ASEAN Centrality: Comparative Case Study of Indonesia Leadership

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Abstract

For almost 60 years of establishment, ASEAN has received praises and disdain from institutional scholars. It is heralded as the only regionalism in Southeast Asia able to manage regional order through its normative power, but also criticized for the same power. ASEAN once again faces a challenge with the looming of Myanmar crisis. The research aimed to find out whether ASEAN Centrality, the primacy of ASEAN in addressing regional issues, is still strong enough amidst the crisis. The research provided an analysis on ASEAN Centrality by adopting an individual-state leadership concept portrayed by Indonesia as a de facto leader of ASEAN. The research methods employed qualitative explorative research by focusing on comparative case studies on the Preah Vihear and Myanmar cases. The research finds that in both cases, ASEAN Centrality prevails. However, its strength varies as Indonesia's leadership depends on mutually inclusive variables. These determining variables are institutional mandates, the domestic interest of followers, and external pressures.

Keywords: Centrality, Indonesia, Leadership, ASEAN

Introduction

The discourse on the primacy of ASEAN in setting the regional tone evolves along with the concept of ASEAN Centrality. Within this framework, ASEAN has provided exemplary mediation mechanisms and inclusive engagement in network buildings. It assumes a central role in this network of states, creating a regional architecture that is centered on ASEAN. Its
centrality thus has become the contested ‘reputation’ ASEAN has to uphold in ensuring its relevance (Damayanti, 2018; Kassim, 2019; Mueller, 2019; Tsjeng, 2016). ASEAN faces a constant challenge on its Centrality conception. Recently with the looming Myanmar crisis, is ASEAN Centrality, the primacy of ASEAN in addressing regional issues, still strong enough?

The research provides an analysis on ASEAN Centrality by adopting an individual-state leadership concept portrayed by Indonesia as a de facto leader of ASEAN (Emmers, 2014; Kurus, 1993; Tan, 2015). Indonesian leadership is analyzed due to the assumed un-debatable role provided by its strategic geopolitical position, large population, and natural resources. Especially under the Soeharto regime, Indonesia plays an enabling force allowing ASEAN to grow and develop as a regional organization. In return, Indonesia’s leadership has gained acknowledgment not only by ASEAN Member State (AMS) but also by external parties who wish to engage with ASEAN. Despite receiving criticism, researchers and policymakers second the notion that Indonesia’s leadership is indispensable in ASEAN regionalism (Anwar, 1994; Agastia & Perwita, 2015; Emmers, 2014; Rattanasevee, 2014; Smith, 2022).

The research finds that ASEAN Centrality prevails, yet its strength varied in each case as individual leadership depends on mutually inclusive variables; competencies to exercise leadership, the domestic interest of followers, and external pressures. Furthermore, ASEAN institutional framework is salient in determining leadership competency, as ASEAN institutional mandate can either constraint or boost states’ ability to exercise leadership.

**Analytical Framework**

**What is ASEAN Centrality: Rowing behind Legal Construct and Elite Endorsements**

What is ASEAN Centrality? First reference towards the concept enshrined in ASEAN institutional documents. The ASEAN Charter Article 1.15 stated that the main aim of ASEAN is “to maintain the centrality and proactive role of ASEAN as the primary driving force in its relations and cooperation with its external partners in a regional architecture that is open, transparent and inclusive” (ASEAN, 2008). It is accepted as a principle of ASEAN in which needing “the centrality of ASEAN in external political, economic, social and cultural relations while remaining actively engaged, outward-looking, inclusive and non-discriminatory” (article 2.m) (ASEAN, 2008).

Another mention of centrality is captured on its external relations behavior, in which “ASEAN shall be the primary force in regional arrangements that it initiates and maintains its centrality in regional cooperation and community building” (article 41.3) (ASEAN, 2008).

This written concept is further seconded by ASEAN leaders. During the 17th ASEAN in Hanoi Chairman’s Statement defines ASEAN Centrality as “a regional architecture based on multiple existing regional frameworks which are mutually supporting and reinforcing with ASEAN as the primary driving force” (Vietnam Chairmanship, 2010). It also highlighted that ASEAN Centrality is pursuing a two-pronged approach that gives priority to the acceleration of ASEAN integration while intensifying ASEAN’s external relation (Vietnam Chairmanship, 2010). The latter understanding exemplified the concept of ASEAN Centrality takes place on
two levels. First is the level of internal integration and second is the level of external cooperation. Boost towards ASEAN Centrality is also reiterated by Indonesia, the *de facto* leaders of ASEAN. In his speech, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) emphasized that as the Chair of ASEAN, Indonesia's priorities one among others is, the "maintaining the Centrality of ASEAN" (Yudhoyono, 2011).

