthen the capacity building, there are four ways that must be done in counter-radicalization program, namely (1) expanding focus from violent to non-violent extremism; (2) empowering mainstream Moslem voice; (3) addressing the local grievances as local issues; and (4) promoting prosperity and democracy. These four steps are absolutely non-military approach. The implementation can be done through the relations between government apparatus and society, especially religion figures. Tackling the grievances issues such as poverty, injustice, and inequality must use soft strategy and usually it takes long time planning.

In addition, Trethewey and Corman (2009) add the four elements inside the counter-radicalization, those are naturalizing, obscuring, universalizing, and structuring. Naturalizing means restoring socially constructed by facing all belief and meaning behind the extremist ideology that jeopardizes public assumptions. This approach must need some process as Borum (2011, p.8) said

radical beliefs are a proxy. Meanwhile, obscuring means to omit the contradictions behavior between extremist and public opinion, in which the behavior of extremist is a key factor to be assessed to determine whether there is a risk or not (Klausen et al, 2016). The effort of universalizing means to understand the interest and influence of all terror group leaders. All of them must have the universal or common goals to establish the state under the Islamic law. To implement universalizing target in counter-terrorism program, thus engaging subgroups and their leader, politicizing the differences in interest is necessary (Schmid, 2013). And lastly, structuring means to preserve the prevailing ideology by empowering rules and resources. Taking an example in Indonesia, the ideology of Pancasila used to fight back radicalization movement and to structure the social system (Rahman, 2017).

Counter-Terrorism

Previously, the definition of terrorism is a political act that stands at once at the nexus between individual and collective action (Gurr and Marshall in Schmid, 2013). And there is another definition by Matusitz (2013) who stated that terrorism is the use of violence or threat of violence in the pursuit of political, religious, ideological, or social objectives. There are many definitions of terrorism; there is no universal and absolute consent on the definition due to the complex and multi-approach on its problem-solving. To counter or to end terrorism, it cannot be done by a single approach, both military and non-military are used by the state. In 2003, US National Grand Strategy combatted terrorism by attacking their sanctuaries; leadership; command, control, and communications; material support; and finances. This

approach will have a cascading effect across the larger terrorist landscape, disrupting the terrorist's ability to plan and operate (CIA.gov, 2013). Meanwhile, European Union have established four ways in conducting counter terrorism, *first*, preventing people to terrorism by tackling the factor or root cause; *second*, protecting citizens and infrastructure and reduce our vulnerability attack, *third*, pursuing and investigating across the borders and globally from terror attack; and *four*, managing and minimizing the consequence of terrorist attack (EUCT, 2005). In addition, Cronin (2009) said that to end terrorism, the state can decapitate like catching or killing the group leader or even negotiating (non-military way) which aims to transit toward a legitimate political process. Cronin (2012, p.192) gave an example of killing Osama bin Laden considered as the US Grand strategy counter terrorism, and it is believed that helping US to prevent Al-Qaeda influence in the world, especially in the US. The influence of the head of group terror is very significant. They have a moral effect to develop their influence to the terror group, especially their ideology. Although *killing* leaders does not completely destroy terror group, but Fisher (2016) said that *killing* group terror should weaken the organization (ISIS), especially depriving its direction and radical ideology spread. Stopping this means to support the effort of counter-radicalism too by other means or hard power. Moreover, preventing radicalism influence could be done by reducing support of all kinds of group terror (Powell, 2016, p.50). Bearing in the mind that group terror like ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and Boko Haram must have its bureaucracy/level (Fisher, 2016); therefore using hard power to diminishing its figure could help countries to hamper radicalism influence from group terror. Therefore, the main difference between countering

radicalization and terrorism is using what power in diminishing terror movement. Soft approach (non-military) can be used both for counter-radicalization and terrorism; meanwhile hard power (military) is only used to end terrorism.

De-radicalization Programs in Southeast Asia Countries

Indonesia

The government has established the National Agency for Combating Terrorism (*Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme/BNPT*) through Presidential Decree No. 46 of 2010. This agency has three main duties, *first* to establish national policies, strategies, and counterterrorism programs; *second*, to coordinate related government agencies in the field of counterterrorism; and *third*, to implement the policy by forming the task forces consisting of elements of relevant government agencies (BNPT, 2017). In addition, Sari (2016; p.73), stated that to perform the de-radicalization, BNPT has three main coaching programs, which are personality mentoring, independency mentoring, and continuous mentoring. Personality mentoring aims to fix the radical ideology which is not in accordance with the philosophy of *Pancasila*. This mentoring is being done with the help of the inmate's family who supports the program. Meanwhile, the independency mentoring aims to equip the inmates with soft-skills to get the work after release from the prison. The soft-skills are needed to develop and enhance every detainee capability, thus they will be more ready for the integration process with the civil society. Lastly, the continuous mentoring aims to prevent the potential of post-release recidivism.

In the mid-2017, the Bambu Apus Prison has sent 152 inmates to their

hometown across Indonesia, and this deemed as the successful of the de-radicalization program. (Halim, 2017). Parameswaran (2016), said that Indonesian government has promised to increase the fund of de-radicalization efforts due to the concern of the indoctrination of prisoners to become IS supporters behind the bars. The Indonesian government efforts to tackle the terrorism and radical groups must be praised, because since 2002, Indonesia has experimented initiatives aimed at the countering violent extremism as can be seen with the establishment of BNPT in 2010. (Sumpter, 2017). Moreover, BNPT's programs consist of "a cultural interrogation approach", whereby the officers displayed their own faith of Islam, treated detainees with the respect and attempted to build trust (Rabasa in Sumpter, 2017; p.117).

Malaysia

The major Malaysian de-radicalization initiative is by introducing the Religious Rehabilitation Program. Most of the programs are based on re-education and rehabilitation. Re-education focuses on correcting the political and religious misconceptions of the militants, while the strategy of rehabilitation is adopted for monitoring of the militants after their release (Noor & Hayat in Aslam et al., 2016; p.157). Subsequently, the rehabilitation proves is divided into four phases. *First*, counselors and the police extricate radical ideology or twisted Islamic perception; *second*, counselors open the discussion to address the misunderstood ideologies; *third*, all twisted Islamic ideologies are replaced by correct interpretations of the Holy Quran, and *lastly*, the process is continued by education program about Islam comprehensively (Aslam et al., 2016; p.

