REGIONALISM UNDER CHALLENGE: IDEAS AND JOKO WIDODO’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS ASEAN, 2014-2019

Mohamad Rosyidin1*; Shary Charlotte H. Pattipeilohy2
1,2Department of International Relations, Universitas Diponegoro
1mohamadrosyidin@lecturer.undip.ac.id; 2charlotte_pattipeilohy@ymail.com

Received: 27th July 2020/ Revised: 21st October 2020/ Accepted: 13th November 2020


ABSTRACT

Indonesia’s foreign policy under Joko Widodo ‘Jokowi’ has significantly shifted compared with his predecessor’s era, especially regarding policies on regionalism. While former President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono emphasises multilateralism with a particular focus on ASEAN, Jokowi’s administration tends to overlook ASEAN as a multilateral organization. The research investigates the causal root of the tendency by using the concept of ideas in foreign policy. The results argue that the diminished role of Indonesia in ASEAN, especially during the first term of Jokowi’s presidency, is strongly influenced by causal beliefs held by Indonesian political elites and presidential advisors. Despite varying from one individual to another, these ideas have similar characteristics in proposing that Indonesia should expand its concentric circle beyond ASEAN, arguing that ASEAN is intrinsically weak and thus can no longer accommodate Indonesian aspirations. This idea acts as a road map that defines Indonesia’s national interests amid international politics dynamics in the 21st century.

Keywords: Indonesia’s foreign policy, Joko Widodo, ASEAN, causal beliefs, road map

INTRODUCTION

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) plays a strategic role in Indonesia’s foreign policy. As a regional power, Indonesia regards ASEAN as a ‘cornerstone’ of its foreign policy. During Suharto’s New Order period (1967-1998), ASEAN had helped project Indonesia’s image as a peace-loving country with a moderate and developmental perspective (Anwar, 1994). Importantly, ASEAN supports political and economic stability in
Southeast Asia; thus, stability, security, and prosperity in the region will directly impact Indonesia (Luhulima, 2013). For Indonesia, ASEAN is one instrument through which it can achieve its national interests among other multilateral bodies – primarily the United Nations – as well as bilateral relations and, if necessary, unilateral self-help (Weatherbee, 2013). Indonesia’s foreign policy approach has been ‘the regionalist approach to globalism’. Indonesia sees ASEAN as the basis of legitimacy to achieve status as a global player (Acharya, 2014). ASEAN is also becoming Indonesia’s platform to enhance its desired status as a significant power while implementing middle power diplomacy (Tan in Roberts et al., 2015). In short, ASEAN matters to Indonesia.

However, ASEAN’s central role has been somewhat diminished since Joko Widodo ‘Jokowi’ was elected as the President of Indonesia in 2014. ASEAN is no longer attractive from the Indonesian government’s perspective because of its ‘Global Maritime Fulcrum’ doctrine, a new Indonesia’s foreign policy agenda under Jokowi that takes a ‘look West policy’ by embracing countries in the Indian Ocean and Africa (Syailendra, 2015). To some extent, Jokowi’s foreign policy characteristics are like those of Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte. Experts from Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) argue that Jokowi’s foreign policy tends to be nationalistic, unilateral, emphasises the domestic agenda, and pays less attention to ASEAN, including being impatient with ASEAN processes and protocols (Cook, 2016). While official Indonesian statements stress the importance of ASEAN in Indonesia’s foreign policy, it appears that Indonesia’s commitment to ASEAN is mere rhetoric. Even though ASEAN remains a strategic partner for Indonesia, especially in terms of trade and investment, ASEAN is no longer seen as crucial for Indonesia’s pursuit of national interests. For example, on the South China Sea issue, Jokowi tends to overlook ASEAN, instead choosing a unilateralist approach to protect Indonesia’s sovereignty in the Natuna Sea from the Chinese expansion. In this case, Jokowi seems to have lost interest in using ASEAN as an instrument of diplomacy (Connelly, 2016), and his commitment to ASEAN on the issue is considerably passive (Weatherbee, 2016).

There is existing literature on the issue of ASEAN’s role in Jokowi’s foreign policy. Most scholars of international relations rely on realist analysis to explain this trend. Shekhar (2015) suggests that this tendency reflects the ‘realist turn’ in contemporary Indonesia’s foreign policy. He further says that Jokowi’s foreign policy fits well with the basic premise of realism that tends to be sceptical of multilateral fora and international organizations such as ASEAN. This argument is supported by some Australian observers who argue that Jokowi is more concerned with bilateral approaches rather than multilateral ones (Poole, 2015; Willis, 2017). Similarly, Arif (2015) argues that Jokowi’s foreign policy represents a pragmatic and realist approach. Consequently, Indonesia does not see ASEAN as an essential institution.

Those works of literature have provided a foundation for further arguments on ASEAN regionalism challenges under Jokowi’s foreign policy. It is noteworthy to mention three factors of Jokowi’s foreign policy shift from the previous government on ASEAN’s issue. First, Jokowi faces a different social and political situation from the previous administration in which Jokowi seeks to defend his legitimacy from the various political forces around him. Second, Jokowi’s personal background is different from the previous president and affects his
perspective on the international environment. Third, Jokowi’s foreign political orientation places domestic development as a priority issue, even if it does not ignore ASEAN’s central role (Umar, 2016).

Unfortunately, existing literature has not given a satisfactory answer to why Jokowi downplays the importance of ASEAN. Realist arguments seem convincing at first glance; the pragmatic character of Jokowi’s foreign policy emphasises bilateralism rather than multilateralism. However, realists neglect the fact that Indonesia still recognises the importance of multilateral forums. As Dinarto (2017) points out, although Indonesia neglects ASEAN, it is essential to consider other multilateral fora such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). Through IORA, Indonesia expects it can support Jokowi’s domestic infrastructure policies and strengthen the agenda of the ‘Global Maritime Fulcrum’. If realist logic is right, Indonesia should entirely ignore multilateral fora, as they serve merely as a ‘talking shop’. This is a downfall of a realist perspective on the issue and is a compelling reason for the research to enrich analysis with a constructivist perspective.

The changing dynamic of Indonesia’s foreign policy towards ASEAN is useful to test foreign policy change theory. Hermann (1990) mentions four factors behind foreign policy changes: individual leaders, bureaucracy, domestic politics, and international pressure. These, in turn, determine changes in the decision-making processes resulting in foreign policy changes. Holsti (cited in Gustavsson, 1999) mentions many factors such as external, domestic, historical, and cultural factors, coupled with other factors such as perceptions, personalities, elitist attitudes, and policy-making processes. Carlnsaes (1993) describes the agent-structure framework, in which foreign policy changes are the result of an action-reaction cycle between agents and structures. These theories apply at three levels of analysis: individuals, domestic, and international. Although the domestic level covers the decision-making process, it does not consider the group’s role in shaping elite perceptions and attitudes in setting foreign policy. In other words, the existing theories are weak in explaining the dynamics of foreign policy at the domestic level.