A similar endorsement was given by external power. President Obama's pivot to Asia increases the region's importance by signing the TAC (Treaty of Amity and Cooperation), sending a US permanent mission to ASEAN, and decided to attend the East Asia Summit in 2011 hosted by Indonesia (Clinton, 2011). Although Trump’s administration showed a disregard for ASEAN Centrality by skipping all East Asia Summit, Biden’s administration showed a rapprochement gesture. In a contested issue of QUAD, The Leaders Joint statement endorsed ASEAN Centrality that "*we reaffirm our strong support for ASEAN’s unity and centrality as well as the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific*" ("Quad leaders’ joint statement", 2021). Support was also provided by China, during the ASEAN-China Summit in 2019, premier Li Keqiang said that China will stay firmly committed to supporting ASEAN Centrality in East Asian cooperation on the issues of COC (Code of Conduct) on the South China Sea and harmonization of BRI (Belt Road Initiative) and MPAC (Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity) (Lai, 2019). ASEAN Centrality is especially important amidst the recent heightened tension between China and the United States. As argued by Singapore's Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan, "when I say centre, I don’t just mean that we are geographically at the centre, but philosophically, diplomatically and strategically, ASEAN remains at the centre of Indo-Pacific area" (Kassim, 2019).

Prominent scholars understand ASEAN Centrality in line with leaders’ views, yet argue that ASEAN Centrality has yet been defined in a unified manner. The research highlights three main understandings on centrality in explaining the utilization of this framework within this research. First, centrality is understood as having two main purposes. Strategic purpose in the sense that centrality is benefiting ASEAN’s position. By putting ASEAN at the core of the regional order, ASEAN’s relevance is secured. Normative purpose in the sense of ASEAN Centrality is understood in the primacy of the ASEAN core beliefs and identity. Its principles of inclusivity, openness allows for the generation of shared understanding, thus positioning ASEAN as a neutral and safe platform in negotiating regional order (Acharya, 2017).

Second, ASEAN Centrality is argued interchangeably with that of leadership. Historically, the conception of leadership comes from the Realist branch of Hegemon; a single powerful state controlled or dominated the other (Gilpin, 1981). Leadership is obtained through the possession of material power, such as economic and military, to dictate others. However, a hegemonic relationship is not a one-directional force to shape other behavior but a consensual hegemony in which the hegemon assumes its position because it was permitted to do so (Goh, 2013). Therefore, the relationship between that of leader and its follower in which 'leadership is conferred by the follower' (Gardner, 1990, pg 24; Cerami, 2013 pg 20) can be argued highlighted the aspect of consensual leadership. In this sense, power must then be understood in terms of not only material but also ideational power (social power).
Since ASEAN is not a hegemon, it is essential to know the kind of leadership quality it possesses. Given its lack of hard power, ASEAN possesses an entrepreneurial leadership able to bring ‘willing parties together’ to achieve mutual benefit. ASEAN also possesses intellectual leadership that makes use of “the power of ideas to shape” how regional issues are understood (Young, 1991). ASEAN’s normative power can persuade others to display a certain behavior. This normative power created a perception that ASEAN is not a threat for anyone, thus building ASEAN reservoir of trust in which ASEAN can transform the Southeast Asia region from trust deficit to strategic trust (Natalegawa, 2018).

Leadership can be generated through social power. Social power defines what ASEAN can do by depicting ASEAN as an important node within a social structure. Centrality is understood in the closeness and cohesiveness of nodes that lend to ASEAN’s increased influence through resource access, agenda-setting, and framing debate (Beckfield, 2003). Social Network Theory explains ASEAN Centrality further by looking at how closely connected it is with the networks in the wider East Asia institutional framework; the position of ASEAN as ‘a node in bridging the different networks’ together (Caballero-Anthony, 2014). Its closeness and connection with others allow ASEAN to utilize the web of networks to advance its interests. The network is manifested through various meetings in which ASEAN drives the agenda within the regional multilateral platforms. By setting the agenda ASEAN is able to maintain and retain its centrality and as a consequence amplifying ASEAN’s capacity to shape the regional order. This influence leads to the leadership role that is inherent to ASEAN’s position in the structural web of networks (Caballero-Anthony, 2014). To understand ASEAN Centrality from a leadership approach, it must be seen in ASEAN ability to take the initiative in solving problems, the willingness to shoulder the leadership role, and the cooperation of follower states in the actions that are taken (Stubbs, 2014).