158). The Malaysian de-radicalization program is under the Royal Malaysian Police, and it claimed the success by 95%. Most of the inmates had successfully reintegrated which only five percent returned to recidivist. (Ismail, 2016).

Singapore

Even though the case of violent attacks in Singapore is far less than Indonesia, but three out of four Singaporeans believe that it is only a matter of time before the country comes under a terror attack, with Changi Airport the likeliest target. (Cheong, Tan, and Qing, 2016). This survey has been conducted after the Brussels's Airport attack which killed 30 people and injured more than 300 people. Moreover, Lam (2017), said the Ministry of Home Affairs of Singapore confirmed that the country was specifically targeted by terrorist groups in the past years and the terrorism threat to the country remains the highest in recent years, as ISIS has been linked to several violence cases in Southeast Asia Countries.

Due to the least number of terrorist attacks, Singapore has preferred to conduct the CVE (*Countering Violent Extremist*) rather than to focus on de-radicalization. The CVE program has been conducted through the courses given to all students to understand a theoretical foundation in countering violent extremist and radicalization (Taylor and Romano, 2015). The efforts from Singaporean government differ compared to other countries like Indonesia and Malaysia. The government prefers to conduct the "vetting process" to check whether its society have been influenced by radical's views or not. Aslam et al. (2016) said that the vetting process aims to screen the potential detainees actively involved in terrorism. Throughout the process, the

terrorist detainees will be reviewed by the psychologist and given security assessment.

The Failure, Debate, and Assessment of De-radicalization Program

The Case in France

Apart from Southeast Asian countries, France has announced that they will shutter its first and only de-radicalization center for Islamic extremist in the mid-2017, because its experimentation was claimed unsuccessful (Chasmar, 2017). The France de-radicalization center which is called as "The Pontourny Centre" is the voluntary center and has nine participants only who none of them completed the program. Spencer (2017), argued that de-radicalization programs which the West Countries has placed so much hope have long been a failure. This is because the Holy Koran and *Sunnah* are full of commands to make war against the unbelievers, and the idea that *Jihadist* can be "de-radicalized" by reference to them is just a myth told to infidel authorities to lull them into complacency. Previously, in 2016, 400 people were arrested on suspicion of links to jihadist groups, and 2,400 people and 1,000 families are actively monitored. This data also linked to the Bataclan attacks which killed around 120 people (Euronews, 2017). This is why, in the beginning, France really depends on the de-radicalization program which designated to the young people between 18 – 30 ages to halt their association to IS.

Unfortunately, the fact that France Government officially closed its de-radicalization program has opened the debates among experts in examining whether the program is effectively run or not in diminishing the radicals group.

McAuley (2017), said that the failure caused by the lack of evaluation of the mechanisms set up by the state in the area of taking responsibility for radicalization and the lack of a comprehensive prevention strategy. Moreover, some believe that trying to change the perspective of the radical people is not working, thus the effort of preventive measures are more fit and preferable. The report from France implies that de-radicalization does not work because most Islamic radicals do not want to be de-radicalized. This can be seen by the fact that from 8,250 Islamic radicals, only 59 people have inquired about going to France de-radicalization center (Pontourny) since its opening. Among those, only 17 submitted applications and just nine arrived and not a single resident has completed the full ten-month curriculum (Kern, 2017).

Another reason of France de-radicalization program failure was the issue of volunteering, which deemed as the crucial factor that leads into the failure. Crowell (2017) said that the issue of volunteering was very problematic, because it was impossible to someone to declare himself as a radicalized people and announce that he needs a treatment to de-radicalize his mind. The ambiguity of the term of "radicalization" becomes the question, because radicalization is subjective and cannot be categorized as an illness or like suffering from addiction. Some experts continue to argue that government is not supposed to use the de-radicalization term because they cannot invent a vaccine against the radical temptation/Islamist (Dunleavy, 2016). In the beginning, de-radicalization should not take a radical inmate as a patient like in the hospital, but unfortunately, some de-radicalization, particularly in France, implement the programs similar with the

drugs rehabilitation in prison which actually very contradict in dealing the terrorist prisoners.

De-radicalization Program: Are They Effective?

It is not easy as some people think in running the de-radicalization program. Sometimes, it is hampered by the definition of radicalization itself. Yusuf (2016) said the term of "radicalization" is defined in an extremely broad manner, and this becomes more especially difficult given that the concept of terrorism/radicalism is so contested and politically loaded. This lead to the government, for instance Australia, to more prefer the policy of "countering violent extremism" rather depend on their de-radicalization program too much. As a matter of a fact, the Australian government has developed a parallel criminal justice specifically for acts deemed "terrorist/radical acts" (Yusuf, 2016). This show the complexity of de-radicalization occurred, and some believe the program is too instant in removing the radical ideology which already inhibited in every mind of prisoners. Moreover, some countries are still finding the best format to implement the de-radicalization program, and of course the program must be realistically run.

If we saw violence caused by recidivism, means that the de-radicalization program is failed. Actually, the facts of recent attacks in the UK and Western Europe from the *Charlie Hebdo* in France and *Lee Rigby* in the UK point the repeated of terrorist recidivism. , rates of recidivism are understood to be legitimate markers of a program's success, and indeed, they are consistently referred to when discussing the effectiveness of programs and initiatives (Koehler, 2017; P. 172). There is no a certainty to assure that

there will be no recidivism in the upcoming years after the release. Even though the recidivism rate among terrorist can be consistently lower than 'normal criminals' but still it will be always used as a measurement whether the program is success or not. Only in Saudi Arabia who claimed 0 percent of recidivism, but meanwhile in Europe the rate is nearly 30-40 percent (Pettinger, 2017; p. 11).

In the case of UK, Marsden (2015), said the de-radicalization program still needs to be explored, thus it will have a clear set of metrics that reflect what successful reintegration 'looks like'. The program should notice on '*push and pull*' factors to make sure the ex-prisoners are not surprised when they try to integrate with the community. The *push factors* deemed as the reaction to leave the group because he/she has lost a faith in it. Meanwhile, the *pull factors* underline the essence of achieving a normal life after prison, so the financial incentives, the jobs, and the support from the family are important. In further explanation, Bjorgo in Johnston (2009; p.12), explained *Push factors* may consist of a loss of faith in the ideology of the group or the feelings that the violence went too far or even the loss of confidence in the group. Meanwhile, *pull factors* consist of a longing for the freedoms of a 'normal' life".

