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Sub-National Government and the Problem of Unequal Development in ASEAN Economic Integration: Case of Indonesia
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RESEARCH NOTE
Liberal World Order in the Age of Disruptive Politics: A Southeast Asian Perspective
Sue Thompson

in cooperation with Indonesian Association for International Relations
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Aim and Scope

The Journal of ASEAN Studies (JAS) is an International peer-reviewed bi-annual journal that enriches understanding of the past, current, and future issues relevant to ASEAN and its circle of issues. The article shall address any research on theoretical and empirical questions about ASEAN. The Topics addressed within the journal include: diplomacy, political economy, trade, national development, security, geopolitics, social change, transnational movement, environment, law, business and industry, and other various related sub-fields.

JAS expects the articles encourage debate, controversy, new understanding, solid theory, and reflection on ASEAN. The articles sent should have a sharp analysis and rigorous methodologies quantitative or qualitative as well as written in an engaging and analytical style. The JAS does publish original research, reviewing research, book review, opinion pieces of current affairs. However JAS does not publish journalistic or investigative style of article. The JAS would not be responsible for any implied or written statements of articles published. Each author would be responsible for their own writing.

JAS is an international multidisciplinary journal, covering various fields of research on ASEAN either as community, organization, process, and web of cooperation.

JAS publishes the following types of manuscripts:

- **Scholarly articles**: The manuscripts should be approximately 5,000-8,000 words. The manuscripts must contain a review of the current state of knowledge on the research question(s) of interest, then share new information or new ideas that will impact the state of theory and/or practice in area of ASEAN Studies.

- **Review Article**: The manuscripts should be approximately 1,500-3,500. The manuscripts must contain the current state of understanding on a particular topic about ASEAN by analysing and discussing research previously published by others.

- **Practice Notes**: These are shorter manuscripts approximately 1,500-3,500 words that are of specific interest to practitioners. These manuscripts must present new development for the ASEAN.

- **Research Notes**: Similar to practice notes, these are shorter manuscripts approximately 1,500-3,500 words that have specific implications for ASEAN. The manuscripts should employ rigorous methodology either qualitative or quantitative.

- **Book Review**: The manuscripts should be approximately 1,500-4,000. The manuscripts must contain a critical evaluation of book by making argument and commentary on the particular book discussed.

Centre for Business and Diplomatic Studies

Centre for Business and Diplomatic Studies (CBDS) is established as part of the International Relations Department, Bina Nusantara (BINUS) University. Our aims are to undertake and promote research and deliberation on diplomacy, business, international relations and developmental issues particularly in Indonesia, Southeast Asia and Asia Pacific.

We also commit to build, connect and share research and others kinds of knowledge generating activities for the betterment of life of the people and earth. Our immediate constituency is International Relations Department, BINUS University and the larger constituency is the broader academic community of the BINUS University and other universities and institutions both national and international as well as policy community.

CBDS publishes scholarly journal, working papers, commentaries and provides training and consultancies services in the areas of diplomatic training, negotiations, commercial diplomacy, conflict resolutions for business, business and government relations, promoting competitive local government in attracting foreign investment, and understanding impact of regional economic integration on development specifically toward ASEAN Community 2015.

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Greetings from the Journal of ASEAN Studies. We are very grateful to reach the fifth year of contributing to the Southeast Asian studies, both Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as institution and also individual country in the region. With the publication of this Volume 5 Issue 1, 2017, we are pleased to stay on track in providing an academic venue for scholars, practitioners, diplomats, businessmen, and larger stakeholders of ASEAN to contribute to the development of knowledge and debates pertaining to the Southeast Asian political, social, economic, and security issues.

In this issue, there are six interesting manuscripts that consist of five articles and one research note. The first article is entitled, “The Evolution of Southeast Asian Regionalism: Security, Economic Development, and Foreign Power Support for Regional Initiatives, 1947-77” written by Sue Thompson from Australian National University, Australia. Thompson discusses Southeast Asian regionalism by focusing on the aspect of economic development and security. She argues that the evolution of Southeast Asian regionalism was a combined effort of foreign power support for Asian initiatives throughout the economic development with the aim to provide security during the political transformation of the region from the post-war period into the early years of ASEAN and the aftermath of the war in Vietnam.

The second article is entitled, “Redefining ASEAN Way: Democratization and Intergovernmental Relations in Southeast Asia” written by M. Faishal Aminuddin and Joko Purnomo, both from University of Brawijaya, Indonesia. Aminuddin and Purnomo review inter-state relations in Southeast Asia countries and find that regional cooperation in the region has achieved limited political development. They provide an alternative type of political diplomacy by combining formal diplomacy actions done by state institution and informal diplomacy actions done by non-government actors.

The third article is entitled, “The Rohingya Muslim in the Land of Pagoda” written by Leni Winarni from Sebelas Maret University, Indonesia. Winarni examines why the Buddhist Community in Myanmar turns into religious violence against Rohingya people in the State of Rakhine. She uses historical perspective to analyze the ethnic-religion violence and finds that the conflict is either an indication of a weak state or failure state in managing diversity.

The fourth article is entitled, “Higher Education Integration in ASEAN: ASEAN University Network Case” written by Teuku Rezasyah, Neneng Konety, Affabile Rifawan, and Wahyu Wardhana from Padjadjaran University, Indonesia. Rezasyah et al. discuss the role of ASEAN University Network (AUN) in enhancing regional integration in the higher education sector in ASEAN. Lastly, the fifth article is entitled, “Sub-National Government and the Problem of Unequal Development in ASEAN Economic Integration: Case of Indonesia” written by Agus Suman, Pantri Muthriana Erza Killian, and Ni Komang Desy Arya Pinatih. They elaborate the problem of increasing intra-national development gap due to regional integration by using Indonesia as a case study.

This issue ends with a research note entitled, “Liberal World Order in the Age of Disruptive Politics: A Southeast Asian Perspective” written by Moch Faisal Karim from University of Warwick, United Kingdom. Karim explores the notion of disruptive politics and the challenge it poses to the liberal world order.
Finally, the editor-in-chief would like to express highest appreciation for the authors who have submitted their manuscripts as response from our invitation and call for papers, as well as who have participated in the International Conference on Business, International Relations, and Diplomacy (ICOBIRD) at Bina Nusantara University whose papers are published in this issue. We also would like to thank the Indonesian Association for International Relations (AIHII) for continuing support of this joint publication with the Centre for Business and Diplomatic Studies (CBDS) of the Department of International Relations of Bina Nusantara University.

Jakarta, 31 July 2017

Prof. Dr. Tirta N. Mursitama, Ph.D.
Editor-in-chief
The Evolution of Southeast Asian Regionalism: Security, Economic Development, and Foreign Power Support for Regional Initiatives, 1947-77

Sue Thompson

Abstract

Policy objectives for Southeast Asian regionalism had been evolving since the end of the Second World War. Economic development viewed as essential for establishing peace and stability in Southeast Asia and the links between development and security were evident in the elaboration of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Also evident was the second-line support provided by external powers. While ASEAN was a regional initiative that came out of the Bangkok talks to end Confrontation, Western governments had been formulating regional cooperation policies in Southeast Asia decades prior. Economic development viewed as essential for containing communist influence and preventing internal insurgencies in the region. Growth and prosperity would come through regional development programs with external support. This would then expand to some form of collective security led by the Southeast Asian nations themselves. Regionalism viewed as one way of providing economic assistance to newly independent nations without the appearance of foreign interference in regional affairs. Therefore, the evolution of Southeast Asian regionalism was a combined effort of foreign power support for Asian initiatives throughout the economic development with the aim to provide security during the political transformation of the region from the post-war period into the early years of ASEAN and the aftermath of the war in Vietnam.

Key words: regionalism, Southeast Asia, economic development, security
Introduction

At the end of the Second World War, early efforts towards Southeast Asian regionalism emerged from Southeast Asian nations seeking to achieve peace and stability, economic development and policies of self-reliance. Western governments too were pursuing their policies on regional cooperation for similar outcomes. For the United States (U.S.) especially, such agreement would provide stability for a grouping of non-communist nations without the appearance of Western support, as well as a multilateral umbrella under which bilateral relationships between the West and Southeast Asian countries would thrive and prosper. These policies have often overlooked when tracing the post-war evolution of Southeast Asian regionalism as the focus of this topic has tended only to highlight the role played by the regional nations themselves. Indeed, officials such as Abu Bakar Lubis, the private secretary to Indonesian Foreign Affairs Minister Adam Malik, have promoted this perception, denying that formal regional cooperation was the result of an American idea or action (Anwar, 1994, pp. 49-57). Additionally, perceptions of the role of regional cooperation have highlighted economic and social issues, rather than any security benefits, missing the importance of regionalism as a vehicle for promoting both economic development and safety policies of regional and external powers.

Western governments initially sought to secure regional peace and cooperation through the United Nations (UN). Washington was interested in collaboration among groups in the UN where there was mutual interest, such as regional cooperation. Australia and New Zealand too saw the benefit of such an arrangement, taking the initiative to seek consultation with the U.S. on the future of the Pacific region at the end of the war. Britain was also supportive of the idea of regional cooperation and looked at developing a policy for its colonial areas. Both the British and the Australians believed that some form of regional cooperation was much preferable to a post-war mandate system (Letter, Evatt to Johnson, 1944). Securing support from the region was crucial for officials who were keen to avoid direct interference in the affairs of governing bodies, and within Asia, some states also backed the idea of closer cooperation, especially those that supported decolonization, but not pro-communist independence movements.

However, regional cooperation could only succeed if Southeast Asian nations themselves agreed that there was a need for closer relations and would work together. This need did come from the common fear of China’s domination in the region and concern for economic development, especially once Western interests reduced. The creation of formal regional cooperation came with the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a move that was only possible through regional initiatives from the founding member states. Indeed, the creation of ASEAN attributed to efforts from the countries in the region, especially ASEAN’s conception was a direct result of the Malaysian-Indonesian talks that ended Confrontation, the conflict between these two nations. However, Western policies did contribute to the evolution of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia, reflecting the
combined efforts of foreign power support for Asian initiatives.

**Early Initiatives**

On 4 July 1949, Philippine President Quirino made a speech outlining the need for a ‘Pacific Union, a real union of peoples around the Pacific on the basis for common counsel and assistance.’ Quirino then sent a letter of instructions to General Romulo, Philippine Diplomat and President of the UN General Assembly at the time, outlining his plans for such an organization. Romulo responded and proposed that Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, New Zealand, Australia, India, Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia organize a political and economic union aimed at containing ‘Russo-Chinese’ Communism, while also denouncing European imperialism. Britain, France, the Netherlands and the U.S. would at first excluded from such an organization. After some form of grouping emerged, an offer of economic cooperation with the U.S. would pursue. Then, if Communism could contain, a joint appeal for American military aid could be considered (Memo, for Butterworth and Fisher, 1949).

The links between economic development and security had been evident from the beginning of the UN and had resulted in the establishment of some agencies such as the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), amongst others. In early 1947, ECOSOC created regional commissions to encourage development, and one of these bodies was the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), which was established on 19 March 1947. The membership of ECAFE included both Asian countries and non-regional members such as France, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Britain, and the U.S. As the Cold War intensified, the Australian Government particularly, promoted the commission as a forum for non-communist governments and capitalist development (Mitcham, 2012, p. 191 & 1930).

However, Washington and several other countries were cautious about Philippine overtures towards the development of a Pacific Union. When General Romulo tried to undertake preliminary discussions on the idea with various diplomatic representations at the UN, several nations indicated that American policy would largely influence their position. Following this, Romulo attempted to secure a commitment from Washington to support the participation in a Southeast Asian meeting. The response from the State Department was that while the U.S. would be sympathetic to the principle of a Southeast Asian association, the success of any such group would have to be generated spontaneously within the area (Memo, Secretary of State and Butterworth, 1950).

Nevertheless, the U.S. continued to promote the idea of Asian regionalism to counter anti-Western forces. This idea reflected in support for the development of the Mekong River Basin. Post-war interest in developing the area came out of French-Thai negotiations to settle a territorial dispute. In 1950, former Office of Strategic Service Director William Donovan recommended that the administration support the development of the Mekong Basin as a long-range project to secure cooperation between Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam. This concept presented to ECAFE, and in 1957, the Committee for the
Coordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin established. In 1958, Washington provided US$2 million to help finance the collection of primary data in the area. The State Department viewed the Mekong Committee as having enormous potential for the political and economic future of the region, ‘in determining whether Southeast Asia remains free or comes under the control of the Sino-Soviet Bloc’ (Memo, Landon to Rostow, 1961).

By the early 1960s, there were some regional organizations in existence, but only a few with solely Asian membership. The Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) - an economic and cultural organization that included Malaya, the Philippines, and Thailand - was one such organization. It founded in 1961, yet its functions limited, especially when the Philippines refused to recognize the newly created Federation of Malaysia, because of a Philippine claim to the British Borneo territory of Sabah. Another organization was Maphilindo, for Malaya, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Its purpose was to unite the Malay world, and arose out of the Manila Agreement, a report by the Foreign Ministers of those countries, accepted and augmented by the three heads of government in meetings in Manila in July and August 1963. They agreed that foreign bases should not undermine their independence, although Maphilindo came to nothing because of the outbreak of Confrontation, and Manila’s claim to Sabah (Minute, Mare to Mr. Samuel, 23 January 1967).

**American Initiatives**

Under President Johnson, the Department of State continued to pursue regional cooperation as a policy objective, supporting two main goals in Southeast Asia as interdependent: security and social and economic development (Administrative History of the Department of State, 1963-1969). In early 1965, State Department advisers suggested to Under-Secretary of State George Ball, that some Asian development defense agency, or organization, might be initiated to replace existing groups. Ball agreed to consider such an approach (Conversation between Ball and Talbot, 1965). However, many in Washington were wary that this policy would portray as American interference. In April 1965, Chester L. Cooper, a staff member of the National Security Council (NSC), suggested that Washington should present to UN Secretary General, U Thant, the idea of forming a new regional institution called, The Southeast Asia Development Association. It would be a coordinating and consultative organization with permanent staff and an executive agent for the management of multi-national capital projects, and the concept must appear to be an Asian initiative and be Asian (Talking Points for Bundy from Cooper).

Many officials felt that regional cooperation was to be an Asian idea, privately Washington attributed main part of its implementation to American money. Johnson’s Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, claimed that one important step towards regional cooperation was the provision of US$1 billion for economic development in Asia, as outlined in a speech delivered by President Johnson at Johns Hopkins University. Another important step was directing this US$1 billion towards the establishment of the Asia Development Bank (ADB) and other regional programs (Rusk to Rev. Dusen, 1965).
...Until Confrontation ended, regional security cooperation was unfeasible. However, economic development could be a means to end that dispute, and improve relations between Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries, especially Malaysia and Singapore. When Washington commented favorably on Maphilindo as an organization that might provide the means of promoting regional cooperation and of finding a solution to Confrontation, Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, expressed his concern that the U.S. was supporting the resurrection of Maphilindo. Department of State officials told Lee that Maphilindo was an Asian and not an American initiative and that the State Department did not want any plans for trade and security cooperation perceived as American interference (Washington to Singapore, 1965).

By mid-1966, some regional and sub-regional cooperative initiative had evolved such as the Asian Pacific Council (AS PAC) – an economic and cultural alliance made up of non-communist countries within the region, the ADB and the ASA. State Department officials believed these bodies were promising for future progress in regional and sub-regional cooperation that would, in turn, led to collective efforts at solving economic, social and security problems in Asia (Memo for Rostow from Jorden, 1966). Donald D. Ropa of the NSC Staff stressed to National Security Adviser, Walt Rostow in April 1966 that American security interests in the Pacific basin would be dependent on more regional cooperation for economic development and political cooperation for mutual security concerns. The ASA or Maphilindo might be able to evolve as a wider cooperative group, depending on Indonesia’s participation. Consideration would then have to be taken as to the form and substance of such a group, what its relationship would be with other regional organizations and in what direction would American diplomatic initiatives follow in furthering the idea (Memo from Ropa to Rostow, 1966).

Continuing American interest in Asian economic development and regional security cooperation continued as Johnson made a trip to the region in October-November 1966. There he met with the heads of six nations – Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, South Vietnam and Thailand – in Manila on October 24-25. This meeting closed with a declaration of Peace and Progress in Asia and the Pacific and all seven heads of government declared strong support for the principle of regional cooperation (Administrative History of the Department of State, 1963-1969).

**British Support and the End of Confrontation**

London also supported regional cooperation for Southeast Asia, especially considering Britain’s military commitments to the region. In early 1964, the British Embassy in Washington delivered an Aide Memoire to the White House posting that Western withdrawal from Vietnam or Malaysia was inevitable and if there was any chance of stabilizing an independent Southeast Asia without the presence of Western forces, regional cooperation was an undeniable attraction. This withdrawal was an ideal situation in the long-term, but it was not possible in the short-term, especially due to the leftist chaos of Indonesia (British Embassy in Washington Aide Memoire,
1964). However, the British did not present any ideas on how to progress this issue. In May 1965, Rusk suggested to his British counterpart, Michael Stewart, that Washington and London should do more to encourage Southeast Asian countries to cooperate. With the aim of reducing British or American military involvement in the region, suggesting the establishment of an organization around Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand (Record of discussion, Rusk, and Stewart, 1965).