Third, centrality is most often portrayed as ASEAN relationship vis a vis another major or great external power. However, this one side portrayal failed to acknowledge that the centrality of ASEAN is also taking place when ASEAN is dealing with issues within the Southeast Asia region. ASEAN Centrality is a two-pronged approach “starting with strengthening centrality within ASEAN, followed by maintaining its centrality within the dense cluster of networks in the regional arena” (Caballero-Anthony, 2014). This argument then translated to what is called ASEAN ‘centrality within’ and ‘centrality of’. Leadership in both levels, therefore “entails one state, or a group of states, proposing, executing and getting others to agree on a course of action to deal with a specific problem or challenge” (Stubbs, 2014).

Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between ASEAN Centrality and individual leadership exercised by AMS. ASEAN Centrality can be analyzed through the individual leadership of AMS (Stubbs, 2014). Furthermore, borrowing from Caballero-Anthony’s two-pronged approaches, ASEAN Centrality is applied on two levels; one is claimed as ‘centrality within’ ASEAN and the other is projected externally as ‘centrality of’ ASEAN (Caballero-Anthony, 2014). To investigate ASEAN Centrality within this framework, the research takes individual leadership of Indonesia toward its projection internally, in relation with the rest of AMS, and externally, in response to external stimulus.
Hence, as leadership can be projected by one state or a group of states, analyzing ASEAN centrality in the light of regional conflict shows different dynamics. It is argued that leadership can be seen from three main aspects, the ability to take initiative, taking responsibility, and support from other members (Stubbs, 2014). However, support from other members towards ASEAN leadership is influenced by the domestic interests of each member state. Furthermore, ASEAN is not immune from external pressure although the impact varies. Therefore, in analyzing ASEAN Centrality, the research proposes a new set of indicators cultivated from the previous framework involving individual country competencies to exercise leadership, the domestic interest of followers, and external pressures.

**Research Methods**

The adopted research methodology is structured and elaborated. First, as centrality can be exercised through leadership, the research scrutinizes Indonesia's leadership in ASEAN. This is done by looking at Indonesia's ability to take initiative, responsibility and gain support from other members. As support from other members towards ASEAN leadership is highly influenced by the domestic interests of each member state, an analysis of AMS interests is provided. However, it is beyond the aim of research to contest leadership quality between AMS leadership. Instead, the research focuses on the constituting variables that affects Indonesian leadership to uphold ASEAN Centrality.

Second, the research employs secondary data qualitative explorative research by focusing on comparative case studies. Two case studies are presented: 1) Preah Vihear's (Thai-Cambodia conflict) and 2) Myanmar case, an ongoing conflict. The research acknowledges that Preah Vihaer and Myanmar cases constitute a different set of domestic build-ups. Even so, to minimize random selection trap, the research opts to select a comparative approach based on the variation of explanatory variables. It means that contradictory cases are selected to understand the extent of Indonesia’s leadership. One case exhibits strong leadership and the other case shows weak leadership. The analyses then proceed to investigate the explanation of the differences (Kaarbo & Beasley, 1999). However, a degree of comparability is presented. Both cases show the extent of Indonesian Leadership in solving the crisis. Thai-
Cambodia conflict is treated as the base for a reference toward Indonesia’s leadership in taking the initiative and responsibility for ASEAN’s internal problem and as it lies ‘the methodology for dealing with future disputes’ (International Crisis Group, 2011). At the same time, both case studies are chosen on the premise that conflicts are an internal ASEAN issue that also received attention from the international public. Additionally, the research acknowledges the limitation of the Myanmar case as a non-past factum and suggests that future events will impact current analyses. Nevertheless, by following the Myanmar case the research is able to provide insight to the discussion on ASEAN Centrality in which Indonesian leadership is constrained.

Third, the analyses take on two levels; the ‘centrality within’ and ‘centrality of’. The first level refers to Indonesia, an individual ASEAN state, exercising its internal leadership amongst its fellows AMS. As ASEAN is not immune from external pressure, the second level assesses Indonesia’s leadership in responding to external pressures and defending the unity of AMS against it.

Results and Discussions

Leadership Quality: Indonesia 'Appropriate Engagement' and Institutional Constraints

Clashes between Cambodia and Thailand over the Preah Vihear temple rose when in 2008 UNESCO gave the World Heritage Site to the Cambodian government. Tension already erupted since, however, it is in 2011 the firefighters become noticeable. The then secretary-general Surin Pitsuwan argued that the clash is ‘open conflict’ (Wagener, 2011) even the UNSC (United Nations Security Council) has weighed into the conflict.