The research shows the role of individuals and groups, especially in the inner circle of government, on leaders’ perceptions and attitudes that drive foreign policy changes. Using ideas and foreign policy framework, the research argues that Indonesia’s foreign policy towards ASEAN under Jokowi is strongly affected by his foreign policy advisers’ causal belief. These ideas influence how Jokowi positions Indonesia at the regional level, arguing that Indonesia no longer needs ASEAN as a concentric circle of foreign policy. Indonesia should instead expand its concentric circle beyond ASEAN because ASEAN can no longer accommodate Indonesian aspirations as an emerging power in Asia. The research focuses on the first term of Jokowi’s presidency for two reasons. First, the design of Jokowi’s foreign policy was strongly influenced by his closest advisers during his presidency’s early days. Since Jokowi has little personal interest in foreign policy, international relations played a significant role in formulating his foreign policy agenda. Second, ASEAN has been neglected in Jokowi’s foreign policy as he champions a bilateral over multilateral approach in the pursuit of national interests.
The research is organised in three sections. The first section sketches the theoretical framework as an instrument of analysis. Using the framework proposed by Goldstein and Keohane (1993), ideas play a crucial role in policy-making. Understanding the foreign policy of a country requires us to understand the ideas held by policymakers and other people involved in foreign policy decision making. The second section discusses continuity and change under Jokowi’s foreign policy towards ASEAN. It highlights the characteristics of Jokowi’s foreign policy, especially the idea of the ‘Global Maritime Fulcrum’, and addresses Indonesia’s role in ASEAN with particular attention to multilateralism. The third section elaborates the critical argument by discussing the research findings on the impact of ideas on Jokowi’s approach to ASEAN. The empirical findings then lead to the conclusion and policy recommendations in the last section.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Ideas and Foreign Policy

Conventional analysis of states’ behaviour has been dominated by a decision-making approach, focusing on the policy’s complexity. However, as Hudson (2014) argues, Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) should focus on “… decisions taken by human decision-makers regarding or having known consequences for entities external to their nation-state.” Decision-making theory was first developed in post-World War II, pioneered by Snyder, Brucks, and Sapin (in Rosenau, 1961). They maintain that “[E]mphasis on action suggests process analysis, i.e., the passage of time plus continuous changes in relationships – including the conditions underlying change and its consequences.” Graham Allison made the most notable contribution of decision-making theory in his Essence of Decision: Explaining Cuban Missile Crisis. He revised the analysis from the rational model that emphasises the personality of decision-makers. Instead, he proposed two additional approaches: the bureaucratic and organizational models (Allison, 1971). Like Snyder, Brucks, and Sapin, Allison focuses on the process that underlies state policy development.

However, foreign policy is not reducible to decisions since enacting policy differs from policy-making. In other words, foreign policy is state action, while decision-making is the process by which a policy is made. Hill (2003), for example, defines foreign policy as “… the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations” [emphasis added]. Talking about foreign policy is talking about state behaviour. Foreign policy deals with the policy choices that the state takes in certain situations, whereas decision-making is formulating policy options (Neack, 2008). Mintz and DeRouen (2010) mention four critical features of the decision-making process: identifying problems, finding alternatives, selecting alternatives, and executing alternatives.

The research focuses on policy, not decision-making. Then, how can we explain states’ policy? Various theoretical lenses can help us answer this question. While realism stresses material dimensions, constructivism focuses on ideas since ideas give meaning to the material elements (Wendt, 1999). Some liberals share the same assumptions as constructivists
concerning the role of ideas in international relations. Goldstein and Keohane (1993) put non-material elements in a rationalist perspective to explain states’ behaviour. Although the actors – in this case, the state – behave rationally, the role of ideas cannot be neglected (Goldstein & Keohane, 1993). In contrast to the constructivist premise that ideas shape interests and policy, rationalists believe that ideas play a role as an instrument of national interest. In other words, ideas help decision-makers to get what they want.

Ideas can be defined as “beliefs held by individuals” (Goldstein & Keohane, 1993). Yet, the term has been equated and used interchangeably with similar terms such as ‘belief’, ‘ideology’, ‘theory’, ‘model’, ‘school of thought’, or even ‘intellectual idiosyncrasy’ (Kitchen, 2010). We use Weber’s definition of ideas as the source of ‘world images’ that generate interests. Weber states, “Not ideas, but the material and ideal interests, directly govern men’s conduct. Yet very frequently the ‘world images’ that have been created by ‘ideas’ have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest” (cited in Eastwood, 2005). Put it another way, Weber pointed out the role of ideas in shaping how people perceive the world in which they are embedded. This perception then determines people’s interest which in turn generate actions. Legro (2005) differentiates between level, type, and content of ideas. Ideas can be differentiated on three levels: namely, a reflection of individual leaders, the property of states, or a summation of individual ideas. Ideas also can be defined as ‘identity’, ‘interest’, ‘ethics’, ‘images’, or ‘instrumentality’. As mentioned earlier, ideas are an instrument to achieve specific goals. Finally, ideas can explain various topics, for instance, systemic vs. national (levels of analysis), economic vs. foreign policy (issues), or regional vs. global (scope).

The role of ideas in foreign policy change has been intensively discussed in international relations scholarship. Employing a cause-effect mechanism adopted by the positivist approach, scholars argue that ideas can cause policy change. However, since social sciences are indeterminate, ideas are “only one of many probable and partial causes of policies” (Yee, 1996). Many empirical research have shown the causal linkage between ideas and foreign policy. For example, Flibbert (2006) argues that the US decision to go to war in Iraq was influenced by the ideas of a handful of policy intellectuals that shaped and defined US interests, particularly in the post-9/11 national security structure. Hook (2008) argues that the program changes in US foreign aid policy in 2002 was influenced by ideas on international development, which granted the president to embed the ideas in a new foreign policy program. Thorun (2008) analyses Russian foreign policy thinking since the end of the Cold War and argued that from 1992 to 1994, liberal collective ideas shaped foreign policy, while from 1994 to 2000, geopolitical realist ideas replaced liberal ideas.