Some Southeast Asian states supported the departure of Western military bases from the region, but not all. Indonesian leader, General Suharto reportedly said in February 1966 that the defense of Southeast Asia was a matter for the countries in the area and that the British military base in Singapore was a target for China’s expansionism. The Malaysian and Singapore governments, on the other hand, wanted the base to stay (Kuala Lumpur to Ottawa, 1966). Nevertheless, cooperation between the Southeast Asian nations was required. London was quite keen on the establishment of an organization like the defunct Maphilindo, with the addition of Singapore. However, the Malaysians were less sure of resurrecting this organization. Kuala Lumpur’s preference was for the ASA, which would include Thailand. Regardless of the form such an association would take, London’s position was to support any new organization that might emerge from the Bangkok talks between Malaysia and Indonesia on ending Confrontation (Memo, Pritchard to Lord Beswick, 1966). Britain was uncertain whether a regional organization would discuss at these meetings; however, it instructed its missions in the region to stress its approval for some form of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia that would be worked out by the participating countries (London to certain missions, 1966). Then London could plan for the withdrawal of its forces from Singapore. While Washington wanted the British military bases to stay for at least the immediate future, the hope of some U.S. officials was that out of the regional initiatives implemented in the early 1960s. The initiatives would uniquely be Asian mutual security arrangements, buttressed by American power presence, which will compensate for ultimate British withdrawal (Ropa to Rostow, 1966).

Formal Initiatives and the Creation of ASEAN

It informally agreed at the Bangkok talks that Indonesia should join an ASA-type body that would give a new name (Kuala Lumpur to London, 1966). Indonesia was keen to see that foreign forces withdraw from the region and new Indonesian President Suharto wanted closer ties with his neighbors to help stem the spread of China’s influence in the area (Jakarta to Washington, 1966). He told two British Members of Parliament that an Asian community should be responsible for the security of Southeast Asia (Meeting, Jackson MP, Dalyell MP, and General Suharto, 1966). Thai Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn and Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman said that they were pleased that countries in the region were increasingly aware of the need for regional cooperation, and stressed their determination to make a Southeast Asian association work (Kuala Lumpur to Washington, 1966). Malaya had been the initiator of ASA and was a participant of Maphilindo, and was now, like Malaysia, willing to join a regional organization that...
would include members of Singapore. The Australian High Commission in Kuala Lumpur saw the possibility that a new local organization would make Malaysia less dependent on its non-Asian allies (Kuala Lumpur to Canberra, 1966). Malaysian Finance Minister Tan Siew Sin explained to U.S. officials that the American nuclear umbrella and a Southeast Asian regional organization were the only two alternatives to avoid the spread of communist influence (Kuala Lumpur to Washington, 1966).

The Malaysian Government specifically, agreed with continued Western support in Southeast Asia. During a meeting between Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak and U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara in Washington, Razak said that from Malaysia’s perspective, it was important to have Laos, Burma, Cambodia, and Thailand coordinating policy to keep any pressure from China away from Malaysia’s borders. McNamara then emphasized the importance that the U.S. attached to the creation of some form of regional grouping so that American forces could eventually withdraw from the Asian mainland (Washington to Kuala Lumpur, 1966). In Thailand, Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman had told Humphrey, he wanted to gather representatives from non-communist Asian countries to promote increased regional cooperation. The Japanese Prime Minister, Eisaku Sato, and the South Korean President, Park Chung-hee, backed this sentiment (Letter, Vice-president to Johnson, 1966). However, Thanat did not want overt American support. He told Rusk that he hoped regional development could have America’s discreet blessing. When the Secretary of State asked if Bangkok did not want U.S. support to be too obvious, Thanat replied that he was sure Washington would be able to determine where and when it could provide useful assistance (Record of conversation between Rusk and Khoman, 1966).

However, problems arose over whether the organization would involve itself in regional defense. Malik stressed to the American Ambassador in Jakarta in early 1967 that the new regional group would only be an economic, cultural and technical association and that defense matters would not consider; although in time ASEAN would take on a more political role (Jakarta to Canberra, 1967). However, one defense matter that was discusses was the presence of foreign military bases in the region. Indonesia was opposed to such bases and wanted this reflected in the new organization’s declaration. This opposition had been an aim of the previous regime in Jakarta and had been part of Sukarno’s anti-imperialist rhetoric during Confrontation. For the apparent pro-Western Suharto government, the motivations for opposing foreign bases seemed less clear. However, in early 1967, officials told Australian and British representatives that the Indonesian military stood to gain significantly if countries in the region opted out of defense arrangements with non-regional powers and instead organized their defense plans with the participation of Indonesia (NIC 303(74), First Draft, 1974). Although, the Acting Director of Asian Regional Affairs at the State Department, Philip Manhard, also told the Australians that it was difficult to determine how far Malik was interested in ASEAN taking on a security role and whether the Indonesian Army was pushing for this position. Manhard pointed out that
in a recent speech, Malik had denied that the new regional grouping would have a security role, but had then made contradictory statements, commenting that regional security had discussed amongst the five nations (Washington to Canberra, 1967). Back in May 1967, Malik asked whether proposals for the new regional organization would include a joint military security plan against communist infiltration, he replied that regional cooperation along the lines of economic, cultural and technical partnerships could interpret as a form of defense (Kuala Lumpur to Canberra, 1967).

When ASEAN was inaugurated on 8 August 1967, the State Department regarded the formation of ASEAN as a positive move, despite the indication that member nations would not welcome any form of outside interference, and not just from China. Washington was not overly concerned about the paragraph relating to foreign bases, believing the negotiations had largely avoided contentious political issues (Washington to Canberra, 1967). The Soviets denounced ASEAN, labelling it a new military group and China completely ignored the new organization. ASEAN’s declaration stated that the countries in Southeast Asia would cooperate on economic, social and cultural development. The founding countries also declared their commitment to stabilizing and securing the region from external interference (Gill, 1997, pp. 30-33). The declaration added that all foreign bases were temporary and that the countries in the region shared the main responsibility for defending Southeast Asia, although ASEAN was not directly concerned with defense. Of the five founding members, Indonesia was the only country that did not have Western forces inside its territory, and Jakarta insisted on a statement reflecting the temporary nature of Western bases in the region. For Indonesia, the declaration must refer to the foreign bases, and stipulate that the region was responsible for its defense. However, the other four nations also did not emphasize ASEAN as a security organization (Canberra to all posts, 1967). Indeed, days later, when the Soviet Ambassador to Thailand asked Thanat about the issue of bases, he responded that the military bases stationed in Thailand was Thai and not American and that the U.S. was only needed to use these bases in the face of North Vietnamese aggression (Washington to Canberra, 1967).

The Australian Government, on the other hand, seemed to view the organization as a forum to promote security in the region. A day after ASEAN’s inauguration, Australia’s Minister for External Affairs, Paul Hasluck, praised the new association and its aims at increasing cooperation amongst the member states. He added that ASEAN not only had committed to support economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region but to also ‘promote regional peace and stability’ – objectives that had the full support of Canberra (Canberra to certain posts, 1967). Years later, in his memoirs, Lee Kuan Yew wrote that the unspoken objective of ASEAN was to build strength through regional solidarity before a power vacuum was created because of the British military withdrawal from Southeast Asia and a possible American one later (Yew, 2000, p.369).

The Early Years of ASEAN

However, in the early years of ASEAN, the organization was loosely
structured, and Singapore was the only member state that gained any great financial benefit. The Singaporeans pushed for issues such as tourism, shipping, fishing and intra-regional trade to be considered by the first meeting of the ASEAN standing committee, hoping that these economic projects would lead to closer involvement in regional planning. However, four of the five founding members – Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines – had similar and competed for agricultural economies and economic nationalism was expected to be a major hurdle for the new organization. Singapore was the country best suited economically to a regional arrangement. As a result, the Australian Government’s assessment of the benefit of ASEAN was that it would carry more significance in the political rather than the economic sphere (Canberra to all posts, 1967). Indeed, this view was reflected in the outcome to internal tension within the organization through Manila’s ongoing claim to Sabah that caused the breakdown of Philippine-Malaysian diplomatic relations in 1968. ASEAN encouraged a resolution of the crisis and Indonesia was given credit for acting as an effective mediator (Talking points for meeting with Malik, by Kissinger, 24 September 1974). However, the approach was essentially one of non-interference in member disputes, reflecting the way ASEAN tackled both external and internal pressures through a philosophy of non-interference and consensus (Tarling, 2006, p. 210).

Debate on the future role of ASEAN emerged at a meeting of foreign ministers in December 1969. The opening statements from some ministers revealed emerging issues on whether the organization would deal solely with economic and cultural cooperation, or try to forge ahead into the security arena. Singaporean Foreign Minister, S. Rajaratnam, stated that his government believed ASEAN should stay solely focused on economic cooperation in Southeast Asia. Whereas Malik referred to Britain’s military withdrawal and a prospective American disengagement as cause for the member states to ‘induce us to jointly consider policies in our effort to cope with the new emerging situation.’ Thanat Khoman also mentioned security concerns, which was reiterated by the Malaysians, stating that there was scope to work out some form of security arrangements and that member countries should take responsibility for their region following any power vacuum left by departing Western forces (Kuala Lumpur to Canberra, 1969).

Fueling these security concerns was the announcement in January 1968 of Britain’s intention to withdraw all its military forces from Southeast Asia by 1971 and U.S. President Nixon’s statement on the island of Guam in July 1969 that the U.S. expected Asian nations to assume more responsibility for their defense. America would keep all existing treaty commitments, but would not enter any new ones, unless they were vital to the interests of the U.S. In the case of internal subversion in Asia, assistance from Washington would not be in the form of troops, but development aid, military equipment, and training (Record of meeting between Wilson and Nixon, 1969).

Later in the Philippines, Nixon nevertheless continued to stress the importance of economic development as a vehicle for increased stability in Asia. In a statement, the American President reiterated U.S. was backing for the ADB saying that he had asked Congress to appropriate US$20
million for the ordinary capital of the ADB and US$25 million to its special fund for the following fiscal year. He also stressed that the Bank was an Asian institution with its headquarters in Asia and with a requirement that 60 per cent of its capital must come from Asia. While the U.S. and other non-Asian countries could play a role, the leadership of the Bank must always come from Asia (Nixon Statement, 1969). Then, a few weeks later, Secretary of State William Rogers supported Nixon’s position in a speech to the media in Canberra. He stressed that American policy in Asia would be to encourage Asian leaders to meet their own internal security needs with material assistance from the U.S. and to encourage ‘rapid economic development of the area with emphasis on increasing regional cooperation’ (Rogers speech, 1969). Nixon publicly announced in January 1970 his proposal to ask Congress to authorize a contribution of US$100 million to the ADB’s Special Funds over a three-year period – US$25 million in the first fiscal year, and then US$35 million and US$40 million in the following two fiscal years. He stressed that since the ADB’s establishment, the bank had made a major contribution to Asian economic development and that it provided a ‘unique capability for acting as a catalyst for regional cooperation’ (White House Press Statement, 1970).

However, officials American Embassy in Singapore warned Washington that if Southeast Asian regionalism were to be successful, nations there must be sure that the U.S. would not abandon them (Singapore to Washington, 1969). Kissinger too stressed this position to the American Vice-President in December 1969, before Spiro Agnew’s proposed to visit the region. During the visit to Indonesia, Kissinger told Agnew that he should stress that Jakarta’s pursuit of regional economic policies and multilateral economic aid approaches justified America’s aid program to Indonesia (Memo, Kissinger to Agnew, 1969). Indeed, by the end of 1969, the administration in Washington had noticed that Asian nations were starting to rely less on individual outside aid donors. The Asian begin to rely more on multilateral aid organizations such as the ADB and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and that the Americans welcomed the creation of other Asian organizations based on Asian initiatives. Therefore, while the U.S. did not want to interfere, it would be willing to assist multilateral and regional organizations where possible (Memo, East Asia and the Pacific, 1969).

The Changing Regional Scene

Overall, the response of Southeast Asian leaders to Nixon’s comments was that they viewed the so-called Nixon Doctrine as a warning signal that the U.S. would eventually disengage from the Asian mainland and regional allies must assume greater responsibility for their security. For some regional nations, the American policy announcement was in step with current aspirations, such as Bangkok’s efforts to move towards a more independent foreign policy path and Manila’s wish to move beyond the traditional image as an American strategic client (Acharya, 2012, p. 140). The Australian Embassy in Manila reported that the Philippines appeared to be in favor of Southeast Asian nations becoming more self-reliant. Philippine President Marcos’s proposal for an Asian forum to ‘solve Asian problems’ and his foreign secretary’s references to Asian security arrangements indicated that Manila acknowledged the
changing role of future American involvement in Southeast Asia and admitted that the Philippines would become more involved regionally (Manila to Canberra, 1970).

Thanat Khoman told the Australians that he believed China would become a more serious problem after the end of the war in Vietnam and that countries in the region had only two alternatives: either submit to China or unify and develop a front, which the Chinese would have to accept. A pact was not necessary for this purpose, instead of regional cooperation based on mutual understanding and self-interest was all that was needed (Bangkok to Canberra, 1969). However, a year later, the Thai Government seemed to recognize that regional cooperation alone would not provide in the immediate future any prospect of an alternative security backing. This recognition was because of the disparity of power between countries in the region, the internal instability in most Asian nations and Bangkok’s reluctance to accept the risks that would be involved in any new mutual security arrangement. Nevertheless, regional cooperation potentially provided an opportunity for Thailand to supplement its security alliance with the U.S. by underpinning political and economic ties with its neighbors (NIC Note 4/70, 1970). This assessment was made a few months after Thailand secured additional financial assistance from Washington. In August 1971, Nixon directed that a US$45 million special assistance packaged negotiated with Bangkok to strengthen the Thai economy and defense capabilities. The Americans hoped this would accelerate the improvement of Thai armed forces capabilities so that they might be capable of facing any possible contingencies (Memo 126, 1971).

Malaysia’s reaction to Nixon’s declaration was to support bilateral relationships between countries of the region but without treaty ties or another institutionalization. This policy stemmed from the announcement of not just the Nixon Doctrine, but also the British intention to withdraw militarily. Kuala Lumpur’s doubts about the utility of the newly formed Five-Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) between Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Malaysia, as well as limited expectations of Australian and New Zealand assistance (Kuala Lumpur to Canberra, 1970).

Singapore’s response to the changed strategic environment was to build its defense forces, but these efforts were not a direct reaction to the so-called doctrine, although Singapore’s efforts for closer cooperation in defense matters with Malaysia could have been encouraged by it. However, since the British announcement, Singapore had been building its military due to its geographical proximity to Malaysia and Indonesia (Singapore to Canberra, 1970).

The Indonesians seemed to accept much of what was outlined by Washington and emphasized the need for extensive foreign aid to counter the military weakness of the countries in the region. In fact, the concept of increased economic development to replace a foreign military presence suited the government in Jakarta that was quick to point out that Indonesia lacked the capacity to contribute to the joint defense and military security. Rather its priority was economic development (Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Singapore to Canberra, 1970). Nevertheless,
Indonesia became the beneficiary of an expanded U.S. military aid program when Washington approved in March 1970 contributions of approximately $15 million U.S. dollars per year – an increase of $10 million from the original budget (Kissinger memo for Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, 1970). Jakarta was hoping for yet more and that the Americans would not depart any earlier than 1973 and would leave no security vacuum. Suharto sent General Sumitro to Washington in July 1970 to ask for more military aid, and during discussions with Nixon’s National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, he stressed that Indonesia was not yet a ‘real power’ and was still unable to take over the responsibility of security in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, the Indonesian Government had not intended to expand its armed forces before 1973, instead deciding to concentrate on economic development and ‘sacrifice’ security for the sake of national reconstruction. Jakarta was worried that its neighbors – Thailand, Singapore, Philippines, and Malaysia – lacked the military power to withstand potential internal instability, or stand up to intensive Soviet diplomacy. Besides, these Asian nations might turn to the Soviet side to counter Chinese infiltration. Therefore, Indonesia now had to develop strong armed forces and hoped to acquire military supplies from Western Europe and the U.S. (Memo of Conversation between Sumitro and Kissinger, 1970). Kissinger responded very positively to Sumitro, stating that, ‘we recognized the Indonesian role, precisely what the Nixon Doctrine required (Memorandum of Conversation between Sumitro and Kissinger, 1970).

Although the Americans did not presume that Indonesia’s request for more arms was out of regional altruism, Jakarta was extremely keen to secure funds for six C-130 planes, and an M-16 rifle factory and American officials noted that they might have used their support for and participation in regional cooperation as part of their bid. NSC staff member, John H. Holdridge raised that possibility with Henry Kissinger, before adding that while there was still no movement towards a regional security arrangement in Southeast Asia, ‘the Indonesians might just be able to get things going’ (Memorandum, John H. Holdridge to Kissinger, 1970). Nixon authorized an increase in military aid to Indonesia to $18 million for the 1971 fiscal year (Memorandum, Holdridge and Kennedy to Kissinger, 1970).

The Australian Government was also hopeful that Jakarta would pursue a greater interest in a collective security for Southeast Asia, despite Suharto’s preoccupation with the economy and internal disputes along with the continuation of the Indonesian position of non-alignment. Malik’s efforts to arrange an international conference in Jakarta in 1970 on how to bring peace to Cambodia was the cause of these high hopes in Canberra. The officials believed that the Jakarta Conference on Cambodia revealed the Indonesian Government’s willingness to take a leading role in regional security (NIC 1(70), 1970).

Britain as well recognized the importance of Indonesia as an emerging leader in Southeast Asia. In 1971, the British Ambassador in Jakarta urged the British Government to acknowledge the growing importance of Indonesia to regional stability. He wrote to the Foreign Office that the long-term security of British investments in Malaysia and Singapore depended on the
fortunes of Indonesia and hoped that London would steadily increase its aid program there. Ambassador Combs felt that the Indonesians viewed their position in Southeast Asia, as resident guarantors of stability in the region, were keen supporters of ASEAN and were increasingly likely to take the lead on regional policies (Combs, to Foreign Office, 1971). In early 1969, London was providing £200 million a year on aid and technical assistance to the Far East. While this support was mostly bilateral, the British placed a lot of emphasis on multilateral aid to Southeast Asia and the opportunities it presented for regional cooperation. In doing so had played a role in many regional bodies such as the Colombo Plan, the ADB, the Mekong Committee, and the specialized institutions of the UN (Speech, Maclehosesp, 1969).

The Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality

As the level of American and British military involvement in Southeast Asia declined, the five ASEAN countries started to pay closer attention to political and security issues. However, each of these nations had different security arrangements. Thailand and the Philippines were members of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), and the Philippines had a security treaty with the U.S., Malaysia, and Singapore were members of the FPDA. Indonesia had no security deals but shared joint-military arrangements with Malaysia. Nevertheless, there was a new attitude towards a reassessment of past policies and practices in an aim to seek more regional independence. As a result, ideas of some neutral area presented as a solution to the changed security environment in Southeast Asia. The Malaysians proposed a neutralization concept, while the Indonesians, Thai, Filipinos, and Singaporeans showed their preference for a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality (NIC 124(72), 1972).

These proposals first discussed at a meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers in Kuala Lumpur in November 1971. At this venue, the Malaysians sought an agreement that all foreign powers should be excluded from Southeast Asia, that the region should not use as a theatre for international power struggles, and that the great powers – the U.S., Soviet Union, and China – would guarantee this. This proposal was unacceptable to the four other representatives at the meeting. They did not want to see a certain reference to ‘neutralization’ or great power guarantees. The meeting’s declaration reflected this. In the end, the meeting stated that the ASEAN nations would make all necessary efforts to enable Southeast Asia to be recognized as a zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality that was free from any form of interference by outside powers. The regional nations would also make every effort to increase cooperation amongst themselves (Canberra to Australian posts, 1972).

However, each member state had different aspirations regarding security in Southeast Asia and their existing bilateral relationships. For the Malaysians, ZOPFN was a means to achieve domestic security without cooperative arrangements with non-regional or regional states (NIC 303(74), 1974). For the other four ASEAN nations, external security guarantees still viewed as necessary. Thailand and the Philippines continued to place importance on the U.S. as their main protecting power. Singapore, with an economy oriented to manufacturing and exporting, on the other, hand believed
its interests were best served by an open-door policy for all the great powers, and not only one powerful ally. Indonesia saw itself as playing an independent role in the region, which involved encouraging its neighbors to strengthen their security systems as well as practice closer regional cooperation. At the same time, Jakarta also placed a lot of reliance on its relationship with the U.S. for both economic assistance and a guarantee of regional security (NIC 124(72), First Draft, 1972).

By 1973, ZOPFAN continued to exist as a mere statement of intent rather than any concrete framework. Indonesia, especially, was in no hurry to see the implementation of the neutralization proposal because of its wish for a continued U.S. military presence (Memo, Kissinger to Ford, 1975). Singapore also supported American military presence in the region and during a visit to the U.S. in March 1973, Lee Kuan Yew emphasized the benefits to achieving the long-term objective of a quadripartite balance between U.S., Soviet Union, Japan and Western naval forces. In turn, the neutralization concept did not appear to be a factor severely affected by the U.S. military planning in the region, nor did it halt the flow of American economic and military assistance (NIC 57(73), 1973). Indeed, ZOPFAN reflected the changes taking place in Southeast Asia that the ASEAN nations were unable to influence, as they were unable to agree on what would be the future role of the external powers (Narine, 1998, pp. 198-201). Towards the end of the decade, the Malaysians had lost interest in the concept, as had the other ASEAN member states (Response to Proposed Parliamentary Question, 1977).

Diversification

Despite the signings of ZOPFAN, and an agreement in 1973 to establish a Permanent ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta, Washington felt pressure from within Southeast Asia. Notably, Thailand and the Philippines, retain SEATO as a symbol of American presence in the region during its transitional period of disengagement (Buszynsky, 1981, pp. 287-296). However, Bangkok and Manila did agree to abandon the military component of SEATO in response to Australian and New Zealand pressure on Washington to downgrade the alliance as a price of their continued membership.

The issue of a changing role for SEATO raised during a meeting with Nixon and the SEATO General Secretary, General Sunthorn, just days before the September 1973 SEATO Council meeting. During the former, when Sunthorn suggested that SEATO could play a future role in supplementing bilateral aid programs in Asia, Nixon replied, ‘that can give meaning to the organization. The military is very important, but this is also helpful’ (Memo of conversation, President Nixon and General Sunthorn, 1973). At the 18th SEATO Council meeting of 28 September 1973, all delegates agreed to abolish the military structure of SEATO, except military exercises.

Canberra’s pressure to downgrade SEATO reflected the regional policy aims of the Australian Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam. When he first came to office in 1972, Whitlam endorsed proposals for neutralization of the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia, sought to withdraw Australian forces from Vietnam, praised the Guam Doctrine and Nixon’s moves towards détente with China and the Soviet Union, and showed little support for the FPDA or
SEATO. For Whitlam, supporting regional cooperation would be one of the main elements of Australia’s foreign policy for the 1970s with less emphasis on military pacts (Briefing Paper, 1974). This increased emphasis on regionalism and cooperation between the superpowers led to calls from Whitlam to propose an Asian and Pacific organization that would eventually include China’s membership. The idea would be to bring the Asia-Pacific nations closer without the interference of the major powers (The Hobart Mercury, 1973). Such an organization was not supposed to replace SEATO, ASPAC or ASEAN, nor was it to transform these organizations. Rather, Whitlam attempted to propose new ideas about regional cooperation (Letter, Paris to Canberra, 1973).

The Singaporeans also had visions of other regional groupings. Rajaratnam told his Australian counterpart during a meeting in Canberra in November 1973 that while a long-term objective for his government was a larger regional group, this would come about with the assistance of the formation of some smaller sub-regional groupings. Suggestions for these sub-groups were the possibility of a smaller organization made up of Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea, and creating a group for the four Commonwealth countries in the region. These groups would run alongside ASEAN and the FPDA, strengthening Southeast Asian unity (Record of Conversation, Rajaratnam and Willesee, 1973).

The End of the War in Vietnam

The end of the war in Vietnam and the withdrawal of American forces paved the way to closer cooperation between some Southeast Asian nations. During the 1975 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, the discussion was dominated by the implication of the political changes in Indochina. Ministers expressed optimism and caution and concluded that the war’s end provided hope for securing peace, progress, and stability in Southeast Asia and decided to initiate friendly relations with the Indochina nations (Draft Paper, 1975).

At the first meeting of Heads of ASEAN governments in Bali in February 1976, members reiterated the commitment to the organization and at a subsequent meeting of economic ministers; the agreement reached on the establishment of an industry in each member country where there would be joint equity participation that would be developed to benefit the region. The Philippines then suggested the establishment of an ASEAN common market; however, this proposal was only supported by Singapore. Instead, discussions commenced on whether to set up a system of preferential tariffs. By the mid-1970s, ASEAN members had also started cooperating closely in international bodies, coordinating votes at the UN and representations to the European Economic Community (EEC) on economic matters (Response to Proposed Parliamentary Question, 1977). Significantly, member states obtained from the EEC recognition of ASEAN as one region and preferential access to certain commodities into EEC markets, strengthening relations between the two regional blocs (Jakarta to Canberra, 1974). ASEAN also pursued external economic support from wider regional states, security some joint economic cooperation projects with Australia, and seeking similar cooperation with New Zealand and Canada.
Japan also started expressing a willingness to undertake joint economic ventures with the regional group, despite earlier refusals to do so (Jakarta to Canberra, 1974).

Despite closer cooperation economically and diplomatically, ASEAN member states continued, ten years after the association’s inauguration, to differ as for whether ASEAN should pursue security objectives. Indonesia was one of the stronger supporters of security cooperation amongst members, but even Jakarta was concerned about the organization presenting an image of a defensive alliance. Thus, most military cooperation in the region remained bilateral and at the 1976 ASEAN summit in Bali, leaders agreed to continue to cooperate on security matters, on a non-ASEAN basis (Memo, U.S. Interests, and Objectives in the Asia-Pacific Region, 1976).

Independence and non-alignment were a major goal for ASEAN members regarding security cooperation; however, relations with Vietnam also shaped defense issues, as there was a consensus among the member’s states not to confirm Vietnamese suspicions that ASEAN would become the next SEATO. Hanoi’s position was that while it was prepared to develop bilateral relations with ASEAN member states, it was not willing to deal with ASEAN as an Association. In turn, the Southeast Asian member nations in ASEAN, despite increased cooperation within the organization as well as continued aspirations for independence and non-alignment, sought continuing American involvement in their region as a deterrent to the Soviet Union and Chinese strategic ambitions as well as Japanese economic domination (FCO paper, 1977).

After the second summit meeting of ASEAN heads of Government in Kuala Lumpur on 1977, ASEAN leaders maintained the level of cooperation in economic areas and took steps to increase cooperation in cultural and social fields. One of the most substantial areas of progress was in ASEAN’s external relations through discussions with the Prime Ministers of Australia, Japan and New Zealand on common foreign policy and especially foreign economic policy. As Lee Kuan Yew pointed out in his closing statement at the meeting, ‘it is psychologically easier to deal with ASEAN’s external partners than to sort out intra-regional arrangements between the partners themselves.’ These arrangements are an indication that ASEAN nations would continue to value both cooperation within the Association while maintaining their external relationships (ASEAN Information Paper, 1977).

**Conclusion**

Policy objectives from inside the countries and outside of Southeast Asia towards regional cooperation and security had been developing since the end of the Second World War. Economic development viewed as essential for containing communist influence and preventing internal insurgencies in the region. Regional cooperation was one way of providing financial assistance to newly independent nations without the appearance of foreign interference in regional affairs. The aim for many of the countries involved in Southeast Asian regionalism was that growth and prosperity would come through regional development programs with external support. This program would then expand to some form of collective security led by the Southeast Asian nations themselves. This
policy started to gather pace during the 1950s and 1960s. By the late 1950s, the U.S. administration was strongly promoting the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East as one of the most important multilateral groupings in promoting regional economic and social cooperation and development. In 1950, the U.S. supported the development of the Mekong Basin as a long-range project to secure regional cooperation between Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam. In the early 1960s, the U.S. tried to promote regional cooperation in Asia by urging closer Japanese relations with other countries in the region, initially through the Association of Southeast Asia. Key to this plan was the role that the regional nations would play themselves. For Western countries, regional cooperation not only potentially provided a vehicle for containing communism in Asia, but the policy presented an alternative security system in replace of Western military bases. Southeast Asian nations themselves supported closer regional integration as a means of containing Chinese communist influences and for countering the decline of Western military support. The inauguration of ASEAN paved the way for a formal regional association to bring some Southeast Asian nations together, and although the organization’s initial aim was claimed to be socioeconomic collaboration, political factors such as the promotion of regional peace and stability were present from the beginning. Therefore, while formal regional cooperation came directly out of initiatives from Southeast Asian leaders, it did not end continued Western financial support to local institutions, nor did it end external bilateral security relationships. In the early years of ASEAN, Asian initiatives towards economic development and security relations continued to be supported by foreign powers.

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Redefining ASEAN Way: Democratization and Intergovernmental Relations in Southeast Asia

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Abstract

This paper reviews inter-state relations in Southeast Asia countries. Regionalism in Southeast Asia has been criticized on its limited achievement in political development. Political development in this region focuses more on nation’s interests than regional interests. Added to this, there is a lack of political channel outside formal government relations hinders political connectivity among Southeast Asian people.

The aim of this paper is threefold. Firstly, to analyze the pattern of political development in Southeast Asian region. Secondly, to assess the implication of using non-interference principle for maintaining political relations in Southeast Asian region and its contribution to the lack of political awareness regionally. Thirdly, to propose new political diplomacy concerned with promoting political awareness regionally.

This paper ends by providing an alternative type of political diplomacy by combining formal diplomacy actions done by state institution and informal diplomacy actions done by non-government actors. We point out an alternative strategy to promote political awareness in Southeast Asian community in the future. First, open policy to connecting the diplomatic based community. Second, optimize the regional cooperation with more concern with democracy and human rights issue. Third, building and institutionalizing political awareness through people participation.

Key words: regional cooperation, non-interference principal, political awareness, communitarian

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Introduction

Regionalism in Southeast Asia is dominantly related to ASEAN. Since it was established over 50 years ago, it appears that strategical position of ASEAN has not been able to bring the significant form of mutual understanding among the members. The positive achievement in terms of economic development within this region contributes a minor progress in narrowing inequalities between countries. There was also some progress in term of poverty alleviation. After the 1990s, however, economic growth only facilitates the increase in inequalities between Southeast Asia countries. Interestingly, inequality within country shows different pattern. Inequality trends have diverged, with inequality rising in Indonesia and falling in Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines; in part due to policy Efforts (Jain-Chandra et al., 2016). In terms of internal mobility within this region, there is an intriguing interaction between people in Southeast Asian countries. A study shows that 97 per cent of the 6.5 million internal migration in 2013 only circulates in three countries: Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore. In a more specific scale, of a total of 88 per cent of internal migration, connecting eight corridors (ILO & ADB, 2014).

In the context of social and political matters, however, connectivity among Southeast Asian people is very limited. This circumstance exists because there is a lack of political channel caused by straight government policy. In the study of BTI (2016), there are two processes that are taking place in Asia. First, political processes fail to build democracy as in South Korea and Taiwan and enforces consolidated autocracies in China, Laos, Singapore, and Vietnam. Second, there is unstable autocracies occurred in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand. Added to this, civil society organizations get significant pressure from autocratic power and only a few among those organizations who have political representation. BTI (2016) also found that countries with high economic growth, such as Singapore and Vietnam showed that political stability, strong government institutions, and tight administration control are factors contribute to economic transformation. Hence, there is a little progress in flourishing democratization at the regional level.

The studies noted that the concept of ASEAN way is a passive response and it tends to hinder the progress of democratization. The ASEAN way is going into the debate and still unclear, hence, it needs to get a more extensive explanation (Haacke, 1999; Acharya, 2001). Other study cited that the ASEAN way may represent the collective identity of ASEAN crystallized in the principle of non-intervention or silent diplomacy (Rüland, 2000; Nischalke, 2000). In some cases, however, the ASEAN way is more than just the principle of non-intervention. Some evidence depicts the success in the intervention of domestic conflicts such as in Cambodia (Goh, 2003). Unfortunately, weak political intervention to foster democratization in this region only facilitates a hijack of the ASEAN Way led by autocratic power. These are caused by the inclination of the state sovereignty and
policy priorities in maintaining domestic stability (Katsumata, 2003).

Moreover, the achievement of economic growth is not always followed by an increase in regional exchange to share democratic values. Studies on democratization showed findings varied. In Malaysia and Singapore, democracy runs within the strong-state authority, where the stability of the regime occurs due to its strong control over political activities (Slater, 2012). On the other side, democratization in Indonesia successfully reduces state authority but it also facilitates the rise of oligarch (Hadiz & Richard Robinson, 2013). In general, there is no single factor that causes stagnant democratization in this region. Specific explanation of the difficulties of democracy establishment relies on the tradition of the political elites who have a concern to dominate the political system. Thus, democracy merely produces "elected autocrat" (Kurlantzick, 2012).

This paper will answer the question of: to what the extent the redefinition of ASEAN way should able to solve regional politics problem? We offer normative assessment based on the cultural approach to undertaking the ideal type of intergovernmental relationships in this region. We use the interpretive analysis on the concepts of forming the ASEAN cooperation and undertake the theoretical review to explain the compatibility of democracy in this region.

This paper consists of three discussions, namely: 1) restrictive conceptions on intergovernmental relations analysis to obtain the possibility or probability for interconnectivity amongst governments in politically sensitive issues; 2) explanation on the extension of the boundaries of regionalism towards democratization pressure to create open regionalism; 3) designing the model of political awareness as an active concept of non-intervention.

Scoping Government Interaction

The intergovernmental relationship in Southeast Asian region comes into dynamics situation. It attracts scholars to contribute to the theoretical discussion on regionalism perspective. Generally, regionalism is interpreted as a policy and a tremendous project where some actors from state or non-state engage in cooperative and coordinate their common good for the region. Krasner (1983), stated that some aspects have necessarily to be identified related to some norms, rules, and procedures which may be met to the expectation of some different actors. We argue that regionalism in ASEAN is viewed as an interplay between political development, pseudo-nationalism, and closed regionalism.

The important variable needs to be explored in the discussion of regionalism is political development. Even though there are variations of political development within this region, but there is a tendency for centralizing political power as a model of political development. It can be seen in Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore. The government authority had dominant control in public life even though citizen is still given political space if not considered as national stability threat. We argue that centralistic government-style with significant political power is intended to create political subsistence aimed to ensure the stability of the domestic economy. Hence, political development in this region only focused
merely on country’s interests rather than regional interests.

This pattern of political development continued until the early of the 1990s. Afterward, regionalism became a well-known issue which discussed since the shifting of worldwide power constellation. ASEAN regionalism was reconstructed to become tether of expectation for strengthening government control capacity. The expansion form of ASEAN consultation with other state or regional cooperation counterpart had significance only to improve regional economic development. By the expansion of Japan and China, it had a possibility to transform larger regional economic agenda, namely Asian economic agenda. This kind of action, however, is inadequate for developing the democratic pattern in Southeast Asian region. Two explanations on this matter. Firstly, Southeast Asian economic actors do not have any specific interest to ensure the establishment of democracy because they are more interested to expand their business outside Southeast Asian region due to its economic advantages. Secondly, China and Japan also have limited attention on the political matter during its economic expansion in Southeast Asian region. China has strong desire to become the center of regional corporation in Asia (Wunderlich, 2008). The tendency to secure its energy security and market expansion, however, makes China does not put significant attention to political development in Asia.