Issue of Preah Vihear was happening a few days before the 41st ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in 2008 but the meeting failed to address the crisis. Cambodia then proposed the creation of the ASEAN Inter-ministerial group to Singapore as the chairman of ASEAN (Phan, 2015). Singapore chairmanship offered to establish a Contact Group to help the effort in finding a peaceful solution to the issues, but it was rejected by Thailand (“Statement by Minister for Foreign”, 2012). When Cambodia asked Vietnam as ASEAN chair to mediate in 2010, it was also rejected by Thailand (Wagener, 2011). Any attempt was hindered because of the basic disagreement over the dispute settlement mechanism. Thailand sought to address the dispute bilaterally while Cambodia preferred a multilateral mechanism, involving the UN and ASEAN in the process. After the inaction for the past two years and upon the clashes that took place in February 4th and 5th 2011, Indonesia who just resumed its position as ASEAN chair in January 2011, took immediate actions.

In ensuring ASEAN ‘centrality within’ in the case of Preah Vihear, Indonesia exhibited leadership quality by taking initiatives, assuming responsibilities, and was followed by other ASEAN Member States (AMS). Indonesia as ASEAN Chairman under Foreign Ministers (FM) Marty Natalegawa took the initiatives by first contacting conflicting parties, ASEAN FMs, and
ASEAN Secretary-General in February 5th and 6th 2011 and followed immediately by a visit to each capital, Bangkok and Phnom Penh, in February 7th and 8th 2011 for shuttle diplomacy.

The shuttle diplomacy is important for several reasons: 1) to open a diplomatic window to solidify direct ASEAN engagement, 2) to show ASEAN’s timely support towards the conflicting parties thus securing their confidence toward ASEAN objectiveness under Indonesia’s leadership, 3) to find a shared common ground for conflict management leading to dispute settlements, and 4) to prepare for a unified ASEAN stance and cohesion on the issues (Natalegawa, 2018).

Thus Indonesia proposed 'appropriate engagement' referring to the comfortable middle way in between Cambodia's preferences of multilateralism and Thailand's reluctant (Natalegawa, 2018). The result of the shuttle diplomacy was then consulted to all AMS highlighting that despite the disagreement, both parties agreed to seek a peaceful settlement of the dispute and welcomed the willingness of Indonesia to take responsibility as a 'hotline' bridge between the two parties. The conclusion is well received by AMS thus legitimizing Indonesia’s leadership in the process.

February 1st marks the start of the worsening condition in Myanmar, in which Myanmar’s military force has acquired full control of the country’s government in a coup d'état. The military managed to detain Aung San Suu Kyi, Myanmar’s civilian leader, and her National League for Democracy (NLD) party members. At the moment, Min Aung Hlaing, who served as Chairman of the State Administration Council of Myanmar, is considered the country’s de facto leader as of February 2nd. Though Myanmar has gone back and forth between military and civilian leadership over the years, it is still considered to be a large step back for Myanmar from fully democratizing the country or simply having a stable government. Since 2011, the military has started to govern alongside and coexist with Suu Kyi’s administration. However, during the November 2020 election, Suu Kyi has further advocated and campaigned for additional restrictions for the military's role in governing the country. Seen as a high threat, especially since she succeeded to win 83% of the body's available seats, generals accused the election to be a sham. Citing the 2008 Constitution, the military declared a national emergency, allowing them to remain in power for a year long. The country’s infrastructure was fully controlled and seized by the military, which results in: 1) broadcasts suspended, 2) domestic and international flights canceled, 3) suspension of phone and internet access, and 4) closure of stock markets and commercial banks. This worsening condition has turned peaceful protests by civilians into violent and deadly when two unarmed protesters were killed by security forces on February 20th. Responding to the protests and civilian strikes, the armed forces have subsequently responded by violent means as well, by killing, assaulting, detaining, or torturing groups of civilians (Goldman, 2021).

Indonesia has led the effort to come up with a peaceful solution to the Myanmar crisis. It has given its best endeavors to rally up ASEAN response through shuttle diplomacy in the series of Informal ASEAN Ministerial Meetings led by Indonesian FM Retno Marsudi (“Singapore, Indonesia says ASEAN”, 2021). Upon the escalation of the conflict, Indonesia proposed an initiative to hold the extraordinary ASEAN Leader’s Meeting (ALM) (Strangio,
The ALM was actually realized on 24th April 2021 in Jakarta, five weeks after Indonesian president, Joko Widodo, called for an ASEAN Special Summit (Drajat, 2021). Jokowi sent a rather assertive response in which he referred to the development in Myanmar as “unacceptable and cannot be continued” (“ASEAN leaders’ meeting”, 2021). He pressed for Myanmar’s commitment on a few fronts including the cessation of violence, initiation of inclusive dialogue process, and lastly the opening up access to humanitarian aid from ASEAN.