Previously, many scholars have distinguished the meaning of de-radicalization and disengagement. According to Kruglanski et al. (2014; p.87), disengagement denotes the discontinuation of active participation in violence whereas de-radicalization denotes a belief system that supports violence. This means the de-radicalization program focus on halting the ideology which has been portrayed as a triggering and motivating key factor. The challenge

is can the program change the radical ideology to normal perspective? In which, it is difficult to measure its progress. It becomes harder when de-radicalization program occurs when a group or an individual no longer believe in a violent ideology; meanwhile 'disengagement' occurs when a group or people no longer engage in violence (Johnston, 2009; p. 9). This is a key point why conducting de-radicalization program is much more difficult rather than disengagement. It will take a very long time to convince inmates to leave the radical view behind, rather to stop being engaged in any kind of violent acts.

More critics come from Dechesne (2011; p. 2), who said that de-radicalization may not require any coordinated action to get it underway, or in other words, de-radicalization may rise spontaneously. This means that structured programs do not guarantee a success to eliminate radicals view in every inmate's head. On the contrary, many countries still depend on the structured programs to run de-radicalization strategy, and this cost a high amount of state budget. If the de-radicalization process is really occurred in the 'spontaneously stage', then every structured programs are a waste of government spending. This has been criticized by some scholars who believe that the de-radicalization program tends to spend budget inefficiently.

Assessing the De-Radicalization Program in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore

Assessing the progress of the de-radicalization program in those countries will give the results whether the programs run effectively or not. Both Indonesia and Malaysia are countries in which Muslim is the highest population and they are still depending on the de-radicalization

program to minimize the number of radical groups.

Indonesia

Performing the program in prison clearly needs an adequate fund and reliable practitioners, especially the person who capable in teaching the Koran meanings without against any law in Indonesia. Moreover, the practitioners must have the ability in approaching inmates and his families and networks. The family connection is a vital part to success the program, so the family support from outside prison is clearly needed, and it is a responsibility for the practitioner to make it happens continually. The failure of the program is usually caused by the instant process, so the program officer cannot understand the root of the problems why the inmates still stand with their radical paradigm. From the previous research, Sukabdi (2015) found that some inmates believe the de-radicalization program does not alter their views and they do not understand on what strategy the government will change them into normal people. In addition, from the FGD and interview, Sukabdi found an inmate who totally denies the program. He believes the program cannot change his heart to love Allah and Jihad, and only possible to stop bombing (Sukabdi, 2015).

To assess whether the program is success or not, I evaluate the behavior transformation of every inmate who just follows the program routinely. It is not easy to assure them to avert their behavior, from pro-violence to contra-violence, moreover for the challenge for them to integrate with the social community after the release. In this reason, Sapiie (2016) said that the program is not really optimal because it cannot convince the former terrorist to return

back to society after serving their sentences. In fact, the main purpose of the program is to bring the ex-extremist to their community, but unfortunately, it is contradicted by the facts that many recidivists joined their previous radical group. This can be seen by the case of Thamrin attack in 2016, which one of the five perpetrators was a former terrorist convict, thus it was a concrete example of the de-radicalization program failure (Sapiie, 2016). Finding this fact, the result of de-radicalization program obviously needs to be assessed in some certain stages.

Lestari (2016), moreover, said that the de-radicalization program in Indonesia is under fire. Her opinion is same with the previous reason, because the terror attacks have continued with the perpetrator who just released from prison bars. It also shows the example of the police's inability to completely monitor the former detainees in terrorism-related cases. Another reason that points the failure of the program is the accessibility in every prison. This means that every crowded prison actually is no longer effective to run program. In fact, the more crowded prison, the bigger the possibility to spread the extremist ideas among detainees, thus many international experts still claim that a breeding ground for Islamic extremism (Beech, 2016).

The general results from assessing de-radicalization program shows three answers; *first*, many prisons lack of capable staff who runs the program. The officer with the educational background of social-security science is really needed

to back up the prison. It is a different matter if the prison still uses the staff who only capable in engaging criminal acts to run the de-radicalization program. *Second*, the program often stops after the release; in fact it should maintain the life of ex-prisoners outside the bars. The government has a difficulty in seeing ex-prisoner's network in his new environment. Due to this, the government has failed in solving the question why there are still many recidivists perform terror acts. And the last one is the condition of the prison that too overcrowded, so the program could not run effectively. Even though the program has been implemented by the capable staff, but as long as the prison environment is not supported with the good condition, hence the desired goals cannot be achieved.

In addition, from the primary data taken from the field research by Samto Isnanto (2017), the number of inmates of terrorism cases in prisons until 2015 has reached 215 people in 47 prisons scattered in 13 provinces, which can be seen from Table 1.

From his research from 2009-2015 in Surakarta Prison, Isnanto found that the challenges do not come from the inmates, rather the prison officer or supervisor who do not possess special ability in conducting the de-radicalization program. Mostly, the officer/supervisor only has the understanding of law enforcement and criminalization, thus the lack of human resources readiness, facility resources, guidance preparation, and control-monitor still persist.

Table 1. The Capture of Terrorists in Indonesia Until 2014

No	Status	Total
Indonesia		
1	Inmates in prison	215
2	Released from prison	598
3	Death penalty	3
4	Killed in the scene	103
Foreign Countries		
1	Repatriated from Turkey	169
2	Killed in Syria	53
3	Suicide bombing	4

Source: Isnanto (2017)

Malaysia

Looking to the neighbor country – Malaysia, seems they are really appreciated by the international community. Malaysia has achieved recognition from international organizations over the success of its de-radicalization program. The government has claimed a total of 130 people were arrested in connection with IS, and had been placed under the program. Malaysia has succeeded to collaborate through the Welfare Ministry to support the finance for the program and many psychological experts (Povera, 2016). Malaysia's advantage compared to Indonesia is they have formally enacted the relationship between the prison with welfare department, which is very important to make sure the prosperity and safety of every inmate after the release. Meanwhile, Indonesia seems still need to find the best format to build the relationship between the related stakeholders. This is much contradicted with the Malaysia's achievement which claims the success rate

in implementing de-radicalization by 95%. This is caused by the Malaysian government effort who success in building and modifying its experience to design rehabilitation program in order to respond to the current generation of Islamist militants (Besant, 2016). Moreover, Malaysia also strengthens the relationship with the neighbor states, particularly in exchanging the ideas on de-radicalization and rehabilitation. This makes this country has a knowledge advantage to perform their program compared to Indonesia.

