

Far from Home: Profile of pro-IS Deportees' Mobility throughout 2016-2020 and Prevention Strategy of Indonesian Government

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Abstract

Transnational terrorism has been a worldwide challenge, especially after the declaration of Islamic State (IS) that was based in Syria and Iraq in 2014. By 2017, most foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) from Southeast Asia were Indonesian nationals, of almost 700 individuals. The actual number might be higher as some departed to Syria and other destination countries, like Afghanistan, the Philippines, and India, undetected. The research aimed to examine how Pro-IS terrorists exploit loopholes in border and immigration control to join IS abroad and the shortcoming in Indonesian government strategy to counter their mobility. The novelty of the research rested on its use of Supreme Court's record of 38 Pro-IS deportees to build a dataset of their profile and travel history from 2016 to 2020. Profile of individual deportee was categorized into demography, affiliation, and funding. Travel history was mapped in accordance with the point of departure in Indonesia, transit country, final destination, and location where the arrest took place- which then led to deportation. The research finds that Indonesia needs improvement in human resources, law enforcement, immigration management, border control, as well as cross-border cooperation.

Keywords: terrorist mobility, terrorist mobility strategy, the Islamic State (IS), departure, immigration

Introduction

Following the call of Islamic States' (IS) so-called "caliphate" Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi's for all Muslims to immigrate (*hijrah*¹) to the caliphate state in late June 2014, waves of departure of pro-IS fighters came from all over the world. Such movement is dubbed as 'terrorist mobility,' which Ginsburg (2006) defines as "the ability to move people across borders and within nations without being detected by hostile authorities." Around 27,000 to 30,000 foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) from 86 countries have travelled to Syria or Iraq, 75% of whom are from 12 countries, including Indonesia (Longo, 2017). The cross-border terrorist threat became a worldwide challenge that exposes the weaknesses in border and immigration control.

For members and sympathizers of terrorist groups in Indonesia, cross-border mobility or migration is nothing new. Solahudin, Fealy, and McRae (2017) mention that from 1985 to 1992, 192 recruits of Darul Islam (DI) migrated to join military training in the border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Upon returning, they played a vital role in several Indonesian notable terror attacks, such as the first and second Bali bombing, the JW Marriot Hotel attack, and the Australian Embassy bombing. Another group like Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) sent fighters to train at Hudaibiyah Camp in Mindanao between 1995 and 1999; later on three out of the 144 Mindanao graduates—Noordin M. Top, Dr. Azhari Hussein, and Ali Fauzi—became the mastermind behind several terror attacks (Solahudin et al., 2017).

The number of Indonesians responding to the appeal of the IS leader is particularly concerning. National Counterterrorism Agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme/BNPT) estimated about 514 Indonesians have joined IS in Syria and Iraq by 2014 (Taufiqurrohman, 2015), other estimations mentioned 980 people by 2017 (Longo, 2017) and 689 people by 2020 ("Pemerintah tidak berencana", 2020). Furthermore, according to the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (2018), Indonesian nationals who were caught and deported from transit countries before arriving at the country of destination, or "deportees", increased from 171 in 2016 to 226 people in 2017. The Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict also records that as of mid-2018, more than 500 people were deported for attempting to cross into Syria from Turkey to join IS. The actual number might be higher due to the availability of other routes and the possibility of some returning undetected. Those numbers reflect IS' success in promoting the narrative of migration as a manifestation of the caliphate that will emerge before *al-malhamah qubra* or the Islamic Armageddon, although part of its attraction includes worldly incentives – such as allowance, health care, free education, and housing facilities - for professionals to take part in running the IS territory as administrators, accountants, teachers, doctors, engineers, or religious experts (Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, 2018).

Path of cross-border mobility of Indonesian extremists further diversified following the expansion of IS activities. In 2015, IS decided to expand to the Khorasan region, an area historically part of Iran, Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018). While the number of Indonesians that joined IS-Khorasan is unknown, there is the case of Muhammad Aulia, a travel facilitator for eleven people, who

was deported from Bangkok before joining IS-Khorasan via Thailand and Iran (Briantika, 2019). Between 2016 and 2018 around 40 Indonesian extremists attempted to cross the border following Southeast Asian Pro-IS fighters' pledge via the internet to support the Mindanao fight in the Philippines, nine of them were later deported (Arianti & Azman, 2019).

Under President Joko Widodo's administration, BNPT tried to improve its deradicalization and rehabilitation program for deported terrorist suspects and returnees through interagency collaboration, especially after the ratification of Law No. 5/2018 on terrorism. However, national strategy or specific regulation to counter terrorist mobility remains absent. While there is plethora of literatures on terrorists who travel from Indonesia (Nuraniyah, 2015; Kibtiah, 2016; Anindya, 2019; Timur & Yani, 2019), none touched upon the issue of mobility strategy. To fill the gap in academic literature and policy-making formulation, the research aims to investigate the limitations of the Indonesian government in preventing pro-IS deportees in 2016-2020. In doing so, the research will first describe the profile of Indonesian pro-IS deportees and their exploitation of the border and immigration system, and then assess the government's capability and its obstacles to effective counter of terrorist mobility strategy (TMS).

Although terrorists who travel outside their country are interchangeably labeled as either "deportee," "returnee," or "foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs)," there is no consensus on the definition of the terms. United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2178 defines FTFs as individuals who travel to a state other than their origin to perpetrate, plan or prepare, or participate in terrorist acts. They could be the providers or receivers of terrorist training. Whereas the Indonesian government defines "returnees" as nationals who managed to cross into Syria or Iraq and voluntarily returned (Laelani, 2018). Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (2018) differentiates both terms from "deportees," defined as individuals who tried to reach *hijrah* destination but got caught before arriving.