Indonesia took the opportunity to host the ALM meeting in ASEAN Secretariat, as Brunei Darussalam has declined to host the leaders meeting due to its limited diplomatic capacity and concern about the pandemic (Bland, 2021). By inviting General Min Aung Hlaing instead of Aung Su Kyi, to ALM ASEAN is criticized for its acknowledgment of the Junta as the official ruler. Nevertheless, Indonesia managed to bring General Min Aung Hlaing, the top person of Myanmar’s Junta, to the ALM in Jakarta. It highlights Indonesia’s competence as a provider of good offices. It was also able to agree on the quite ambitious five points of consensus at the present of Myanmar delegation. The five-point consensus is an ASEAN collective response that highlight important follow-up states including: (1) there shall be an immediate cessation of violence in Myanmar and all parties shall exercise utmost restraint, (2) constructive dialogue among all parties concerned shall commence to seek a peaceful solution in the interests of the people, (3) a special envoy of the ASEAN Chair shall facilitate mediation of the dialogue process, with the assistance of the Secretary-General of ASEAN, (4) ASEAN shall provide humanitarian assistance through the AHA Centre, (5) the special envoy and delegation shall visit Myanmar to meet with all parties concerned (ASEAN Secretariat, 2021). Certainly, the meeting was heralded as a success of ASEAN in addressing an urgent crisis. Indonesia once again shows its experiences and leadership in managing the regional conflict.

However, further scrutiny shows that Indonesia’s role is limited in following up the 5 points of consensus due to further development. First, a tension on envoy election was taking place. The selected special envoys must have the qualification and experience to deliver mediation services and conflict management. To be legitimate, the special envoy must also have the confidence from Myanmar and the rest of the members. Indonesia preferred a single envoy and proposed Hassan Wirajuda, an experienced diplomat and the former Indonesia Foreign Minister who has been involved during the Preah Vihear conflict. However, Thailand was keener on sending a group of envoys further stressing the dissents amongst AMS (“The failed mission”, 2021).

Second, as the Chair of ASEAN, Brunei was entrusted to pick the special envoy, yet it failed to overcome the bureaucratic hindrances and resulted in a delay for more than a month since the five-point consensus agreed on ALM (“ASEAN, hurry up”, 2021). The delay was further when Myanmar Junta seems to back down its commitment arguing that “only after we achieve a certain level of security and stability, we will cooperate regarding that envoy” (Septiari, 2021). Indonesia’s frustration was expressed by Retno Marsudi, Indonesian Foreign Minister arguing that the delay ‘does ASEAN no good’ as for months after the declaration of five-points consensus nothing is developed (Allard & Costa, 2021).
Third, on the 4th of June Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, met with Brunei’s Second Minister for Foreign Affairs Erywan Pehin Yusof and the secretary-general of ASEAN, Lim Jock Hoi, in Myanmar's capital, Naypyitaw ("Myanmar's junta chief", 2021). The meeting was not handled well as Yusof’s visit was done without prior notification to fellow ASEAN Foreign Ministers. What was more disappointing was that upon returning there were no briefings shared with the rest of the bloc (“The failed mission", 2021). Myanmar case, therefore, showed the limited role of Indonesia’s leadership.

ASEAN Centrality within in Preah Vihear case is strong due to the leadership portrayed by Indonesia in taking the initiative and responsibility. However, the Myanmar case shows the extent of Indonesian leadership within ASEAN. Although Indonesia has accumulated experience in providing good offices and even took initiatives to solve the problem, the lack of institutional mandate, being not the Chairman, limits how far Indonesia can exercise its leadership. Indonesia did not encounter an obstacle in initiating the moves. However, its influence is seriously limited in following up the initiative and taking responsibility for the process of mediation when it stalled.

Domestic Interests; Rallying Support or Easing Dissent

In the Preah Vihear case, Indonesia as the ASEAN chair was finally able to achieve the first milestone in addressing the conflict. On the informal meeting of the ASEAN FMs in Jakarta, February 2011, Indonesia managed to broker an agreement that Bangkok and PnomPhen promised to take measures to prevent military clashes, welcome the dispatch of Indonesian observer group to the further area, and resume bilateral talk with Indonesia assistances (Padden, 2011). In the 18th ASEAN Summit in Jakarta, the Cambodian and Thailand government agreed on the term of reference of the Indonesian Observer Team (IOT) (ASEAN Secretariat, 2011). This is further supported by the Head of Government (HoG) meeting between President SBY, Prime Minister (PM) Hun Sen, and PM Abhisit Vejjajiva to reaffirm the Ministerial Summit decisions.