Having a success implemented strategy lead Malaysia to set broader discussion in the international level. Malaysia's counterpart in exchanging the views on de-radicalization is not only ASEAN members, but international states like US, Japan, and South Korea. Malaysia has a good image in annihilating the communist influence during 1960's, and the method in combatting communist has been transformed to fight IS threats. According to Najimi and Ramli (2016),

Malaysia has a long experience in the de-radicalization program due to the successful of campaigning against a communist insurgency in the aftermath of World War. This makes Malaysia has a standard temple on diminishing any kind of radical perspective in their country. Their standard temple is clearly considered as the good method, which can be seen by the few of number terror attacks. Moreover, there is no case of recidivism who conducts terror attack in the last several years in Malaysia.

Singapore

Since 2007, Singapore has been aware with the potential threat from radicals group, thus the government has gathered 122 Muslim organizations to condemn and reject the ideological extremism (Hassan, 2007). After that, the number of terror attacks in Singapore is none until now. Even though the number or attacks is none, but the government still has a procedure for de-radicalization program such counseling time and financial support for the detainee. Aslam et al. (2016; p. 158) said that Singapore has performed continuous and comprehensive efforts undertaken by the government to combat terrorism, which should be praised and improved in the de-radicalization program is an obligatory with the uncertainty of political atmosphere at present to ensure harmony among the citizens are protected and to ensure national security free from militancy which sought to develop radicalism around the world.

Even though, there are no terror attacks in Singapore, but in September 2017, the government under ISA (International Security Act) has arrested two suspects – Imran Kassim (male) and Shakiran Begam (female), who tried to go to Syria for Jihad purpose (Channel News

Asia, 2017). The screening has been performed well by Singapore because the government has vowed to not let any Singaporean to become radicalized. The government emphasizes the effort of disengagement, for instance adding the policy to screen every citizen they have. This is not hard compared to Indonesia, because Singapore citizen is only 5.6 million, or only half of Jakarta.

Prioritizing Counter-Terrorism through Military Operation Other Than War (MOOTW) Policy

Tackling terrorism issues is quite complex and it takes many approaches. Due to the fail of the de-radicalization program in France and the rising debate of de-radicalization, thus the effort must put forward the preventive way that seems more plausible. Powell (2016) affirmed that the objectives of preventing (countering) will be achieved by responding immediately and working with a wide range of sectors. To response terrorism threats, the government can implement the military other than to optimize what security apparatus have done. In Indonesia case, Supriyatno (2014, p.218), said that Military Operation Other Than War (MOOTW) – *Operasi Militer Selain Perang* (OMSP) in Indonesian – can be used to tackle non-military threats such as terrorism, even though it requires political decisions from parliament.

Using MOOTW actually is like to combine the military-intelligence-territorial operations, which aims to secure the territory security. For the US case, their counter-terrorism forces are active in 40 percent of the world's countries (76 countries), and their presence comes with striking repercussions (Besteman and Savell, 2018). The U.S. has emphasized the “war on terror”, and it has been 17 years since

the attack of World Trade Center. The US government has provided its latest military technology and hardware, including to training local military personnel in Africa and Middle East countries. Since 2005, the MOOTW aims to end terrorism threats, which Blais (2005, p.5) claims that the program has provided a quick response measures that includes preemptive, retaliatory, rescue operations, and normally, counter-terrorism program requires specially trained personnel capable of mounting swift and effective action.

Previously, before the reformation era, Indonesia has done the same thing as the U.S., in which the qualified personnel to tackling the terrorism threats is under the responsibility of Special Detachment 81 (*Gultor Kopassus*). However, due to Anti-terror Law no. 16/2003, terrorism handling currently under the control of Indonesia Police (*Polri*) with the formation of Detachment-88 in 2003. It is been 15 years that *Polri* still fighting terror groups, and now the number of personnel have been strengthened by the additional of 600 Densus-88 personnel, bringing the total personnel to 1.300 (Soeriaatmadja, 2018). The presence of TNI to tackle terrorism has decreased significantly and the effort of MOOTW seems never to exist, because based on the anti-terror Law, *Polri* is the main actor to maintain the security at the national level, including terrorist attack.

This leads to the ineffectiveness of MOOTW due the TNI who is not supported by the anti-terror law, whereas using MOOTW can yield a significant result in combating terror groups. As quoted by Supriyatno (2014, p.219), there are four elements of MOOTW namely *offense, defense, preventive diplomacy, and recovery*. The element of offense aims to capture the leader and to destroy terrorist

and networks (Baker, 2007), which, the military force (TNI) can be used to help *Polri* implementing its operation. The challenge of the synergy between TNI-*Polri* is still being debate due to the regulations and applicable law. From the perspective of *Polri*, terrorism is considered as the criminal acts, thus the effort to diminish them still not using the MOOTW. In addition, Prasetyo (2016, p.46), the implementation of current collaboration by TNI-*Polri* is only limited to the policy makers levels at the headquarters, however, the collaboration at the forefront level such as Military Rayon Command/*Koramil (Babinsa)* and *Police Sector/Polsek (Bhabinkamtibnas)* still has not happened yet. Moreover, the doctrine of tackling terrorism between TNI and *Polri* is different, as Putranto (2014) said that police aims to enforce the law, while TNI aims to defend its territory from any kind of threats, including terrorism. This leads into the debate of TNI-*Polri* collaboration and cannot implement MOOTW. The rest MOOTW elements (defense, preventive diplomacy, and recovery) also cannot be implemented as long as Indonesian government still finding the best format of TNI-*Polri* collaboration.

The question is how to implement MOOTW, thus TNI can support *Polri* to fighting end terrorism? The answer is having the National Security Council (*Dewan Keamanan Nasional*), as Singapore, Malaysia, and major players such US, UK, and Russia did. As Praditya (2016, p.45) said that the main purpose of National Security Council is to formulate the security policies and strategies, which include how to tackle terror attacks by TNI assistance. Unfortunately, the draft bill (laws) of National Security Council has been rejected and still has not received approval yet from the parliament (Mukti,

2015). The strategy to implement MOOTW cannot be run as long as the country (Indonesia) possesses National Security Council and its law. Again, according to Praditya (2016, p.55), Singapore already had its national security agency called NSCS (National Security Coordination Secretariat) which formed in 1999. This agency (NSCS) aims to strengthen coordination between Singapore's defense agencies (military-police-intelligence agency), thus they can prevent terrorism acts with the assistance from the military based on its Law. Meanwhile, Malaysia also already had National Security Division (*Badan Keselamatan Negara*) which formed in 2006, and it aims to coordinate national security issues, including terrorism (Praditya, 2013, p.57). The further explanation can be seen by Table 2.