Another example comes from Ipek (2013), who argues that ideas adopted by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey affect Turkey’s foreign policy in development issues under the program of the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA). Similarly, Chacko (2018) has shown that “India’s approach to intervention has been shaped by its domestic state project that is grounded in the foundational ideas of economic self-reliance, accountable governance, and non-imperial internationalism.” These empirical analyses suggest that ideas matter in explaining foreign policy change.
Regionalism under Challenge

There are three types of ideas: worldview, principled belief, and causal belief. Worldview is defined as “...symbolism of a culture and deeply affecting modes of thought and discourse” (Goldstein & Keohane, 1993). In other words, a worldview can be interpreted as a person’s paradigm or way of thinking about the reality of the world. Religion and culture are examples of worldviews that have a significant influence on the actions of the state. As Sandal and Fox (2013) argue, religion affects international relations in two ways: through affecting the belief system or policy-making perspective and accommodating most religion’s adherents in society. Meanwhile, culture acts as a weltanschauung or worldview that creates an identity in shaping the pattern of relationships, whether conflict or cooperation (Huntington, 2002).

Unlike how worldview defines an ontological reality, moral belief contains normative ideas of behaviour. It defines what is ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, ‘good’ and ‘bad’, ‘appropriate’ and ‘inappropriate’, and so on. One example is the use of chemical and nuclear weapons that are considered ‘taboo’ in conflict after World War II (Price, 1995; Tannenwald, 2005). Another example is the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) role in establishing the norms of war; any action that is considered to be a violation of the principle of humanity (Finnemore, 1996).

The third type of idea is the causal belief, which is “beliefs about cause-effect relationships which derive authority from the shared consensus of recognised elites” (Goldstein & Keohane, 1993). Campbell (2002) categorised this type of idea as a programmatic idea, that is, “The idea implicitly or explicitly contains the prescriptions of how government should behave amid an incomprehensible situation” (Campbell, 1998; Campbell in Nedergaard & Campbell, 2008). It generally relates to scientific knowledge created and disseminated by scientists or experts in a particular field. This scientific knowledge explains a phenomenon and has an impact on policy choices. For example, disarmament cooperation between the US and the Soviet Union in the 1970s resulted from American defence experts (Adler, 1992). International cooperation on the chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) ban was also a product of the academic research of environmental experts (Hass, 1992).

Causal beliefs contain prescriptions for policymakers and derive from the thinking of experts skilled in specific fields. In the process of policy-making, political elites are often facing situations they do not understand. Moreover, international dynamics are rapid and difficult to predict. In that condition, the elites have a hard time understanding what is going on and what they should do in response. Therefore, they need input from experts to help understand the situation and solve the problems faced. One characteristic of causal belief is that it is part of a public debate (Campbell, 2002). In other words, this idea is not hidden from public attention behind the scenes but instead explicitly stated in public, although not necessarily by political elites themselves. These ideas explicitly appear in writing in the form of papers, policy briefs, and memos (Campbell, 1998, p. 386) and opinion papers in the mass media and election campaign texts. The public recognises that this idea has emerged as a solution to solve the problems.

These three types of ideas affect foreign policy through several mechanisms: becoming roadmaps, becoming focal points, and being institutionalised. Ideas act as roadmaps when
policymakers face complex situations that require clarity. When policymakers do not know for sure the consequences of their policy, ideas can provide indications of the impact of a policy (Goldstein & Keohane, 1993). Meanwhile, ideas also serve as a ‘glue’ when countries face difficulty reaching agreements over certain forms of cooperation. For example, Martin (1992) investigates economic sanctions against Argentina during the Falkland War and indicates that the European Union (EU) could facilitate inter-state cooperation even amidst conflicting interests among them. Finally, ideas affect policy through formal institutional instruments. Once an idea is institutionalised, it automatically has the power to influence policy. For example, the Japanese and German constitutions regulate the prohibition of military force except for self-defence equipment, so the existence of the law affects the foreign policy of both countries not to send troops abroad (Berger in Katzenstein, 1996).

![Figure 1. The Impact of Ideas on Foreign Policy](source: Goldstein & Keohane (1993)).

The research chooses to focus on causal belief and its effects through roadmaps. Causal belief is considerably more appropriate to explain President Jokowi’s foreign policy towards ASEAN since he has insufficient experience with international relations that would allow him to ask for help from his closest advisers in the field of international relations. The mastermind’s existence is vital in understanding the design and orientation of Indonesia’s foreign policy under Jokowi. Although Jokowi’s idiosyncratic factor (personality) plays a significant role, the idea ‘behind the scenes’ is much more decisive.

### RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

#### ASEAN’s Role in Jokowi’s Foreign Policy

Since its establishment in 1967, ASEAN has become the cornerstone of Indonesia’s foreign policy. This means that ASEAN plays a central role in pursuing Indonesia’s national interests in the international sphere. During the Suharto era, Indonesian elites strongly believed that ASEAN mattered for regional stability since, without regional stability, Indonesia could not focus on its economic development. This was one reason why Indonesia decided to play a significant role in ASEAN at the time (Suryadinata, 1998). Furthermore, ASEAN was also
crucial for Indonesia in helping the country restore and preserve its international and regional credibility, maintain regional harmony and order, buffer against external attack, and facilitate international cooperation (Anwar, 2005).

Since then, ASEAN has been the first concentric circle in Indonesia’s geopolitical strategy. After all, Indonesia is located within Southeast Asia, so its emphasis on ASEAN makes historical and geographical sense. ASEAN enables Indonesia to promote its ‘free and active’ principle by “developing ‘regional solutions to regional problems’ position” (Acharya, 2014). As Emmers (2014) suggests, Indonesia’s leadership role in ASEAN “has historically been central to Indonesia’s foreign policy.” ASEAN is also essential as Indonesia’s foreign policy has always been constrained by ASEAN because it influences how policymakers formulate foreign policies. Thus, Indonesia may seek to increase its global role, but it must be anchored on a regional footing (Natalegawa, 2018).

However, current Indonesia’s foreign policy tends to overlook ASEAN. Jokowi’s government seems uninterested in playing an active role in ASEAN. This is not to say that Indonesia will leave ASEAN. Instead, Jokowi’s foreign policy pays more attention to bilateralism rather than multilateralism. As a result, ASEAN as a multilateral institution has no significant impact on Jokowi’s foreign policy.

The most prominent feature of Jokowi’s foreign policy is prioritising domestic affairs rather than active engagement in international politics. During the 2014 presidential election campaign, Jokowi stated the following vision and mission explicitly: “We will enhance the global role through middle-power diplomacy that places Indonesia as a regional power with selective global engagement, giving priority to issues directly related to interests of the nation and Indonesian people” (Widodo & Kalla, 2014). The phrase “enhance the global role” seems contradictory to Jokowi’s commitment to prioritise domestic issues. However, the statement implies that Indonesia’s increased global role can only be pursued by strengthening domestic structures. This seems to be in line with the opinions of some Indonesian foreign policy experts. Rizal Sukma, an architect of Jokowi’s foreign policy, pointed out that Indonesia’s aspiration to become a global player is plagued by the complexity of domestic problems (Sukma in Reid, 2012). This means that to play an important role in the international sphere, Indonesia must first restructure in the internal sphere (Anwar, 2013). This idea was consistent with Indonesia’s foreign policy orientation during the New Order era when Suharto said before parliament on August 16, 1969, that Indonesia “… would only be able to play an effective role if we had great national power” (Leifer, 1989). Thus, we can see the similarity between Suharto and Jokowi regarding their concern with inward-looking foreign policy. Meanwhile, the phrase “selective global engagement” refers to prioritising the state’s foreign policy in the pursuit of national interests. It does not mean that this term focuses on ‘domestic-centric’ foreign policy orientation. Instead, Indonesia would play at international fora only if it would bring benefits for the Indonesian people.