When it comes to which category carries higher security risks, arguably, a returnee with military experience would be a bigger risk than a deportee with no combat experiences. However, frustrated deportees could also pose a significant danger compared to non-combatant returnees. They could carry out terror attacks at home because the continuous illusion of IS collides with reality that *hijrah* is no longer a feasible option. The research will focus on Indonesian deportees because of their potential risks.

Literature Review

Migration as a security issue touches upon a range of matters directly affecting migration policy, including border integrity, national security, and citizenship (International Organization for Migration, 2010). A compromised border integrity and immigration system becomes the weak point that terrorist groups exploit in today's borderless world. Citrawan and Nadilla (2019) argue that immigration policy intersects with terrorist activities. Hence, countermeasures to terrorist mobility should include optimization of intelligence gathering, pre-inspection of travel documents and immigration permits, and border checks. However,

further literature that touches upon this particular subject, such as dismantling illicit markets that provide travel documents, arresting terrorist travel facilitators, and cooperating with countries of choice to *hijrah*, are hardly found.

Ginsburg (2006) argues that understanding the elements of terrorist mobility is essential since it helps to exploit terrorists' needs to remain mobile and cross borders. Terrorist mobility comprises three elements: (a) management of travel function, (b) exit routes and transportation practices, and (c) entry and residence tactics. Firstly, management of terrorist travel functions requires an understanding of the actor who arranges the travel, either a travel facilitator or an illicit travel organization, and the actor who provides the illicit travel documents (the illegal market exists and has supported many terrorists attempting to cut corners to avoid detection by the authorities). Secondly, understanding key jumping-off points and checkpoints and preferred choices of practices require information on means of purchasing a certain passage and whether terrorists are trained in particular kinds of transportation ranging from small boats to airplanes. Thirdly, there are two approaches to exploit the border and immigration control: 1) to make illegal use of legal channels and 2) to utilize illegal ones. Legal channels are used illegally when a terrorist passes through any of the legal checkpoints nations and their immigration systems by using tourist visas and residence permits. Whereas the use of illegal channels refers to any discreet travel outside immigration control and border ports of entry, i.e., the use of boat or land crossing in remote places to enter illegal routes. These elements will be used to analyze Indonesian deportees' travel history and planning to *hijrah*.

The research borrows Ginsburg's (2006) argument that a national and global terrorist mobility strategy (TMS) is essential as it serves three broad purposes, which are defensive, offensive, and deterrent. A defensive operation is to secure travel, immigration, and transportation channels at borders against undetected terrorist movements. The offensive measure is to exploit the vulnerability of border and immigration systems exposed by terrorists' need to disrupt their network. Combined, an effective defensive and offensive countermeasure will deter or raise the risk for the terrorist movement. A deterrent, offensive, and defensive countermeasures can be set within a single terrorist mobility framework. Ginsburg emphasizes seven elements that would identify the roles of government institutions and agencies in every terrorist mobility phase, as seen in Table 1. These elements will be used as the benchmark to evaluate the existing Indonesian strategy pertaining to terrorist mobility.

Since Indonesia does not have a single framework or an established expert group that focuses on responding to this problem, some countermeasures overlap. Hence, the TMS is simplified into three indicators. First, immigration and border control, including understanding terrorist mobility knowledge while modernizing the border and immigration system for effective management. Second, crime control by arresting criminal travel networks, including travel facilitators and illegal document providers. Lastly, cross-border cooperation to help identify and track terrorists on the move.

Table 1. Elements of Terrorist Mobility Strategy (TMS)

No.	Element	Description	Indicator
1	Foundation: Terrorist Mobility Knowledge	A basic guideline or report for top officials and front-line managers on terrorist mobility trends and detection methods.	Immigration and border control
2	Border and Immigration Management: Securing Legal Entry Channels	Securing legal channels from terrorists and other threats through a “smart borders” policy that relies on modernized infrastructure to make use of foreign and domestic intelligence about terrorists, as well as on risk management tools.	
3	Perimeter Control: Denying Access Through Illegal Channels	Control over infiltration by terrorists through illegal entry channels that avoids screening by crossing surreptitiously away from a port of entry.	
4	Targeting: Terrorists Who Act as Travel Facilitators	Strategy against terrorists who facilitate travel for groups, cells, and networks.	Crime control
5	Crime Control: Attacking Illicit Travel Network	Disrupt illegal market that provides travel services, including criminal exploitation of law-abiding travel agencies.	
6	Domestic Constraining Mobility	Security: A strategy to protect against or exploit terrorist use of public and private systems to move around including the immigration system with its regulation of employers, which confers legal status and verifies identity, and the public and private transportation systems.	
7	Global Tracking Route	Awareness: Strengthen the ability to identify and track any individual or small group of terrorists on the move.	Cross-border cooperation

Source: Ginsburg (2006)

Research Methods

The research employs a qualitative methodology to understand Indonesia’s Pro-IS jihadists movement and how counterterrorism strategy intersects with border security and immigration reform. The analysis captures terrorist movement trends within the period from 2016 to 2020. The originality of the analysis comes from a dataset of mostly primary sources constructed from the Supreme Court’s record of 38 Pro-IS deportees’ convictions. Selection of documents are based on several keywords: “*putusan*”, “*kejahatan terhadap keamanan negara*”, “*teroris*”, and “*deportasi*”. In addition, data of two Pro-IS deportees, Rullie Rian Zeke and Ulfah Handayani Saleh, were collected from media coverage and official statements by the

Philippines authorities.² In total, the dataset collects 40 profiles of the arrested for terrorism-related charges or successfully launched a terror attack from 2016 to 2020. Whereas to examine the Indonesian government's strategy in countering terrorist mobility, the research depends on both primary data, i.e. court documents and government regulations, and secondary sources.