Meanwhile, if we see major players, they have their National Security, like National Security Council for the US; Security Council of the Russian Federation for Russia; and MI5 for the UK. Therefore, the conclusion is that the country must own its national security acts/council as a single entity to coordinate military-police in tackling the terror threats. In other words, the MOOTW can be done effectively to combat terrorism as long as there is no law on it. In Indonesia case,

Polri still regarded as the leading sector due to the Laws.

Solutions for In-effectiveness of De-radicalization Program

There are some strategic solutions to answer the debate of the effectiveness of de-radicalization, however, the writer divides into two conditions:

1. If the government still keep running the de-radicalization program:

First, the program officers in prisons must understand the concept of de-radicalization, and they cannot only have the knowledge background of criminal science and extra-ordinary crime.

Second, program officer in prisons can handle the radicalized inmates by embracing the existence of their family and religion figures. Moreover, the program officer has the ability to interpreting (*tafsir*) the Qur'an.

Third, for Indonesia case, BNPT must be authoritatively and financially empowered to conduct the de-radicalization program. The main agenda is to provide many qualified program officers to oversee de-radicalization course.

Table 2. Comparison between Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore Security Councils

Countries	Security Council	
Indonesia	(none)	Cannot implement MOOTW optimally
Malaysia	BKN (<i>Badan Keselamatan Negara</i>)	Can coordinate military and police under one agency, thus could perform MOOTW effectively
Singapore	NSCS (National Security Coordination Secretariat)	Can coordinate military and police under one agency, thus could perform MOOTW effectively

Source: Praditya, 2016; elaborated

2. If the government stop the de-radicalization program (for Indonesia case):

First, empowering the counter-terrorism policy with the help of military (TNI) through MOOTW. This should be supported by the applicable laws and regulations (revision of anti-terror law) to enable the MOOTW works.

Second, to have National Security Council/acts immediately like Singapore and Malaysia did, thus the collaboration between TNI-*Polri* would be run effectively by one/single entity.

Third, strengthening the intelligence operation to capture the group leader and prominent actors of terror, thus their influence can be cut immediately. This role falls under the BIN (National State Intelligence Agency) as the leading sector to coordinate TNI and *Polri* in gathering intelligence information. This is very useful for Indonesia while the government still don't have National Security Entity.

Fourth, strengthening joint patrols and intelligent sharing through ADMM (ASEAN Defense Minister Meeting) to secure from terrorist and radicalism movement. From Indonesia case, the ADMM can be chosen as a place to perform Indonesia Defense's preventive diplomacy.

Conclusion

De-radicalization program cannot be harnessed as a primary way to annihilate the extremist movement, because the process to de-radicalize is a long process and it is not an instant stage. There is no certain step to de-radicalize inmates, and it is still debated among the scholars and

experts. The government cannot cut the radicals ideology immediately, but they can stop violence acts which are called as a disengagement strategy. Moreover, Indonesia needs to re-evaluate what is the best format for the de-radicalization program, thus it will deliver a desired result. And lastly, after comparing the program in Indonesia with two neighbor countries (Malaysia – Singapore), the cultural aspects only deemed as a crucial factor only in Indonesia, while others depend on the quality of the program without engaging cultural approach. Meanwhile, the effort to implement MOOTW to crush the terror group by TNI is still being limited by the applicable Law in Indonesia. Until now, Indonesia can only perform its counter-terrorism under the *Polri* responsibility.

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Explaining the Fast-Growing Textile and Garment Industries (TGI) in Vietnam (2000-2015)

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Abstract

The goal of this research is to explain the fast-growing textile and garment industries (TGI) in Vietnam from 2000 to 2015. This research is important in the context of Indonesia's competition with Vietnam as among top TGI exporters in the world. This research adopted Gereffi's Global Commodity Chains (GCCs) framework which situates TGI under the category of buyer-driven chains. Under this category, actors, both government and industry, interested in industrial upgrading must develop both forward (marketing) and backward (production) linkages and learning process between this continuum. This research found that Vietnam's fast growing textile and garment industries from 2000-2015 has been contributed by the government's successful industrial upgrading through its learning process in developing forward and backward linkages. Following these findings, therefore, Indonesia as competitor must also develop similar attitude and learning process in both linkages.

Key words: *textile, garment, Vietnam, global commodity chains, industrial upgrading*

Introduction

The last two decades have been a remarkable history in Vietnam economy in which the country has grown from one of the least developed countries in Southeast Asia to one of the fastest growing nation in the region. The GDP annual growth peaked in 2007 when it reached \$8.5 billion as high as Singapore (ASEAN Secretariat, 2010). And, even though its economic growth was slightly down during the global financial crisis 2008-2010, the trend afterwards has been consistently increasing compared to those of China and its neighboring countries (WTO, n.d.) (Chi, 2016). Overall, Vietnam economy has grown from only US\$31 billion in 2000 to US\$193 billion in 2015, an increase which is more than 500% in only 15 years (WTO, n.d.).

Its textile and garment industries (TGI) which recently has substituted crude oil and gas as the country's primary export also experienced a tremendous growth with 20% annual growth rate from 2000 (AFTEX, 2010) and increased to 30% since 2005 (WTO, 2011). After the financial crisis, Vietnam's TGI remains the world fastest growing industry with 17% increase from 2010-2015, far exceeding China which, despite maintained as the world largest textile and garment exporter, its annual growth stuck in the level of 6% (WTO, 2016). In terms of access to the world largest markets, Vietnam now ranks the second after China as the textile and garment supplier for the United States (U.S.) and Japan (WITS, n.d.). It is also one of the biggest ten exporters for European Union (EU) market in the last decade with its export volume continues to increase considerably (Vinatex, 2011). With all the above development, textile and garment

industries play pivotal role for Vietnam economy, not only contributing to half of its manufacture export but also to 2.5 million employments for local people (Chi, 2016).