There are at least four characteristics of Jokowi’s foreign policy (Rosyidin, 2017a). First, the revival of nationalism ideology. In Indonesian domestic political contestation, nationalism is often associated with the ideology held by the Indonesian Democratic Party of
Struggle (PDIP), which became the political vehicle behind Jokowi’s road to power. PDIP has a nationalist view that is visible in the 2019-2024 Statutes and Bylaws of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, which states that PDIP is a “tool of struggle to shape and build a national character based on Pancasila June 1, 1945.” Pancasila is based on socio-economy, socio-democracy, and cultural divinity dimensions, which reflects the spirit of nationalism, where Indonesian society/nation (socio) is the primary goal of democracy, economy, cultural divinity, and other aspects of the state” (“Anggaran dasar dan anggaran rumah”, 2019). Jokowi implements the nationalist principles held by PDIP in an effort to protect Indonesian sovereignty from foreign threats. This is evident in Indonesia’s aggressive attitude in sinking foreign illegal fishing boats and Jokowi’s gunboat diplomacy in responding to China’s aggressive expansion in the South China Sea, including in Indonesia’s Natuna Sea (see, for example, Rosyidin, 2016b). While maintaining its position as a non-claimant state in the South China Sea dispute, Indonesia asserts that its core interests are twofold: to promote peace and stability in the region and protect its maritime sovereignty over the Natuna Islands. Since the Natuna Islands belong to Indonesia under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Indonesia’s assertiveness towards China in the area should be regarded as a form of self-defence against foreign aggression. Second, there is a tendency to circumscribe the concentric circle of Indonesia’s foreign involvement. Unlike the previous era during which Indonesia was brought to the global stage, Jokowi’s administration confines itself to the Indo-Pacific region, primarily focusing on Indonesia’s involvement in IORA. Third, there is the belief that national power rests on domestic capabilities. Jokowi’s diplomacy focuses on improving domestic economic capability. This is also in contrast to the Yudhoyono era, which viewed the actualisation of national roles on the global stage determines a status as a global player (Rosyidin & Andika, 2017). Fourth, the formulation of national interest is reduced to material interests. Jokowi’s foreign policy pursues three primary objectives: economic prosperity (wealth), defence posture (power), and state sovereignty (security).

Concerning the second characteristic of Indonesia’s involvement in the Indo-Pacific region, it is interesting to be associated with the ‘Global Maritime Fulcrum’ doctrine. This idea is closely related to the country’s identity as an archipelagic country, explicitly expressed in the 2014 Jokowi-JK vision-mission. Rizal Sukma arguably coins the idea that the doctrine is a vision representing “…a great call to return to Indonesia’s identity or national identity as an archipelagic country” (Sukma, 2014). In his speech at the 25th ASEAN Summit in Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar, on November 13, 2014, Jokowi outlined five main pillars of the Global Maritime Fulcrum doctrine: maritime culture, food sovereignty at sea, sea tolls, maritime cooperation, and maritime defence (Setiawan, 2014).

From an international relations perspective, maritime cooperation is the only pillar closely related to Indonesia’s foreign policy. This reflects the country’s focus on domestic issues that emphasise on minimising global roles that may complicate Indonesia’s path to becoming a global power (Rosyidin, 2014). One of Indonesia’s most successful forms of international maritime cooperation is Indonesia’s active involvement in IORA. Indonesia even became the Chairman of IORA for the period 2015-2017. Nevertheless, Indonesia’s role in IORA has not been optimal because instead of using the multilateral forum as an instrument of
strengthening status and reputation, Jokowi’s administration perceives it solely as a means to facilitate bilateral meetings (Rosyidin, 2016a).

Jokowi’s administration often expresses rhetoric regarding Indonesia’s commitment to ASEAN. In 2015, Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi said, “ASEAN remains an Indonesia’s foreign policy priority. ... Indonesia will continue to play an active role in the achievement of the ASEAN Community and prepare the ASEAN Community’s vision post-2015” (“ASEAN tetap prioritas politik”, 2015). In her annual speech in 2017, Retno again expresses the commitment that “ASEAN remains a pillar of Indonesia’s foreign policy” (Marsudi, 2017a). These statements clearly express Indonesia’s commitment to continue its active role as a regional power and one of ASEAN’s founding fathers. Yet, Indonesia’s strong commitment to ASEAN is not supported by empirical evidence; it is merely lip service from a high-ranking member of the Indonesian political elite.

Some observers are sceptical of Jokowi’s foreign policy regarding ASEAN. The former member of the House of Representatives, Tantowi Yahya, argues that Jokowi sees ASEAN only through profit logic. In his view, Indonesia will remain involved in various ASEAN meetings but is more selective by considering the profit that will be obtained by Indonesia (Yahya, 2015b). Others argue that Indonesia has turned away from ASEAN because it lacks a clear vision of the prospects of the ASEAN Community and Indonesia’s leadership in the region (Heiduk, 2016). Thus, it can be argued that Indonesia under Jokowi has lost the spirit of regionalism as shown by previous governments, especially during the Yudhoyono leadership, when Indonesian diplomacy in ASEAN was considered incredibly successful (Yahya, 2015a).

Although Jokowi does not seem enthusiastic about ASEAN, Indonesia’s participation in ASEAN meetings remains high, at least at the annual ASEAN Summit. The ASEAN Summit in Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar, 2014, was the first high-level ASEAN forum Jokowi attended. It was at this forum that Jokowi announced the ‘Global Maritime Fulcrum’ doctrine. In his speech, Jokowi said that Indonesia was prepared to become a mediator to solve the South China Sea problems between China, Japan, and ASEAN countries. On this issue, Jokowi did not consider Indonesia one of the parties directly involved in the conflict. Instead of using ASEAN as an important instrument of conflict resolution, Jokowi took the opposite view and placed Indonesia as a main actor of mediation:

I need to say that Indonesia is not in the disputing parties there. We just want to encourage that the Code of Conduct can be implemented, and obviously the finalization ... We need peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region ... So we support the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, and also dialogue China (PRC)-Japan as well as China (PRC)-ASEAN (Setiawan, 2015).