Southeast Asian region has an opportunity to increase political development rapidly. It can be ignored that there are difficulties to maintain its political development related to the problem of establishing democratization. Democratization, however, may contribute to the structural political change in each country. Moreover, it also gives adequate influenced pressure for the pattern of regional relationship, especially inter-political agencies. Democratization provides a great opportunity for replacing state-centric model that puts the state as a center for all the interaction. Ideally, democratization within regionalism becomes a part of the political commitment to fight against authoritarian style in domestic politics whether by self-modality based on domestic capacity and capability or by using stronger power from the outside.

State-centric model came from the definition extended by Weberian that gave larger space for the optimization of state authority. General view concerning the role of the state puts the government as the superior political agency. To control extensively, the authority requires the existence of internal loyalty and external acknowledgment. Hence, the state should not only act for their interest but should also represent the interest of others outside the government. It can be stated that decision making process within the state is an arena of many interests and the results represent the dynamic interaction amongst them (Moravcsik, 1999).

From this perspective, the model of state authority influences the behavior of its governmental regime. Governmental behavior has its scope and can be divided into bilateral and multilateral. A bilateral relationship is developed both with countries within region and countries outside regions. While a multilateral relationship is developed both with regional countries and different regional countries. Both of those stages become natural fence
which indicates that the government has limited scope for territory and sovereignty.

Another variable which needs to be observed is the ‘network establishment’ in the regional cooperation. Domestic regime commonly brings function as motivator or catalyst for strengthening relationship within the jurisdictional region. The pattern of organized network provides sufficient stability which indicates non-hierarchical and interdependent attitude. Moreover, it is also connecting various actors who share high mutual interest and trust as a sign of togetherness. This kind of cooperation with collective purpose achievement considered as an ideal type of regionalism (Börzel, 1997). Hence, regionalism should be viewed as a complex and multi-facet process involving both formal and informal integration supported by networks from government and society.

Democratization and Regionalism: A Crossing Boundaries

Regionalism has limited attention to integrating the regional interest with the promotion of democracy. Regional integration tends to consider more on economic, social and cultural aspects and has a limited action to bring the spirit of democracy when dealing with domestic politics. It is very important to change the essence of regionalism where economic interests are superior than commitment on democratization. Added to this, ASEAN gives limited interest to strengthen the inter-citizen relationship to spread democratic values. Consequently, ASEAN has lost its opportunity to create reciprocal dialogue to broader political issues. It is not surprise that ASEAN is viewed as an elite integration rather than people integration. Hence, it is highly obvious that the type of regional integration only concerns with institutional policy and behavior, but it has less connected with people’s interests, namely democratization with specific values embedded within ASEAN society.

The concept of regionalism in Asia needs to be viewed as a representation of ASEAN value, namely communitarian. Moreover, democratization is considered as specific value embedded in ASEAN society. Domestic politics that becomes a threat to the institutionalization of democracy is important to get an attention. Undoubtedly, there are some countries who had an unsteady political situation. The process of democratization faces significant challenges as it can be seen in Kampuchea, Laos, and Vietnam. On these countries, build the commitment for integrating democracy with domestic politics is not an easy task to be done. We argue that the participation of ASEAN in the process of democratization in their members will give significant contribution to the deepening democratic spirit in that countries. Moreover, it can reduce the participation of external actors such the United States or European countries to involve in domestic politics within ASEAN countries.

We need to consider that there is no homogeneous political culture in the region. As it can be seen from the polarization of state political institution that is divided in the form of absolute monarch, constitutional monarch, republic, socialist and junta military. Meanwhile, governmental structure is also varied, namely: presidential, parliamentary, Leninist, and military dictator. Clark Neher and Ross Marlay (1995) classify this region into four categories in term of democratic scales: semi-
democracy, semi-authoritarian, authoritarian based on citizen participation, electoral competition and civil freedom. Democratic implementation which has electoral competition and civil freedom is relatively well known in Indonesia, Philippines, and Thailand.

Even though some countries show positive performance to accept the democracy, it does not mean that there are limited political obstacles in those countries. Attempts of the military coup, political competition among elites, local resistances and separatism are among potential problems faced by countries such as Indonesia, Philippine, and Thailand. In other words, serious political problems still exist, even though democracy is also flourishing. With this circumstance, it gives relevance for ASEAN to strengthen its contributions to democracy with the spirit of ASEAN: communitarianism.

Expanding spectrum of democratization will bring a better consequence for the intergovernmental process of negotiation. Democratization model is not homogenous. It needs to represent and accommodate political tradition. Hence, it allows variety of domestic political management in each country. One good example is what happened in Myanmar. The crisis was handled by two things: regional cooperation through ASEAN participation and public awareness regarding humanitarian issues. The act of regional institution combined with people awareness and participation are potentially reducing the crisis.

Democratization with Asian values may be used as a moral reference that is formed by the characteristic of social structure and kinship containing a set of mutual share principle and doing something for a community (Inoguchi, 1998). Political culture in the Southeast Asia is closely related to kinship system that influences the shape of interaction or inter-institutional relationship. Personal figure is very important for the whole process for taking decision. Fukuyama (1995) described an example like in China which strictly develops the greatness of family.

Specifically, in the Southeast Asia, it seems that the personal trust exceeds social trust. It needs a new formulation where the combination between colleague trust and formal regulation of political institution is established. Regional integration needs to take into accounts the urgency of using the basic value of society when establishing regional policy and behavior. Marsh (ed. 2006) mentioned that Malaya cultural background is less influence compared to China cultural background to governmental behavior. On the contrary, other aspects such as ideology, whether it is liberal democracy or authoritarian, influences more (Blondel, Sinnott, & Svensson, 1998). Hence, establishing connectivity by strengthening colleague trust as a manifestation of cultural values as an important aspect of developing regional policy and behavior is very important action to be done.

The design of communitarian democracy that is accommodating local values is essential for ASEAN. Communitarian democracy differs with western liberal democracy in terms of providing space for local wisdom-cultural values, instead of abandoning these values. It is expected that by using local wisdom-cultural values that embrace the sense of communitarian, democratization in region
and promoting regional-based conflict resolution for any political dispute within ASEAN are truly established. The sense of communitarian among people will develop substantially if connectivity does exist. To be on that stage, we need to consider, what we call, “political awareness”. ASEAN community needs to consider opening more extensive opportunity for instituting political instruments, where the regional political institutions may be used for supporting the design of political awareness. Civilian also has a good experience to manage a better integration, not only in the economic field but also in sociopolitical policy and regional security (Bersick & Pasch, 2007).

**Designing Political Awareness**

We view the concept of political awareness as an awareness of citizens to accept a concept of political action and the results of the political process. Political awareness has a direct impact on certain aspects such as the political action of citizens and their political behavior which is dependent on the intake and supply of political information (Zaller, 1990).

Political awareness is an urgent agenda needed to be strengthened in ASEAN. There are reasons for it. First, each government tends to strengthen regional diplomacy by not having interfered with domestic problems faced by other ASEAN members as an act of implementing the principle of non-interference. Human rights violation in Papua, Rohingya persecution in Myanmar, and the arrest of pro-democracy activists in Malaysia, as examples, did not bring significant political attention regionally. Consequently, attention between ASEAN members toward some political issues occurred in one country becomes very minimum, even though the political issues may affect other countries or regional stability. This kind of diplomacy leads to political ignorance between ASEAN members and it reduces mutual understanding between countries. We cannot ignore that non-interference principal is chosen by considering sociocultural aspects embedded in Southeast Asian society. The implementation of this principal, however, should also consider the importance of responsiveness among others about the political problems that can significantly influence regional politics.

Second, the regional intercommunity relationship has already been formed but limited action has been done to foster this society relationship to strengthen regional connectivity among ASEAN people. Domestically, network of non-government organization (NGOs) is flourishing. Regionally, the connectivity between NGOs tends to focus on specific issues related to the concern of NGOs but it gives less attention to strengthen political awareness and political dialogues. In other words, a potential asset that already exists between civil society to create connectivity among civil society is ignored.

Third, the regional corporation that strongly relies on non-interference principal provides complexity when defining which problems needed to tackle domestically and which problems that needs regional attention and actions. This complexity gives dis-incentive for ASEAN to maintain regional interest and become important actors within regions. As a result, ASEAN does not use the opportunity to foster inter-country relationship by using its unique
cultural and traditional ASEAN values to tackle domestic problems.

Political issues slant Southeast Asian countries can compare into two scales. It particularly appears during the last second decade, facilitated by the increase of worldwide political escalation and the spread of these issues through transnational channels. The first scale is regional issue, which emerges as the effect of global interaction. After the 9/11, this region takes a significant attention to war against terrorism programs sponsored by the USA under President George W. Bush. This agenda results to the domino effect toward the existence of transcultural communities within this region due to the idea of polarization and stigmatization between radical and non-radical community or terrorist and non-terrorist organization.

The second scale is domestic government issue contributing to the regional stability. There is a fluctuation relationship among countries in Southeast Asian region, especially when it comes to the bilateral relationship. Pursuing its national interests rather than promoting mutual understanding among ASEAN member is becoming the picture of the bilateral relationship. Moreover, there is a tendency of conducting political ignorance when it comes to the political issues of one country. Separatist issue occurred in Pattani, Southern Thailand; Papua, Indonesia; and Moro, Philippines is only viewed as internal matters and does not bring more attention to build regional collaborative act to solve the problems. ASEAN is seen to do anything but ignorance. It can be stated that ASEAN provides limited incentives for bringing truly intergovernmental interaction in the political matter.

On the other side, no country has the courage to bring domestic political issues to become regional political issues. The problem is that this situation is worsened by the increase in political cooperation between ASEAN state members and external actors such as developed country and other multilateral cooperation beyond the regional boundary. Thus, regional politics in this region is picturized by political ignorance and political dependence into external actor outside the region such as China, USA, and Russia. This article tries to bring the attention of the limited political awareness among ASEAN member. Moreover, this article also reviews the recent political value of this region that too much rely on non-interfere principal. Specific attention is given to the issue of political awareness between countries which is politically abandoned.

There is an urgent need to emphasize political awareness in the way ASEAN members construct their diplomacy. It is an urgent action to put political awareness as a spirit of cultural and political diplomacy. The concept of political awareness refers to the establishment of space for mutual understanding among countries which are not only concentrated on domestic issues but also extend to some issues across the country in logical reason and boundary. Political awareness insists to each country for having an equal responsibility in a mutual understanding frame, concerning with the need of promoting and protecting regional democratization. Thus, a mutual controlling dynamic for each country may have maximum power to put the position of each country as balancing force against political unstableness.

Using a case of Spratley Archipelago, a territorial dispute between some ASEAN
countries and China, we can see that the maintenance of political stability in this region is ignoring the importance of seeking a solution by maximizing the role of ASEAN to involve actively in regional politics. In the positive side, the involvement of external actor outside ASEAN gives contribution for problem resolution by forming partner for dialogue. While from the negative side, the external environment affects cohesion of ASEAN policy itself (Yoshimatsu, 2006). More importantly, the role of ASEAN is dominated by the active role of external actors. Hence, political stability in this region at some degree has significant dependency on external actors rather than internal actors. Important assessment regarding this issue came from Emmers (2003), he evaluated that ASEAN had its own way in resolving its different problems in every case and for each member. There is no legal mechanism which allow to approach each problem by using dialogue effort for achieving collective consensus. The main frame for this consensus is national sovereignty and non-inference politics in the domestic matter. Consequently, the desire to maintain their domestic interests rather than regional interests is obvious. With this situation, each country does not want to be politically tied, thus, they become an unpredictable agent.

We are emphasizing alternative pathways to strengthen the work of ASEAN. First, develop the network among non-state actors. Civil societies in Southeast Asian region need to strengthen its communication and collaboration regionally. Cultural bonding as an Asian people can be used to strengthen solidarity and trust among Asian people. This network can be expected to perform the significant collaborative action to solve regional problems instead of invite actors from outside region. Eliminating external pressure and infiltration will be additional benefits from this action.

Second, facilitate the connectivity between economic actors, especially to maximize regional market. Regional market within ASEAN country provides benefits mainly for big corporations especially when each economic actor only focuses in their own domestic market. ASEAN corporations tend to choose international market than develop market within ASEAN territory due to economic advantage’s consideration. A new type of regional economic connectivity, especially done by small and medium enterprises could bring positive progress not only in terms of economic benefits but also social benefits. Connectivity between economic actors will develop a better understanding of others led to the collaborative work for maximizing regional market for ASEAN’s economic actors.

Third, build a stronger altruism spirit. We cannot ignore that each country has domestic problems that potentially becomes regional problems. Abu Sayyaf group in Philippine, as an example, tends to be viewed as the domestic problem in Philippine rather than an embryo for regional problems faced by all ASEAN member. Being selfish and ignore each other - as the best action of the ASEAN way-, however, is only postpone the development of problems. It needs urgent attitude change among countries to put concern for the other interests.

Fourth, reduce the dependency to external actors outside ASEAN to solving local or regional problems. There is a tendency where involving external actors, mainly powerful countries, is the first
reaction among ASEAN countries rather than relying on inviting ASEAN to solve domestic problems. Terrorism, illegal migration, drug trafficking problems, and territory dispute as it is shown at South China Sea are some examples of that tendency. Strengthen trust and commitment among ASEAN countries and between ASEAN countries with other counterparts to settle problems using peaceful and durable solution as it already undertakes when announcing the Declaration on The Conduct of Parties in The South China Sea (DOC) be implemented seriously.

**Neighboring Partnership**

Has government realized what they should do in neighboring life? This simple question has a significant implication for the improvement of regional cooperation, whether it is represented by ASEAN as regional cooperation institution or another initiative in the relationship of intergovernmental. Focused on ASEAN, the issue of well-neighboring concept is still problematic. Pursuing their internal benefits when conducting diplomatic matters rather than regional benefits is one explanation for this situation. Moreover, ASEAN country tends to choose bilateral relationship to gain expected benefits due to its less complexity than regional relationship. Bilateral relationship that always emphasizes more on internal benefits among two countries conducted relationship is an advantage behind that choice.

One of the basic things strictly observed is that conflict resolution model in ASEAN is less powerful. The cause relates to the very strong nationalist politics in each country. Hence, the intergovernmental organization such regional organization play less significant role. A new form of approach needs to be offered. ASEAN members need to be pushed to create a closer cooperation and formulate policy collectively. As happened in Kampuchea in the 1980s or ASEAN reconciliation mission in East Timor, both change political mindset, particularly in the concept of autonomy and self-government (Vatikiotis, 2006).

The regional issue needs to be resolved by considering the expectation of the people in this region. Cooperation and consultation which bring mutual benefit among the countries involved in the issues may influence the type of solution. Cultural similarity in ASEAN community is commonly considered have a significant power in searching for the solution. One example for this is in the effective conflict resolution based on cooperative principle. It might be traced from what was stated by the Indonesian ex-minister of foreign affairs in 1979 concerning with communicatively conflict resolution (Anwar, 1994). The same thing may be known from Ghazali Shafie who commented in Malaysia that collective cultural inheritance was spirit of togetherness in a big kampong (village/country) of Southeast Asia. Estrella Solidum from the Philippines underlined ASEAN way is consistent with the cultural elements that every member of ASEAN has. ASEAN way is viewed as process of taking policy based on consultation and consensus, informally, non-confrontation and collective benefit (Acharya, 2001).

Indeed, the establishment of supranational organization in Southeast Asia has limited prospect or better future. There are three main reasons for that. First, historically, there is no political authority that dominantly governs to this region. The
second is ideological reason, where nationalism becomes the main trigger to the emergence of resistance against colonialism. Hence, nationalism exceeds regionalism. Lastly, until now there is no country who wants to play powerfully as regional leaders. ASEAN form which is static and with no political integrated orientation should be tested for the next further period. Political dynamics of intercountry relationship in this region is extremely influenced by external pressure. On the other side, the accumulation of domestic issues in this region until now does not come up with an effective resolution, yet.

A space for discussing various kind of governmental interest, not only in the case of giving protection for the citizen but also for national interest, maybe accommodated in special diplomatic action which is considering another country as part of strategic partnership cooperation. Strategic partnership cooperation is needed to be strengthened to gain better understanding and perception among countries.

Another framework which has better opportunity in the context of regional cooperation is a neighboring partnership. Philosophical background of this framework comes from some positive elements in closer social life. Neighbor is a part of someone closer life. In Southeast Asian society tradition, collectivity becomes a foundation of interfamily interaction, however, it has not hit the boundary of privacy for each territory.

Implementation of neighborhood partnership needs a precondition that should be fulfilled by each country. Low trust among countries within ASEAN is needed to be minimalized due to its impacts on reducing in consensus’s effectiveness. Without that, well-established cooperation and the optimization of the result of cooperation among ASEAN members will be far away to be reached.

A legal and formal cooperative framework is extremely needed. International law should also need to become compulsory. Consensual and political approaches in regional relationship within ASEAN, however, must be strengthened to maintain positive achievement. It is functioned for covering the impasse of formal diplomatic line or limited negotiation toward some exertions or services that are involving the interest of country beyond the region.

Collectivity and caring one with another should not be considered as part of one’s aggressiveness toward each other. With this new understanding, involving in one country’s matter should not be viewed as an act of interfering with the domestic issue of one country. On the other side, proactive offer should also be provided in the incidental cases that need urgent responses.