This development of Vietnam's TGI has undeniably posed significant challenges to other TGI exporting countries especially Indonesia which is also among 10 largest TGI exporters in the world and the second largest in the region after Vietnam. However, the growth of Indonesia's TGI has been stagnant since 2010 with 0% growth in 2010-2015. Vietnam's TGI growth, in this regards, could be treated as the biggest competitor for Indonesia, but at the same time also an example to learn how to survive in the TGI industry.

Against this backdrop, this research aimed to analyze this major development of Vietnamese textile and garment industries from 2000 to 2015, particularly how the government promote this national growth of its TGI. The year 2000 is chosen because this period marked the beginning of significant growth in Vietnam' TGI, while the cutoff in 2015 is chosen to help making better observation on the object of study which would be otherwise difficult if it is conducted on the ongoing period (2018).

Several works have been made to study the Vietnam's growing textile and garment industries in the previous decade from 1990-2000 (Tran, 1996) (Nguyen & Le, 2005) but the trend of development after 2000 has been very different both in term of size and factors involved. The changing international environment, particularly, has contributed to the major leap for Vietnamese textile and garment industries. Yet still, those studying TGI growth after 2000 focus only on particular aspect of TGI such as coloration (Phong &

Thong, 2008) and particular partners countries such as comparison of Vietnam's export to the U.S., Japan, and the EU (Goto, Natsuda, & Thoburn, 2011). These studies also focus on individual companies rather than focus on the strategy conducted by Vietnamese government to promote the growth of Vietnamese TGI internationally, which is more useful for the purpose of giving feedback to Indonesian government. It is for this reason; this study intends to fill this gap.

The past research, however, has introduced basis for theoretical framework to analyze textile and garment industry which could be maintained for this research. Common among the past research was the adoption of Gary Gereffi's Global Commodity Chains (GCCs) (Gereffi, 1999) as a tool of analysis. This framework principally looks at global economy as a commodity chain consisting of designing, producing, and marketing activities (Gereffi, 1999). In GCCs, the chain is divided into producer-driven chain in which the large producers have more power in influencing the chain through its large capital reserve and technological advancement and buyer-driven chain in which buyers, marketers, and retailers have more say within the chain through its value added learning process. The dominance of buyers and marketers have created pressures in reducing production costs which make the main characteristics for the latter category is its labor intensive production such as apparent in the textile and garment industry. Another characteristic of this category is what he termed as "geographical expansion" or "multilayer source network" (Gereffi, 1999). This phenomenon occurs when the production in particular countries has arisen which makes buyers, marketers, and retailers

shift their production to other countries with cheaper production cost. This phenomenon is what determines the dynamics in buyer driven chain and the one that enables one country to move up the ladder within the chain. This occurs because buyers, marketers, and retailers tend to retain the previous producing countries as their "middle men" in their relations with the new outsourced countries. This is the aspect from Gereffi's framework that most of the past researches have focused on.

Of course, this systemic cause is not the only way one country could move up the ladder of buyer-driven chain. Gereffi suggests that countries aim to upgrade its industry within the chain must also develop its agency role in influencing the chain by strengthening its forward and backward linkages. The first refers to the strategy of identifying and expanding its consumer and marketing network, while the latter refers to the strategy of strengthening its production system and network. While the main actor in this chain is firms within TGI, but this theory could also be applied in the government, meaning the government could also help developing forward and backward linkages to help its domestic industry moving up the ladder of chain. This is often the case as the character of TGI, as Henrik Schaumburg-Muller noted, "has hardly ever been characterized by free trade arrangements where comparative advantages would alone be the main driver for the location of production and distribution of exports" (Schaumburg-Muller, 2009). The durability of Multi-Fiber Agreement (MFA) which set quota for trade in textile and garment from 1974 to 2005 is a telling evidence on the government intervention tendency in this industry. Even though MFA has been terminated, but various

individual government measures are also introduced to protect their market particularly against the competitive pressure from China's TGI and the more open market which makes TGI in the post MFA often subject to government intervention (Schaumburg-Muller, 2009). In addition, the dynamics of this industry is also highly influenced by macro economy of a country particularly in relations to labor wages, therefore, the role of government is significant in TGI development of a country and it is also the reason why discussions on TGI use country as the main reference.


Based on this explanation, it is my contention here that the fast-growing textile and garment industry in Vietnam from 2000 to 2015 cannot be separated from two major factors of Vietnam industrial upgrading strategy. First, the given character of geographical expansion in this buyer-driven chain has benefited Vietnam as the neighboring country when the production cost is rising in China and consumers relocate their production base. Second, in addition to this advantage, Vietnam also plays agency role in

establishing forward and backward linkage. All these factors, in the end, contribute to the development of Vietnam textile and garment industry and its industrial upgrading in the global commodity chain.

Methods

In testing this hypothesis, this research was conducted in two stages. The first was literature study on the development of textile and garment industries in Vietnam to establish context within which this study was undertaken, to demonstrate the importance of these industries to Vietnam, and to illustrate the significant growth that the industries have reached in the past decade. The second stage, then, analyzed the factors underlying the rapid development of TGI in Vietnam since 2000 to 2015 particularly from the side of government's strategy in promoting this growth using the framework of global commodity chains (GCCs). The GCC framework itself could be summarized using the following diagram.

Graph 1. Vietnam's TGI in GCC Framework



In collecting data on government strategy to promote TGI growth, this research primarily relied on desk study to collect both primary data provided by

relevant Vietnamese government websites and secondary data from scholarly literatures and media. It is the analysis of

these data using the framework that will lead to conclusion.

Result and Discussion

In line with the above method, the result of this research would be divided into two parts: findings on the historical development of textile and garment industries in Vietnam and analysis of the fast-growing TGI industries in Vietnam using GCC framework.


Historical Development of Textile and Garment Industries in Vietnam

Textile and garment are both old commodities in international trade dating back to the early silk route which interlinked traders from Afro-Eurasian to the Eastern part of Asia. Yet, it was not until the industrial revolution in the late 18th century in England that the modern textile and garment industries come into existence (Simones, 2005). The newly industrial countries came afterward in Europe such as United Kingdom, French, and the Netherlands were all expanding their textile industry as the backbone of their economy throughout the world (Simones, 2005). It is within this context that French, during his colonization in Vietnam (1802-1945), built the first textile factory named Nam Dinh in the Red River delta in the northern part of the country (Institute of Economics, 2001).