Further investigation reveals that the Preah Vihear temple conflict was driven by Thailand’s domestic interests (International Crisis Group, 2011). The Cambodian decision to register the Preah Vihear temple to UNESCO was initially received as a non-threatening move. However, democratization caused the military to lose its power following the election of Thaksin Shinawatra. Due to the competition within Thailand Yellow Shirt vs Redshirt factions, the issue has been developed into a national narrative to undermine Thaksin’s power. Thaksin’s administration under PM Samak Sundaravey was accused of selling ‘the motherland’ as part of his business interest despite the policy having been previously supported by the military-installed administration (Pongphisoot, 2011).

Other ASEAN countries were not happy with the border tension between Cambodia and Thailand. Yet they show an unresponsive attitude and inaction both during Singapore and Vietnam chairmanships. Cambodia’s attempts to seek mediation from ASEAN Secretary General both in 2008 and 2010 were without avail. AMS was basing its inaction under the ASEAN’s non-intervention policy. Yet this behavior changes along with Indonesia’s shuttle
diplomacy and constructive engagement. Through this approach Indonesia manages to rally support from AMS, creating a unified stance on the need to solve the border conflict immediately and in return giving Indonesia legitimacy.

Quite contrary in the Myanmar case dissents within AMS have been already apparent since the start of the issues. Each AMS has different views, in which Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore are pushing more to stop the use of force against unarmed civilians, while Thailand and Vietnam supported by Cambodia and Laos have somehow accepted Junta Myanmar based on non-interference principles (ANU Editorial Board, 2021). Brunei’s response to Myanmar is in line with its capacity as ASEAN chair. Singapore expressed grave concern. PM Lee Hsien Loong argued the use of violence was ‘not acceptable’ and ‘disastrous’ (Aradhana, 2021). FM Vivian Balakrishnan denounced the armed forces for using lethal weapons against citizens but opposed sanctions to be imposed on Myanmar, arguing that widespread measures would only hurt ordinary citizens instead of the military (“Singapore says Myanmar situation”, 2021). Malaysia Prime Minister (PM) Muhyiddin Yassin stated that the ASEAN's principle of non-interference should not lead to inaction if a domestic situation “jeopardizes the peace, security, and stability of ASEAN and the wider region” (Karmini, 2021). Both Singapore and Malaysia governments have been supportive of Indonesian efforts to create an ASEAN collective response.

On the other side, Thailand avoided criticizing the coup and evoked the non-interference principle calling the coup an internal affair. However, this move is highly influenced by its Junta rise making Thailand the closest friend of Myanmar military power (Johnson & Thepgumpanat, 2021). Its leader even opted out of ALM in April 2021 but instead sent Thailand Foreign Minister (FM) to attend the meeting. The Philippines’ stance is in limbo. The government has condemned the military coup but also refused similar scrutiny towards its human rights record by the UN. It admitted the unifying role of Aung San Suu Kyi but also rejected the UN statement which called upon the release (Palatino, 2021). President Duterte has not attended the ALM in April, instead of sending his Foreign Minister. Cambodia and Laos take a similar stance with Thailand by calling the coup an internal affair. President Hun Sen even stated that “Cambodia does not comment on the internal affairs of any country at all, either within the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) framework or any other country” (“Cambodian leader Hun Sen”, 2021). Laos abode the ASEAN principles and sought to cooperate with ASEAN (Phonevilay, 2021), but it failed to send its leader to the ALM in Jakarta. Vietnam did send its Leader to attend the ALM, but it was restrained in calling out to the Myanmar Junta leader. However, Vietnam has reiterated that the country is ‘seriously concerned about the development in Myanmar and seeks cooperation with ASEAN’ (“VN ‘seriously concerned’ about”, 2021).

ASEAN Centrality in the case of Indonesia’s leadership in Preah Vihear was strong. Marty Natalegawa was astute in his understanding that leadership quality requires support from another member. ASEAN’s good office under Indonesia’s presidency was only possible if it enjoyed the trust and confidence of the affected parties especially in terms of impartiality and objectivity (Natalegawa, 2018). AMS shows support and follows Indonesia’s leadership.
AMS preferred to lean on its non-interferences policy and primacy of sovereignty but this only can be changed through a strong leadership portrayed by Indonesia.

While in the Myanmar case, Indonesia was only able to ease basic dissent by providing the first venue of mediation through the ALM. Further development showed that the stark dissent of AMS’s stance toward Myanmar Junta lends to the un-employability of any leader-follower leadership framework.