Conclusion

ASEAN is unique regional cooperation. There is some achievement in economic development in this region, however, regional integration provides little benefits in terms of political development. The principle of non-interference as a code of conduct for maintaining regional diplomacy reduces significantly a political awareness to the political matters. Therefore, political connectivity among Southeast Asian countries is limited.
This paper has opened a space for further discussion as an attempt to design both formal and informal field for intercountry regional relationship. A significant recommendation from this article is to review non-interference concept of ASEAN since it only results to a deferment of conflict explosion. In addition, Future agenda on implementing democracy based on communitarian tradition must be the principal regional agenda to support the implementation of neighborhood partnership model. With this proposal, it is expected that political awareness among people in Southeast Asian region replaces political ignorance embedded within non-interference principle. Connectivity, that is the heart of regional integration, then, is no longer an illusion.

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**References**


The Rohingya Muslim in the Land of Pagoda

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Abstract

Regarding Southeast Asia as a multi-ethnic region, this paper attempts to examine about why Buddhist Community turns into religious violence against Rohingya people in the State of Rakhine (formerly known as Arakan). Through understanding the triggers of conflicts, this paper applies historical perspective to analyze why ethnic-religious conflict occur nowadays between Buddhist and Rohingya Muslim in Myanmar. This paper also discusses how history has influenced the construction of the government’s policy under a military regime to exclude Rohingya. However, the ethno-religious conflict is either an indication of a weak state or failure state in managing diversity.

Key words: ethnic-religion violence, Muslim Rohingya, Buddhist Rakhine, state’s role

Introduction

The challenges that newly independent state faces in the post-colonial period are not only on how to manage diversity but also how to maintain the stability of a nation-state based on nationalism. Southeast Asia is the portrayal of the “melting pot” with its mixed ethnic identity and religious diversity among them. It is the place where most of its unification is an agreement resulting after the colonial states left at the end of World War II. Meanwhile, the mixed community has also caused another problem, which revolves around minority and majority. Rather than examining the problem of diversity, this paper will focus on explaining why the Rohingya Muslim and Rakhine Buddhist often involve in these conflicts compared to other ethnic groups in Myanmar throughout its historical perspective.

Throughout history, the conflict between Rohingya Muslim in the north and Rakhine Buddhist in the South of Rakhine state are much influenced by their relationship in the past. Although it is classic, the history has created a pattern of a conflict which is accumulated in the society and has constructed their perspectives about the others. Moreover, this can also be used to analyze why the government leads the primordialist issue as a reason to maintain stability within the state. Thus, history is one main factor to construct the ethnic-religious conflict in Myanmar today. Even though, Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) won the elections in 2015 and her victory is a way to democracy, but in the case of the Rohingya, the task will not be easy.
Rohingya Muslim in the Land of Pagodas

Many centuries ago, Hinduism is the most dominant religion in the Rakhine Kingdom and Buddhism took its place in the 500 BCE. After around 710 CE, Islam reached the state (Saw, 2011; Sakinada, 2005). According to Minahan (2012) in the book entitled Ethnic Groups of South Asia and the Pacific: An Encyclopedia, Islam’s arrival has embraced many of the former Buddhist, Hindu, and animist population. When Bengal was under Muslim rule in 1213, Muslim’s influence was greatly developed in Arakan (Minahan, 2012) one the other hand, Bamars or Burmans disposed the king of Arakan in 1404. During the same period, Buddhism became the most influential and ascertained religion which can be seen in the later period of Rakhine kings who were all Buddhists (Gibson, James, & Falvey, 2016). Another fact of Rakhine State is that for many centuries there has been relations made between the Muslims in Bengal and the Kingdom of Arakan. When Arakan was independent in the 15th and 16th century, this region was ruled by both Buddhists and Muslims (Ursula, 2014).

According to Minahan (2012), Rohingya was also known as Ruainggas, that is part of Indo-Aryan ethnic group. He stated that there are other Rohingya communities spreading out in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, Europe, North America, United Arab Emirates, Australia, and New Zealand. That is approximately 3.5 million of Rohingya people and about 800,000 has lived in the Rakhine State (Minahan, 2012). He also explained that Rohingya speaks an Indo-Aryan language which refers to Bengali or known as Chittagonian language that Southeastern Bangladesh uses and in the religion aspect, most of Rohingya has Muslims- Sunni. In his book, Minahan also stated that according to Bamar Historian “…the term ‘Rohingya’ did not appear until the 1950s when it was coined by Bengali Muslim migrants who had settled in the Rakhine region during the colonial period…” (Minahan, 2012). On the contrary, another literature claims that the Rohingya community has settled in that region for a long period before it was under the British colonial rule.

The historical background of Arakan seems close to the conflict. In 1785, Burman soldiers have attacked Arakan brutally resulting to the destruction of mosques, libraries, and cultural institutions (Jonassohn & Björnson, 1998). The Burman monarchy attempts to clean up those who were considered as “the other” or has non-Burmese origins. In the efforts to appall the memories of Burmese brutality, the Rohingya community welcomed the British in Arakan and it was during the colonial rule that they received political rights and economic autonomy. In 1937, the British separated Arakan from the Indian empire which causes the Rohingya community’s regress into its previous situation; living in fear and insecurity.

In 1942, the Japanese forces have reached Rakhine and made that area as a front line until the end of the Second World War. During 1942-43, both Muslims and Rakhines were attacking each other mostly due to their different alliances; most Muslim communities were pro-British, and Rakhines were supporting the Japanese. With shellacking from both parties, Muslim communities fled to the north where they were a majority, and Rakhine moved to the south (Yegar, 1972, in Asia Report No. 26, International Crisis Group (ICG), 2014). This is reasonable in seeing why the largest Muslim groups were settled in the Rakhine State. In 1945, British
awarded the Rohingya community a civilian administration in Arakan because of their loyalty. Two years later in 1948, Arakan State was integrated into Burma according to the 1948 treaty and Burma granted its independence from Britain (Jonassohn & Björnson, 1998).

Although many evidences and historical reports prove that the Rohingya community is a native in that region, but Burma (now Myanmar) as well as the Burmese Kingdom still perceived them as foreigners or newcomers. Therefore, for the Muslims living as a minority in the Buddhists’ land is difficult for Rohingya. The poor relationship between Muslims and Buddhists did not only happen today, but it has a heavy historical relation that result to the Burmese’s reluctance to co-exist with the Rohingya Muslims since centuries ago.

Today the Rakhine State, like other states of Myanmar, is a diverse region. The Rakhine Buddhist is the largest group amongst the total population which is approximately 60 per cent of the 3.2 million. The Muslim communities, including Rohingya, are at least 30 per cent while the rest population is Chin (who are Buddhist, Christian or Animist), and other small minorities including the Kaman (also Muslim), Mro, Khami, Dainet and Maramagyi who have reached 10 per cent (International Crisis Group (ICG), 2014). In fact, the data of Rohingya population could not be accurately mentioned; it is because there are discrepancies of numbers from different sources.

Moreover, there are communities unregistered as citizens because they are unrecognized by the regime under the 1982 Citizenship Law. The military regime rejects Arakan Muslims (Rohingya) from their recognition as citizens, even though they have been settling in the land of Arakan since 1823 (Bayefsky, 2005). The Rohingya community was not only stateless but also endures military pressure; including highly restrictive policies. This situation is compounded by the fact that the military regime is the one to facilitate the movement against Rohingya (Dittmer, 2010). The goal of that movement is to reduce Rohingya’s population, hence, there is no accurate documentation estimating the number of Muslim population in the Rakhine State. Meanwhile in 1982, there was about 56 per cent of the total population inhabitant in the district (Yegar, 2002). It is possible that the Rohingya community has the highest population at that time. A decade later in 1994, Burmese Muslim was estimated to be 3 per cent out of the total population of 45 million, but Muslim claimed that their number of population is around 7 million or 13 per cent out of the total population (Veen, 2005). According to the data, the Muslim population shows a small number in Myanmar, but the data of ICG in 2014 or other sources stated that Rohingya Muslims were the second largest group in the State of Rakhine; even though the number was under 50 per cent of the population. However, this imbalance number of population causes insecurity and fear to emerge.

Violence Against Rohingya: Problem with Ethnicity or Religiosity?

The violence against minority refers to “uncertainty” (Appadurai, 2006). The problem “came out” when they are among us and the boundaries are unclear between “them” and “us.” Likewise, the minority group who has identified themselves as different, the majority needs them to determine what they call as “we.” According to Appadurai (2006), the majority needs the “other” to define their own identity. He also argues that the
majority recognizes the minority group as an “impure” element in the national body. Meaning, they destroy an opportunity for self-definition in “understanding their own identity” (Sen, 2010).

In fact, the concept of “we” as the majority’s argument poses as a difficult boundary to accept the “others.” In the case of Rohingya, the Burma Kingdom for many centuries ago and Myanmar state today have continuously oppressed them because they are different. They are regarded as not a part of Myanmar nationality. Rohingya is perceived as different because they were pro-British in the Second World War and they have a different religious identity with the majorities of Myanmar. Rohingya was closely associated with Bengali, but on contrary, they are clearly different from Bengali; physically and politically.

When it is believed in 1990 that in accordance with the ending of Cold War, the world would return to a new hope of peacefulness and a more democratic world order, but the fact is showing the pathologies in the nationhood purification. Myanmar, since their political isolationism under the military’s rule in 1962, is closed from outside world. There is not much information acknowledged by the international community regarding Myanmar’s situation. There is no clear and obvious information on how Rohingya people becomes the object of perpetrator and the subject to brutal violence from the majorities. For example, in 1991-2, the army has arranged about 250,000 Rohingya communities to flee to Bangladesh, and they were repatriated without “given citizenship” by the state (Dittmer, 2010).

Meanwhile, according to the 2009 Human Right Watch Report, in 1995, the Bangladesh government has forced most of Rohingya Muslims to go back to the border with the UN supporting this repatriation process. Then, the government granted them a Temporary Registration Card (TRC), which gave them the limited freedom of movement and employment in the western part of Arakan.

The violence for anti-Muslim also occurred in 1996 in Shan state and Yangon. In 1997, SLORC initiated an anti-Muslim riot in Mandalay as well as other cities and the government is reported to be involved in the riot (Veen, 2005). The issue of anti-Muslim violence has since been happening in 2001 as well as in Sitwe which results to many Muslims and Buddhists killed and injured. Since that time, the Government decided for travel restriction on Muslims in the conflict area, particularly those who do travel between Sitwe and other towns. In these cases, there were no information on whether Muslim-Rohingya has been involved in the conflict or not. However, the issue of anti-Muslim (non-Rohingya) has also spreads out to the other Muslim communities. The data from Amnesty International reported that Karen Muslim community has also been victimized. A refugee from Muslim Karen Woman from Hpa’an Township Kayen State, said that
her village was destroyed by the soldiers in April 2004 - including their mosque.

Until in 2012, the conflict occurred between Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine finally spreads out in international media, harvesting mass attention from the world. The trigger of this conflict is the rape and murder of a Buddhist woman by Rohingya Muslims which leads into violence and riot in the same year. The data report shows that dozens of people were killed, a hundred houses burned, and 75,000 people, mostly Rohingya, displaced (Caballero-Anthony, 2016).

The conflict between Muslim Rohingya and Buddhist Rakhine also spreads out of the Rakhine state. In March 2013, violence occurred in Meiktila, Mandalay region and 43 people were killed in this accidence. While in May 2013, a boarding school and a mosque were set on fire in Lashio, Shan State (Fuller, 2013). According to the data, extremist Buddhist groups known as 969 were suspected to initiate the anti-Muslim violence. This report is also written by Caballero (2016), but according to her, 40 people were killed because of these riots. She explained that a commotion in a gold shop in Meiktila, Central Myanmar has lead the violence between Buddhist and Muslims.

She also explicated that based on the UN claim and a BBC News report, in January 2014, more than 40 Rohingya men, women, and children were killed in Rakhine State after an issue that a Rohingya Muslim killed a Rakhine police. Seeing these cases, we can see how violence can be easily followed by another violence; even the reason behind the incident was unclear. The boundaries of conflict become unclear then, whether it is communal conflict between Rohingya and Rakhine or Rohingya Muslims and Rakhine Buddhists. Besides being Muslim, the physical appearance of Rohingya is very distinct from the descendant of Mongoloid. It seems to simplify the reason, “they are not like us; we cannot accept them” (Hurd, 2015).

The communal violence between Muslim Rohingya and Buddhist Rakhine was not only an issue in the Islamic world, but also in international level. It leads into strong international critic over military government of Myanmar neglecting the conflict in Rakhine state. However, the violence against Rohingya Muslim by the state is showing how state has significant rule in perceiving Rohingya as “the other.” Thus, the discrimination was not only in, law, economic, or education, but also political and humanity right.

When Buddhists Turn to Violence

The historical explanation describes that Arakan State, for centuries, has been an area for territory struggle and symbol of power, respectively amongst Portugal, Britain and Japanese. The Rakhine Buddhist and Muslim, including Rohingya are claiming each other that Arakan is their own land, whether that is “the land of Muslims” or “the land of Buddhists.” In terms of political phenomenon, there are two major factors in ethno-religious conflicts which are ethnicity and territory (Harris, 2009).

In her book, Erika Harris (2009) explained that homeland is a crucial place for the people:

“In the case of homeland, the appeal is that, in the first place, it belongs to people whose name it carries; what happens to others who may not have another homeland or who even think of it as their own is as secondary consideration, if a consideration of
ethno-national movements at all... there is no potential for conflict anywhere without disputed territory, as there is no peace without territorial settlements. Homelands are spaces where national narratives are made, to which past struggles and dreams of the future belong. All homeland are “lands of hope and glory” but also, space of the nightmare of ethnic violence take place....

Nevertheless, the conflict in Rakhine state is not only about the clash of two ethnicities, but also identity, which Harris did not include it as an element of analysis. The identity could not be separated from homeland nor ethnicity. It can be seen from the Palestine conflict between Palestinian and Israeli who fights and claims that Palestine is their homeland. For Rohingya people or the Rakhine Buddhist, Rakhine state is the place where their ancestor lived in and they are emotionally engaged with. Arakan is the place where they find the memories of their identity. Although the oppressed government compels them to leave the land, they are returning with the consequence of being stateless. It is because they have no other place nor choice for both to stay and survive.

Historical homeland conflict also has its root when U Nu regime fulfilled their promise to give autonomy in Arakan and Mon in 1962. However, the Mujahidin in that time continue demanding its legal separation from Burma (Azizah in Yusuf, 2013). In the same year also, Burmese Army did coup d’état against U Nu regime, and Burma was under military junta. In 1989, the government changed the name of Arakan to Rakhine. Thus, when someone mentions “Arakanese Muslims,” it refers to Muslim minorities that has already disappeared. It seems that the nomenclature of Rakhine was designed for Rakhine people or known as “the Buddhist land.”

There are three core points contesting in this conflict; ethnicity, territory, and identity, which are all related to the historical background. These points are the main elements of why conflict happens in the world, particularly in Rakhine. According to Jack Snyder (2000), there are two kinds of nationalities in the world: ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism. Ethnic nationalism is based on the primordial sentiments such as ethnicity, culture, or religion. While, civic nationalism is based on national sentiments that overcome the distinction of ethnicity, religion, race, and social class within the society. Today, in the globalization era, the ethnic nationalism, which based on primordialism sentiment is being abandoned gradually, especially in the West. In contrary, the countries that faced diversity problems like Myanmar, the common structure of a conflict is constructed by the dominant power to marginalize the minorities with great oppression.

The question then is why the Buddhist community turns to violent measures against Rohingya Muslims. Firstly, it should be noted that religious violence can occur in all religions (Hansclever & Rittberger, 2000; Seul, 1999; Bartels, n.d.). Jeffrey Seul in his journal argued that the escalation of intergroup or inter-ethnicity conflict cannot be solely seen as identity competition, even economic and politics factors also play important roles in the conflict (Seul, 1999). By adopting Connor’s idea about nationalism which refers to “us-them” (Seul, 1999), Seul explains that Connor’s argument was based on a single cultural marker, including religion which can be
the root or reference for national identity construction. This argument could be examined in the context of Myanmar in which Buddhism was constructed as their national identity. In the other hand, Rohingya community is not reflected as a part of the Mongolian nation. Thus, there must be a logical argument to explain how intergroup conflicts in Rakhine occur.

Seul as well as Samuel Huntington are using the primordialist perspective. Huntington believes that the next pattern of conflict after the Cold War pattern was not only dominated by ideological or economical aspects, but it will involve religion-fed cultural “fault lines” (Ventura, 2014). The following statement is Huntington’s most cited passage in The Clash of Civilization:

“It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be culture” (Huntington, 1993).

According to the primordialists (Samuel Huntington, Gilles Kepel, Jeffrey Seul, and Bassam Tibi), they argue that the most important factor in the twenty-first century conflicts is the nations in civilization (Hasenclever & Rittberger, 2000). In their book, Hasenclever and Rittberger are also attempting to outline the three approaches to analyze the impact of faith and politics, before it can be used to measure the conflict.

In the instrumentalist perspective, socio-economic are the basic of conflict and religion is only a spurious correlation in terms of intergroup conflict. The Instrumentalists believe that most of religious conflicts start from unequal growth between economic, social, political and nations (Hasenclever & Rittberger, 2000). Otherwise, in the constructivist perspective, religion is an intervening variable.

Marco Ventura (2014) mentions about the constructivist approach in his book in the following term:

“…ethnic identity is as fluid, changeable, and often actively contested. From such perspective, most of the emphasis of the analysis is on the strategic aim of collectivity framing ethnic membership and boundaries in a given manner than on individual motives to endorse a given ethnic affiliation. Consequently, elite and mass interests are not assumed to converge, nor are the interests of different ethnic group assumed to be intrinsically divergent: ethnic conflict and violence can serve elite interests beyond ethnic boundaries and can contradict the interests of the masses on all sides.”