Jokowi mentioned the issue of the South China Sea by “... calling for all parties to refrain [from further conflict], implement the Declaration of Conduct (DoC) and speed up the Code of Conduct (CoC) agreement” (Taw, 2014a). However, it was no more than a normative statement. There were no diplomatic efforts to promote peaceful settlements in the South China Sea. Indonesia remained passive and had so far only reacted when events concern its
sovereignty, such as the Natuna incident in June 2016, when Indonesia’s Naval Force shot Chinese fishing boats due to the violation of Indonesia’s EEZ in the Natuna.

Another Indonesian involvement in ASEAN is to initiate the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting (AMM) on the Maintenance of Peace, Security, and Stability in the Region at the 49th ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting, July 24-25, 2016 in Vientiane, Laos. The six points of agreement were reached: first, ensuring that ASEAN and the surrounding area are peaceful, stable, and secure; secondly, fostering mutually beneficial relationships to maintain peace, security, stability, and prosperity with nations in the region and the global community; third, upholding the Charter of the United Nations, the ASEAN Charter, and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), as well as Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) and other declarations as norms of interstate relations and cooperation; fourth, reaffirming the ASEAN Agreement at the 49th ASEAN Ministerial Foreign Ministers Meeting; fifth, promoting self-restraint and activities that can trigger tensions in the region, and sixth, enhancing ASEAN’s unity, solidarity and centrality and calling on others to respect ASEAN’s norms and principles (ASEAN, 2016). As Foreign Minister Retno suggested, the agreement reached by ASEAN members reflects that they still maintain mutual trust (Salim, 2016).

Indonesia also initiated the ASEAN Senior Official Meeting (SOM) in Bali, December 8-9, 2016. The meeting discussed the relationship between the major powers and their impact on Southeast Asia, including in the South China Sea and the issue of free trade in Asia-Pacific. The delegates agreed that ASEAN should enhance its role at regional and global levels, particularly to strengthen the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), accelerate the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations, and encourage the implementation of people-centred and people-oriented ASEAN (“SOM ASEAN bahas tantangan”, 2016).

At the ASEAN Summit in the Philippines, November 9-14, 2017, the Indonesian government encouraged ASEAN to move forward rapidly, responsively, and openly. Retno Marsudi states, “It must be admitted that ASEAN has created a stable, peaceful, prosperous ecosystem. However, the challenges ahead are getting more complicated. ASEAN must be faster, progressive, and open to respond to various challenges. We want ASEAN to be a responsive community” (Kompas, 2017). For Indonesia, ASEAN’s most significant challenges are security and the economy. The two are intimately connected; the economy will not grow without stability, and the stability will not be established without economic prosperity. Indonesia urges ASEAN countries to increase cooperation to maintain the region’s stability so that, in turn, the region can sustain economic growth. Indonesia has previously given the example of how the humanitarian crises in Rakhine and Marawi have threatened the region’s stability. Indonesia is actively pursuing a settlement in both cases by sending humanitarian aid to the Rohingya people, asking Myanmar’s government to stop violence, and arranging trilateral cooperation with Malaysia and the Philippines to deal with terrorism and extremism in Marawi.

Despite its active participation in various regional meetings, Indonesia’s role in ASEAN has been minimal since Jokowi became president. Indonesian involvement is limited to
participation in multilateral meetings, either as initiators, hosts, or participants. Despite these meetings’ success in producing mutual agreement, Indonesia has not been able to co-opt ASEAN as a regional power. Indonesia’s role in maintaining regional peace and security remains beyond the ASEAN framework, using bilateral and trilateral mechanisms as described above. As we will see in the following section, Indonesia’s negligence of ASEAN is not only caused by Jokowi’s scepticism towards the regional institution but also his preference for the bilateral approach as the primary character of Indonesia’s foreign policy.

It is noteworthy that the lack of Indonesia’s prominent role in ASEAN does not necessarily mean ASEAN does not bring benefits for Indonesia. As with his predecessors, Jokowi maintains that ASEAN is vital for Indonesia’s interests. For Jokowi, ASEAN plays a role as an instrument of bilateral cooperation between Indonesia and its strategic partners. The triumph of bilateralism over multilateralism has become Jokowi’s principle in conducting foreign relations. Indonesia’s participation in ASEAN fora, especially high-level fora or summits, is nothing more than business as usual. Indonesia does participate but does not play a significant role. Behind the meeting, Jokowi strives to establish cooperation to produce agreements in various fields with Indonesia’s strategic partners on a bilateral basis. This, in Jokowi’s perspective, gives more tangible benefits than multilateral diplomacy efforts that function primarily as ‘talking shops’.

At Jokowi’s first ASEAN Summit in Myanmar, Jokowi held several bilateral meetings with the host (President Thein Sein), UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and Prime Minister of New Zealand John Key. The bilateral meeting with Thein Sein discussed investment, the cooperation of transportation, the financial cooperation, especially in the banking sector, and the dispatch of experts in construction from Indonesia (“Bertemu Thein Sein”, 2014). With Ban Ki-Moon, Jokowi expressed Indonesia’s full support for Palestinian independence and expected the UN’s role to be more real and concrete (Taw, 2014b). The bilateral meeting with India discussed opportunities for investment cooperation in coal mining and defence, while in the bilateral meeting with New Zealand, Jokowi offered cooperation on development programs and investment in geothermal power plants. Jokowi seemed enthusiastic about holding bilateral meetings with partner countries to achieve Indonesia’s interests.

This bilateral approach was repeated by Jokowi at the 27th ASEAN Summit in Malaysia, on November 20-22, 2015. During the meeting, Jokowi held bilateral meetings with delegates from Vietnam, Japan, and the UN. During the meeting, Jokowi and Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung agreed to increase cooperation in trade and investment, while his meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe resulted in an agreement to boost investment and infrastructure cooperation. Jokowi promised to invite 1,000 prominent figures and Japanese businessmen to Indonesia. Meanwhile, at the 28th ASEAN Summit in Laos, Jokowi held a bilateral meeting with Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull. The two leaders agreed on trade cooperation, especially beef imports and cattle breeding, counter-terrorism cooperation, and maritime cooperation, especially enhancing maritime security and prosperity within the IORA’s framework. Jokowi also conducted bilateral efforts at the ASEAN Summit in Manila, the Philippines, in November 2017. Jokowi met Abe again to
discuss plans for the 60th anniversary of diplomatic ties between the two countries. Besides, Japan and Indonesia agreed on infrastructure development cooperation regarding the project for Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) in Jakarta (“Jokowi bertemu PM Abe jelang KTT ASEAN di Manila”, 2017). During the 33rd ASEAN Summit in Singapore in 2018, Jokowi also held several bilateral meetings with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chile’s President Michelle Bachelet, Japan Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, and Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison. While at the 35th ASEAN Summit in Thailand, there were five bilateral meetings request from several countries: New Zealand, Australia, India, Japan, and the UN Secretary-General.