Two datasets are built to analyze personal data and travel history. Personal data contains birth location, age, gender, domicile, profession, and education. Travel history includes departure, transit, arrival, arrest, and deportation, as well as detailed information regarding the amount and source of funds. The terrorist mobility trends are then compared with the Indonesian government strategy in order to assess the gap in the implementation. Furthermore, the analysis is supported a report by the Indonesian Ministry of Law and Human Rights' Research and Development Agency (Badan Penelitian dan Pengembangan Hukum dan HAM/Balitbang HAM), and media coverage. The research has two limitations that could be addressed for future research. First, the authors have contacted governmental institutions and agencies for interviews but received no welcoming response. Second, although the authors have collected all deportees' data from the supreme court, it is possible that the digital archive is not complete. Challenges are found in obtaining equally complete information from each verdict.

Analysis

Profile of Deportees: Demography, Affiliation, Funding

Prior to this research, the first and only attempt to profile Indonesian deportees was conducted by the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) in 2018. The think tank collects data from 92 Indonesian deportees from January to April 2017 from the University of Indonesia's Center for the Study of Terrorism and Social Conflict. Their finding covers country of deportation, demography (origin, sex, education, age group), and sentiment towards IS (supportive to IS or another group). Around 89% were deported from Turkey while the rest were deported from Hong Kong, Singapore, and Japan. The basic data shows that 56% of the adults were women and 44% were men, while 76% travel with their families. Moreover, on education, 43% were high school graduates, 30% had tertiary education whereas the remaining deportees only reached junior high school or lower. More than half of the deportees originated from Java, which most of these areas correlate with the strongholds of terrorist group *Jamaah Ansharut Daulah* (JAD). Only eight percent of deportees supported non-IS groups. Based on this profile, IPAC argued that deportees mainly were middle-class and paid their own travel expenses.

The research finds both similarities and differences in the profiling of Indonesian deportees with that of IPAC. Among similarities are transit hub countries, deportees' origin, and education background, while the differences are related to financial aspects, including deportees' financial state, source of funds, and each destination's travel expenses. Around 67% deportees were arrested in Turkey, followed by Thailand (16%), the Philippines (9%),

Hong Kong (2%), and Sri Lanka (2%). It is important to note that these numbers include terrorists who were deported not only once but also twice and even three times. In terms of profile, a high number of deportees were from areas deemed vulnerable to terrorism-related activity: West Java (25%), Aceh (20%), DKI Jakarta (10%), Lampung (10%), and Central Java (7%). Although the supreme court documents lacked personal background information, the data show that 27% of deportees do not hold a bachelor's degree or higher – high school graduates or lower are more probable. Ten people, or 25% of the deportees, has a bachelor's degree, and one person has a master's degree. While men outnumbered women by 7 to 1, the latter may hold critical roles from funding *hijrah* expenses to the executor of suicide bombing. As example, Meilani Indria Dewi used to sell Islamic clothing for Muslim women online to fund her trip to Syria and join ISIS, and Arti Alifah Aviandari Rahardjo, was responsible for purchasing flight tickets and visa applications for herself and family.³

Contrary to IPAC report, the research argues that profession as well as income might not necessarily determine the preparedness of an individual for *hijrah*, as other means of funding are available such as support and loan (Figure 1). By profession, 67% of the deportees work in informal sectors, while the rest were private employees, civil servants (*aparatsipil negara/ASN*), and unemployed. In parallel, some deportees were radicalized during their time as migrant workers abroad as in the case of Ika Puspita Sari who was deported from Hong Kong in 2016. Their suspicious activities related to terrorism became the reason behind their deportation back to Indonesia.

Half of the deportees were self-funded, around 57%, by most likely selling existing properties for funding. Around 19% of the case was partly aided by others and 2,3% was fully funded. Aided individuals mostly received financial help from their travel facilitators, fellow sympathizers, or other cell group members. For instance, Fathu Yahya Hasan received an additional US\$ 701 from Ibrahim, his travel facilitator, to go to Syria after collecting US\$ 1,402. While Uzair Cholid received US\$ 70,090 from his brother Ziad Cholid who is also a Pro-ISIS sympathizer. Fathu Yahya's second attempt to *hijrah* was fully funded by his travel facilitator, Mr. Joko. Angga Irawan, who was deported in 2014 from Turkey, received loans for US\$ 8,271 from Central Java Regional Development Bank. Therefore, contrary to IPAC, the research finds that many deportees are partly or even fully aided by others.




Figure 1. Source of fund for *hijrah*.
Source: Authors, from Supreme Court Verdicts

While most deportees are caught in Turkey, there are many destination choices for *hijrah*. The travel routes map, as seen in Figure 2, shows travelers who transit through Turkey by air legally would likely to cross into Syria. Other routes that serve as a pair of transit point and destination are: 1) Iran to Afghanistan, 2) Manila to Mindanao in the Philippines, and 3) New Delhi to Jammu Kashmir in India. In parallel, taking the sea route from Indonesia is also an option to enter Mindanao, the Philippines, illegally. As the most favorable choice to enter Syria, Turkey's border area with Syria is deemed a strategic transit hub for foreign fighters joining IS. This *hijrah* highway starts from Istanbul in the West of Turkey towards Gaziantep, Sanliurfa, and Kilis. In fact, the country has welcomed and accepted refugees and migrants from Syria, taking the same route as foreign fighters who attempt to cross the border and vice versa (Yayla, 2019). In the past few years, Iran is deemed as the new transit hub choice to various *hijrah* destinations since the departure of Indonesian Pro-IS terrorists in 2019. Furthermore, cheaper option of destinations from Indonesia is India and the Philippines. Not only is it more affordable than Syria, but the Philippines is also a closer destination from Indonesia (Figure 3).