This approach also described about how the elite plays a significant role in intergroup conflicts. Related to the Rohingya case, the elite Army plays a role to mobilize the violence through recognizing that Rohingya people are the “impure” community in the state. Here, the regime saw the issue of impurity as an opportunity to reduce population. Indeed, Buddhist-Muslim violence is nothing new in Myanmar, especially in Rakhine (Kingsbury, 2015). It can be seen from the government statement when other entities ask of the solution for refugee camps or deportation. President Thein Sein emphasizes that Rohingya people were unacceptable in Myanmar. His comments in Radio Free Asia (2013), states that they take responsibility for their own ethnics and because Rohingya were not authentically their ethnic, it was
impossible to endure them legally (Caballero-Anthony, 2015).

There are two approaches to understand the Buddhist in how they are involved in the violence; that are primordialists and constructivist perspective. But this hypothesis has also been influenced from the history of relationships between Buddhist and Rohingya just as how Burmese-Buddha has ruled for centuries imposing the Rohingya. Aside from the historical background, cultural reasons also play an important role. If cultural reasons cause the construction of “us and them,” which is very clear to differentiate Rohingya Muslim and Rakhine Buddhist, then it is indeed an important factor that depicts and influences the course of history for Rohingya people in Myanmar continuously.

The Buddhist practices its religion as a Burmese religion for centuries so that it has a strong influence in the Burmese culture. Although the government changed the name of Burma into Myanmar, the identity was already embraced by the whole nation. Since there is an imbalance between majority and minority, the Buddhist culture becomes a reflection of their basic culture. They feel insecure and fearful that the minority will change the Buddhist culture.

On the other hand, according to the historical background in during the British colonial, Rohingya Muslims owns legal administration since they were loyal to the British colony. They have an opportunity in economic, social status, and education. They have a position in the government and this continues in the U Nu regime until coup d’État by the junta military in 1962. Historically, they came to Arakan as traders and soldiers, most are notably from Arab, Mongol, Turkish, Portuguese, and Bengali. When Arakan was Bengal’s feudatory in the 15th century, Rohingya converted to Islam and developed their own distinct culture and art (Jonassohn & Björnson, 1998). The Rohingya community has the skills needed to develop their own economic ability or thorough education but because they are “stateless,” they do not have the opportunity and are powerless. On the other hand, the Rakhine Buddhist already has an opportunity to restore their socio-economic because they have obtained official citizenship. However, when Rakhine Buddhists opted violence, it seems that they are defending their nationalism, but unfortunately Rohingya could not do the same way, because they have either no state or “nationalism.”

An Overview: Islam in Myanmar

Muslim in Myanmar was not dominated by the ethnic of Rohingya, there some ethnics involved as well. However, the antagonistic relationship between Rohingya Muslim and Buddhist Rakhine has never been in peace. Serial conflicts record that ethnical conflict between Burmese with Buddhists as a majority and other immigrant, such as Indians, does happen. Sub-ethnics such as Mon and Karen, as mentioned previously, have also become victims in the Burmese conflict, and many among of them are Muslims.

It is significant since Buddhists in Myanmar has not been in the conflict with other Muslim community with Chinese descendant –Chinese Muslim that comes from Yunan, a border area between China and Myanmar in the west. Most of them come to Burma as traders, breeders and refugees in the post-Panthay revolution (1856-1873). Under the Manchu government in Myanmar, this Chinese Muslims then are well-known as Panthay
or Hui in the Chinese language. According to Naw Lily Kadoe in her writing entitled *Ulama, State, and Politics in Myanmar*, as cited in Yegar (1972), this tribe easily assimilates with the local community and is be able to keep their identity as Muslims.

On the other hand, the arrival of Indians under the British government had caused an increasing number of Muslim population in Myanmar. Previously, the Muslim population in this state is small, passive and loyal to the king of Burma. Yet, the coming of Indian immigrants have doubled the population and with the increasing number of mosque and school based on Islamic education constructions (Yegar, 1972). The scale of ethnical conflict between Indian Muslims and Burmese Buddhists increases in the post-World War I, that is in the 1930 and 1938 which happens due to the fight for jobs in Rangoon (Yangon) (Kadou, 2015).

Analyzing conflict in Myanmar is not an easy task, but serial historical factors with violence over Muslim Rohingya is showing that ethical conflict is not new, it was rooted on their historical relationship. Through short explanation, we can analyze what Buddhists’ relationship with the Muslim minority in Myanmar looks like. However, it cannot be generally concluded that the Buddhist-Muslim relationship in Myanmar is worse because, in several cases, anti-Muslim sentiment happens in Rakhine due the ethnicity of Rohingya, and the conflict has also happened outside Rakhine.

There are some hypotheses that can be drawn by looking at this problem; first is that conflicts happening between Buddhist Rakhine and Muslim Rohingya is motivated through economic-politic and social variables. Second, is that the conflict between the two had created bigger religious conflicts crossing ethnicity. It happened due to fear over wide distribution of Muslim power and the possibility of a scrapped Buddhist position, which still needs to be proved. Third is that conflict over Buddhist Rakhine and Muslim Rohingya is considered completely as an ethnical conflict, but it has much to do with a religion. For the example, their rejection over Rohingya without mentioning Islam as the religious attribute. Fourth is the limited information of conflict regarding the relationship between Buddhist Burmese and ethnic Hui (Panthay) as minority. Meaning the closeness between Rakhine and Hui could be viewed as ethnical intimacy, both of which came from Mongoloid race. Yet, it could be also interpreted that the ethnic of Hui could adopt the local culture better compared with Bengali Muslim (Rohingya) and Indians.

Path for Harmony

Although it is not easy and there is still no win-win solution acquired between Buddhist Rakhine and Muslim Rohingya, many efforts had already been shown to reconcile the parties. Indeed, this issue had grabbed international attention, either from the Muslim countries or non-Muslim countries. International respond over the conflicts in Myanmar, especially in the northern Rakhine State is a movement for global humanitarian crisis.

Since the crisis happened in the 2012, 57 counties affiliated in the Organization of Islam Cooperation (OIC) condemned genocide over Rohingya Muslim in Myanmar, as what happened in the summit meeting in Mecca, Augusts 2012 (Kadoe, 2015). In the other side, Myanmar government invited the state representatives and UN to see the actual reality that is happening in the Rakhine
The Rohingya Muslim in the Land of Pagoda

Indeed, this decision also emerges a serial of protests especially from Buddhists in several areas of conflicts, such as Yanggon, Meiktila, Lashio in the northern Shan State.

A couple years before in 2011, Adli Abdullah, the leader of the International Concern Group on Rohingya (ICGR) in Malaysia, hoped that the Rohingya issue could be discussed in the ASEAN Summit while several parliaments from Southeast Asian countries still intensively conducted the dialogue to solve the issue of Rohingya. They urge ASEAN to include this issue as the main agenda of the ASEAN summit in Malaysia on 26-27 April 2015. However, this effort still has an obstacle, because Myanmar considers the issue of Rohingya as a domestic matter and ASEAN has no right to interfere this issue. Even if there are many Rohingya refugees residing in ASEAN countries, particularly in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand.

Later, on 20th of May 2015, the Foreign Ministers of three ASEAN countries, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand conducts a meeting in Kuala Lumpur to discuss joint solutions and the resolving of regional issues (Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015). This Meeting also aims to find a comprehensive solution involving the country of origin, transit, and goals through the principle of burden sharing and shared responsibility. This is necessary to prevent the issue of irregular migrants for it not to evolve into a humanitarian crisis in Southeast Asia.

Furthermore, in the meeting with the Ministry of External Affair of ASEAN in Yangon December 2016, the Minister from Malaysia, Anifah Aman, demands for full humanitarian access in the conflict area. It made Malaysia as the ASEAN country that initiates involvement into the issue. Indeed, Malaysia also reports to give emergency support for Rohingya Muslim refugees in February 2017. It is recorded that since the humanitarian crisis happened in 2012, many Rohingya refugees have been escaping to Southern Malaysia.

Likewise, Malaysia and Indonesia as the largest Muslim populations in Asia have also been supporting the refugees in the same way. Recently, refugees of Rohingya community receives accommodation and hospitality in Aceh before they depart to Australia to gain asylum. Indonesia is also the only state allowed by the Myanmar government to enter the Rakhine region to provide humanitarian assistance to Rohingya refugees when the crisis still occurred. The Indonesian government through the Ministry for External Affairs has been doing diplomacy in resolving conflict as well as giving humanitarian aids for Rohingya Muslims. Thus, international demand for harmony cannot be well-achieved without internal effort from Myanmar government per se.

The winning of National League for Democracy (NLD), pioneered by Aung San Suu Kyi in the general election 2015 had previously seen as bringing a hope for religious freedom and sectarian conflict. In contrary, winning does not give a significant contribution to religion harmony. Indeed, Aung San Suu Kyi intents to limit international intervene for resolving the problem of Rohingya Muslim and Buddhist Rakhine. Furthermore, the appointment of Htin Kyaw in the parliament (2016) gives no significant changes due to his loyalty towards Aung San Suu Kyi. Thus, the harmony is located on the government’s ability in handling militaristic regime. At least, the president from civil society could be a new hope for
Myanmar after many years of militaristic controlling regime.

While, international sympathy over this case is still going on. In the prior December 2016, there are fourteen countries, among them are Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and the United States. These countries imposed Myanmar government in allowing them to give aids for Rohingya Muslims (The New York Times, 2016). It is related to the UN report portraying the increasing number of humanitarian crisis in that area. However, the amount of aid especially in food is still limited. There are 20,000 people from 150,000 refugees who got food. This tragedy was reported by Pierre Péron, a spokesperson of UN for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

Basically, the problem of Rohingya Muslim is not an easy task to be solved, it is due to historical complexity that has been happening for a long while. In other words, a conflict between Rohingya Muslim and Buddhist Rakhine is not merely a temporary response; it is rooted happened many years, across generation and remaining into the present.

Conclusion

It is believed that Rohingya is a legacy from British colonial policies that are trapped in a misfortunate situation. Historically, Rohingya were leaving their ancestors to migrate into Rakhine State during the British colonial period and was called by most non-Rohingya people as Bengali Muslim. The official view of the Myanmar Government is that all Rohingya people are illegal immigrants from Bengal (present day Bangladesh) and the government does not address Muslim migration under British rule (Gibson, 2016). Otherwise, according to historian and it is mostly believed by Rohingya people, they argued that their ancestors were not only coming from East Bengal, but also from different Muslim countries. They were not coming to Rakhine State during the British colonial period but over hundred years earlier before. Rohingya people has heavily rooted in Rakhine, the definition of Rohingya people identity seems difficult to be explained. Hence, the Rohingya people itself as an ethnic identity is still debatable.

The conflict in Rakhine based on the primordialists and constructivist perspectives also could be explained based on historical context which states that for centuries the Burma Kingdom did invade Rohingya to get Arakan. After Arakan was a part of Burma Kingdom, this land since then belongs to them. In the 17th century, when Arakan was under the British rule, Rohingya was protected until the Britain colony left the country in 1948. Post-British rule, the Muslims’ peacefulness in Arakan changes into conflict with the Buddhists. Indeed, since 1962, the junta military has oppressed Rohingya Muslims and played a significant role in the movement to expel Rohingya from the Myanmar state. The case of Rohingya currently has found a new stage and it is a concerned as an issue related to humanitarian disaster in Southeast Asia. This issue becomes more complex because the conflict involves not only ethnic-religious, but also economic, social and political aspects. However, the conflict between the Buddhist and Rohingya community is very complicated and its resolution is not easy. The international communities are continuing their efforts to negotiate with junta military to give more accesses to Rohingya and to know about what happened in Rakhine as a part of humanitarian activities.
About the Author

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Higher Education Integration in ASEAN: ASEAN University Network Case

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Abstract

Higher education has an important role in the region’s economic growth, with talents and ideas developing in the process. ASEAN University Network (AUN) is the institution that facilitates cooperation among ASEAN universities and beyond. This research attempts to describe the role of AUN in enhancing regional integration in the higher education sector in ASEAN. This research uses qualitative method to get depth information and the bigger picture in the governance of AUN’s role and mechanism in regional integration of higher education system. The results of this research showed that AUN helped enhancing regional cooperation.

Key words: AUN, regional integration, higher education, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

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Introduction

Education is one of the sectors that have a crucial role in regional integration. It is a backbone for development and regional integration, as it has been proved, in Western Africa, which helped to further regional integration (Guannu, 2010). This research argued that such experience is also relevant in ASEAN.

ASEAN integration process has shown its greater importance following the establishment of ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) in late December 2015. The integration process consists four pillars of economic integration; single market and production base, competitive economic region, equitable economic development, and integration of the global economy (ASEAN Secretariat, 2015). This integration has proceeded with a new phase after ASEAN Charter in 2008. With the new phase of integration in the economic sector, hopefully, it will begin to advance in integration and boost development in a region.

In ASEAN today, only eight occupations received mutual recognition agreements among ASEAN countries (Fukunaga, 2015). Therefore, there is a demand to produce more capable skilled labor to increase or maintain its education sector quality and contribute to regional integration with an equal and fair standard.

The regional integration process in EU countries could be a set of an example of regional integration in the education sector for ASEAN. In Europe, the Bologna Process helped to support the modernization of education and training and helped to better integrate the countries inside EU (Papatsiba, 2006). It shapes European values and knowledge that form European identity also increase competitiveness and capability of human resources.

The cooperation in the education sector in Southeast Asian level particularly higher education has been established since 1956. Mustajarvi and Bouchon (2014) explained it narratively with the first establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Institutions of Higher Learning (ASAIHL) in 1956, followed with the Southeast Asia Ministers of Education Organization (SEAMEO) in 1965 (Mustajarvi & Bouchon, 2014). Thirty years later, the ASEAN University Network (AUN) was established in 1995. Mustajarvi and Bouchon also described the comparison later compared the higher education integration in Europe and ASEAN. The pattern of higher education integration in ASEAN more likely suitable with neo-functionalist approach and accompanied with legal formal and political initiatives.

Research Question and Methodology

The fact is ASEAN has not yet fulfilled the complete integration among stakeholders of higher education. Although the stakeholders such as policy makers and institutions have established the regional organization, in the process, has not involved all universities in ASEAN, or at least the state universities.

The purpose of this research is to highlight the regional integration of ASEAN in higher education sector. It uses the theory of regional interdependence for regional integration. This theory is originated from interdependence theory which developed as a critique of realist theory in the 1970s and emphasized non-state actor in international relations (Wilkinson, 2010). The term of regional interdependence is more familiar with economic development in a region. The
non-state actor has bigger role in regional integration and economic prosperity.

The questions that arise in this article are:

1. How is the quality of the higher education sector in ASEAN countries?
2. How can AUN contribute in regional integration in the higher education sector?

The method of this research uses descriptive analytical method, and get data incorporate primary data coming from ASEAN Secretariat, and secondary sources coming from academic journals dealing with the development of AUN.

This research is divided into two parts. The first part is to describe the overview of higher education in ASEAN countries. Each of ASEAN countries will be described in this part. The second part is to discuss regional integration process of higher education sector in ASEAN particularly AUN and analyze how AUN contribute for regional integration of the higher education sector.

The Overview Condition of Higher Education in ASEAN Countries

Nowadays, with the introduction of AEC in 2015, ASEAN tried strongly to narrow the gap among ASEAN countries, proved with the growth of the higher education system in ASEAN. Here is the brief overview of higher education in ASEAN Countries.

Philippines

There are 2,060 higher education institutions until 2008 in Philippines (ICHEFAP, 2011). Most of them are satellite campus. The political structure of higher education governance in Philippines has put the main policy maker in one institution that is the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) which was established in 1994. It is an autonomous institution that has authority on higher education policy in Philippines. The unique thing about the higher education system in the Philippines is that the quality assurance or accreditation based on an internal request and then to be accredited by the external auditor and the higher education institution pays the accredited agents. The regional cooperation of the higher education institution in Philippines is very extensive but mostly only located in five best universities in Philippines.

Indonesia

Indonesia has 3,000s higher education institution until 2013, and the majority is college type campus (Moeliodihardjo, 2014). Recently, in 2014, the new administration has established a new ministry dealing only with research and advance education, with its own budget. Before that, the higher education was put merely under the directorate general level, under the Ministry of Education and Culture. Today, the higher education in Indonesia has begun to show greater trends to conduct extensive international networks. In terms of regional cooperation, every university has its own policy with so many association and organization but in this part, only AUN that been described.

Malaysia

With 600 higher education institutions in 2011, Malaysia has proved itself to become an advanced institution of higher education sector in Southeast Asia (Arokiasamy, 2011). Public institutions in this country received massive support from the government, and later developed
themselves to becoming international reputed universities. Earlier on, Malaysia operated a system called National Higher Education Strategic Plan (NHESP). In 2014, NHESP was in phase 2, with the merging of two ministries, focusing on internationalization, to become a hub for international higher education. The existing activities in internationalization among others are international mobility program, international service learning, and international cooperation in education and training, and boosting and trust to Malaysia partners (Knight, 2013).

Singapore

With only six universities, Singapore has the best higher education institution in ASEAN (Ministry of Education of Singapore, 2015). Two of them are Nanyang Technological University and National University of Singapore is the major reputed global university and even the best in Asia. The Ministry of Education is the major policy maker of higher education institution in Singapore. The country has successfully utilized its long national stability and economic growth, and successfully integrated and centralized all areas of education. The universities in Singapore have also maintained enormous cooperation with world class universities such as Harvard, Cambridge, and made themselves the global hub of education in Southeast Asia.

