Overtourism and Ontological (In)security in Southeast Asian Tourism: Balinese Community Responses to Russian Tourists

Disalula Acila Yeda[1], Benni Hasbiyalloh [2]*, Putu Ratih Kumala Dewi[3], and Shiskha Prabawaningtyas[4]

[1, 2]Department of International Relations, Faculty of Philosophy and Civilization, Paramadina University, Jakarta, Indonesia, 13880
[3] International Relations Study Program, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Udayana University, Denpasar, Indonesia, 80232
[4]Paramadina Graduate School of Diplomacy, Faculty of Philosophy and Civilization, Paramadina University, Jakarta, Indonesia, 13880

[1]disalula.yeda@gmail.com; [2]benni.hasbiyalloh@paramadina.ac.id;
[3]ratihkumaladewi@unud.ac.id; shiskha.prabawaningtyas@paramadina.ac.id[4]
*Corresponding author

How to Cite: Yeda, D. A., Hasbiyalloh, B., Dewi, P. R. K., & Prabawaningtyas, S. (2026). Overtourism and ontological (In)security in Southeast Asian tourism: Balinese community responses to Russian tourists. *Journal of ASEAN Studies, 14*(1), 181-204. https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v14i1.15081

Abstract

While Southeast Asia's post-pandemic recovery has led to a resurgence of overtourism, existing scholarship often prioritizes technical carrying capacity over the security of host community identity. This research investigates how Russian tourists' behavior in Bali generates ontological insecurity and prompts collective resistance that transcends economic concerns. Employing a narrative analysis of public discourse from 2019 to 2025, the research identifies a paradox. Although Russian tourists accounted for only 2.56 percent of Bali's 2024 arrivals, their presence provoked disproportionate political mobilization. State responses included establishing specialized task forces, increasing deportations, and proposing to revoke visa privileges. The findings suggest that visitor volume alone does not explain this phenomenon. Instead, behavioral transgressions, such as desecration of sacred sites and illegal business operations, positioned Russian tourists as existential threats to Balinese Hindu identity. The research carries ontological security theory from the state, where it usually sits, to the host community, showing how scapegoating and abjection turned diffuse anxiety about a changing island into fear of one group. The research proposes ontological carrying capacity to name a threshold that technical, volume-based models overlook, the point at which a host community begins to read tourism as a threat to who it is.

Journal of ASEAN Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1 (2026), pp. 181–204
P-ISSN 2338-1361/ E-ISSN 2338-1353
Received: 05th January 2026/ Revised: 10th July 2026/ Accepted: 21st July 2026

Keywords: Bali, ontological security, ontological insecurity, overtourism, Russian tourists

Introduction

Southeast Asia's tourism sector has undergone a substantial recovery following the COVID-19 pandemic, with international arrivals to ASEAN member states rising from 2.9 million in 2021 to approximately 101.9 million in 2023, representing 71% of pre-pandemic levels. In 2023, Thailand received 28.2 million international visitors, followed by Malaysia (20.1 million), Singapore (13.6 million), Vietnam (12.6 million), Indonesia (11.7 million), and both Cambodia and the Philippines (5.5 million each) (ASEANstats, 2023). Collectively, tourism contributed approximately $313 billion USD and supported over 40 million jobs in 2023 (ADB, 2024; WTTC, 2024). However, this rapid recovery has also accelerated the resurgence of overtourism, prompting reactive measures such as the Philippines' six-month closure of Boracay Island in 2018 (Scott, 2023) and Thailand's closure of Maya Bay (Koh & Fakfare, 2019; Sullivan, 2024). These closures, like the crowding that drives overtourism debates in European cities such as Venice, Barcelona, and Paris (e.g., Koens et al., 2018; Martins, 2018), address a problem of sheer volume. The Bali case examined below departs from that pattern, turning on conduct and settlement rather than numbers. Although ASEAN policy frameworks articulate goals for quality and sustainable tourism (ASEAN Secretariat, 2025; Santoso et al., 2025), the pace of post-pandemic recovery has outstripped institutional capacity to fulfill sustainability commitments, leaving communities to shoulder the social and environmental burdens of unmanaged growth.

The literature on overtourism describes it as a multidimensional phenomenon in which tourism significantly affects the perceived quality of life for both residents and visitors (Koens et al., 2018). This scholarship largely frames overtourism as a management and resilience issue, focusing on breaches of tolerable thresholds and the overloading of services, infrastructure, and social capacities (Cheer et al., 2019; Veríssimo et al., 2020). Documented negative impacts include environmental degradation, such as pollution and waste accumulation (Kuščer & Mihalič, 2019); social disruptions, including congestion, housing displacement, increased rental costs, and the displacement of residents (Namberger et al., 2019; Panayiotopoulos & Pisano, 2019); and economic imbalances, such as unequal cost-benefit distribution and increased tourism dependency (Martín et al., 2018). In Indonesia, post-pandemic "revenge tourism" has led to overtourism in destinations such as Banyumas and Yogyakarta, causing structural strain, environmental degradation, and pressure on cultural identity (Purwandani & Pakan, 2022; Yamin et al., 2024). Bali received 6.33 million international visitors in 2024 (BPS Provinsi Bali, 2025c), compared to a resident population of 4.4 million (BPS Provinsi Bali, 2025b), and faces acute challenges. These include water shortages, with tourists and resorts consuming 65% of total water, as well as waste management issues, traffic congestion, and increased competition for employment due to foreign workers (Adams & Sanchez, 2020; Wibowo, 2024). Of particular concern are

behavioral violations by Russian visitors that have prompted government deportations and debates over visa restrictions (Devi et al., 2023; Tahir et al., 2023).

Despite its prevalence, the technical perspective on overtourism often overlooks how host communities experience tourism saturation as a threat to collective identity and existential security, and instead interprets local resistance primarily as responses to physical congestion or resource depletion rather than as assertions of ontological security. Although recent research has begun to examine how tourism crowding can threaten tourists' ontological security (Peng et al., 2024), this framework remains underutilized in analyzing host community responses to transgressive visitor behaviors. This research addresses this gap by extending ontological security theory, traditionally applied in International Relations (e.g., Kinnvall, 2004; Kinnvall & Mitzen, 2020), to tourism contexts. While the case is often framed in public debate and tourism literature as an overtourism issue, the underlying concerns involve the settlement of foreigners and their unlicensed work, and more fundamentally, fears that the island is being transformed into a home for outsiders—issues not adequately captured by the language of congestion and carrying capacity. Through the lens of ontological security, the case is better understood as a politics of identity, in which the community perceives certain visitors as threats to its collective self. The analysis is guided by a central question: How and why did the conduct of Russian visitors come to be experienced and publicly represented as a threat to Balinese identity, at a scale disproportionate to their share of arrivals? Addressing this question requires a narrative approach rather than a quantitative one.

Bali provides a compelling empirical site for addressing these gaps. There, it was not visitor volume but highly publicized behavioral transgressions, particularly by Russian tourists, that catalyzed unprecedented community mobilization from 2023 to 2024. Viral dissemination of incidents involving Russian nationals on social media generated significant public outcry, often articulated in terms of existential threat. Notable violations included nude photography at sacred temples, reckless driving, immigration offenses, and intentional disregard for customary practices (*adat*). Provincial authorities responded with expedited deportations, intensified enforcement operations, and policy discussions concerning the restriction of visa-on-arrival privileges for Russian and Ukrainian nationals. Local discourse interpreted these incidents not as isolated acts of misconduct but as symbolic attacks on Balinese Hindu identity. Customary village authorities were involved in monitoring and regulating foreign behavior, while Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) organized petitions and demonstrations. Such collective actions are rarely directed at tourism, despite Bali's long history of intensive tourism development.