Figure 2. Map of travel routes taken by Indonesian Pro-IS deportees to Turkey.

Source: Authors, from Supreme Court Verdicts




Figure 3. Map of alternative travel routes taken by Indonesian Pro-IS deportees to Iran.
Source: Authors, from Supreme Court Verdicts

The amount of funds collected seems to affect a terrorist's choice of destination. The total cost of *hijrah* for each person in Turkey could reach Rp 50 to 100 million (US\$ 3,482 to US\$ 6,963). There is also the additional fee of US\$500 per person for smuggling into Syria. In 2018, Uzair Cholid and Arti Alifah prepared Rp 1.05 billion (US\$ 73,164) to cover travel expenses and buy an apartment in Turkey with the help of Arpiet Mahfuz Fitri Kemora. The next year, a group led by Muhamad Aulia attempted to travel to Afghanistan by taking the Thailand-Iran route, where each member prepared between Rp 20 to 150 million (US\$ 1,392 to US\$ 10,443). In other cases, those who travelled to India and transited in Sri Lanka like Farid Ramadhan, as well as those who travel to the Philippines like Agistya Agriyana and Muhammad Ghufon Damanhuri, prepared Rp 20-50 million (US\$ 1,392 to US\$ 3,480) each.

How Terrorists Exploit the Border and Immigration Control

A traveler requires travel documents and immigration permits to be able to depart. Based on Law No. 16/2011 on Immigration Article 24 and Regulation of the Minister of Law and Human Rights No. 30/2016 on Immigration Intelligence, immigration permits encompass travel documents, visa, entry, and exit proof. Immigration control starts from applying for a passport and visa application, followed by pre-inspections of these travel documents at the immigration checkpoint.

Not all deportees require to apply for new passports since many of them have had applied before for pilgrimage trip to Mecca. Those without passports would go through legal or illegal channels, as in the case of Wahyu Deddy Saputra, who managed to apply for another passport despite being deported from Turkey before. After his passport application was rejected, Wahyu requested assistance from a friend, Jannah, who had access to the data center, to secure a new passport. Another example, Uzair Cholid managed to obtain a new identity card (IC) under the name Husein Ali Asegaf with the help of his brother. He was then able to apply for a new passport with his new IC through a middleman without further background checks and other proper documentation check and other proper documentation.⁴

Travel facilitators have a vital role as a travel planner, including but not limited to deciding travel routes, acting as a middleman with travel hosts in the destination country, as well as arranging tickets and visas. Recruitments are mostly done through social media and chat applications such as Telegram, WhatsApp, Facebook and Instagram, which are also used to communicate with prospective *mujahideen*. More than half of the facilitators travelled together with their travel group and mostly acted as *amir*, as in the case of Muhammad Aulia and Ahmad Supriyanto. The ones not travelling would likely be part of criminal networks, either in Indonesia or abroad.

These deportees knew how to identify and exploit exit points with the least security control as well as having the capability to infiltrate immigration systems without detection during document validation and interview at several checkpoints. In Indonesia there are five ports of departure in total: 1) Jakarta's Soekarno-Hatta International Airport in Tangerang as the favorite choice, 2) Kualanamu International Airport in Deli Serdang, North Sumatra, 3) Juanda International Airport in Sidoarjo, 4) I Gusti Ngurah Rai International Airport in Bali, or 5) Tunon Taka Seaport in Nunukan, North Kalimantan. Muhammad Aulia decided to depart from Kualanamu International Airport to avoid detection from authorities while Triyono took the sea route from Tanon Taka Port and crossed into Zamboanga via Malaysia acting as a merchant.

Deportees were also able to exploit stealth travel beyond immigration control. Cici, the daughter of 2019 Jolo Church Bombing perpetrators, evidently took her family to enter the Philippines through illegal channels from Keningau, Malaysia with the help of two Indonesian facilitators (Latief, 2019). The Philippines authority claimed that Cici and her family took the sea route to enter Mindanao, were held up in Lampinigan Island for a few days and then sailed to Jolo by pump boat (Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, 2019).

In between the legal and illegal ways, there are also the grey areas used by these terrorists. Examples include the use of tourist visas and residence permits. Arpiet Mahfuz and his family used an *ikamet* to prevent the authorities from detecting terrorist-related activities while extending their stay in Turkey. *Ikamet* is a residence permit for foreigners who want to stay longer in Turkey – up to six months. After acquiring the residence permit, Arpiet bought an apartment in Sogutluceme, Istanbul and he even managed to return to Indonesia and travel back to Turkey undetected.

Counter to Terrorist Mobility Strategy: Obstacles to Effective Implementation

There have been efforts by the Indonesian government to counter the terrorist mobility of the mentioned profiled militants. In 2016 the police prevented two families comprising ten people from Tangerang, a suburb of Jakarta and Singkawang (in West Kalimantan) from departing Soekarno-Hatta airport, suspecting that they will join IS in Syria (Tristiawati, 2016). Again in 2019, Detachment 88 (Densus 88) captured Hari Kuncoro in the same airport when he was about to depart to Syria, using Iran as a transit point (Rico, 2019). Nevertheless, terrorist mobility issues have not been effectively addressed.