Aside from being a facilitator of bilateral cooperation, ASEAN also plays an important role in Indonesia’s interests, especially in the economic sector. ASEAN is widely regarded as a regional economic powerhouse. The total GDP of ASEAN (US$2.4 trillion) is larger than India (US$1.8 trillion), Australia (US$1.5 trillion), South Korea (US$1.2 trillion), and Taiwan (US$485 billion), but less than China (US$8.9 trillion) and Japan (US$5 trillion) (Rosyidin, 2017a). According to Retno Marsudi, ASEAN provides a ‘welfare ecosystem’ for its member countries because intra-ASEAN trade is the largest compared to trade with countries outside ASEAN. Moreover, intra-ASEAN investment is also large, with 40 per cent of the investment is invested in Indonesia and over 720 Indonesian companies operating in other ASEAN countries (Marsudi, 2017b). In line with the vision of economic integration within the ASEAN Economic Community framework, Indonesia will utilise the momentum to export its superior products. Jokowi said that Indonesia should seize the opportunity, “We only need to keep being smart, do not wait, all must be seized, must be improved regulation, our competitiveness” (“Presiden Jokowi: MEA harus”, 2015).

To conclude, the importance of ASEAN for Indonesia lies in its role as an instrument of bilateral cooperation and welfare ecosystem to pursue Indonesia’s economic goals. This is not to say that Indonesia does not see other interests from ASEAN. Following the vision of the ASEAN Community, the political-security and socio-cultural pillars are also seen as necessary in addition to the economic pillars. Rosyidin (2017b) argues that aside from its function as a regional economic powerhouse, Indonesia needs ASEAN because it plays the role of power broker in interstate conflicts and a security stabiliser in Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific. In other words, for Indonesia, ASEAN’s presence becomes vital because it facilitates economic cooperation between its member states and acts as a ‘regional conductor’ (Yates, 2016). In this case, ASEAN “has played a prominent part in negotiating and managing the order in Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific” (Yates, 2019). However, for Indonesia under President Jokowi, the economic pillar of the ASEAN Community appears to be Indonesia’s priority, perhaps because it is most likely to be achieved rather than the other two pillars. The political-security pillar, for example, faces the constraint of the South China Sea issue that divides ASEAN. Moreover, the political-security pillar has been viewed as a prerequisite for the creation of ASEAN prosperity. In other words, ASEAN will not be able to create a conducive climate to productive economies without robust security architecture. Indonesia will continue striving to promote stability in the region, as repeatedly said by both Jokowi and Foreign Minister Retno. However, regarding Jokowi’s priority in the economic sector, ASEAN’s existence will be viewed deeper through the lens of cost and benefit.
Ideas and Jokowi’s Foreign Policy towards ASEAN

Foreign policy is a domain in which the state will use any material and non-material resources to gain its national interest. Rosyidin (2016a) sees Indonesia’s foreign policy under Jokowi as an implementation of realpolitik. This idea came from Henry Kissinger’s realpolitik concept that foreign policy could not be separated from its national interest and power (Kissinger, 1994). However, Indonesia’s national interest continually changes since it depends on the newly elected leaders’ beliefs.

Jokowi’s election in 2014 has led to significant political changes in Indonesia’s foreign policy. Jokowi’s sudden rise to power represents a new political advancement model in Indonesia. Unlike his six predecessors, Jokowi did not come to the presidency through the military or political party systems. Jokowi’s rise began in 2005 when fellow business leaders recruited the successful entrepreneur to run for mayor of his hometown of Surakarta (Connelly, 2014). Unlike Yudhoyono’s foreign policy that was characterised by an outward-looking orientation, Jokowi espoused a ‘pro-people’ approach. The three main guiding principles of his approach are maintaining the country’s sovereignty, enhancing citizen’s protection, and improving the country’s economic diplomacy. These principles represent Jokowi’s domestic prioritization over global affairs. As mentioned earlier, the domestication of foreign policy affects how Indonesia perceives its regional environment, including ASEAN.

The decreasing importance of ASEAN in Indonesia’s foreign policy was seen by See Seng Tan (personal communication, September 27, 2017) to respond to both internal and external factors. First, ASEAN is no longer the main cornerstone of Indonesia’s foreign policy as other international institutions will give a more prominent effect to transcend its regional power. Indonesia’s inclusion in the G20 is seen as a reflection of Indonesia’s competency to enhance its role as a global player:

[It is] True [that] while ASEAN continues to be identified as the ‘cornerstone’ of Indonesia’s foreign policy, the domestic discourse on ASEAN since JW [Joko Widodo] became president has been that of ASEAN being but “one of the cornerstones” of Indonesia FP [Foreign Policy] – a commonly heard refrain from Indonesian academics as well as, in some cases, officials speaking in their private capacities. Furthermore, the JW administration sees Indonesia’s inclusion in the G20 as a reflection of Indonesia’s rising prominence as a global player, one whose global aspirations transcend the regional cum institutional limits of ASEAN (See Seng Tan, personal communication, September 27, 2017).

Second, Jokowi’s negligence of ASEAN is also influenced by the belief that this institution lacks power in managing regional conflicts among members. ASEAN’s limited role and global players in the region make ASEAN’s power as a regional institution is highly questionable. Many member countries’ selfish behaviour is undermining ASEAN unity and indirectly harassing Indonesia’s role as a founding father. Since the early 2000s, Jakarta was frustrated by the constrained relations of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam (CLMV
members). To resolve the conflict between Cambodia and Thailand over the Preah Vihear temple area, Indonesia became a mediator. However, the conflict, which began in 2008, has proved difficult to resolve under the ASEAN Charter. Both countries showed resistance to any solutions:

And while [then-Foreign Minister] Pak Marty [Natalegawa] played a key leadership role to cobble together the 6-point principles in the wake of ASEAN’s failure to deliver a joint communique at Phnom Penh in July 2012, the issue also hinted at the growing sense of Indonesian discontent over the lack of commitment to ASEAN among particular member states (See Seng Tan, personal communication, September 27, 2017).

Later, even the newest ASEAN member, Cambodia, demonstrated its opposition against ASEAN in the 2016 South China Sea maritime dispute, leading to the first deadlocked meeting since 2012. China’s long history of cooperation with Cambodia has resulted in leveraging its power against Vietnamese influence in the region.