This research investigates how Russian tourists' behavior in Bali generates ontological insecurity and activates a "politics of fear" that reshapes tourism governance. While the analysis centers on Bali, the pattern is regional: post-pandemic tourism across Southeast Asia's major destinations has shifted toward longer stays and settlement, and Bali serves here as a theory-building case for destinations facing the same shift. The central argument challenges the assumption that economic benefits inherently secure tourism's social license. When visitor behaviors threaten identity continuity and social order, host communities mobilize by framing certain tourists as existential threats rather than economic assets, through

threat scripts that recast a tourist demographic as a security concern requiring state intervention. Sustainable governance, the findings indicate, must address not only technical carrying capacity but what the study terms "ontological carrying capacity," a limit that visitor conduct can breach qualitatively and symbolically rather than by weight of numbers.

Analytical Framework

Recent work has begun applying ontological security to tourism, but from the tourist's perspective. Peng et al. (2024) show that crowding threatens visitors' ontological security and prompts compensatory consumption. The host community's side remains unexamined. This section traces ontological security theory from individual psychology through International Relations to the host community, showing why communities prioritize identity stability even when it is economically costly, and develops the framework through which tourism-induced anxieties become threat scripts that reshape governance.

Ontological security refers to "the confidence that most human beings have in the continuity of their self-identity and in the constancy of the surrounding social and material environments of action" (Giddens, 1991b, p. 92). The concept originates with psychiatrist Laing (2001), whose study of schizophrenia distinguished individuals with a secure sense of self from those in ontological insecurity, beset by fears of engulfment, implosion, or petrification into objecthood. Such a person, in Giddens's gloss, may be "existentially unsure about whether he or she is several selves, or whether others really exist," and thus "entirely incapable of inhabiting the same social universe as other human beings" (Giddens, 1991b, p. 93). Although Laing focused on individual pathology, later scholars found that the same dynamics of identity anxiety and self-protective routine operate at collective levels.

Giddens (1991a, 1991b) sociologizes the concept, arguing that modern societies and institutions develop routines to maintain collective ontological security against rapid change and uncertainty. International Relations scholars built on this insight to analyze state behavior and collective identity dynamics (e.g., Kinnvall, 2004, 2014; Kinnvall & Mitzen, 2020; Steele, 2008; Steele & Subotić, 2024). One strand of this work secures the state; another secures collective identities, nations, religious and ethnic groups, diasporas, tracing how such a group holds together when an outsider seems to threaten it. Either way, what is secured is a collective's sense of self, and a host community remade by tourism, bound to a place and smaller than a nation, is a collective of that kind. Groups prioritize identity stability alongside, and sometimes over, physical security, holding to the routines that keep their biographical narrative consistent (Mitzen, 2006). For a host community, this means tourism policy has to sustain not just economic benefit but a coherent sense of who the community is and how it stands toward outsiders. When identity or honor is threatened, a group may act in ways that look counterproductive by a physical-security measure yet preserve a coherent self-narrative (Steele, 2008; Steele & Subotić, 2024), which is why a community may refuse profitable development that unsettles its sense of self.

For host communities, the decisive point is that this anxiety is relational and, at first, objectless. Identity stability depends not only on internal coherence but on stable relationships and predictable surroundings, so when tourism introduces unfamiliar conduct, demographic change, and disrupted routines, it threatens the biographical continuity a community requires (Kinnvall, 2004; Kinnvall & Mitzen, 2020). Rapid change generates a diffuse unease rather than fear of a specific threat, and its resolution is not given in advance. It can open space for the creative reimagining of community identity, or it can harden into rigid boundaries that cast outsiders as existential threats, the path Kinnvall and Mitzen (2020) call the securitization of subjectivity, in which the world is simplified into us and them. Which path a community takes depends on the narratives, routines, and expertise that mediate its response (Steele & Subotić, 2024). This research terms the second path a "threat script." Through the politics of fear, a community converts diffuse anxiety into an identifiable object it can target through collective action, typically by scapegoating, which directs blame toward visible foreigners, and abjection, which frames a group as incompatible with community values (Kinnvall, 2014; Kinnvall & Nesbitt-Larking, 2011). When it then demands state intervention to protect identity rather than physical security, it reframes tourism management as existential rather than economic.

Threat scripts gain traction by drawing on historical memories and chosen traumas, binding present anxieties to past loss or violation (Volkan, 2001). They resonate by tapping fears of cultural dissolution and the loss of control over sacred space, and they offer simple explanations for complex change through the actions of identifiable outsiders. Because communities transmit chosen traumas across generations and weave them into group identity (Volkan, 2001), these scripts enable mobilization by supplying clear targets, through protest, policy demand, or exclusion. Once established, they transform a tourist demographic from an economic asset into a security problem, so that a community may reject profitable tourism that threatens who it is.

These insights inform a relational framework in which external pressures—rapid demographic change, deepening tourism dependence, migration flows—meet internal vulnerabilities such as cultural fragility under rapid modernization, unevenly distributed benefits, and historical memory. Where those pressures exceed a community's adaptive capacity, ontological insecurity hardens into threat scripts and their political outcomes: resistance movements, demands for restrictive regulation, exclusionary practices, and media narratives of visitor danger. Resistance, on this account, emerges not from any single variable but from the interaction of cultural, economic, political, and identity factors.

This framework contributes a mechanism, not a new label. Communities facing rapid transformation experience a diffuse, objectless anxiety that the politics of fear resolves by fixing on a visible outsider, converting anxiety into fear through scapegoating and abjection, and thereby securitizing identity. This insight points toward what this study calls "ontological carrying capacity," a heuristic that names the limit this mechanism reveals and shifts overtourism analysis from the quantity of visitors to the quality of host community experience. The phrase deliberately borrows the vocabulary of carrying capacity, against its grain. Technical carrying capacity rests on a logic of accumulation, in which physical,

ecological, and infrastructural systems degrade as visitor numbers rise toward a measurable ceiling (Butler, 1980). Even overtourism research warns that visitor numbers capture the problem poorly and that the phenomenon is multidimensional rather than a simple function of volume (Koens et al., 2018). Ontological carrying capacity still follows a different logic. A community's sense of identity continuity is not depleted gradually by volume but ruptured qualitatively by events that carry symbolic weight. A single act of desecration at a sacred site can breach it, while large numbers of unobtrusive visitors may not. The concept does not extend the carrying-capacity paradigm. It exposes the assumption beneath it, that the harm of tourism scales with its quantity.

Read this way, the puzzle of the Bali case becomes its strongest evidence. Russian visitors constituted roughly 2.56 percent of arrivals in 2024 (See Figure 1), a figure any volume-based model would treat as negligible, yet they generated sustained political mobilization. This disproportion between numerical share and political reaction is not an anomaly to be explained away. It is what ontological carrying capacity anticipates, because the limit at stake is symbolic and relational rather than numerical.

Because the limit is experiential, ontological carrying capacity functions as a sensitizing device rather than a measurable variable, and this study uses it in that sense throughout. It directs attention to three dimensions through which communities register identity disruption. Biographical discontinuity emerges when tourism transforms familiar landscapes, routines, and social relationships to the point that residents come to experience the transformation of their surroundings as a loss of cultural and social meaning, rather than merely an economic trade-off (Chong, 2020). Symbolic transgression turns on visitor conduct that violates the sites, practices, and norms that anchor a community's ontological security. Sacred places and ritual routines function as a protective cocoon, sustaining the taken-for-granted continuity of collective identity (Giddens, 1991a, p. 3), so their violation registers not as discrete damage but as an assault on the ground of being. The reaction draws further force from chosen trauma, the shared representation through which a group binds a present violation to remembered histories of threat to its identity and reactivates that representation when it feels under siege (Volkan, 2001). For this reason, the anger and disgust such acts provoke exceed any material harm they cause. Boundary dissolution sets in as the distinction between temporary visitors and permanent residents blurs and the community loses its grip on who belongs. These dimensions interact. Sustained visitor presence normalizes spatial disorder, so that individual transgressions, once they occur, carry amplified meaning; settlement then compounds both by dissolving the line between visitor and resident.