Table 2 shows the institutional arrangements in countering terrorist mobility in Indonesia, based on the existing regulations such as Law No. 16/2011 on Immigration and Regulation of the Minister of Law and Human Rights No. 44/2015 on Entry and Exit Procedures at Immigration Checkpoints. Accordingly, efforts to combat terrorist mobility can be divided into immigration and border control, crime control, and cross-border cooperation.

Table 2. Institutional Arrangements for Countering Terrorist Mobility

Factor	Variable	Indicator	Institution	Limitation
Immigration and Border Control	Detection Method for Immigration Officers	Guideline	The Immigration and BNPT	Absence of technical guideline; lack of integrated and accessible information systems; institutional culture; poor infrastructure condition of immigration checkpoints at borders
	Travel Document Application	SIMKIM	The Immigration, Dukcapil, BNP2TKI, Ministry of Religious Affairs, National Police, and INTERPOL	
		INTERPOL's I-24/7 system		
	Document Validity During Inspection at Checkpoints	SIMKIM, BCM	INTERPOL's I-24/7 system	
BCM				
		ASEANAPOL Chain (e-ADS)		
Crime Control	Dismantle Illicit Market for Travel Documents	Investigation and intelligence exchange	National Police, the Immigration, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Internal Affairs, BAIS, BNPT, PPATK, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, BIN, Special Detachment 88,	Lack of coordination and cooperation between critical entities during investigation
	Arrest Travel Facilitator		Ministry of National Development	

			Planning, and UNODC	
Cross- Border Cooperation	Bilateral and Multilateral Cooperation	Information and Intelligence Exchange	The Immigration, POLRI, BNPT, and Ministry of Defence	The need to expand cooperation with new transit hub countries

Immigration and Border Control

For passport application examination, Rahmanto et al. (2020) describes that officers use the Immigration Management Information System (*Sistem Informasi Manajemen Keimigrasian/SIMKIM*), already integrated with several systems from different stakeholders, such as the Population and Civil Registration Agency (Dukcapil), the National Board for the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Overseas Workers (BNP2TKI), and documents from Ministry of Religious Affairs. If all required documents are complete, the holder will proceed to the interview session. However, if the documents are invalid, the immigration officer will deny the passport or visa application. During the interview session, the officer observes the applicant's facial expression, body gestures, and behavior. If the applicant's intention is suspicious, officers could coordinate with the Directorate of Intelligence or Directorate of Investigation and Enforcement. Both directorates coordinate for document verification using SIMKIM which has been integrated with INTERPOL's I-24/7 system. In addition, officers could also observe by visiting the applicant's residence for a more convincing decision. If the applicants are students, officers could verify by contacting their sponsors or institutions that granted them scholarships (Rahmanto et al., 2020).

Similar to inspections during passport application, Rahmanto et al. (2020) explains that an immigration officer examines a traveler's documents at checkpoints with the support of data and information available in the SIMKIM that controls all application systems at every immigration office, points of entry and exit, immigration detention centers, and representatives' offices abroad. The inspection reveals an individual's profile, travel history, or whether the document is stolen or manipulated to falsify travel. Moreover, an interview session will follow to detect false personas (Putra & Arifin, 2020).

Effective law compliance and enforcement could be achieved if immigration checkpoints are information-rich environments that continuously improve biometric screening systems and provide denied visa or admission information and a watchlist. To improve clearance systems, Putra and Arifin (2020) explain that SIMKIM has been integrated with the Border Control Management (BCM) system since 2010. The BMC system includes visa and residence permit system, departure ban and entry ban data (Enhanced CEKAL System or ECS), passenger's movement system (PMS/APK), passport application (SPRI/E-Office), detention center application system, and immigration and enforcement system (Nyidakim). This integration of systems allows law enforcement agencies to detect travelers connected or engaged with transnational criminal activities, including terrorism. The

prevention list also includes names of individuals who are in the National Police's wanted list (DPO) (Citrawan & Nadilla, 2019).

BCM is also synchronized with INTERPOL's I-24/7 system and ASEANAPOL Chain (e-ADS) at regional and international levels. Based on the State Police Regulations No. 5 in 2011 on the Use of the INTERPOL Network (I-24/7) and ASEANAPOL Chain (e-ADS) in Indonesia Article 1 Clause 2, INTERPOL's Global Police Communications System works nonstop, used for information exchange between member states of the ICPO-INTERPOL. The State Police Regulation also explains that Electronic ASEANAPOL Database System (e-ADS) is a database system based on the agreement of the ASEAN Chief of Police for criminal intelligence exchange between member states. These databases include but are not limited to personal and biometric data, INTERPOL notices, stolen or lost travel and identity documents (SLTD), criminal records, criminal syndicate, and modus operandi.

Cooperation between Immigration and NCB-INTERPOL Indonesia started post-Marawi Siege. From 2017 to 2018, the INTERPOL Borders Management Task Force (IBMTF) with NCB-INTERPOL Indonesia and the Directorate General of Immigration conducted border control operations at several immigration checkpoints across Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines to anticipate a wave of Pro-IS fighters leaving and entering the country (*Divisi Hubungan Internasional POLRI*, 2018a). The operation focused on the southern region of the Philippines: Tarakan, North Kalimantan; Balikpapan, East Kalimantan; North Sulawesi; and West Nusa Tenggara. Using the Mobile INTERPOL Network Database (MIND), immigration officers could counter and detect foreign terrorist fighters' mobility.