External Pressures: Undermining ASEAN Unity vs Boosting Confidences

Indonesia was portraying its leadership further by assuming responsibility in its role as Chair of ASEAN to keep the issue of Preah Vihear within a regional jurisdiction of ASEAN. The issue of Preah Vihear was first brought to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) by Cambodia in 2008 when Indonesia was seated as part of the council at that time. Yet, there was no unified stance of ASEAN (Natalegawa, 2018). Considering this, Indonesia was firmly to further sustain ASEAN Centrality. Several considerations drove Indonesia’s ambitions. First, it was very important not to turn the peaceful region into a war-ridden region. Second, in line with ASEAN’s fear of intervention and Indonesia’s ‘bebas-aktif’ foreign policy, Indonesia sought to avoid that the issue will be taken to an international setting. Based on UNSC article 8, conflict situation is brought to the UNSC in the absence of regional-level conflict resolution. Such a situation if happened will undermine ASEAN further. Third, Indonesia has been a supporter of advancing regional organization roles in conflict prevention, management, and resolution. As, Natalegawa argued, “to ensure ASEAN becomes a ‘net contributor’ to international peace and security, principally by demonstrating its capacity to maintain the peace and stability of its immediate region” (Natalegawa, 2018). Forth, acknowledging the ASEAN’s effort to solve the issues is an example of subsidiarity principles that boost ASEAN’s credibility.

As suspected, an invitation from UNSC came in during a special meeting on the 14th of February for Indonesia, as ASEAN Chairman under article 39 of UNSC provisional procedure. Indonesia was consulted on the issue at stake and was able to present unified agreements of ASEAN. UNSC was supportive of the ASEAN role and appreciated Indonesia’s mediating effort as ASEAN Chair (Putra et al., 2013; UNSC, 2011). The document further specifying the reference of Indonesia as ‘current chair of ASEAN’ was seen as a boost toward Indonesia’s credibility. Another support on ASEAN’s primacy was given by the ICJ, when in July 2011 acknowledged rendered its provisional measures to both Cambodia and Thailand should cooperate with ASEAN (Phan, 2015).

In the case of Myanmar, international pressure is palpable. The United States labelled the takeover as a coup. US Secretary of State, Blinken accuses the security forces as a “reign of terror” (“Myanmar Coup,” 2021). Biden administration imposed sanctions, freezing assistance directed to the Burmese government but will maintain support to the people (“Biden-Harris administration”, 2021). There European Union has prepared a third sanction for Myanmar, even though the efficacy of sanctions has been in question as it has yet shown an obvious impact on the military regime (“ASEAN diplomacy in Myanmar”, 2021). While
China argued that the situation in Myanmar is "absolutely not what China wants to see" ("ASEAN leaders to visit Myanmar", 2021), but still blocked UNSC's statement condemning the coup. Therefore, United National will be largely ‘toothless’ (ANU Editorial Board, 2021) in dealing with Myanmar. Despite their grave concern, major powers have left the issue of Myanmar to ASEAN to handle (Poling, 2021). European Union like other external power endorsed its support to ASEAN. Foreign affairs chief Josep Borrell emphasized that “to find a political solution for the Myanmar situation belongs to ASEAN” (“ASEAN diplomacy in Myanmar", 2021). It further reaffirms ASEAN primacy in solving the Myanmar issues. In April Liechtenstein with the support of 48 countries, drafted a UNGA resolution to apply arms embargo to Myanmar, “calling for an immediate suspension of the direct and indirect supply, sale or transfer of all weapons, munitions and other military-related equipment to Myanmar” (“ASEAN makes half-hearted”, 2021). This resolution was opposed through a letter from the nine remaining AMS. ASEAN comes in defend of the Myanmar Junta regime has met with criticism (Taylor & Westfall, 2021), but further scrutiny reveals that it is in line with ASEAN principles. The limiting norms of non-interference and the fear of external intervention have led ASEAN to forge a united front amidst external pressure.

Although being postponed due to not having enough support to pass, the resolution is finally adopted in June when UNGA passed its resolution; 119 in favors, 36 abstains, and 1 against. Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore with Philippines and Vietnam support in favors of the passing, while Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand vote against it. Brunei Darussalam as ASEAN Chair voted against the resolution (UNIFEED, 2021). Although the resolution was criticized due to its failure in including the arms embargo, it shows dissents within ASEAN member states in the external platform and the lack of internal regional leadership. The latest development shows a unifying stance within AMS to exclude Myanmar Junta from the ASEAN Summit. Instead, ASEAN chooses to invite the non-political figure to the annual summit (Geddie, 2021).