Specifying these dimensions distinguishes ontological carrying capacity from adjacent concepts. Research on residents' perceptions, dominated since the 1970s by social exchange theory, explains host attitudes as the outcome of how residents weigh tourism's benefits and costs (Scalabrini & Remoaldo, 2022). In its attitude-change variant, rapid growth and overcrowding erode satisfaction and tip communities toward anti-tourism sentiment (Kuščer & Mihalič, 2019; Martins, 2018); in its economic variant, resistance follows the material costs tourism imposes, with the most exposed residents rejecting it most strongly (Martins, 2018). Both logics are cumulative and rational, and neither fits cases in which a small, economically

marginal group provoked an outsized reaction. The carrying-capacity family shares the difficulty: social and cultural carrying capacity and the resident-irritation tradition extend the threshold idea to community tolerance (Scalabrini & Remoaldo, 2022), but both remain logics of volume and cannot explain a reaction to a negligible group. Community-resilience work shows hosts bearing costs without return (Cheer et al., 2019), and tourismphobia names the resulting hostility without specifying its source (Veríssimo et al., 2020). Ontological carrying capacity supplies that source, locating resistance in a community's biographical and relational continuity rather than in physical load, mood, or cost-benefit balance. The distinction matters most for social license (Baumber et al., 2021; Williams et al., 2007): an ontological account explains why it can collapse even when returns stay substantial, and the visitor share stays small, a failure the analysis returns to below.

Two qualifications keep the concept from overreaching. A host community is not a single subject with one identity threshold; *adat* authorities, tourism workers, younger residents, and officials weigh these disruptions differently, so the framework treats ontological carrying capacity as plural and contested rather than uniform. Moreover, the limit does not announce itself. It becomes politically consequential only when actors name it, dramatize it, and attach it to identifiable others. Ontological carrying capacity is therefore better understood as a discursive achievement than an objective property of a place, activated by narrative entrepreneurs whose framings turn diffuse unease into shared threat, which this study examines directly in the discourse of Ni Luh Djelantik.

Treating the limit as experiential and discursively activated does not make it arbitrary. The framework suggests conditions under which it is more readily reached, offered for testing rather than as findings. The more a domain is sacralized or central to collective self-understanding, the less conduct is required to register as a breach, which is why desecration at religious sites provokes reactions out of proportion to material harm. The more the boundary between visitor and resident blurs, through settlement, informal work, and permissive visas, the more readily ordinary friction reads as boundary dissolution. A breach becomes politically consequential only when a narrative entrepreneur consolidates diffuse unease into a shared threat script, so mobilization tracks the availability of such actors rather than the volume of incidents. The weaker the local capacity to regulate conduct, the more a community turns to securitized rather than administrative remedies. In Bali, these conditions operate together, and disentangling their weight requires comparative research.

As a preliminary contribution, the concept invites further development and testing. Its purpose here is to direct sustainable tourism governance beyond infrastructure and environmental limits toward the conditions under which communities experiencing existential threats to collective self-understanding resist tourism regardless of economic benefit.

Research Method

This research is a single qualitative case study, and it aims to build theory rather than test it. Using narrative and discourse analysis, it traces how ontological insecurity takes shape and travels through Balinese responses to the conduct of Russian visitors, and it treats Bali as a case from which a wider account of tourism and identity conflict in Southeast Asia might be developed. Narrative analysis serves this purpose because it treats politics and meaning as co-constructed in the telling, so that accounts of groups and their relations become places where a shared cultural script meets one person's sense-making (Hammack & Pilecki, 2014). Following Kinnvall (2014), the analysis reads discourse and recurring stories for the marks of ontological security at work, attending to how a community builds a coherent account of threat from the cultural scripts available to it about tourism and the sacred order that foreign conduct is said to endanger.

The corpus is a body of secondary text covering 2019 through March 2025, spanning tourism before the pandemic, the war in Ukraine and its recovery, and the situation at the time of writing. It holds twenty-five items. At its center is the sustained interview discourse of Ni Luh Djelantik, above all her long appearance on Deddy Corbuzier's Close the Door podcast, which provides the narrative elaboration that short quotations cannot. News reporting supplies twenty-one items, eighteen from national and Balinese outlets (Kompas, ANTARA, CNN Indonesia, Detik, Balipost, and NusaBali) and three international ones (ABC News, Foreign Policy, and The Jakarta Post). The rest are the immigration directorate's notice establishing the Bali Becik task force, the regional tourism strategic plan, and the Central Statistics Agency's record of foreign arrivals by nationality, the basis for Figure 1. Indonesian sources provide the main record of community and official talk, while English sources add corroboration and an external vantage point. The authors translated the Indonesian quotations.

Ni Luh Djelantik is a Balinese footwear designer whose handmade shoe label, made in Canggu and sold internationally, bears her name (Bali Politika, 2025). Over the past decade, she has become one of Bali's more visible social activists, outspoken against unruly tourism and unchecked development, and she runs Lapor Niluh, a channel through which residents report foreign visitors' misconduct. Her reach is not only online. In the 2024 election, she won one of Bali's four seats in the Regional Representative Council (DPD), taking 377,152 votes to finish third among the winners and as the only woman elected for the province (Bali Politika, 2025; Maolan, 2024). The vote shows her public voice reaches a broad Balinese audience, which is why her discourse warrants close reading. It does not show that her account is the community's settled view, and this study makes no such claim, since her mandate rested on a wide platform and the ballot was not a referendum on the threat script.

For the same reason, the analysis treats her as a narrative entrepreneur rather than as a representative sample of Balinese opinion, and narrative analysis does not ask otherwise. The approach is interpretive and inductive, concerned with what language does, how it justifies or blames, and how it works to legitimize collective action, rather than with generalizing from a set of texts by counting them (Hammack & Pilecki, 2014). What matters is the story and the

work it does, not whether the teller is demographically typical. Read in these terms, Djelantik is a personal narrative engaging a master narrative, the cultural script about Balinese identity and its outsiders that already circulates in the mass media (Hammack & Pilecki, 2014), and so the analysis sets her discourse against the news coverage rather than against a panel of residents assembled for balance. The community dimension enters through that shared script, which she draws on and reworks, not through a tally of who agrees with her.

To keep one prominent voice from standing in for a whole community, the analysis reads Djelantik's discourse alongside other positions: provincial officials, the police and immigration authorities, the people behind community petitions, and Russian residents who criticize their own compatriots, together with news coverage of both the community response and the policy that followed. This traces how a narrative of insecurity moves across social locations instead of resting on any single account. Narrative analysis also specifies where corroboration has to come from. Stories are not inert texts; they are enacted in practice and carried in movements of collective action (Hammack & Pilecki, 2014). A claim that Djelantik's account was taken up, therefore, calls for evidence of enactment rather than more of her words, which is why the analysis follows the narrative into reporting on her platform, the petitions against the Ubud development, and the monitoring of foreign conduct that customary-village officers came to carry out.

Coding was done in MAXQDA and moved abductively between concepts from ontological security theory and categories that surfaced in the material. The hierarchical code system began with emergent Key Issues codes capturing observable phenomena—immigration violations, traffic offenses, disrespect toward custom, weak regulation, Russian settlement, pandemic effects—which theory-derived codes then sorted into external dimensions (political and security threats, socioeconomic pressure, cultural change), internal dimensions (identity construction, ideas of home, emotional response, abjection, the securitization of subjectivity, chosen trauma), and a range of community responses from resistance to accommodation. Following Hammack and Pilecki (2014), the coding held together two things easily separated: the thematic content of what the stories say about identity under threat, and the narrative form that casts Russian visitors as antagonists to a Balinese protagonist. Reading content and form together shows how separate incidents were framed as an existential threat rather than left as isolated misconduct.

The research seeks interpretive generalization, so its credibility depends on what a reader can check; intercoder reliability, a measure suited to statistical claims, does not apply. The coding frame is reported above so the move from data to reading is visible, and the several kinds of sources are set against one another so that no single account carries the argument. The analysis also looked for disconfirming material, accommodationist responses, and dissenting voices that a resistance-focused reading can overlook. Throughout, observable events are presented alongside the discourse that made sense of them, keeping the claims about identity threat tied to statements and incidents that can be cited.

Studying public talk about a group defined by nationality carries a risk that the analysis reproduces the very threat narrative it means to examine. The study guards against this by

taking "the Russian tourist" as a discursive construct, not an analytic fact. It asks how that category is constructed and put to political use, and it keeps the conduct of particular people apart from the collective attributions built on that conduct. Nor does it endorse the demands for exclusion that it documents. The aim is to explain how a community comes to see and frame a group as a threat.