As explained extensively by A.N. Tran (Tran, 1996), after the reunification of southern and northern Vietnam under the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in 1975, Vietnam textile and garment industries were controlled by the government who exported 90% of the textile production to Soviet Union and Eastern Europe under the agreement of the so-called Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) (Tran, 1996). This export which mainly in

form of military uniforms were exported to pay for foreign debt and to seek assistance for the country's development fund (Tran, 1996). In the late 1980s, the government announced *doi moi* policy which would be the foundation for the development of the Vietnam's future economy. This policy not only opened the door of its domestic market to private and foreign investment but also redirected the country's economy into export-oriented production. Since then, thousands of private firms and foreign-owned companies were flooding Vietnamese industries in terms of textile and garments (Tran, 1996). Nevertheless, the disintegration of Soviet Union which has been the only market for Vietnam over the past decade has suspended the prospect for growth.

The rest of 1990-2000 is the account of how the country rebuilt its textile and garment industries and its overall economy in general. Tran explained that the signing of trade agreement with the EU in 1992 and the lifting of U.S. embargo have revived the textile and garment industries in Vietnam by opening alternative markets outside the communist countries (Tran, 1996). This trade has significantly increased the textile and garment export from 2404 million dollars in 1990 to 7000 million dollars in 1996 (Tran, 1996). It should be noted, however, that in the trade with the European Union, Vietnam's role was limited in manufacturing because Europe still relied on their East Asian partners whom they thought was more reputable in supplying material, management, and quality control (Tran, 1996). From this trade, Vietnam only earned 4% of the total price which still continue to decrease due to economic crisis hitting Asia since 1997 (Tran, 1996).

Graph 2. Vietnam Export from 2000-2015 (US\$ billion)

Source: Adopted from WITS (n.d.)

It is only in 2000 that the export of textile and garment in Vietnam stabilized and consistently growing as shown in Graph 2.

The signing of bilateral free trade agreement with U.S. in 2000 which concurrent with the implementation of ASEAN Free Trade Area have quadrupled Vietnam export from only \$1.3 billion in the late 1990s to almost \$4 billion in 2004. Vietnam accession to WTO also followed by the dramatic increase both in export and Foreign Direct Investment which culminated in 2008. That year, Vietnam export reached \$9.082 billion (AFTEX, 2010) and the FDI scored in \$10.6 billion (Tran, 1996). It is only in 2009 that Vietnam export decreased slightly to \$9.01 billion due to global financial crisis. Yet in overall, despite China still dominated the textile and garment industry; Vietnam managed to be the fastest growing exporter of both commodities and its growth consistently increases from 2000-2015.

GCC Analysis on Vietnam's Fast Growing TGI

From GCCs point of view, the fast-growing export of Vietnamese textile and garment industries cannot be separated from the nature and activities along the global commodity chain and the government responses to those dynamics which determine the overall performance of export and import as will be explained below.

The Nature and Activities along the Chain

The buyer-driven chain such as textile and garment are highly competitive. Fashion world changes so quickly, and thus buyer always searches for producer who can deliver their product on time with the production cost as low as possible. As this industry is labor intensive, wages are very important element in the calculation of total production cost (Simones, 2005). It is for this reason that producers are very responsive to the rising cost of production. The nature of the production which does not require a great deal of capital and technology makes

them easy to move to other places where labors are abundant and cheap.

The period of 2000 to 2015 in global textile and garment chain witnessed the primacy of China as the number one exporter of textile and garment commodity, rising from 10.4% share of the total world export to 39.3% in 2015 pushing aside the EU in the second place (WTO, 2016). The end of the MFA which has previously restricted the quota of textile and garment industries from developed to developing countries, however, had dual impacts for China. In the one hand, it helped China to increase the already high export of TGI to developed markets. China, indeed, enjoy comparative advantage of abundant and cheap labor whose wages account for only 9% of those in the developed countries (Wright, Sahni, & Zamora, 2011). In the other hand, however, it also increased China's competitors from other developing countries who also enjoyed this new policy.

The rising living cost in coastal China whose Consumer Price Index (CPI) increased considerably 15% from 2010 to 2015 (WTO, n.d.), the aging population, and the better educated young generation have contributed to the beginning of scarcity and increasing wages in China's labor up to 20% since 2000 (Wright, Sahni, & Zamora, 2011) and even 80% since 2010 (Lomas, 2017). Despite many foreign companies maintained their operations in China or moving inland where labors are cheaper, there have been many companies relocating their production base to other countries. Chinese firms themselves also began to build their subsidiaries in their neighboring countries whose labor wages were less than those in China.

This is definitely benefiting Vietnam as the neighboring country which has been flooded by 90 companies relocating from China (China Economic Review, 2011). The labor productivity in Vietnam, as reported by Asian Productivity Organization, is below the labor productivity in China (APO, 2012) and other ASEAN countries (Vietnamnet, 2016). Nevertheless, their wages is less than a quarter that of Chinese workers (Wright, Sahni, & Zamora, 2011) (The Economist, 2015). Thus, in the case of significant increase of wages in China which makes the country lost its cost advantage, it is profitable for companies to relocate or build subsidiaries in the lower-cost countries such as Vietnam (Wright, Sahni, & Zamora, 2011). And compared to other Southeast Asian countries, Vietnam is relatively stable country with government policies support the business environment (Department for International Trade, 2018). According to World Bank's Doing Business Report which measures "the ease of doing business" across countries, Vietnam ranks higher than Indonesia, the Philippines, Laos, and the average of East Asia & Pacific (World Bank, 2017). It is located in coastal area and the most important is geographically close to China. The last mentioned is particularly important for those who intend to build subsidiaries and thus minimize the transportation cost and more rapid delivery of product which are important in fashion industry. This comparative advantage as an 'alternative to China' has ultimately attracted many foreign investment coming to Vietnam during the last decade. These FDI-invested enterprises are accounted for 25% of total textile and garment enterprises in Vietnam with their export accounted for 60% of the total Vietnam export on both commodities

(Vietnam Chamber of Commerce & Industry, 2012). The major countries which shared the majority of these FDI-invested enterprises are Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and the U.S. (Vietnam Chamber of Commerce & Industry, 2012).

In addition to this international dynamic along the commodity chain which contributed to the rising Vietnam textile and garment industry, the government response to those dynamics is also another importance factor affecting the performance of Vietnam export. Since 2000, Vietnamese government has made significant effort to upgrade the position of the country in GCCs both through the forward linkage and the backward linkage which also contribute substantially to the fast-growing export of textile and garment industries.