Thailand

Thailand had 645 higher education institutions in 2000 (Kirtikara, 2001). The Ministry of Education holds the authority in running the education system. Following the Second 15-year Long Range Plan on Higher Education and the 11th Higher Education Development Plan, the country conducted an internationalization of Thailand higher education system and paid attention to the use of English as the medium of communication.

Brunei Darussalam

Brunei currently has 18 higher learning institutions (Ministry of Education of Brunei Darussalam, 2015). The public institutions are predominantly in Brunei and administered by the Ministry of education of Brunei, aiming to educate its citizens. Most of Brunei citizen are studying in tertiary education abroad and prefer to choose advance education in advance APEC. In internationalizing its higher learning institutions, Brunei provided scholarships for foreigner to study in Brunei’s universities.

Vietnam

Vietnam is developing countries with rapid growth in the economy and needs progressive advancement in the higher education sector to support its economic growth. There are 498 institutions of higher education in Vietnam (Nguyễn & Vũ, 2015). The main administrator of higher education sector in Vietnam is the department of higher education under the authority of Ministry of education and training. Vietnam is improving and restructuring its internal quality.

Laos

Laos began its commitment to developing its higher education in the early 1990s (Ogawa, 2008). Previously, the government focused on improving the primary education sector. Until 1995, the country had only 10 public higher education institutions. Today, it has grown to 91, including the rapid number of private institutions (Lie, Kaur, & Sirat, 2014). The rapid development of private
institution was driven by decree of government that allows private institutions to be established. The Ministry of Education holds the power to govern higher education sector in Laos. The focus of Laos is the internal quality improvement within the late development of higher education sector. Considering the need to support international student mobility, the Ministry of Education continued to send the local students overseas to study, aiming to come back to the country to improve the quality of education in Laos. However, Laos also accepted international student from abroad.

**Myanmar**

The transition from the military regime to a more democratic regime in 2011 helped to reform the higher education system in Myanmar, with government launched a comprehensive review of the education system in 2014 (Win, 2015). That review aimed as a foundation for the betterment of higher education sector in Myanmar. Nationally, there are 164 of higher education institution in Myanmar, with 96 institutions located in Mandalay and Yangon (McCord, Simon, & Weil, 2013). The main authority in ruling higher education sector is the ministry of education, visioning international cooperation for Myanmar higher education system mainly focusing on aid preferably coming from overseas to improve the local education quality. At the same time, Myanmar also sends the local student abroad to transfer the knowledge and practice in Myanmar’s education.

**Cambodia**

Soon after the end of the Khmer regime in 2009, the new government in Cambodia began to improve the qualities of the local 134 educational institutions (Kitamura et al., 2016). The Ministry of Education holds main authority in ruling the higher education, focusing on the improvement and enhancement of its internal quality. Specific attention had been given to, in reaching young generation to participate in tertiary education. Like Laos and Myanmar, Cambodia also preferred to attract foreign sources to develop its higher education system.

**The Role of AUN in Integration of Higher Education in ASEAN**

In November 1995, AUN was established. Following the development in 1997 to 1999, the membership of AUN was expanded in line with the increasing member of ASEAN. Today, AUN incorporates 30 universities (AUN Secretariat, 2016) (Table 1).

AUN establishment was based on the ambitions of the leaders of ASEAN and the ASEAN Sub-Committee on Education (ASCOE) in establishing ASEAN universities. But the idea failed due to constraints of cost, location, and leadership. Therefore, in 1994 ASEAN initiated began initiated ideas leading to the establishment of networks between universities in ASEAN so that cooperation in the field of education can be improved. In 2000, the AUN Secretariat set up in Bangkok, Thailand (Beerkens, 2004). While most of AUN member are public universities, only two universities are private, namely De La Salle University and Ateneo de Manila University.
Table 1. AUN Members in ASEAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mandalay University</th>
<th>University of Brunei Darussalam</th>
<th>Ateneo de Manila University</th>
<th>Royal University of Phnom Penh</th>
<th>De La Salle University</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Royal University of Law and Economics</td>
<td>University of the Philippines</td>
<td>Airlangga University</td>
<td>Nanyang Technological University</td>
<td>Gadjah Mada University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National University of Singapore</td>
<td>University of Indonesia</td>
<td>Singapore Management University</td>
<td>Bandung Institute of Technology</td>
<td>Burapha University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National University of Laos</td>
<td>Chiang Mai University</td>
<td>National University of Malaysia</td>
<td>Chulalongkorn University</td>
<td>University of Malaya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahidol University</td>
<td>Universiti Putra Malaysia</td>
<td>Prince of Songkla University</td>
<td>University of Science, Malaysia</td>
<td>Vietnam National University, Hanoi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universiti Utara Malaysia</td>
<td>Vietnam National University, Ho Chi Minh City</td>
<td>Yangon Institute of Economics</td>
<td>Can Tho University</td>
<td>University of Yangon</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The objective of AUN is the wish for the establishment and strengthening solidarity networks between universities in ASEAN. So far, the cooperation involved the exchange of staffs and students respectively to increase the skills, knowledge, and ability of Human Resources (HR) at each university (AUN Secretariat, 2016). AUN also managed to establish cooperation with universities outside ASEAN such as EU, Japan, South Korea and China and invited them as an observer in meetings of the AUN.

For example, in the fields of geology, AUN and cooperation between universities in Japan conducted research on the potential development of geology in the area. Research and development of products successfully developed in this collaboration. Based on research conducted by Koichiro Watanabe et al, shows the AUN and Japanese cooperation schemes initiated through South East Asia Engineering Education Development Network (SEED-Net) helped to strengthen the Japan-ASEAN Summit in 1997 and the ASEAN+3 Summit (Watanabe et al, 2006). This brings considerable benefits in utilizing geological potential in Southeast Asia, as well as exchange of students and staff. Another example in social sciences issues, AUN has the positive impact on its member by the enhancement of the Southeast Asian Human Rights Studies Network (SEAHRN). It involves other universities which are not AUN member.

Learning from the ideas of Thomas Friedman which highlighted the greater importance of globalization following the year 2000, it can be asserted that the increasing development of AUN, run in tandem with the ASEAN’s path by establishing the what so called the ASEAN Community in 2015 (Friedman, 2005).
In fact, AUN continued to highlight the importance of human resources, manifested in the completion and innovation. In the process, universities inside ASEAN had begun to better interact, with experts and academics working together to improve the education qualities in various countries inside ASEAN at the same time (Ratanukul, 2009).

At the level of regional cooperation and the establishment of AUN is also attractive because it can improve the relationship between ASEAN countries. Education has been utilized as a tool of foreign policy, with member benefitting from permitting their universities to better interact with their partners inside ASEAN. In addition, education is a part of people to people diplomacy by doing international mobility student. Nowadays, there are 12 programs of scholarship that available for AUN member and will increase along with the capacity enhancement of AUN member (AUN Secretariat, 2016).

In line with the findings of Josef T. Yap, universities inside ASEAN had benefitted from the exchange of people, transnational education, information exchange, regulatory reform, and development cooperation. In this research, Yap mentions that the AUN and ASEAN Quality Assurance Network had played an important role in furthering the importance of ASEAN (Yap, 2012). Even though the ideas of quality of assurance and accreditation is yet to come, but integration processes inside ASEAN tend to work along this direction.

Even though, AUN alone currently covers only 30 universities from thousands of universities in Southeast Asia. There are still a lot of universities inside ASEAN that have the potential, to take advantage of this scheme. In the membership issue, it is not easy to integrate quickly in adding the new member. Such difficulties can be overcome if every member of AUN play a role in practicing AUN mechanisms, and share their expertise to their fellow partners at the national level. AUN enhancement in SEAHRN could be the good model for collaboration beyond AUN member in ASEAN. In the same way, AUN can share its best practices in supporting the local governments inside ASEAN’s provinces to better deal with globalization issues, such as finding the best ways to achieve all targets stipulated in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). By doing this, AUN’s role will further strengthens ASEAN’s path towards achieving all goals stipulated in the ASEAN Community 2015 and raise the reputation of its members at the global level.

**Conclusion**

AUN has a network which runs in line with the ideas of ASEAN Community. In addition, AUN has a capacity to improve the quality of education and universities in ASEAN, especially changing the mind of universities which are outside the top 400 universities in the world.

Acknowledging there is a big gap on one hand between universities in Singapore and Malaysia, and universities in Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar. On the other hand, it is advisable that AUN to better focusing on strengthening the internal cooperation using all frameworks inside ASEAN. There is a lot of potential of AUN to contribute in the regional interdependence of ASEAN. By doing this, AUN will help to narrow the current gap already exist, which will in the long run help to increase the sense of belonging and
sense of identity as an internal part of ASEAN.

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References


Sub-National Government and the Problem of Unequal Development in ASEAN Economic Integration: Case of Indonesia*

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Pantri Muthriana Erza Killian University of Brawijaya, Indonesia
Ni Komang Desy Arya Pinatih University of Brawijaya, Indonesia

Abstract

Economic integration, as a prevalent phenomenon in contemporary international relations, brings with it several problems including in the practice of development. Krapohl & Fink (2013) argue that regional integration can follow three different developmental paths which are intra-regional interdependence, extra-regional dependence and intra-regional asymmetries and hence regional integration can in fact reinforce current situations rather than changing it. With regards to this, ASEAN is following the second path, creating a reliance on external actors and thus requiring member states to be highly competitive in the global level. However, this strategy ignores an important element, the intra-national development gap, since ASEAN is mostly focused in overcoming the intra-regional gap. This paper therefore seeks to elaborate the problem of increasing intra-national development gap due to regional integration by using Indonesia as a case study. The findings show that regional integration in Indonesia can in fact widen the national development gap due to three main reasons. First, ASEAN integration is highly top-down in nature, thus limiting the role of Indonesia's sub-national governments (SNGs) and private actors in the process; second, differing capacity of Indonesia's sub-national governments to engage in IR provides higher opportunities for some while creating hindrances for others and lastly, the high transactional cost of intra-national economic activities in Indonesia causes the benefits of economic integration to be highly concentrated in one area. Therefore, there needs to be a larger role for SNGs in regional integration particularly in the most underprivileged area of Indonesia.

Key words: ASEAN, Indonesia, development gap, sub-national government

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Introduction

For most countries, regional integration is no longer a choice but a necessity. The need to be included in the global economy and obtain the benefits of a freer market have forced countries to engage in multiple trade arrangements. As of April 2015, a total of 612 regional trade agreements have been reported to World Trade Organization, with 406 agreements being in force (WTO, 2015). Of these 406 agreements, there are at least 13 arrangements which are formed based on regional integration or regionalism. By far, European Union (EU) is the most advanced regional integration while Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is the most successful and long-enduring regional integration outside of the western world (Beeson, 2013).

ASEAN member countries themselves are highly diverse in terms of economic growth and political conditions. Its member countries include wealthy states such as Singapore and democratic countries like Indonesia, but also incorporate poor countries such as Cambodia and authoritarian states like Myanmar. In terms of economic growth, intra-ASEAN trade has a moderate growth, with an average growth of 7.62 per cent from 2007 up to 2013 (ASEAN Statistical Yearbook, 2014). This number is relatively low compared to other areas such as Europe and Southern America. At the end of 2015, ASEAN will enter a higher level of economic integration which includes free flow of labor, investment and capital, commonly known as ASEAN Economic Community. Under this scheme, one of the main goal or pillar is to achieve an ‘equitable economic development’ which focuses on minimizing development gap between member countries. However, aside from development gap among member countries, ASEAN is also facing development gap within their own countries, such as the case of Indonesia.

Indonesia is an archipelagic country with a relatively modest infrastructure quality and a high level of inequality. Indonesia has one of the fastest growing inequality rate (Gini index) in East and Southeast Asia, rising from 0.32 in 1999 to 0.41 in 2012 (World Bank, 2014a). Indonesia’s inequality is not only evident in the fact that Indonesia’s richest population has enjoyed a 20 per cent higher growth in their income and consumption since 2003, but also a disparity in regional development progress where eastern Indonesia lags in other areas (World Bank, 2014). According to the head of Indonesia’s Autonomy Watch or KPPOD, Sofjan Wanandi, only 10 per cent of Indonesian cities experienced an improvement in their economic performance ever since Indonesia’s implementation of a decentralization policy in 2001 (Antique, 2009).

Based on this background, this paper seeks to explain ASEAN regional integration and its effect on development, particularly on intra-national inequality, by using Indonesia as the case study. This paper argues that when regional integration is implemented in a country with high level of economic inequalities, its benefits will be diminished since regionalism will in fact widen the development gap, as in the case of Indonesia. Furthermore, the nature of the integration, whether it is a top-down or bottom-up integration, also determines the effect of regionalism on development, since it can lead to a concentration of power and rulemaking capacity at the central government. This paper will be
divided into three parts where part one will review existing studies of regionalism and sub-national government while part two and three will discuss regional integration in Indonesia and highlight the role of sub-national government in this process.

Theorizing Economic Integration and Regionalism

Economic integration is the removal of barriers to trade, payment and mobility from the factors of production, or in other words, an effort to unite the economies of two or more countries through a series of joint policies (Carbaugh, 2010). Basically, the idea of economic integration dates back to liberal economists such as Adam Smith and David Ricardo who believe that non-restricted economic activities will give the most efficient outcome for all countries. Economic integration will create static efficiency gains and dynamic efficiency gains (Balaam & Dillman, 2011). Static efficiency gains occur because economic integration will lead to specialization among member countries and market expansion, resulting in the economies of scale (Balaam & Dillman, 2011). Aside from static efficiency gains, economic integration will also bring dynamic efficiency gains because in the long run, economic integration will stimulate innovation and make industries much more efficient and competitive (Balaam & Dillman, 2011). Although, economic gain was often considered the primary motive for regional integration, newer theories of regionalism focus less on highlighting only the economic gains.

In general, theories of regionalism can be classified into 2 eras or waves of theorizing, the classical theories and the new waves or New Regionalism Approach (NRA). Classical theories which range from 1960s to 1980s focus mostly on the debate between the intergovernmental and supranational approach, which highlights the difference between regionalism as an inter-state project and regionalism as a project to create institutions above the state (supranational). Theories under this heading include classic theories of functionalism, neofunctionalism, federalism, confederalism and liberal intergovernmentalism. Newer theories of regionalism emerge in the late 1980s and early 1990s following the shift and inclusion of non-material or ideational factors in the analysis. One important theory under the New Regionalism Approach is Multilevel Governance (MLG) in which the article uses as its basis.

Marks (1996) defines MLG as a policy-making or decision-making process which involves not only the state as the exclusive actor but also other actors at various levels, namely at the supranational, national and sub-national levels. Under MLG, each level should have the authority to create and implement policies and in several cases, to even refuse in implementing decisions that higher levels of authority impose. Multilevel governance was originally developed in the European Union where the tendency to result in overlapping governance among multiple levels of government is high since many countries uses a decentralized system of government. MLG tries to avoid this problem by offering an alternative form of power sharing between multiple levels of governance and reduces the chances of overlapping. Multilevel governance sees regionalism as a process of governance and policy making that involve multiple actors at multiple levels (supranational, national and sub-national), employing both vertical and horizontal relationship
Horizontal relationship means that the process involves multiple actors at the same level while vertical relationship involves different levels of governance (Gibson, 2011). In this sense, MLG expands the classic definition of rulemaking (in terms of regional integration) by government to include various actors at multiple levels.

**Regionalism and Development in ASEAN Countries**

In their 2007 Report, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) stated that developing countries have started to use regionalism as one of their development strategies since it is viewed as a collaborative effort that countries do to engage in development. However, countries are also in a dilemma on choosing to fully integrate themselves to the global economy or still trying to retain their economic sovereignty. Hence, countries are struggling to balance their domestic interests, regional agreements and international demands through multilateral cooperation (Abugattas, 2004). With regards to ASEAN, relatively low socio-economic conditions by member countries has caused development to be one of the priority issues in ASEAN.

Table 1. Human Development Index (HDI) of ASEAN Member Countries (1985-2013)

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brunei Darussalam</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.786</td>
<td>0.838</td>
<td>0.843</td>
<td>0.844</td>
<td>0.846</td>
<td>0.852</td>
<td>0.852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.512</td>
<td>0.536</td>
<td>0.564</td>
<td>0.571</td>
<td>0.575</td>
<td>0.579</td>
<td>0.584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>0.582</td>
<td>0.623</td>
<td>0.640</td>
<td>0.654</td>
<td>0.671</td>
<td>0.678</td>
<td>0.681</td>
<td>0.684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>0.422</td>
<td>0.449</td>
<td>0.511</td>
<td>0.533</td>
<td>0.549</td>
<td>0.560</td>
<td>0.565</td>
<td>0.569</td>
</tr>
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<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>0.693</td>
<td>0.720</td>
<td>0.747</td>
<td>0.760</td>
<td>0.766</td>
<td>0.768</td>
<td>0.770</td>
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<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.472</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>0.514</td>
<td>0.517</td>
<td>0.520</td>
<td>0.524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>0.692</td>
<td>0.719</td>
<td>0.638</td>
<td>0.648</td>
<td>0.651</td>
<td>0.652</td>
<td>0.656</td>
<td>0.660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>0.784</td>
<td>0.821</td>
<td>0.840</td>
<td>0.868</td>
<td>0.894</td>
<td>0.896</td>
<td>0.899</td>
<td>0.901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>0.673</td>
<td>0.705</td>
<td>0.685</td>
<td>0.704</td>
<td>0.715</td>
<td>0.716</td>
<td>0.720</td>
<td>0.722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viet Nam</td>
<td>0.582</td>
<td>0.610</td>
<td>0.598</td>
<td>0.617</td>
<td>0.629</td>
<td>0.632</td>
<td>0.635</td>
<td>0.638</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: ASEAN Statistical Yearbook (2014)*

In average, there has been an increase in the human development condition of ASEAN member countries from the year of 1985 up to 2013, with Lao PDR obtaining the lowest HDI (0.569) and Singapore has the highest (0.901). The difference between Singapore and Lao PDR is around 0.4 which shows quite a high level of human development inequality. In addition to that, the domestic inequality also shows a similar picture.
On average, from 1990-2013 almost all ASEAN countries have the experience of an increase in their Gini coefficient, with Indonesia showing the steadiest upward trend. This shows that despite the implementation of ASEAN Free Trade Area in 1994, domestic inequality remains a large problem in Southeast Asia. In terms of intra-ASEAN trade itself, ASEAN still trade largely with external countries (non-ASEAN states) with a ratio of around 1:3, in both exports and imports (ASEAN Statistical Yearbook, 2014).