The reporting of findings keeps empirical and interpretive material within a single structure, organized by the three dimensions of ontological carrying capacity, so that, for each dimension, the observable phenomena are read alongside the discourse through which the community gives them meaning. The design has limits worth stating. Leaning on public discourse privileges those with access to media and institutional platforms, and it cannot capture the full range of Balinese views, including residents who welcome the Russian presence for the income it brings or who reject the exclusionary framing outright. The corpus tilts toward elite and semi-elite voices rather than ordinary residents, and ethnographic interviews would better capture grassroots meaning-making. A focus on narratives of resistance may also understate the quieter accommodation that draws less coverage. These limits constrain what can be claimed here and point to the need for fieldwork to test the framework further.

Analysis

The empirical material is organized around the three dimensions of ontological carrying capacity, drawing on Ni Luh Djelantik's public discourse and contemporaneous media coverage. After setting out the scale of post-pandemic tourism and the changing character of Russian presence, the analysis takes each dimension in turn, biographical discontinuity, symbolic transgression, boundary dissolution, and traces how they converge into the threat scripts that drive mobilization and state response.

Overtourism and the Transformation of Russian Tourist Presence

Bali's post-pandemic tourism recovery has been dramatic. According to data from Indonesia's Central Statistics Agency (BPS Provinsi Bali, 2025a), the island received 2.16 million international visitors in 2022, rising to 5.27 million in 2023 and 6.33 million in 2024, an increase of 193 percent across the period. This growth has brought overtourism and a widely reported decline in residents' quality of life (Suriyani, 2023). These pressures sit uneasily with Tri Hita Karana, the Balinese Hindu philosophy of harmonious balance among people, nature, and the divine.




Figure 1. International Visitor Arrivals by Country 2022-2024

Source: BPS Provinsi Bali (2025a, 2025c)

Within this recovery, Russian visitors form a small but conspicuous demographic. Arrivals grew from 57,860 in 2022 to 144,104 in 2023, a 149 percent rise, before moderating to 162,097 in 2024 (BPS Provinsi Bali, 2025a). Although Russians made up only 2.56 percent of total arrivals in 2024 (Figure 1), their prominence in public discourse reflects the character of their presence, not its scale. Once seen as high-end visitors on charter flights (Ginaya, 2023; Sandi, 2023), they are now described in public and official discourse as behaving more like migrants than tourists. Djelantik captures the shift, calling the new arrivals not tourists but "blonde refugees … wrapped in neat clothes, looking fancy" (Corbuzier, 2024). This shift from temporary visitation to quasi-permanent settlement is what the three dimensions below trace into ontological insecurity.

Biographical Discontinuity: Disorder and Alienation in a Transformed Environment

The first dimension of ontological carrying capacity registers when the environment that anchors a community's sense of continuity becomes unrecognizable. Biographical discontinuity does not require any single dramatic event. It accumulates as the routines, landscapes, and relationships through which residents know themselves are steadily reorganized, until the familiar world feels alien. In Bali, this rupture is both material and temporal.

Materially, the post-pandemic surge has remade everyday space. Alongside congestion in Seminyak, Kuta, Canggu, and Ubud and waste systems overwhelmed by visitor volume, roughly 3,100 hectares of rice fields are slated for conversion to tourism development, eroding the agrarian landscape that Tri Hita Karana ties to Balinese identity (Marta, 2024). The disorder is also embodied in everyday risk: accounts of unlicensed foreign riders, frequently identified as Russian, in fatal accidents circulate widely, and the meaning residents attach to them exceeds their statistical frequency. Corbuzier marks the rupture temporally, recalling that across five decades he had never expected to see a foreign visitor crash into a truck on Balinese roads (Corbuzier, 2024), and police report that complaints about foreign misconduct overwhelmingly concern visitors who behave as though local law does not apply to them (Jati, 2023). Traffic disorder matters here not only as a safety problem but as evidence that the predictable rhythms of local life have come undone.

The rupture is sharpest when residents set the present against the past. Djelantik condenses the sense of displacement into the claim that Balinese have become "refugees in our own home," strangers in landscapes that once provided ontological security, insisting that no earlier era, not the hippie period or the pandemic, compares to the present (Corbuzier, 2024). This is the work of a chosen trauma, a narrative measuring a degraded present against an idealized past. Her image of theft makes it concrete: an earlier Bali left motorcycles unlocked, whereas now "even the milk is stolen" (Corbuzier, 2024), a detail that matters less as a record of crime than as a measure of lost trust. Taken together, the transformed landscape, the disorder of everyday movement, and the narrated contrast between past and present constitute biographical discontinuity, the condition in which a community can no longer recognize itself in its own place.

Symbolic Transgression: Desecration and Disproportionate Response

The second dimension turns on the violation of the spaces and norms through which a community holds its identity together. Here the limit breaks at once rather than wearing down. A single act can breach it, because what is at stake is sacred and identity-constitutive, not a matter of quantity. In Bali, the most charged transgressions occur at religious sites. Reported incidents include nude photography at Hindu temples, pornographic filming at Mount Batur, and disrespect toward pelinggih, the shrines through which Balinese Hindus order sacred space (Mardiastuti, 2019; Sepriyossa, 2021). Read through the framework, such desecration strikes the protective cocoon of routine and sacred order on which ontological security rests, reactivating a narrative that binds the present affront to a longer history of threats to Balinese Hindu identity (Volkan, 2001).

The community response confirms the symbolic stakes. Media coverage portrays reactions of intense anger and disgust, emotions whose force exceeds anything the material harm would warrant (Astajaya, 2019; Jati, 2023; Mardiastuti, 2019). This disproportion marks symbolic transgression. When an act is read as an attack on collective identity, the reaction tracks the meaning of the violation rather than its physical cost.

Media circulation is part of the mechanism. Isolated incidents do not remain isolated. As images and accounts spread rapidly across social platforms, particular acts are detached from their local context and recirculated as representative instances of how foreign visitors treat sacred Balinese space (Mardiastuti, 2019; Sepriyossa, 2021). Through this amplification, a handful of episodes are consolidated into a collective representation of threat, so that the transgression attributed to a few comes to stand for the conduct of a category. Symbolic transgression thus operates by converting discrete provocations, through emotional intensity and media repetition, into a shared sense that the community's sacred order is under attack.

Boundary Dissolution: When Visitors Become Settlers

The third dimension emerges when the distinction between temporary visitors and permanent residents becomes blurred, undermining a community's capacity to define who belongs. The most visible sign is spatial. The growth of Kampung Rusia, or New Moscow, in Canggu, Seminyak, and Ubud has produced enclaves marked by Russian-language dominance, Cyrillic signage, and patterns of settlement rather than visitation (Ginta & Hartik, 2024; Herin & Setianto, 2025; The Jakarta Post, 2025). When a visitor population builds a parallel social world inside the host society, the boundary that distinguishes guest from resident begins to dissolve.

Economic conduct compounds the blurring. News reports document cases of Russian nationals running businesses without valid permits, including rentals, tour guiding, surfing instruction, and restaurants. In one recorded case, a surfing instructor on a Visa on Arrival admitted continuing to work after paying bribes for protection (Syahrianto, 2023). A large development in Ubud reportedly assembles roughly a hundred residences, shops, restaurants, and leisure venues into a self-contained Russian quarter (Blau, 2024), while digital nomads operate unlicensed villa rentals through online platforms (Redaksi Merdeka, 2023). Djelantik frames the pattern as exploitation, charging that Russian nationals used Bali's fragile post-pandemic recovery to acquire cheap housing and land and to position themselves as landlords (Corbuzier, 2024). Read through the framework, the resentment this provokes is not simply economic. It arises because visitors have stepped into the economic roles of residents, occupying a position that the boundary was supposed to reserve for locals. This tension predates the Russian case. The 2021 dispute over Kristen Gray, an American digital nomad deported for working on a tourist visa, divided opinion along the same line, with Indonesian commentators insisting that Bali is a place to visit rather than to settle and foreign users pressing for it to be opened to nomadic residence (Bahri & Widhyharto, 2021).