In the field, immigration officers acknowledge four critical challenges: 1) lack of fiber optic network along with bad weather conditions and lack of real-time data; 2) uneven facilities and infrastructure development at immigration offices in remote areas, such as Immigration Office Class II Tahuna, North Sulawesi; 3) lack of access to data and profiling terrorist; and 4) lack of capacity building measures on counter-terrorist mobility for front line officers (Rahmanto et al., 2020). For example, SIMKIM Ver. 1 and Ver. 2 could be used to check applicants' passport details. However, only the Directorate General has access to the database. Meanwhile, at the border checkpoints, existing infrastructure realities hamper immigration officers to get real-time information, especially in remote areas. No border checks are using BCM with international standards. Most border posts use portable BCM without the ability to provide the real-time information. The immigration office in Tanjung Perak uses an offline portable BCM, which could only be synchronized once every one to two days. Besides Tanjung Perak, immigration offices in West Kalimantan do not use fiber-optic networks and only rely on satellite communication. In fact, due to geographical conditions, immigration offices in remote areas are less likely to be monitored, allowing further immigration violations.

Furthermore, without having a guideline to detect terrorist suspects during an interview, immigration officers could only rely on their intuition and suspicious signs from facial expressions, body gestures, and behavior. This further shows that the lead agency on counterterrorism, BNPT, has not optimized its role—according to Governmental Regulation No. 77/2019 on Terrorism Prevention and the Provision of Compensation, Restitution and

Assistance to Witness and Victims—in coordinating, integrating, and evaluating analysis involving multiple agents to produce such information and intelligence as a terrorist detection method.

Another problem that should not be ignored is the government's plan to integrate BCM with INTERPOL's I-24/7 system in every departure point across the country by 2020 (Divisi Hubungan Internasional POLRI, 2018b). At first, integration of the two systems was launched back in 2017 at Soekarno-Hatta International Airport and I Gusti Ngurah Rai International Airport. In 2018, representatives from the National Police (Polri) and Directorate General of Immigration signed the Standard of Procedure (SOP) on alert for INTERPOL's I-24/7 system integration with BCM. However, there has not been any update or media coverage on this matter. In addition to lack of infrastructure modernization, as argued before, it would be difficult to expect an even installation across the archipelago by 2020. An equal development is required as other international airports and small seaports are also vulnerable to terrorist mobility.

Crime Control: In-Country Identification and Tracking

Rejecting an issuance of passport or visa application is not enough as government needs to attack the illicit market of terrorist mobility support to constrain terrorist mobility at the pre-travel phase, most predominantly travel document providers and terrorist travel facilitators. They are relatively easier to find since these illicit businesses focus more on money than ideology. Arresting a single travel facilitator would not guarantee the rise of future unknown successors, but it could slow down operations (Ginsburg, 2006).

Although there has not been any law and regulation that specifically target the disruption of the travel facilitator network, there are laws against individuals as illegal documents providers. Law No. 16/2011 on Immigration clearly states the consequences for immigration officers who attempt any violation that threatens the security of the immigration system. Firstly, an immigration officer or other appointed officials who knowingly and unlawfully provide travel documents or give or extend immigration documents to a person they know is not entitled will face imprisonment for up to seven years. Moreover, if officers allow an individual to commit an immigration-related crime, they will face a maximum of five years of imprisonment. There are also legal actions related to the information system: immigration officers or other officials who deliberately leak confidential immigration data to unauthorized parties will face imprisonment for up to five years. As a matter of fact, if they intentionally and unlawfully do not input data into the Immigration Management Information System, they will be in six months of prison time. Clues from the arrested travel facilitator could be traced back to the document provider and vice versa.

The government should prioritize the arrests of terrorists travel facilitators due to the following reasons. First, their arrest could disrupt the day-to-day functioning of the terrorist network. Second, terrorist facilitators could be the source of contacts providing clues for tracking other members of the terrorist network (Ginsburg, 2006). Travel facilitators who also travel with a particular group are likely to get arrested. On the other hand, the facilitators who

do not travel remain free. Their arrest would provide law enforcement with a huge advantage in tracking other previously undetected terrorist network members.

As the primary counterterrorism investigative authority, Rahmanto et al. (2020) argue that Polri is responsible for arresting these illicit travel service providers. Effective law enforcement would also need intelligence exchange with vital and relevant ministries and agencies about the latest terrorist mobility trends, potential terror attacks, and identification of terrorist networks. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs formed several task forces, including the group responsible for the List of Suspected Terrorists and Terrorist Organizations (*Daftar Terduga Teroris dan Organisasi Teroris/DTTOT*) from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) – such as the Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Center (*Pusat Pelaporan dan Analisis Transaksi Keuangan/PPATK*), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, BNPT, State Intelligence Agency (*Badan Intelijen Negara/BIN*), Densus 88 and Directorate General of Immigration. Their meeting discusses the individual profile of a suspected terrorist, which then requires approval from the Central Jakarta District Court before adding it to the information immigration system (“Anti pencucian uang”, n.d.). Using the DTTOT might be a challenge as the immigration needs real-time information as all the Indonesian deportees who were detected abroad are not on the list in the first place.

At Polri, a man-to-man program focuses on coordinating law enforcement and other agencies to observe suspected terrorists. The investigation result would be used for the next coordinated meeting. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also conducted training with the support of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and coordinated with the Ministry of National Development Planning based on the priority of each institution and agency. Meanwhile, trainings conducted by PPATK focus on analysis and detection methods of terrorism funding.