The third is the diminishing importance of ASEAN regional territorial. Ahmad Rizky M. Umar (personal communication, September 27, 2017) argues that the establishment of Belt and Road Initiatives as China’s foreign policy project in May 2017 responds to ASEAN stagnation in the negotiation over the South China Sea and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. The Belt and Road Initiatives will soon diminish the ‘territorial logic’ of ASEAN that was socially constructed by a similar historical and political background with other ASEAN member states. Soon, ASEAN regionalism will be replaced by more complex regional infrastructure and industrial cooperation outside the region. The increasing importance of Chinese power in ASEAN has forced Indonesia to shift its strategy by pursuing bilateral partnerships with China and Japan, leapfrogging ASEAN.

The strengthening of political power is undoubtedly seen through Indonesia’s foreign policy under Jokowi. Even though Indonesia tends to prefer a defensive strategy, it is now seen as more assertive and more precise in actualising its objectives towards other countries. This realpolitik approach is inspired by Jokowi’s ‘mastermind’, which consists of Indonesian experts since Jokowi himself has no prior experience in international politics and foreign policy (Rosyidin, 2016b). Jokowi is new to the practice of international diplomacy; he did not come to the presidency with any strong views about Indonesia’s place in the world or any passion for the subject. Jokowi sees himself primarily as a domestic reformer, not an international statesman. Moreover, indeed, the domestic reforms that he has advocated in the areas of infrastructure and the fight against corruption, if executed, would enable economic growth that would allow Indonesia to play a more significant role in world affairs (Connelly, 2014). In response to the rapidly changing world, it is becoming more apparent that Jokowi wishes to involve intellectuals in policy-making. The emergence of a new generation of scholars makes it possible for individuals outside government bureaucracy to be involved in policy discussions.

Among Indonesian scholars, Rizal Sukma is arguably the most influential figure in shaping contemporary Indonesia’s foreign policy. Before appointed as the Ambassador for the
Regionalism under Challenge

United Kingdom, Sukma was an Executive Director of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), one of the most influential intellectuals thinktanks on Indonesia’s foreign policy. Sukma was Jokowi’s closest foreign policy aide, along with Andi Widjajanto (a former defence scholar at Universitas Indonesia); both held important roles during Jokowi’s 2014 presidential campaign. Rizal Sukma described Indonesia’s long-term strategy towards the US and China as hedging against uncertainty to ensure Indonesia’s national interests and bilateral relations with both superpowers. In Sukma’s perspective, Indonesia should maintain an equal relationship with China and the United States because, as a nonaligned country, Indonesia has no military alliance with China nor the US (Singh & Cook, 2017).

See Seng Tan (personal communication, September 27, 2017) agrees that Sukma is one of the most influential advisors on Indonesia’s foreign policy under Joko Widodo, due to his idea of ‘post-ASEAN foreign policy’ discourse. This idea had appeared in Sukma’s op-ed in The Jakarta Post in 2009 when he argued that Indonesia should not be ashamed by the cynical views of other countries regarding its domestic weakness. He continued,

It is enough for Indonesia to imprison itself in the ‘golden cage’ of ASEAN for more than 40 years. … Indonesia, therefore, needs to begin formulating a post-ASEAN foreign policy. ASEAN should no longer be treated as the only cornerstone of Indonesia’s foreign policy. For Indonesia, ASEAN should constitute only one of the available platforms through which we can attain and fulfil our national interests (Sukma, 2009a).

Sukma (2009b) has suggested several policy recommendations in implementing the idea of ‘post-ASEAN foreign policy’. First, Indonesia should implement a ‘true’ ‘bebas-aktif’ (free but active) principle of foreign policy by refusing to follow the wishes of any state or international organization, including ASEAN, if those wishes were to jeopardise Indonesia’s national interests. In other words, Indonesia should demonstrate a degree of autonomy vis a vis ASEAN. Second, the concept of concentric circles needs revision. Instead of ASEAN, the first concentric circle should be G20. According to Sukma, strategic necessity, functionality, values, and identity are crucial factors in defining areas in which Indonesia could play significant roles. Third, Indonesia needs to balance multilateralism with bilateralism. Bilateral relations should be implemented without using ASEAN. Instead, Indonesia should improve direct bilateral relations with several ASEAN member states, especially Malaysia, Singapore, Philippine, and Thailand. Fourth, Indonesia should expand its geopolitical influence in Asia-Pacific. Indonesia should take part in shaping the emerging regional architecture. Fifth, Indonesia should help ASEAN to become a better organization. Thus, the idea of ‘post-ASEAN foreign policy’ does not necessarily mean abandoning ASEAN.

However, not all agree that Rizal Sukma is the main influential actor behind Indonesia’s foreign policy. Jokowi receives significant input from many parties and individuals on various topics, including foreign policy. Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi is also highly influential. Retno was appointed as an Indonesian Ambassador to Norway and Iceland in 2005, the Netherlands in 2012, and has also served as General Director of Europe and America in the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Relations, overseeing Indonesia’s relations with 82 countries.
in Europe and America. Her career in the European/Western countries affects the way she puts less emphasis on ASEAN (See Seng Tan, personal communication, September 27, 2017). Although Retno often praises ASEAN as a robust institution in the region, she tends to treat it as an actor that should adapt to international politics’ dynamics in the 21st century. During the first gathering of ASEAN Foreign Ministers in 2018, Retno urged ASEAN to further strengthen regional architecture in the Indo-Pacific region. For Retno, Indo-Pacific has become a strategic region for global economic development and peace (“Govt proposes strengthening regional”, 2018). This proposal is in line with Jokowi’s agenda to enlarge Indonesia’s concentric circle to the Indo-Pacific region. In her 2018 annual speech, Retno asserts that Indonesia would continue to support the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace and build a sense of regionalism in the region (Marsudi, 2018).

Jokowi might not be as dominant as his predecessors in foreign-policy formulations, but that is for a good cause. The group of intellectual advisers around him consists of top analysts and scholars of international relations. Jokowi plays his part by letting these intellectuals to provide an academically sound and objective assessment of the country’s national interests and the changing strategic environment in which those interests will be pursued. Aside from Rizal Sukma, Andi Widjajanto helped gradually shift the orientation of Indonesia’s foreign policy from the previous government. Andi finished his career as a Cabinet Secretary after only ten months. Nevertheless, he was the one who greatly contributed to the formation of Jokowi’s foreign policy. He has even been called “The Man Behind Jokowi” (Sukoyo, 2014).

Andi is a realist thinker who strongly believes that military muscle power is the most critical element in pursuing national interests. As a scholar, he has research interests in military affairs and strategic studies. In accordance with realist assumptions, Andi presupposes that balance of power should become the fundamental principle in preserving national interests in an anarchic international system. In anticipating China’s rise, for example, he suggests that Indonesia should play a balancing role between significant powers in the region. In doing so, Andi maintains state-centrism as a moral principle in which the state must be strong above all international actors. Consequently, non-state actors, including international organizations, are insignificant. Although Andi never formulated an explicit argument on ASEAN, Jokowi’s foreign policy’s realist character is greatly influenced by Andi’s perspective on international relations.