Faced with this dissolution, residents engage in boundary work to restore the distinction. Djelantik demands intensified state presence in the enclaves, calling for an immigration branch office and a police subsector to monitor Kampung Rusia. She insists that visitors remain visitors, arguing that those who take side work as models, cooks, or instructors must pass through a different channel and can no longer claim the status of tourist (Corbuzier, 2024). This is the securitization of subjectivity, the reinforcement of strict insider and outsider categories in order to recover ontological security (Kinnvall, 2004, 2014). At its limit, the process tips into abjection, in which Russian visitors are cast as fundamentally incompatible

with the social order. The abject status is recognized even from within the Russian community, where one Moscow native quoted in the foreign press described many compatriots as "savages" who speak no English and behave as though, wherever they are, they are not guests (Rachman, 2023). Djelantik gives this its most absolute form, calling for permanent exclusion and a lifelong blacklist on the grounds that Indonesia is the only place Balinese have to be born, live, and die (Corbuzier, 2024). Boundary dissolution, then, is met by an attempt to redraw the boundary by force of category, separating those who belong from those who must be kept outside.

From Threat Scripts to Collective Mobilization

The three dimensions do not remain interpretive. Together, they generate threat scripts that translate into organized action. At the community level, customary institutions have themselves been drawn into policing foreign conduct, which rarely fell to them across earlier decades of tourism. Pecalang and prajuru, the security and governing officers of a customary village (*desa adat*), have acted on their own authority, for example, when officers in Sukawati detained two foreign visitors who ignored the Nyepi closure and handed them over to the police (C. Y. M Putra, 2023). Djelantik's Lapor Niluh platform channels diffuse frustration into systematic reporting of violations by foreign visitors, and civil society petitions against Russian-backed development in Ubud show the same mobilization from below (Blau, 2024). These are coordinated efforts to reclaim control over space and protect collective identity. The escalation reached the national legislature, where members of the House of Representatives pressed the director general of immigration to investigate the emergence of Kampung Rusia and to verify foreigners' residence permits and work status, while acknowledging the dilemma that prevention was difficult amid the post-pandemic drive to expand tourism (Hafiez, 2023).

The state has responded in kind, which indicates that community insecurity can redirect governance priorities. In 2023, the governor of Bali formally proposed revoking Visa on Arrival privileges for Russian and Ukrainian nationals, citing concerns that many had entered to work illegally rather than for tourism (CNN Indonesia, 2023; Nampu, 2023). Enforcement followed through Operation Bali Becik, an immigration task force conducting routine raids on visa and residence violations (Direktorat Jenderal Imigrasi Republik Indonesia, 2023; Chandra, 2025), and through the Tourism Governance Acceleration Task Force established by Governor Decree No. 370/03-L/HK/2023, which joined government agencies, industry, and customary communities to monitor foreign conduct and enforce licensing and sociocultural norms (Dwija, 2023). The provincial office of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights went further, mandating *desa adat* heads to monitor foreign visitors and to act against those who break local law and custom, thereby placing customary institutions within the enforcement chain (Xinhua, 2024)**.** Enforcement reached the level of permanent closure when the Gianyar authorities shut PARQ Ubud for building on protected rice fields without valid permits, in violation of Regional Regulations No. 15/2015 and No. 2/2022 (Lazuardi, 2025; I. W. A. M. Putra, 2025). Alongside repeated deportations and long-term blacklists, these measures

channel community grievances into formal enforcement, although they have emerged reactively rather than as part of any preventive strategy.

Bali's immigration offices removed more foreign nationals each year during this period, and the annual figures should be read with caution. They deported 188 in 2022 and 198 in the first seven months of 2023 alone, already more than the whole of the previous year, and Russians were the largest group among them, 56 by that point, ahead of Americans and Britons, with overstaying and unlicensed work the usual grounds (Siahaan, 2023). Removals reached about 335 for 2023 and climbed to 412 by late September 2024 (Admin Kemenkum Bali, 2024). The makeup of the 2024 figure looked different: the largest single group was Taiwanese, with 90 detained in a July operation against a cybercrime ring, with Russians among the next largest groups, alongside Chinese, Filipino, and Ukrainian nationals (Dialeksis, 2024). By early 2025, the focus had shifted again to foreign-owned companies whose business licenses had been revoked, in which Chinese and Russian nationals predominated (Wiguna, 2025).

Taken together, these measures signal a shift in public discourse, which now frames Russian visitors as a security problem warranting state intervention, whereas it once saw them as an economic opportunity. At that point tourism's social license deteriorates, and economic contribution no longer justifies tolerating identity disruption, spatial displacement, and desecration. This is ontological carrying capacity reached in practice. A demographic that accounted for only 2.56 percent of arrivals provoked sustained mobilization because biographical discontinuity, symbolic transgression, and boundary dissolution converged on the community's sense of continuity. The reaction came as a tipping point, and volume-based governance, which watches for slowly accumulating stress, had no way to anticipate it.

Ontological Carrying Capacity in Comparative and Critical Perspective

The Balinese trajectory clarifies how ontological carrying capacity differs from the developmental models that dominate tourism studies. Unlike Butler's (1980) tourism area life cycle, which charts a destination's evolution as a function of visitor numbers, ontological carrying capacity is not a stage that arrives with volume but a relational limit that symbolic transgression can breach at any point. Bali had absorbed mass tourism for decades without the mobilization Russian visitors provoked; the reaction tracked symbolically charged episodes—sacred-site desecration, enclave formation, informal economic competition—not a rising curve of arrivals.

This pattern also shows social license failing along ontological rather than economic lines. Russian visitors and residents contributed materially to the local economy through spending, rents, and business activity, yet that contribution did not secure their acceptance. The withdrawal of social license followed the perception that their presence unsettled what the community understood itself to be, not a judgment that they were unprofitable. An account built on costs and benefits cannot explain why a profitable group lost standing. In contrast, an ontological account locates the loss precisely where the community experienced it, in the erosion of biographical and relational continuity.

Locating the reaction in symbolic and relational terms does not detach it from material conditions. Ontological insecurity in Bali grew out of concrete political-economic transformations: the conversion of agricultural land into tourist and residential development, speculative pressure on property, deepening dependence on tourism revenue, and the shift from short-stay visitation toward lifestyle migration and digital-nomad settlement under permissive visa arrangements (Wardana, 2020; Wibowo, 2024). These did more than impose costs without commensurate return, a dynamic community-resilience research documents elsewhere (Cheer et al., 2019). They reorganized everyday space so that symbolic transgressions became legible as existential threats. Enclave formation and the blurring of the visitor-resident boundary are at once economic facts and ontological provocations. The framework thus does not displace political economy but specifies how material change becomes an identity threat, by disrupting the routines and spatial orders on which ontological security depends.

Seeing the reaction this way reframes what the threat script accomplishes. These structural transformations generate a diffuse and largely objectless anxiety, since none of them presents a single agent that a community can confront. The politics of fear resolves this anxiety by giving it an address (Kinnvall & Mitzen, 2020). In Bali, the Russian tourist supplies this function. Visible, foreign, and concentrated in the very enclaves where these transformations are most legible, the Russian tourist becomes the container onto which an insecurity rooted in structural and largely faceless sources is displaced and condensed. This displacement, more than the conduct of any individual visitor, helps explain how a small and economically useful group could attract blame so far in excess of its numbers. Reading the threat script this way does not deny that transgressions occurred, but it locates their political force in the work the Russian figure performs for the community rather than in the figure itself.