After collecting raw intelligence, analysis is needed either for investigation or policymaking. However, issues such as sectoral ego and lack of analysts are undermining efforts to counter terrorist mobility. Despite training on intelligence by Ministry of Internal Affairs that involved Polri and Armed Forces as well as analysts provided by BNPT, data and information exchange is impossible if sectoral egos persist within institutions and agencies (Rahmanto et al., 2020). In this regard, other entities that should have helped law enforcement could not optimize their role as front-line officers to detect terrorism-related activities. Head of Class I Immigration Office at Soekarno-Hatta International Airport stressed the fact that they are dealing with a lack of data integration with BIN, the Armed Forces’ Strategic Intelligence Agency (BAIS), INTERPOL, Densus 88, and the Immigration Office itself, which is vital to prevent the issuing of passport (Citrawan & Nadilla, 2019).

Cross-Border Cooperation

When terrorists exit or enter official access points, they will take measures to conceal themselves from the detection of both the Indonesian and transit country authorities. They could either take a route beyond border and immigration control, choose transit countries with visa-free access, or apply for a residence permit at the country of destination. The latter

is a worldwide challenge for counter-terrorism policy considering territorial borders between conflicting states are arguably the least patrolled; thus, making them a promising transit zones (Ginsburg, 2006). Our dataset shows numerous countries have been deemed as new transit hubs, which require cross-border cooperation with Indonesia (Figure 4). In order to travel to four destination countries, namely Turkey, Iran, the Philippines and India, individuals can take routes through 10 transit countries, which are Thailand, Hong Kong, United Arab Emirates, Malaysia, Singapore, Italy, Oman, Brunei Darussalam, Sri Lanka, and Qatar.




Figure 4. Indonesian Pro-IS deportees’ travel history from departure points to arrest location.
Source: Authors, from Supreme Court Decisions

Indonesia has been actively involved in both bilateral and multilateral initiatives for information exchange and capacity-building efforts for effective immigration management, including with visa-free access countries, such as Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand (VisaIndex, 2022). For example, in 2016 the Directorate General of Immigration opened a meeting Singapore’s Immigration Checkpoints Authority (ICA) to plan the strengthening of respective borders from FTFs mobility (“10th bilateral meeting”, 2016).

Moreover, in 2016 the 20th ASEAN Directors - General of Immigration Department and Heads of Consular Affairs Divisions of Ministries of Foreign Affairs (DGICM) agreed to adopt three recommendations from the Indonesian delegation: a framework called the ASEAN Heads of Major Immigration Checkpoints Forum (AMICF), the establishment of Ad-Hoc Working Groups on ASEAN Common Visa, and a joint statement for Regional Cooperation on Prevention of FTFs Movement (“Usulan Indonesia disetujui”, 2016). Furthermore, on July

6, 2018, the Three Supplementary Activities between ASEAN Directors-General of Immigration Departments, Heads of Consular Affairs Divisions of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (DGICM) and Australia was held in Mataram, West Nusa Tenggara, to discuss and strengthen immigration cooperation. The event was attended by ten ASEAN countries and Australia, addressing among others intelligence exchange and countermeasures towards FTFs between DGICM member states and Australia (“Tingkatkan kerjasama keimigrasian”, 2018). Finally, on November 5, 2019, the Indonesian Directorate General of Immigration and Immigration Department of Malaysia participated in the Indonesia-Malaysia Immigration Consultation focusing on border control and management, mobility at the entry and exit points, migrant workers protection, stay permit for families, joint training, and capacity building efforts (Susilo, 2019).

Another multilateral initiative is the Plan of Action (POA) of European Union to ASEAN (EU-ASEAN) interregional cooperation. From 2013 to 2017, one of the implementations of POA is the Comprehensive Border Management Program, which enables the EU to provide capacity building for ASEAN member states to develop an effective border management system (Wibisono & Kusumasomantri, 2020).

As for cooperation with the destination country, Indonesia has established contact with Turkey since 2017. The Turkish National Police (TNP) held a meeting Polri and the head of BNPT to discuss counterterrorism efforts, including how to address FTFs who used Turkey as an entry and exit point to Syria. TNP has assigned analysts and researchers in 33 locations across Turkey to monitor and detect potential terrorists; as of 2017, *Divisi Hubungan Internasional* POLRI (2017) reported that TNP has monitored 17,000 and interviewed 10,000 people. The Turkish government has also deported 4,000 people back to their original countries. Both countries’ police have agreed to strengthen cooperation in information and intelligence exchange to counter transnational crime.

In assuring border control from stealth travelers, increasing enforcement (physical barriers and detection measures) and joint operation with neighboring countries are considered not enough. The ASEAN Our Eyes (AOE) was adopted during the 5th ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM) in 2018 (Ryacudu, 2018). It serves as a critical regional platform that facilitates strategic intelligence exchange with an integrated database, joint training and operation, and capacity-building measures. Unfortunately, the case of Jolo Church Bombing in the southern Philippines in 2019 shows that intelligence exchange has not gone far enough. After the attack, the Philippines authorities claimed that the perpetrators were an Indonesian couple who received help from the Islamic State. The Indonesian government denied the claim and decided to deploy its officials for verification (“Indonesian couple with ties”, 2019). Since Ulfah Handayani Saleh and her children entered the Philippines illegally from Sabah to Jolo, there were no entrance records, which hampered the investigation. It took the Indonesian government six months to clarify that the suicide bombers were indeed Indonesian nationals, after arresting two other suspected terrorists from the JAD network – Novendri and Yoya. The case study shows that state members of ASEAN, including Indonesia and the Philippines, should improve coordination in intelligence exchange to optimize the existing regional initiative against cross-border terrorist threats.