Indonesia’s conception of national interest is also shaped by Jokowi’s closest adviser on national security, General (Ret.) Luhut Panjaitan. Luhut was a special forces (Kopassus) commander during the New Order period and developed particular expertise in counter-terrorism, becoming the first leader of elite counter-terrorism unit Detachment 81 in the 1980s. After Suharto’s fall, Luhut briefly served as an Ambassador to Singapore and as the Minister of Trade and Industry under President Abdurrahman Wahid. Luhut’s relationship with Jokowi goes back further than Jokowi’s other advisers on foreign affairs and national security. When Jokowi declared his electoral victory in front of the Proklamasi Statue in 2014, Luhut stood beside him. Luhut will almost certainly remain influential with Jokowi, regardless of his
official role as a Cabinet Ministry or otherwise. Luhut’s appointment in the Cabinet was crucial for Jokowi “to help him consolidate power” (Syailendra, 2016).

Even though Luhut and Andi Widjajanto have different professional backgrounds, they share similar thoughts on foreign policy. As a former military officer, Luhut upholds state-centrism as a guiding principle for Indonesia’s foreign relations. During the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, in January 2017, Luhut has been interviewed about Indonesia’s role in the South China Sea. He states that the US and EU should not push Indonesia to resolve this problem under the ASEAN mechanism because the positions and interests of many other ASEAN member states are quite different from Indonesia’s. He argued ASEAN as a group has no single position on the issue of the South China Sea. Therefore, Indonesia needs to maintain its relationship with the great powers, China and Russia, to maintain peaceful solutions in the South China Sea (Jakarta Globe, 2017).

CONCLUSIONS

Indonesia’s foreign policy under Jokowi has shown a significant change from its predecessors, especially compared to the Yudhoyono government. With regards to ASEAN, Jokowi lacks the interest to project Indonesia’s national interests in the region. Instead, Jokowi directs Indonesia’s efforts towards the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), considered more relevant to Jokowi’s ‘Global Maritime Fulcrum’ doctrine. Furthermore, Jokowi pays more attention to bilateral relationships than the multilateral ones when participating in various ASEAN summits. This reflects his commitment to putting economic and investment cooperation as the principal goals of Indonesia’s international relations. Despite official statements that ASEAN remains important as a ‘cornerstone’ for Indonesia’s foreign policy, there is little evidence to support that claim. Empirically, Indonesia under Jokowi is undoubtedly looking past ASEAN.

It is shown that Jokowi no longer perceives ASEAN as an integral component of Indonesia’s foreign policy. Instead, the participation of Indonesia in ASEAN is simply a continuation of business as usual. Jokowi’s closest advisors, particularly those who have realist and domestic-centric perspectives, play a crucial role that supports Jokowi’s personal lack of foreign policy interest. In terms of policy approach, Jokowi’s foreign policy stresses bilateralism over multilateralism. As a result, as a multilateral institution, ASEAN has lost its significance in Indonesia’s pursuit of national interests.

The research has also demonstrated that ideas play a crucial role in shaping Jokowi’s foreign policy towards ASEAN. Using the typology proposed by Goldstein and Keohane in their seminal works, it is argued that causal belief – that is, ideas brought by Jokowi’s closest advisers – significantly affect how Indonesia perceives and behaves towards ASEAN. The idea of ‘post-ASEAN foreign policy’ proposed by Rizal Sukma, an architect of Jokowi’s foreign policy, has significantly impacted Jokowi’s preferences.

The research contributes to theories of foreign policy change. As stated in the introduction, existing theories on foreign policy change have focused on levels of analysis in
searching for the source of change. Although Hermann (1990) and Holsti (in Gustavsson, 1999) have mentioned the importance of domestic factors as an independent variable to explain foreign policy change, they have not been gone further to elaborate on each factor. Specifically, they did not consider the political elite and public intellectuals’ advisors who influence the state’s foreign behaviour. Therefore, the research confirms existing explanations that emphasise the impact of individuals on leaders in directing foreign policy transformation. This argument can be applied in various case studies. However, it would be particularly useful to explain the foreign policy change of states led by leaders without strong knowledge and international relations experience. In such case studies, foreign policy is individual and idea-driven rather than leader-driven.

The findings provide policy-relevant knowledge for policymakers. First, the Jokowi’s administration should not perceive ASEAN solely as an instrument for bilateral cooperation. Suppose the government recognises ASEAN as Indonesia’s cornerstone. In that case, Jokowi’s administration should act accordingly by engaging ASEAN in various multilateral fora to deal with severe problems in the region and playing an active role as a regional power and primus inter pares within the ASEAN framework. Second, Jokowi should encourage academics and experts from domestic institutions to enrich foreign policy debates. It would benefit the government in foreign policy-making because they would have abundant input. To achieve this objective, the government should enhance close relationships with academics by conducting seminars, conferences, symposia, and other knowledge-sharing activities. They should welcome any ideas expressed by individuals who have a strong knowledge of foreign policy and international relations.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Mohamad Rosyidin is an assistant professor at the Department of International Relations Universitas Diponegoro. He holds BA from Universitas Jember and MA from Universitas Gadjah Mada. His research interests include Indonesia’s foreign policy, constructivism in international relations, culture and foreign policy, security in Southeast Asia, and non-Western international relations theory.

Shary Charlotte Henriette, S.IP, M.A is a lecturer at the Department of International Relations, FISIP, Universitas Diponegoro, with a scientific concentration of Peace Studies, International Conflict Resolution, and Gender Studies. She graduated from Bachelor of International Relations, Parahyangan Catholic University in 2009, and continued her Masters on Department of International Relations, Gadjah Mada University in 2011. The author is also active in a number of organizations that aim to create and maintain interfaith peace in Indonesia. E-mail: sharycharlotte@lecturer.undip.ac.id
ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This article is an output of the research funded by DIPA FISIP Universitas Diponegoro 2017. The authors also would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments.

REFERENCES


http://setkab.go.id/bertemu-thein-sein-presiden-jokowi-indonesia-tetap-menjadi-sahabat-myanmar/

http://webuser.bus.umich.edu/organizations/smo/protected/resources/campbell98.pdf


http://www.lowyinstitute.org/sites/default/files/indonesian-foreign-policy-under-president-jokowi_0_0.pdf


https://doi.org/10.1017/S02602105099990532


http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/is-jokowi-turning-his-back-on-asean/


https://www.fairobserver.com/region/asia_pacific/consensual-leadership-asean-will-endure-jokowi-02487/