ASEAN Centrality of ASEAN on both issues prevails in which International organization, UN in both case and ICJ (International Court of Justice) in Preah Vihear conflict lend its support to ASEAN. UN and ICJ’s confidence in ASEAN to manage the problem strengthened under the principle of subsidiarity. Although to a different degree, major powers were also show their preferences on leaving things to ASEAN in both cases. However, Indonesia delivered its leadership differently. In the Preah Vihear case, Indonesia’s strong leadership supports ASEAN Centrality. However, Indonesia's leadership in Myanmar’s case against the international community has yet on par with the Preah Vihear temple case.

ASEAN shows its unity by successfully toning down the UN resolution drafting to exclude the arms embargo, but the final vote shows a divided ASEAN. Indonesia is followed by Malaysia and Singapore, as well Philippines and Vietnam. While Brunei as the chair of ASEAN vetoed against along with Thailand, a strong supporter of Junta Myanmar as well fellow CMLV countries, Laos and Cambodia. Adrift between the mainland and continental ASEAN was apparent in the Myanmar case. However, this drift does not stay long as ASEAN FM has decided to exclude Junta Myanmar to attend its ASEAN Summit. Institutional
mandate has proven influential in assessing Indonesia’s leadership in maintaining ASEAN unity against external pressure.

**Conclusions**

The research finds that in both cases, ASEAN Centrality varies as Indonesia leadership depends on mutually inclusive variables. The three main variables influencing ASEAN Centrality are individual country competencies to exercise leadership especially the institutional mandate they received, the domestic interest of followers, and prevailing external pressures.

In the discussed cases, Indonesia acts in line with the ASEAN Charter in its efforts as both ASEAN Chair and individual member to address the issues. Despite having experiences in conflict management and mediation as well as providing good offices. The ASEAN institutional mandate becomes a determining variable in ensuring how far Indonesia can extend its leadership.

Due to the sensitive nature of the ASEAN political bloc, any attempt of dispute settlement must be carefully weaved to produce the intended results. Domestic interests are projected regionally. The higher the gap within AMS, the lower the chance to produce a unified stance. More than often states use the ASEAN Charter principles involving the respect for independence and sovereignty and non-interference as a shield. Thus, enhanced consultation on matters seriously affecting an individual country is crucial in any leadership. External pressure is a constant variable in ASEAN regional building. ASEAN was created in response to it and this historical legacy stays intact until the present times.

A combination of those three variables determines ASEAN Centrality. As shown in the case of Preah Vihear, Indonesia's leadership was strong since it received support not only from external powers but also internally as the domestic stance is unified. While in the case of Myanmar, Indonesia’s leadership is weak even though external powers lend their support towards the ASEAN mechanism, individual domestic dissent further complicates the process. Finally, this dissent spills over to the international platforms creating a vague cohesion.

Additionally, the research finds that a single sub-variable of the institutional mandate has a significant impact on the strong-week pendulum of ASEAN Centrality. In the case of the Preah Vihear temple, Indonesia has been able to defend ASEAN Centrality through its leadership as ASEAN Chairs. Meanwhile, in the Myanmar case, Indonesia’s leadership has been constrained and limited due to the absence of the mandate as a Chair.

However, the research disagrees that institutional mandate is the sole indicator that can determine the strength of ASEAN Centrality as leadership quality comprises beyond only a mandate. The finding also contradicts the general confidence in Indonesia’s natural leadership in ASEAN. Instead, the research shows that the exercise of leadership within an established institution is constrained by the very institutional framework. However, due to the limited scope of analysis presented here, it is beyond the aim of research to extrapolate the extent of
the institutional constraints. Further comparative research across the ASEAN presidency and how their leadership affects ASEAN Centrality is encouraged to provide the answer to this question.

In conclusion, whether ASEAN Centrality remains strong or eroded in the coming years depends on the leadership exercised by its member states. However, leadership requires not only competency and quality of individual AMS but also support from the rest of the member amidst external power influences.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leadership Quality</th>
<th>Domestic Interest of followers</th>
<th>External Pressure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preah Vihear</td>
<td>• Indonesia’s role as the ASEAN Chair is strong as it took initiative, held responsibilities and its actions were supported by the other AMS.</td>
<td>• The domestic interest of AMS was quite unanimous, preferring the stability in the region. Hence resulted in support to Indonesia’s leadership.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Indonesia gain supports from its institutional mandate as the ASEAN chair.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>• Indonesia’s role was limited because it has no institutional authority: not the ASEAN Chair.</td>
<td>• Domestic interest is varied. • Support to Junta comes from Thailand due to its own experiences. • Other AMS has reservations as fear of intervention is high, even though official endorsement on ASEAN mechanism is given, albeit somehow vaguely.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• It can take initiative but facing challenges to follow up the initiative.</td>
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</tbody>
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References