![Table 2. Gini Coefficient of ASEAN Member Countries (1990-2013)](image)

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brunei Darussalam</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>0.380</td>
<td>0.351</td>
<td>0.419</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.444</td>
<td>0.379</td>
<td>0.360</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.357</td>
<td>0.360</td>
<td>0.350</td>
<td>0.370</td>
<td>0.380</td>
<td>0.410</td>
<td>0.410</td>
<td>0.413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.354</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.367</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>0.442</td>
<td>0.443</td>
<td>0.379</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.441</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.462</td>
<td>-</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>0.468</td>
<td>0.488</td>
<td>0.440</td>
<td>0.458</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.464</td>
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<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.482</td>
<td>0.474</td>
<td>0.471</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>0.524</td>
<td>0.525</td>
<td>0.425</td>
<td>0.418</td>
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<td>0.401</td>
<td>0.396</td>
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<tr>
<td>Viet Nam</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.378</td>
<td>0.420</td>
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<td>0.434</td>
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<td>0.433</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: ASEAN Statistical Yearbook (2014)*

**Regionalism and Sub-National Government: Case of Indonesia**

In terms of the formation of regionalism, ASEAN is considered as highly state-centric in nature. ASEAN Secretariat (ASEC) only acts as the facilitator for member states’ activities. ASEC is also understaff and has no executive or legislative power (Wunderlich, 2012). Furthermore, ASEAN member countries deliberately avoid creating a strong supranational institution, making ASEAN Secretariat highly underpowered (Hill & Menon, 2010). In contrast to EU which is highly supranational, ASEAN limits rulemaking ability and involvement of other sectors other than the central government. In supranationalism, regionalism is usually a result of complex interactions between different actors at various political levels. Supranational institutions can also be a medium for society to advance their own interests with less government involvement. A study by Guido & Kamarulnizam (2011) shows that although Indonesian public generally supports the ASEAN Community, they lack the knowledge regarding its process and policymaking which means that the process excludes them greatly. However, this is not to say that ASEAN’s intergovernmental is less favorable that EU’s supranationalism since ASEAN offers flexibility that EU does not always have. All in all, although state-centric regionalism is not necessarily bad, it can generally reduce the public’s awareness
and involvement in the overall process, particularly those who are marginalized.

Aside from ASEAN’s characteristics, Indonesia also faces a problem in provincial disparity at various economic sectors, such as trade and investment. In terms of foreign trade, data shows that Indonesia has average export growth of 1.59 per cent in non-oil and non-gas sector (Ministry of Trade, Republic of Indonesia, 2015). However, 18 provinces (out of 32 provinces) records a lower growth rate than the average rate as well as 17 provinces experiencing a decline in export growth (Indonesian Ministry of Trade, 2015). In terms of investment, foreign investments are also mostly dominated in Java area particularly in DKI Jakarta, West Java and Banten (BPS-Statistics Indonesia, 2015). One exception is for East Kalimantan province that records a high amount of foreign investment. This disparity attributes to the fact that Indonesia has a large gap in terms of conducting international trade and attracting investment. Not all provincial or city government are equipped with the ability to create, promote, communicate or engage in foreign activities due their limited human resources. This in turn creates limitation for them to reap the benefits of freer trade and investment flows. This situation is also worsened by the high transactional cost between provinces in Indonesia.

The high cost of domestic trade is one element that can reduce Indonesia’s competitiveness at the global level (Asia Foundation, 2008). It is reported that Indonesia’s cost of transporting goods is around USD 0.34 per kilometer which is higher than Asia’s average cost at USD 0.22 per kilometer (Asia Foundation, 2008). This high logistics cost results in a price difference of 20-100 per cent between western and eastern Indonesia. For example, a sack of cement can cost 10 times more in eastern Indonesia than it is in the western area (Pambudy, 2011). Under this condition, competitiveness will also vary greatly between provinces in Indonesia since provinces which have access to international ports will be more competitive. Tanjung Priok port in Jakarta (Indonesia’s capital) currently accounts for two-thirds of Indonesia’s international trade (World Bank, 2014b) meaning that only one-third of Indonesia’s international trade is done outside of the capital city. This shows that international trade is still highly concentrated in the wealthiest area.

Conclusion

Based on the discussion, it can be viewed that despite the implementation of decentralization, problem of inequality in Indonesia still exists (as is shown by Gini Index). With regards to economic integration in Southeast Asia, positive effects of ASEAN economic integration to reduce intra-state inequality is still not present. The implementation of ASEAN Free Trade Area in 1994 does not translate to reduced inequality and on the contrary, increases inequality. For Indonesia, the biggest problem is the high discrepancy between provinces and the limited capacity of provincial and city government. With limited capacity to engage in productive international relations, these cities and provinces may lose their opportunity to benefit from the economic integration under ASEAN’s scheme.

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Abstract

There is no question that the current liberal world order faces yet another challenge. The upcoming challenge that we are about to confront is an exceptionally different kind of challenge. This challenge is the emergence of what I call a disruptive politics in the heartland of consolidated liberal states. The two main side effects of disruptive politics can be seen at both the domestic and international levels. Domestically, there is growing rise of populism in stable western democracies epitomized with the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States of America. Internationally, there is a growing rejection of globalization and integration, exemplified by the UK leaving the EU. Many commentators and pundits have observed that the rise of disruptive politics is the very threat to the liberal world order that could eventually cause it to collapse from within. While the side effects of disruptive politics should be addressed with caution; however, it is misleading to equate the disruptive politics with its side effects such as the rise of populism and the growing contend with the globalization. I would argue that disruptive politics is necessary for the survival of the liberal world order. Disruptive politics is a way to make us realize that liberal democracy is not perfect, and we need to fix it. This essay explores the notion of disruptive politics and the challenge it poses. It begins by unpacking the notion. It then offers three insights on how to maintain the liberal world order in an age of disruptive politics.

Key words: disruptive politics, Liberal World Order, Donald Trump
consolidated liberal states. The two main side effects of disruptive politics can be seen at both the domestic and international levels. Domestically, there is growing rise of populism in stable western democracies epitomized with the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States of America. Internationally, there is a growing rejection of globalization and integration, exemplified by the UK leaving the EU.

Many commentators and pundits have observed that the rise of disruptive politics is the very threat to the liberal world order that could eventually cause it to collapse from within. International experts like Stephen Walt (2016), Ian Buruma (2017), and the New York Times’ Roger Cohen (2017) have warned about the dark times facing the liberal world order with the recent disruptive politics happening in the western liberal democracies. Joe Biden even stated that the liberal world order is at risk of collapsing in his last international remarks as US Vice President at the World Economic Forum in Davos (Biden, 2017).

While the side effects of disruptive politics should be addressed with caution; however, it is misleading to equate the disruptive politics with its side effects. I would argue that disruptive politics is necessary for the survival of the liberal world order. Disruptive politics is a way to make us realize that liberal order is not perfect, and we need to fix it.

This policy note explores the notion of disruptive politics and the challenge it poses. It begins by unpacking the notion. It then considers the way in which global leaders should manage the liberal world order in the age of disruptive politics. This note concludes that there is a need for world leaders to rethink the way in which the liberal world order should be maintained.

**Understanding Disruptive Politics within the Liberal Order**

In 1995, Clayton Christensen (1997) put forward the notion of disruptive innovation as “an innovation that creates a new market and value network and eventually disrupts an existing market and value network.” Borrowing the notion of disruptive innovation, I define disruptive politics as a politics that interrupts the established order of things, particularly in the core constituency of the liberal order.

Disruptive politics is particularly different from conventional contentious politics, defined as “a politics that uses disruptive methods to make a political point or to change particular government policies” (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015). While contentious politics can be seen throughout both democracies and autocracies, disruptive politics is a slow process within liberal democracy that strikes at the very core of the liberal world order, namely liberal democracy and global capitalism. Just like the call for democracy in an authoritarian regime, disruptive politics within democracies is mainly caused by the politics of resentment, particularly towards the status quo and the elites who undermine the ordinary people.

In the authoritarian setting, disruption often occurred due to the lack of freedom to contend the authoritarian rule and demand on regime change. In liberal democracies with a stable democratic transfer of power, the very same disruption rarely happened. Liberal democracy has embraced protests and dissidents as part of its legitimation strategy and provided democratic platforms that neutralize resistance...
towards the status quo. But it does not address the issue of inequality where the accumulation of power in the hands of the few has made the voice of most of the people unheard. An interesting study conducted by political scientist Martin Gilens and Benjamin Page on the US democracy reveals that ordinary citizens have a non-significant influence on public policies compared to the economic elites (Gilens & Page, 2014). With this condition, democracy has been habituated as a ceremonial celebration for the ordinary citizens while the decisions are dominated by rich and powerful elites.

In the long run, just like in authoritarian rule, liberal democracies, instead of being the government of the people, by the people, and for the people, as envisioned by Abraham Lincoln, have metamorphosed to become an oligarchy. The recent predicament in the liberal democracies is perfectly summed up in Animal Farm’s famous remarks, “all animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others” (Orwell, 2003). To tame these circumstances, disruptive politics is needed.

Borrowing from Carol Hanisch (1969), the occurrence of disruptive politics has made politics become more personal and personal is political. While the status quo within democracies has disconnected the politics from the people, disruptive politics could empower people to be more involved in politics for better or worse. Some commentators have even argued that the recent rise of populist nationalism in mainstream western political discourse might have been made possible by a collective loss of faith in democracy.

It is possible to read what I have written here as a defense of the rise of populism and the decline of liberal principles. But my message is the exact opposite. Disruptive politics can have dangerous outcomes, but this is by no means the end of the liberal world order. It is Janus-faced. On the one hand, it might lead to the decline of liberal democracy with the rise of populist nationalism where angry democratic majorities rule, which might lead to the rise of authoritarian strong men. On the other hand, it could provide us with an opportunity to reform the core principles of liberal world order, which the national and global agenda have been aggressively pursuing, particularly since the end of the Cold War. Disruptive politics is a harsh wake up call to both the elites and the average citizens that the liberal world order is not without its shortcomings. Through disruptive politics, we have been given a chance to step back and reassess the national and global agenda of the liberal world order.

Managing Disruptive Politics: A Southeast Asian Perspective

With the emergence of disruptive politics, what kind of global political order will emerge in the aftermath? This is indeed a very important question that has attracted the attention of the brightest minds. To contribute to the debate, I offer three insights on how to maintain the liberal world order in an age of disruptive politics.

First, the disruptive politics happening in the western world could provide fresh voices from the non-western powers to come up in defense of the liberal world order. Rather than antagonizing over the non-western powers’ motives in pursuing global leadership, it is time for western leaders to trust the non-western world in terms of the burden of leadership sharing to maintain the global order. The disruptive politics unfortunately has brought the discourse of protectionism and
anti-globalization into mainstream western politics, with President Trump’s statement “Buy American Hire American” (Chu, 2017). Surprisingly it was the Chinese president, Xi Jinping who denounced protectionism and defended globalization (Fidler, Chen, & Wei, 2017). The so-called rising power that is considered illiberal is the one that seemingly holds the principle of the liberal order dearly. This suggests that even though non-western powers may not yet fully embrace the liberal principles, they are aware of the importance of maintaining the liberal world order.

In the case of Southeast Asia, Indonesia has tried to play a constructive role in supporting global world order particularly through the promotion of its democratic values albeit in its own way and with its own caveats (Karim, 2017b). Indonesia has been a promoter of democratic ideals and human rights values at the regional level. This shows that non-western power could become the supporter of western-dominated world order in promoting western liberal norm. Other than being supporter of western-dominated liberal order, countries within Southeast Asia also concern on the importance of the western military presence as a force of balancing in the region (Karim & Chairil, 2016).

Indeed that disruptive politics create uncertainty for Southeast Asia given that regional architecture built by ASEAN has been based on US-sponsored liberal international order through which ASEAN aimed to diffuse the norms into its regional norm and mechanisms (Chong, 2017). Moreover, under Obama’s leadership, ASEAN has been leveraged into one of the most important agenda within the US foreign policy with its pivot to Asia strategy thus boost ASEAN strategic important in the region. The disruptive politics with the election of Trump that focus on his “American first” slogan, has indeed shaken this progress and thus might change the balance in favor of China.

However, the disruptive politics certainly create a new space for second-tier countries in the Asia-Pacific to show their willingness to cooperate and initiate their own commitment without the need to have the great power on board. Although Donald Trump has succeeded in getting the United States out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), it does not necessarily make Asia-Pacific countries unable to spawn similar things without the United States. At the APEC summit in Danang, Vietnam, Trade ministers from 11 Asia-Pacific countries agreed on to press ahead with a major trade deal without the United States, as they seek to go it alone without the involvement of Donald Trump’s America.

Secondly, the disruptive politics has demonstrated how economic resentment towards global capitalism emanating from perceived inequality could tear apart the social fabric of the liberal order. Global capitalism has indeed lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty around the world, especially in Asia. Yet, it also brings huge inequality and social injustice too. In the eastern world, China’s embrace of economic globalization has not only made it an economic powerhouse but has also led to it becoming a country with one of the highest levels of income inequality in the world, where one percent of the richest households own a third of the country’s wealth. The conundrum that most of the time is happening on the periphery has now reached its core. In the US, inequality has become even greater, reaching its most extreme point since the Great Depression.
In Europe, inequality has risen substantially since the mid-1980s (Fredriksen, 2012). Basically, inequality has become the Achilles heel of the liberal order. I believe that the explanation for the rise of racism and xenophobia as well as the allure for the strong men in western democracies cannot be separated from the growing inequality within society. Inequality will incite fear and insecurity among people. In return they can be easily mobilized for hatred towards others (Karim, 2017a). It is time for the global leaders to genuinely focus on solving the tension between the inequality produced by market capitalism and the equality that is required by democracy.

Southeast Asia is also home for the rise of inequality particularly due to the impact the lack of the government to address market failure and reduce rent-seeking activities. While in general, the case of inequality has been experienced by Southeast Asian countries, however, Lao PDR and Indonesia have inequality trends that should be a cause of concerns (Yap, 2013). In a long run, the economic growth without inequality would only create dissatisfaction that may lead to social unrest. The inequality could also endanger the regional integration project in Southeast Asia once the project deemed to be detrimental toward the poor and vulnerable section of the society given the benefits of economic integration have often been unequally distributed.

It is the time for Southeast Asian countries to find out what is the best way to increase its wealth while at the same time reduce the gap of inequality. To do this, at least, there should be a shift in how the economic elites should see the development paradigm of neoliberal economic agenda which shows its failure in creating wealth with equality. Thus, ASEAN countries should pay attention to concept of inclusive growth seriously. The inclusive growth could start with the economic policy that focus on investing in public goods such as infrastructure, healthcare and the environment.

Thirdly, we need to reconsider the way in which the core values of the liberal order should be promoted. Democracy will be the most desirable form of government and the global standard for legitimate governance, despite the seemingly democratic decline and the variety of models that might not be particularly liberal (Ikenberry, 2011). And so is capitalism. Though not always subscribing to the notion of a liberal free-market, most of countries will eventually embrace capitalism as the way in which to govern their economy in the foreseeable future. However, the assumption that liberal principles should be universally accepted is not only wrong but also dangerous.

We should learn on how the two decades of liberal interventionist policy have failed and created more instability in some parts of the world. It has even nurtured antipathy from the periphery states of the liberal order. The challenge posed by disruptive politics also cautiously shows us that even mature liberal democracy is not immune from shifting towards an illiberal one. We should learn from history that there is always a danger of imperial overstretch even when it comes to ideas. Liberal principles might be the last man standing in history. Yet just like many other ideas, it is far from perfect. It is time to be humble and let the two core liberal principles evolve into a variety of models that stem from different cultural and historical contexts.

Indeed, that there is a steady decrease of democratic space as well as the protections of human rights in Southeast
Asia. Many countries remain undemocratic, and others have taken a worryingly repressive turn (Edwards & Karim, 2016). This might be caused by the negative views on democratic norm due to the liberal interventionist policies that are failing in any other parts of the world. Rather than seeing it as a failure of democracy alone, disruptive politics should remind us the need to create our own system and norm that also reflect the universality of democratic and human rights norm while at the same time accept the cultural and historical differences. In this case, Southeast Asian countries should able to increase the role of ASEAN human rights mechanisms as well as enabling its own civil society to foster its local norm on democracy and human rights.

A Move Forward

It seems quite self-evident to say that change always creates uncertainty, and the way we perceive changes often determines how we respond to them. But this is straightforward advice for us in an age of disruptive politics. Disruptive politics has certainly changed the course of the liberal world order into unchartered territory. We can see it as a threat and hence react accordingly. Or we can see it as an opportunity and thus mitigate its negative side effects. The disruptive politics happening in the western world should remind us that no matter how globalized and integrated our world is, our thousand-year old tribalistic DNA is still there. As long as a large segment of the population do not feel the benefits and feel alienated from the process, liberal principles only strengthen the boundaries and thicken the barrier.

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Reference