Reading this mobilization as ontological security-seeking is not the same as endorsing it. The process that restores one community's sense of self produces exclusion, stereotyping, and collective blame for another, converting diffuse anxiety into an identifiable other through scapegoating and abjection (Kinnvall, 2014; Kinnvall & Nesbitt-Larking, 2011). Three cautions follow. The threat script attributes the conduct of particular individuals to a national category, which this study treats as a discursive construction, not as evidence that Russian visitors are a uniform source of disorder. The encounter is not one-sided: Russian residents themselves seek home, routine, and continuity, and some draw their own internal boundaries, as when one distinguishes ordinary migrants from compatriots he calls savages (Rachman, 2023). Moreover, the framework keeps in view whose security is secured, against whom, and who is empowered to name the limit, since one community's recovery of continuity is achieved here through the exclusion of another. The concept is meant to make identity insecurity legible, not to give governance a sharper instrument for pre-empting it, since an early-warning logic that monitors host sentiment could refine exclusion as readily as prevent harm. Recognizing ontological carrying capacity as a driver of resistance therefore requires a critical stance toward its political effects.

Conclusion

When tourism disrupts a community's biographical continuity, spatial control, and collective self-understanding, host populations mobilize to defend identity regardless of the economic benefits visitors bring. Russian visitors made up a small share of arrivals. Yet, the character of their presence, not its volume, determined whether the community read tourism as a manageable activity or an existential threat.

The research's principal contribution is to specify a mechanism. By extending ontological security theory from the state to the host community, it shows how communities convert diffuse anxiety into fear of a particular group through scapegoating and abjection, and it names the limit this reveals, ontological carrying capacity, a heuristic that explains resistance volume-based and economic models leave unexplained. Three dimensions register the breach—biographical discontinuity, symbolic transgression, and boundary dissolution—which together signal that tourism has ruptured a community's identity continuity. As a preliminary contribution, the concept invites further testing of whether the three dimensions travel across tourism contexts, how cultural and political factors shape their sensitivity, and whether governance can address identity insecurity before it hardens into crisis.

These findings carry implications for tourism governance across Southeast Asia. The ASEAN Tourism Strategic Plan 2016–2025 asks member states to align local practice with a regional standard of quality tourism, yet ontological insecurity is generated and managed at the local and sub-national scale, in the banjar, adat institutions, and provincial governments that absorb the daily friction of visitor presence. The result is a governance gap: the frameworks that drive regional inflows operate at the scale least able to register when those inflows breach a community's ontological carrying capacity.

The deeper limitation is that ASEAN's instruments are economic and environmental and offer no equivalent for the symbolic and relational harms documented here. A region that monitors arrivals, receipts, and ecological load has no comparable mechanism for the identity insecurity that can turn a profitable visitor stream into a political crisis. The conditions that produced the Balinese reaction, including rapid post-pandemic recovery, lifestyle migration, and enclave formation, recur across the region's major destinations even where research on the Maya Bay closure has framed such episodes mainly in terms of visitor volume and environmental strain. Through ontological carrying capacity, Bali becomes a theory-building case whose logic may anticipate comparable tensions elsewhere. The practical implication is a shift from reactive to anticipatory governance, in which regional and national policy monitors the symbolic and relational conditions of host communities alongside conventional capacity metrics and folds identity-security considerations into visa, land-use, and destination-management decisions before communities mobilize to restore continuity through exclusionary means. Such monitoring carries its own danger, since instruments that anticipate identity insecurity can be turned toward pre-emptive exclusion rather than protection, and they therefore require safeguards against the securitization of host and guest relations.

Acknowledgement

This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

About The Authors

Disalula Acila Yeda is an International Relations graduate of Universitas Paramadina and a research assistant at the Paramadina Southeast Asia Peace and Diplomacy Lab. She has assisted Benni Hasbiyalloh and Shiskha Prabawaningtyas on various projects, including International Labour Organization research on labor disputes in Indonesian fisheries (2024). Her research interests include sociopolitical issues, tourism studies, and cultural identity.

Benni Hasbiyalloh is a lecturer and researcher in the Department of International Relations at Universitas Paramadina, Jakarta. His research covers labor migration, fisheries labor rights, trafficking and forced labor, and Southeast Asian affairs. Drawing on policy analysis and qualitative methods, his publications and commissioned research address labor governance, migration, and regional affairs.

Putu Ratih Kumala Dewi is a lecturer and researcher in the International Relations Study Program at Universitas Udayana, Bali. She holds a master's degree in International Relations from Universitas Airlangga and specializes in international diplomacy, fair trade, social movements, and cultural studies. Her research examines local-global dynamics, including Indonesian cultural diplomacy and sustainable trade practices for local industries.

Shiskha Prabawaningtyas is an assistant professor at the Paramadina Graduate School of Diplomacy, Universitas Paramadina. She received her doctorate from the Institute of Asian and African Studies at Humboldt University of Berlin. Her research covers borders and boundaries, identity and security, diplomacy and foreign policy, and conflict resolution, and she is developing a transdisciplinary value-chain approach to conflict transformation.

References

Adams, K. M., & Sanchez, P. M. (2020). Tourism as industry and field of study: Using research and education to address overtourism. In K. M. Adams, & P. M. Sanchez (Eds.), *Overtourism and tourism education* (pp. 43–59). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003031765-5

ADB. (2024). *ASEAN–Republic of Korea tourism cooperation: Fostering people-to-people connectivity*. Asian Development Bank. https://doi.org/10.22617/SPR240584-2

Admin Kemenkum Bali. (2024, September 26). *Tidak ada toleransi, Imigrasi Bali tindak tegas pelanggaran izin tinggal WNA*. Kementrian Hukum kantor Wilayah Bali. https://bali.kemenkum.go.id/berita-utama/tidak-ada-toleransi-imigrasi-bali-tindak-tegas-pelanggaran-izin-tinggal-wna

ASEAN Secretariat. (2025). A*SEAN tourism strategic plan 2016–2025*. ASEAN Secretariat. https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/ATSP-2016-2025.pdf

ASEANstats. (2023). *ASEAN Visitor Arrivals Dashboard 2023*. https://data.aseanstats.org/dashboard/tourism (Data Berjalan)

Astajaya, M. (2019, October 8). *Kehabisan uang, turis Rusia ngamuk di Ubud*. Bali Post. https://www.balipost.com/news/2019/10/08/89390/Kehabisan-Uang,Turis-Rusia-Ngamuk.html

Bahri, M. T., & Widhyharto, D. S. (2021). Social network analysis (SNA) on #Kristengray hashtag: Understanding gentrification side effects behind the digital nomad phenomenon. *Jurnal Studi Pemuda*, *10*(1), 75–92. https://doi.org/10.22146/studipemudaugm.65255

Bali Politika. (2025, January 27). *Profil NiLuh Djelantik, desainer sepatu hingga melenggang ke DPD*. Balipolitika.Com. https://balipolitika.com/2025/01/27/profil-niluh-djelantik-desainer-sepatu-hingga-melenggang-ke-dpd/

Baumber, A., Schweinsberg, S., Scerri, M., Kaya, E., & Sajib, S. (2021). Sharing begins at home: A social licence framework for home sharing practices. *Annals of Tourism Research*, *91*, 103293. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.annals.2021.103293

Blau, A. (2024, February 10). *A Russian-Backed 'City' is emerging over the back fence of Bali's Eat Pray Love house*. ABC News. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-02-10/ubud-bali-russian-development-hidden-city/103413004

BPS Provinsi Bali. (2025a). *Banyaknya wisatawan mancanegara yang datang langsung ke Bali menurut kebangsaan 2019-2024*. BPS Provinsi Bali. https://bali.bps.go.id/id/statistics-table/1/MTkzIzE=/-banyaknya-wisatawan-mancanegara-yang-datang-langsung-ke-bali-menurut-kebangsaan-2019-2024.html

BPS Provinsi Bali. (2025b). *Jumlah Penduduk (Ribu) Menurut Kelompok Umur dan Jenis Kelamin di Provinsi Bali, 2024*. BPS Provinsi Bali. https://bali.bps.go.id/id/statistics-table/3/WVc0MGEyMXBkVFUxY25KeE9HdDZkbTQzWkVkb1p6MDkjMw==/jumlah-penduduk-menurut-kelompok-umur-dan-jenis-kelamin--ribu-jiwa--di-provinsi-bali--2024.html?year=2024

BPS Provinsi Bali. (2025c). *Statistik wisatawan mancanegara ke Provinsi Bali 2024*. BPS Provinsi Bali.