Postscript

The fall of IS in 2017 after losing 95% of its territory did not lessen the importance of the counter-terrorist mobility strategy (CTMS) (Glenn, 2019), and neither did the surge of the COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic did cease most illegal travel to terrorist destinations and therefore reduced the number of potential targets globally (Basit, 2020), but this was temporary. IS' influence might have been abating in the Middle East, but they remain to have supporters who continue carrying out violence in Indonesia (Abuza & Satria, 2020). Two years into the pandemic, the world starts to reconnect as international commercial aviation gradually returns to the pre-pandemic condition (Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) UN Security Council, 2021). The most recent development shows that after the *coup* in Afghanistan, IS supporters in Indonesia believe the Taliban is now “the near enemy” - while western countries, including the US, as “the far enemy” - of IS-Khorasan (Arianti & Rahmah, 2021). While it is too early to conclude whether Afghanistan will be the next hotspot for *hijrah*, anticipating a post-pandemic resurgence of terrorist cross-border mobility threat necessitates better screening and border management measures.

The Indonesian government issued President Regulation No. 7/2021 on National Action Plan (NAP) for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCEV) that Leads to Terrorism 2020-2024, which led to the establishment of the Joint Secretariat of the NAP on PCEV in March 2021 (BNPT, 2021c). The plan has three pillars: (a) prevention; (b) law enforcement, witness, and victim protection, and strengthening of the National Legislative Framework; (c) international partnership and cooperation. The first pillar aims to provide and integrate a system of data management that includes profiles and studies that analyze networks, vulnerable areas, trends, and evaluation of previous cases. The second pillar focuses on increasing the institutional capacity of law enforcement to optimize the deterrence effect through coordination and information exchange between relevant actors. Finally, the third pillar enhances international cooperation between relevant countries and communities. There are eight ministries and eight institutions or agencies involved in implementing the action plan.⁴

Besides forming a joint secretariat, BNPT also created working groups and mechanisms to coordinate, monitor, and evaluate the NAP on PCEV (BNPT, 2021a). Although BNPT claimed that the agency had implemented most of the strategies from each pillar, the details have never been disclosed. It is also important to note that the first report of the NAP on PCEV was produced recently during the 2021 annual meeting (BNPT, 2021b). Thus, it is too early to assess the implementation, let alone its impact on TMS.

On the ASEAN level, assessing the implementation of terrorism-related initiatives such as AOE remains difficult due to its confidentiality status. As of January 2022, AOE had conducted six working groups to discuss the implementation of the Standard Operating Procedures of ASEAN Our Eyes (AOE SOP), update on the mechanism and facility of each member states' Our Eyes Command Center (OECC) and ASEAN Direct Communication Infrastructure, and exchange information on the regional and global level on terrorism threat (Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 2021). The SOP was adopted in 2020 during the 14th

ADMM and was finalized during the 6th AOE Working Group in early 2022. Real implementation of the initiative would contribute to the strengthening of ASEAN cooperation on managing the transborder terrorist issues.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The research has produced two main analyses from a novel dataset on pro-IS deportees. First, profession and income are not the determining factor of *hijrah* as individuals, who wish to do so, could seek, or get funding through support and loan through travel facilitators. There are four choices of the transit and destination country, namely Turkey to Syria, Iran to Afghanistan, Manila to Mindanao in the Philippines, and New Delhi to Jammu Kashmir in India, which precondition different levels of financial capability. Although Turkey to Syria routes was the favorite among deportees, Manila to Mindanao routes proved to be the most economical choice for *hijrah*.

Second, the migration pattern of pro-IS deportees confirmed the vulnerabilities of the immigration system and border control along with weak law enforcement to constrain those wishing to join the IS abroad. Travel facilitators have a vital role in exploiting the system. They were responsible for travel arrangements: 1) choosing exit-entry points, 2) acting as the middleman with illegal document providers, and 3) playing the host in the destination country. These individuals have the capability to infiltrate the immigration system without getting detected starting from the first process of the journey, which is passport applications. The deportees are also aware of the exit points with the least security control to conceal their false persona during document validation. On the other hand, deportees also utilize illegal channels to cross the border, such as sea routes to enter the Southern Philippines.

An effective CTMS should be able to constrain terrorists' movement through coordination, law, and diplomacy at both domestic and international levels. Nevertheless, the implementation of current countermeasures has shown that Indonesia needs to improve its deterrent and offensive strategies. All obstacles to effective implementation of CTMS by the Indonesian government highlight the need for detection method guidelines for immigration officers, travel facilitator arrestment and its illegal market, clearance system and infrastructure improvement at borders, as well as intelligence cooperation optimization.

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¹ The Islamic State (IS) has exploited the term *hijrah* to attract foreign Muslim followers and join the fight in Syria and Iraq. The concept of *hijrah* itself traditionally refers to Prophet Muhammad's migration in 622 CE from Mecca to Medina as Muslims were unable to practice Islam (Uberman & Shay, 2016).

² The Indonesian couple were the perpetrators of Jolo Church Bombing in southern Philippines that killed 23 people and wounded 95 others back in early 2019 (Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, 2019).

³ Ulfah Handayani Saleh was deported from Turkey in 2016 and was the suicide bomber of the 2019 Jolo Church Bombing in southern Philippines.

⁴ According to the Directorate General of Immigration (n.d.) website, the required documentations to apply a passport are a valid identity card, family card (KK), and birth certificate, marriage book, diploma, or baptismal certificate.

⁵ The eight institutions/agencies are BNPT, Polri, PPATK, Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), Statistics Indonesia (BPS), National Cyber and Crypto Agency (BSSN), Witness and Victim Protection Agency (LPSK), National Commission on Violence against Women (Komnas Perempuan), and Attorney General. And the other eight ministries are Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Religious Affairs, Ministry of Law and Human Rights, State Intelligence Agency (BIN), Ministry of Social Affairs, and Ministry of Women Empowerment and Child Protection.