Forward Linkage

As the buyer driven chain emphasizes the importance of buyers in determining the dynamics within the production chain, forward linkage to better identify and engage the buyers are crucial for producer. In 2000, Vietnam government signed bilateral free trade agreement (BTA) with the U.S. which followed by bilateral agreement on textile in 2003. These two agreements have been a milestone for the subsequent development of Vietnam TGI's since the U.S. is the largest market for both commodities. This BTA decreased the tariff for Vietnam product to the U.S. from 40% to only 3% and thus allowing a significant increase for Vietnam commodities which have long been excluded from U.S. market since the end of the War (Simones, 2005). During this decade, more than 50% of Vietnam textile exports are directed to the U.S. (Simones, 2005) and thus it is not only

that the U.S. is the first destination for Vietnam export but Vietnam also ranks the second textile exporter to the U.S. (VITAS, 2011). This substantial rise in the trend of Vietnam-U.S. trade can be seen from zero in 1997 to US\$10,000 million in 2007 or in only a decade (Fukase, 2012). Vietnam's export to the U.S. in merchandise alone (where TGI is part of) has increased drastically from zero to almost 35 billion USD in 2015 (Martin, 2016).

While the BTA with the U.S. has been better explaining the fast-growing Vietnam textile export in the first half of 2000s, the second half record was much contributed to the Vietnam accession to WTO in 2007. This membership is important in at least three ways. First, it included Vietnam in the Most Favor Nation rule where its products are no longer subject to discrimination and quota, but instead, abide to the same WTO regulation (CIEM, 2010). Second and still related to the first, this membership opened access to major market such as U.S., China, and European Union. Third, the domestic adjustment made by the government in order to apply for the membership has also indirectly improved the business environment in Vietnam (CIEM, 2010).

After its accession to WTO, there are some major changes in Vietnam overall performance. First, there was structural change in Vietnam export commodity from the previously dominated by natural-based commodity or agriculture to manufactured based commodity (CIEM, 2010). It occurred because Vietnam's entry into free trade area or nearly perfect competition market will weaken the competitiveness of any agricultural product. It is only the differentiated or value-added commodities

such as manufacture that may benefited from this market. It is proven in case of textile and garment industries which competitiveness increased up to 80.6% after its accession to WTO (CIEM, 2010). Second, there are widening in terms of trading partners and deepening in the terms of cooperation. It implies that there are more countries trading and investing in Vietnam and that the cooperation with these countries has also increased in size. Third, the FDI received by Vietnam increased considerably from only \$1.3 billion in 2000 to \$11.8 billion in 2015 with the most significant increase in 2006–2008 where the FDI grew from US\$2.4 billion to US\$9.6 billion (World Bank, 2018). The fact that the highest FDI peaked in 2008 demonstrated investors' confidence on Vietnam economy with its eventual accession to WTO. The FDI growth rate in manufacture which composed mostly by textile and garment industries has also grown from only 1.9% in 2004 to 34.2% in 2007 (CIEM, 2010).

After Vietnam's accession to WTO, Vietnam also actively signed trade agreements under the framework of ASEAN free trade, for example, with India, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, China, and Japan; bilateral trade agreements in which Vietnam as individual country signed with Chile, Japan, South Korea, and Eurasian Economic Union (Vietnam News, 2017); and also regional trade arrangements such as TPP. While their specific impacts to Vietnam's TGI still need to be examined, these agreements have provided alternatives of markets for Vietnam's TGI which is very important in maintaining its forward linkages in this period.

Backward Linkage

In addition to the forward linkage to expand Vietnam's TGI market, government responds to competition also through backward linkage to enhance its supply chain. Despite Vietnam gained unintended benefit from China's rising cost of production, China remains one of the major competitor for Vietnam in terms of the availability of supply, technology, and production efficiency which are needed in the fashion industry. China so far remains the largest source for Vietnam's imports in its TGI accounting for almost 44% of its total TGI import (WITS, 2018). It is for this reason that Vietnam joined other ASEAN members in the ASEAN Federation of textile Industries which are currently focusing on how to implement regional supply chain which offers full- package supply under the scheme named SAFSA (Source ASEAN Full Service Alliance) (Invest in ASEAN, 2018). With the establishment of ASEAN Community, goods and services are free moving among member countries. As each of them has their own comparative advantage both in terms of material and expertise, specializing in those specific areas and cooperate with others to fulfill the market demand will be better-off for all parties. For Vietnam, this cooperation has increased the export of some of the most popular commodities such as synthetic filament yarn, cotton yarn and synthetic fiber yarn up to tenfold from 2002 to 2009 (AFTEX, 2010). For example, the export volume of the first mentioned commodity rose from \$3.6 million in 2002 to \$48.7 million in 2009 (AFTEX, 2010). Apart from that, Vietnam also benefited from getting better quality material from ASEAN countries which cannot be provided by

domestic producers. The ASEAN supply for synthetic staple fiber for example increases 300-fold over seven year's period (AFTEX, 2010). The supply for synthetic filament yarn also increased almost doubly from \$53 million to \$90 million in the same period (AFTEX, 2010).

Conclusion

Based on the above findings and discussion, there are at least two conclusions that could be drawn. First, the findings of this research have well supported the hypothesis of this research that Vietnam's fast-growing textile and garment industries reflects its successful industrial upgrading in the global commodity chain. However, in contrast to the dominant readings which look at this upgrading more because of the systemic factor within the GCC that is China's increased labor wage which unavoidably prompted investors to shift their production to Vietnam, this paper demonstrates that Vietnamese government also has agency role in helping its TGI in expanding its forward and backward linkages. The forward linkage has been focused on capitalizing the normalization of U.S.-Vietnam trade under BTA, Vietnam's accession to WTO, and other FTA and regional arrangements such as TPP and its successor. Meanwhile the backward linkage has been focused on building stronger supply chain with other ASEAN countries. This strategy not only helps Vietnam meeting its demand for raw materials, but also helps it reduce its dependence on China and minimize competition with other ASEAN countries. As the ultimate purpose of this paper is to offer insight for Indonesia's government on Vietnam's strategy in relations to its TGI, Indonesia

could also adopt similar strategy to develop its currently stagnant TGI growth.

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