Butler, R. W. (1980). The concept of a tourist area cycle of evolution: Implications for management of resources. *Canadian Geographer*, *24*(1), 5–12. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-0064.1980.tb00970.x

Chandra, T. (2025, May 24). *23 WNA terjaring operasi Bali Becik*. Nusabali. https://www.nusabali.com/berita/193250/23-wna-terjaring-operasi-bali-becik

Cheer, J. M., Milano, C., & Novelli, M. (2019). Tourism and community resilience in the Anthropocene: Accentuating temporal overtourism. *Journal of Sustainable Tourism*, *27*(4), 554–572. https://doi.org/10.1080/09669582.2019.1578363

Chong, K. L. (2020). The side effects of mass tourism: The voices of Bali Islanders. *Asia Pacific Journal of Tourism Research*, *25*(2), 157–169. https://doi.org/10.1080/10941665.2019.1683591

CNN Indonesia. (2023, March 14). *Imigrasi kaji usulan Gubernur Bali cabut VoA WN Rusia dan Ukraina*. CNN Indonesia.

https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20230313204036-12-924590/imigrasi-kaji-usulan-gubernur-bali-cabut-voa-wn-rusia-dan-ukraina

Corbuzier, D. (2024, June 24). *Kalian tau bule2 itu ngapain di Bali⁉Niluh Djelantik nangis minta maaf untuk masyarakat Indonesia!!* [Video]. YouTube. https://youtu.be/XU2Wo9BpgdQ?si=gXmmo9tCTqRfdFTE

Devi, N. L. P. C., Wiranata, I. M. A., & Asih, G. D. K. (2023). Analisis globalisasi terhadap keamanan negara (Studi kasus: Penyalahgunaan izin tinggal WNA TKA non-prosedural di Bali tahun 2022-2023). *Economic Military and Geographically Business Review*, *1*(1), 38–55. https://doi.org/10.61511/emagrap.v1i1.2023.110

Dialeksis. (2024, September 27). *Bali perketat pengawasan WNA, 412 orang dideportasi selama 2024*. Dialeksis. https://dialeksis.com/pemerintahan/bali-perketat-pengawasan-wna-412-orang-dideportasi-selama-2024/

Direktorat Jenderal Imigrasi Republik Indonesia. (2023, July 22). *Satgas Bali Becik dibentuk, buka nomor hotline pelaporan orang asing*. Direktorat Jenderal Imigrasi Republik Indonesia. http://www.imigrasi.go.id/siaran_pers/2023/07/22/satgas-bali-becik-dibentuk-buka-nomor-hotline-pelaporan-orang-asing?lang=id-ID

Dwija, M. (2023, May 24). *Bali bentuk satgas khusus awasi wisatawan*. Nusabali. https://www.nusabali.com/berita/142379/bali-bentuk-satgas-khusus-awasi-wisatawan

Giddens, A. (1991a). *Modernity and self-identity: Self and society in the late modern age*. Stanford University Press.

Giddens, A. (1991b). *The consequences of modernity*. Polity Press.

Ginaya, G. (2023). *Pergulatan diskursus kepariwisataan dan pasar Rusia di Bali*. Garudhawaca

Ginta, Y. V. S., & Hartik, A. (2024, May 15). *Viral nama New Moscow di peta Canggu Bali, Polisi: Cuma orang iseng*. Kompas. https://denpasar.kompas.com/read/2024/05/15/125326078/viral-nama-new-moscow-di-peta-canggu-bali-polisi-cuma-orang-iseng

Hafiez, F. A. (2023, March 29). *DPR Minta Dirjen Imigrasi bereskan kemunculan kampung Rusia di Bali*. medcom.id. https://www.medcom.id/nasional/politik/9K5D4dak-dpr-minta-dirjen-imigrasi-bereskan-kemunculan-kampung-rusia-di-bali

Hammack, P. L., & Pilecki, A. (2014). Methodological approaches in political psychology: Discourse and narrative. In P. Nesbitt-Larking, C. Kinnvall, T. Capelos, & H. Dekker (Eds), *The Palgrave handbook of global political psychology* (pp. 72–89). Palgrave Macmillan UK. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-29118-9_5

Herin, F. P., & Setianto, A. (2025, January 25). *Menyusuri "Kampung Rusia" Bali, kluster eksklusif yang terbelit alih fungsi lahan*. Kompas. https://www.kompas.id/artikel/menyusuri-kampung-rusia-bali-kluster-eksklusif-yang-terbelit-alih-fungsi-lahan?open_from=Search_Result_Page

Jati, H. (2023, March 20). *Kemarahan warga Bali ke turis Rusia jadi perhatian media barat, soroti ulah buruk mereka*. Kompas. https://www.kompas.tv/internasional/389568/kemarahan-warga-bali-ke-turis-rusia-jadi-perhatian-media-barat-soroti-ulah-buruk-mereka

Kinnvall, C. (2004). Globalization and religious nationalism: Self, Identity, and the search for ontological security. *Political Psychology*, *25*(5), 741–767. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2004.00396.x

Kinnvall, C. (2014). Fear, insecurity and the (re)emergence of the far right in Europe. In P. Nesbitt-Larking, C. Kinnvall, T. Capelos, & H. Dekker (Eds.), *The Palgrave handbook of global political psychology* (pp. 316–335). Palgrave Macmillan UK. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-29118-9_18

Kinnvall, C., & Mitzen, J. (2020). Anxiety, fear, and ontological security in world politics: Thinking with and beyond Giddens. *International Theory*, *12*(2), 240–256. https://doi.org/10.1017/S175297192000010X

Kinnvall, C., & Nesbitt-Larking, P. (2011). *The political psychology of globalization: Muslims in the West*. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199747542.001.0001

Koens, K., Postma, A., & Papp, B. (2018). Is overtourism overused? Understanding the impact of tourism in a city context. *Sustainability*, *10*(12), 4384. https://doi.org/10.3390/su10124384

Koh, E., & Fakfare, P. (2019). Overcoming "over-tourism": The closure of Maya Bay. *International Journal of Tourism Cities*, *6*(2), 279–296. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJTC-02-2019-0023

Kuščer, K., & Mihalič, T. (2019). Residents' attitudes towards overtourism from the perspective of tourism impacts and cooperation—The case of Ljubljana. *Sustainability*, *11*(6), 1823. https://doi.org/10.3390/su11061823

Laing, R. D. (2001). *The divided self: An existential study in sanity and madness*. Routledge.

Lazuardi, A. (2025, January 21). *Pemkab Gianyar tutup 'kampung Rusia' di Ubud karena langgar aturan*. ANTARA. https://bali.antaranews.com/berita/368090/pemkab-gianyar-tutup-kampung-rusia-di-ubud-karena-langgar-aturan

Maolan. (2024, March 9). *Sah! Rai Mantra, AWK, Niluh Djelantik, dan Merta Jiwa peraih suara terbanyak*. Nusabali. https://www.nusabali.com/berita/162897/sah-rai-mantra-awk-niluh-djelantik-dan-merta-jiwa-peraih-suara-terbanyak

Mardiastuti, A. (2019, August 11). *Berbuat Tak Senonoh dengan Air di Pura Bali, Turis Rusia Minta Maaf*. detiknews. https://news.detik.com/berita/d-4661150/berbuat-tak-senonoh-dengan-air-di-pura-bali-turis-rusia-minta-maaf

Marta, M. F. (2024, December 8). *Bali dan paradoks pariwisata: Antara populer dan rentan*. Kompas.id. https://www.kompas.id/artikel/bali-dan-paradoks-pariwisata-antara-populer-dan-rentan

Martín, J. M. M., Guaita Martínez, J. M., & Salinas Fernández, J. A. (2018). An analysis of the factors behind the citizen's attitude of rejection towards tourism in a context of overtourism and economic dependence on this activity. *Sustainability*, *10*(8), 2851. https://doi.org/10.3390/su10082851

Martins, M. (2018). Tourism planning and tourismphobia: An analysis of the strategic tourism plan of Barcelona 2010-2015. *Journal of Tourism, Heritage & Services Marketing*, *4*(1), 3–7. https://doi.org/10.5281/ZENODO.1247519

Mitzen, J. (2006). Ontological security in world politics: State identity and the security dilemma. *European Journal of International Relations*, *12*(3), 341-370. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066106067346

Namberger, P., Jackisch, S., Schmude, J., & Karl, M. (2019). Overcrowding, overtourism and local level disturbance: How much can Munich handle? *Tourism Planning & Development*, *16*(4), 452–472. https://doi.org/10.1080/21568316.2019.1595706

Nampu, R. (2023, March 12). *Gubernur Bali usulkan cabut visa on arrival bagi WN Rusia dan Ukraina*. Antara. https://www.antaranews.com/berita/3437409/gubernur-bali-usulkan-cabut-visa-on-arrival-bagi-wn-rusia-dan-ukraina

Panayiotopoulos, A., & Pisano, C. (2019). Overtourism dystopias and socialist utopias: Towards an urban armature for Dubrovnik. *Tourism Planning & Development*, *16*(4), 393–410. https://doi.org/10.1080/21568316.2019.1569123

Peng, L., Su, J., Zhang, N., & Cui, Y. (2024). Social crowding increases tourists' preference for natural products: The effect of ontological security threat and social connectedness. *Journal of Sustainable Tourism, 33*(12), 2577–2596. https://doi.org/10.1080/09669582.2024.2442628

Purwandani, I., & Pakan, S. P. (2022). Local habitus and temporal overtourism in Yogyakarta. *Consumer Behavior in Tourism and Hospitality*, *17*(4), 544–560. https://doi.org/10.1108/CBTH-07-2021-0177

Putra, C. Y. M. (2023, March 27). *Tegakkan aturan dalam penanganan orang asing di Bali*. Kompas.id. https://www.kompas.id/artikel/tegakkan-aturan-dalam-penertiban-orang-asing

Putra, I. W. A. M. (2025, October 23). *Langgar peraturan daerah, PARQ Ubud resmi ditutup permanen oleh Pemkab Gianyar.* Bali Express. https://baliexpress.jawapos.com/bali/675549819/langgar-peraturan-daerah-parq-ubud-resmi-ditutup-permanen-oleh-pemkab-gianyar

Rachman, J. (2023, March 30). *Russians flock to Bali to avoid war as locals grumble.* Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/30/bali-russia-ukraine-war-indonesia-migration/

Redaksi Merdeka. (2023, March 10). *Terungkapn ya gurita bisnis geng Moscow dan para bule di Bali*. merdeka.com. https://www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/terungkapnya-gurita-bisnis-geng-moscow-dan-para-bule-di-bali.html

Sandi, F. (2023, May 4). *Rusia 'Invasi' Bali, Turis Rusia Jadi Broker Sampai Dokter*. CNBC Indonesia. https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20230504165130-4-434544/rusia-invasi-bali-turis-rusia-jadi-broker-sampai-dokter

Santoso, T., Nurasa, H., Rusli, B., & Sumadinata, R. W. S. (2025). Revisiting sustainable tourism practices in ASEAN member state: A study on the Saba Baduy in Indonesia. *JAS (Journal of ASEAN Studies)*, *13*(1), 35–54. https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v13i1.12880

Scalabrini, E., & Remoaldo, P. (2022). Residents' perception of tourism: A systematic review from 1978 to 2019. *Bulletin of Geography. Socio-Economic Series*, (58), 31–44. https://doi.org/10.12775/bgss-2022-0032

Scott, P. (2023, April 11). *Can the Philippine Island of Boracay beat overtourism?* Nytimes.Com. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/11/travel/boracay-philippines-overtourism.html

Sepriyossa, D. (2021, November 11). *Bali dalam potensi cengkeraman mafia Rusia sebagaimana Pattaya dan Goa?* Jernih.Co. https://jernih.co/potpourri/bali-dalam-potensi-cengkeraman-mafia-rusia-sebagaimana-pattaya-dan-goa/

Siahaan, R. (2023). *198 WNA dideportasi dari Bali pada 2023, Meningkat dibandingkan 2022*. Detik. https://www.detik.com/bali/hukum-dan-kriminal/d-6864423/198-wna-dideportasi-dari-bali-pada-2023-meningkat-dibandingkan-2022

Steele, B. J. (2008). *Ontological security in international relations: Self-identity and the IR state*. Routledge.

Steele, B. J., & Subotić, J. (2024). The ontological security politics of US Naval ship museums. *Journal of Global Security Studies*, *9*(4), ogae045. https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogae045

Sullivan, B. (2024, June 17). *Is Thailand facing an overtourism crisis?* Thailand Business News. https://www.thailand-business-news.com/environment/146424-is-thailand-facing-an-overtourism-crisis

Suriyani, L. D. (2023, June 1). *Bali, ketika pariwisata "di luar kendali" merambah pertanian dan budaya*. Benar News. https://www.benarnews.org/indonesian/berita/dilema-pariwisata-bali-06012023142049.html

Syahrianto, M. (2023, March 7). *Pengakuan bule Rusia di Bali yang 'jajah' pekerjaan warga: Saya paham ilegal, tapi banyak yang melakukan*. Warta Ekonomi. https://wartaekonomi.co.id/read485143/pengakuan-bule-rusia-di-bali-yang-jajah-pekerjaan-warga-saya-paham-ilegal-tapi-banyak-yang-melakukan

Tahir, M., Hendrianto, E., & Abunawas. (2023). Dilematika pertumbuhan pariwisata pasca pandemik dan penertiban hukum untuk imigran di Denpasar Bali. *Empricism Journal*, *4*(2), 394–399. https://doi.org/10.36312/ej.v4i2.1615

The Jakarta Post. (2025, February 7). *Mindful host*. The Jakarta Post. https://www.thejakartapost.com/opinion/2025/02/07/mindful-host.html

Veríssimo, M., Moraes, M., Breda, Z., Guizi, A., & Costa, C. (2020). Overtourism and tourismphobia: A systematic literature review. *Tourism*, *68*(2), 156–169. https://doi.org/10.37741/t.68.2.4

Volkan, V. D. (2001). Transgenerational transmissions and chosen traumas: An aspect of large-group identity. *Group Analysis*, *34*(1), 79–97. https://doi.org/10.1177/05333160122077730

Wardana, A. (2020). Neoliberalizing cultural landscapes: Bali's agrarian heritage. *Critical Asian Studies*, *52*(2), 270–285. https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.2020.1714459

Wibowo, T. O. (2024). Dynamic of migration lifestyle and settlement of nomad in Bali, Indonesia. *Indonesian Journal of Geography*, *56*(2). https://doi.org/10.22146/ijg.90856

Wiguna, D. K. S. (2025, February 21). *Imigrasi jaring 312 WNA di Bali yang dijamin PMA bermasalah*. Antara News. https://www.antaranews.com/berita/4665569/imigrasi-jaring-312-wna-di-bali-yang-dijamin-pma-bermasalah

Williams, P., Gill, A., & Ponsford, I. (2007). Corporate social responsibility at tourism destinations: Toward a social license to operate. *Tourism Review International*, *11*(2), 133–144. https://doi.org/10.3727/154427207783948883

WTTC. (2024, June). *Total Contribution of travel and tourism to the GDP in Southeast Asia from 2015 to 2023, with forecasts for 2023 and 2034 (in Billion U.S. Dollars)*.

https://www.statista.com/statistics/1102510/southeast-asia-travel-and-tourism-gdp-contribution/

Xinhua. (2024, June 30). *Bali perketat pengawasan terhadap wisatawan asing*. ANTARA. https://www.antaranews.com/berita/4175010/bali-perketat-pengawasan-terhadap-wisatawan-asing

Yamin, M., Mahayasa, D. P. S., Satyawan, D. S., & Nurudin, A. S. (2024). Revenge tourism in Banyumas Regency: Examining the interrelationship among social media, overtourism, and post-COVID-19 impacts. *Smart Tourism*, *4*(2), 2408. https://doi.org/10.54517/st.v4i2.2408