Combining Academia and Industry Approach for Secure Coding and Requirements Checklist in S-SDLC: Systematic Literature Review

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Abstract — Rapid progress of digital transformation has occurred across governments, organization and vendors around the world. where this rapid digital transformation is not linearly followed by the security protection of digital infrastructure and its application. For example, in Indonesia One of the largest banks was unable to operate its online and physical services for three consecutive days due to a cyberattack. And many international organizations also experienced the same thing or even worse like bankruptcy. Because of this phenomenon the authors have performed a systematic literature review and identified there are two important phases namely requirement and coding in secure software development lifecycle (S-SDLC). In this study the authors compose 18 Secure Requirement practices (SREC) and 72 Secure Coding Checklist (SCOC) checklist based on Combining previous academia research study and international standard of open secure coding practices (OSCP) in which we target the security vulnerable most occurred to governments, organization and vendors around the world according to Open Web Application Security Project Foundation. This checklist can be embedded in the Quality Assurance process to check in sequence whether the Requirements and Coding that are produced are safe or not from the cyber-attack. Additionally, the checklist approach is simple to understand and can be implemented to a popular public consumer automation testing tools enabling faster software development while maintaining software security.

Keywords: Cyber Security; Secure Software Development Lifecycle; Software Engineering; Systematic Literature Review

I. INTRODUCTION

Secure Software Development Lifecycle (S-SDLC) is currently neglected by most organizations, vendors and government and user itself. These parties are

forgetting that incorrect environment is potentially resulting threats such as financial losses, operational disruptions and reputational damage to the parties itself (Humayun et al., 2022; Inggarwati et al., 2020; A. W. Khan et al., 2022). In May 2023, Bank Syariah Indonesia, one of the largest financial institutions in Indonesia, fell victim to a ransomware attack orchestrated by the cybercriminal group LockBit 3.0. The attackers claimed to have exfiltrated 1.5 terabytes of sensitive data, including records of 15 million customers, and threatened to disclose the information unless a ransom was paid. This cyberattack resulted in the disruption of BSI's banking services, rendering both mobile and physical transactions inaccessible to customers. Consequently, the incident inflicted substantial financial losses and severely compromised the institution's reputation, highlighting critical vulnerabilities in the cybersecurity framework of the banking sector (Fitriani et al., 2023).

Research claims by H. Sadler (Sadler, 2020) state that secure software development lifecycle environment or S-SDLC is necessary to avoid many external threats. It supports developers to build secure software applications while also enhancing their skill, competencies and productivity which impacted many aspects in software development (Saeed et al., 2025).

Advancements in Information and Communication Technology (ICT) have transformed various aspects of human life, from daily activities to critical sectors such as healthcare, finance, and other essential works. These activities often rely on software applications, making the security aspect of software applications important. Additionally, software applications are typically interconnected with other applications, which underline the importance for governments, organizations and vendors to implement a Secure Software Development Lifecycle (S-SDLC) (de Vicente Mohino et al., 2019).

Due to lack of concern in S-SDLC that may threaten Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability and Valuable (CIAV) Resources for governments, organization and vendors. In this study the authors want to perform a Systematic Literature Review (SLR) on S-SDLC and inform what faces organization, vendors and firm if they are neglecting the S-SDLC (B. Kitchenham et al., 2009; B. A. Kitchenham, 2012). and introduce insight of comprehensive security checklist for S-SDLC that derived from systematic literature review and international security standard to mitigate security issues and cyber-attack to software application. The author also utilizes the Retrieval Augmented Generative (RAG) Artificial Intelligence product to perform searching, collecting and filtering the primary, review and SLR research study. In purpose of improving quality of articles collection and information to answer Research Questions (Ayemowa et al., 2024; Gwon et al., 2024).

We use checklist approaches because we aim for simplicity of practical uses and implementation purposes yet proven and beneficial on the field, several studies also use checklist approaches for their ICT Infrastructure in the healthcare industry to mitigate cyber-attack (Baz et al., 2023; Rajamäki et al., 2024).

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides details on phases of SLR conducted. Methods and research study to answer two research questions about security issues, cyber-attack and S-SDLC in Section 3. Section 4 is Result and Discussion which Introduce a minimalistic S-SLDC with checklist approach from international previous study and international standard. Section 5 of this study.

II. METHODS

A Systematic Literature Review a.k.a SLR was selected to be foundation of the research methodology on this study review, because SLR shown of credibility in the process of development article collection and reducing interpersonal-bias, However the authors are performing smaller enhancement for the SLR method rigorously and having alignment with the objective which is finding reliable, latest and trusted sources of the study. According to Kitchenham an SLR has three main phases (B. Kitchenham et al., 2009; B. A. Kitchenham, 2012). The first is planning, conducting and the third answering. see Table 1 for the details.

Table 1. SLR Phases

Phases		Sub Phases
Planning	•	Research Question
	•	Study Sources

	•	Inclusion and
		Exclusion Criteria
	•	Search Strings
	•	AI Prompting String
	•	Study Selection by
		Matching Abstract
		with Authors
		keywords
Conducting	•	Filter and Selecting
		the study
	•	Reading the study
		content
Answering	•	Answering Research
_		Question
	•	Making Responsible
		Insight and Comments

2.1 Planning Phase

2.1.1 Research Question.

The current study conducted a modified SLR, there are two research questions that were answered in this study:

- RQ1: What threat do organizations, firms, or vendors face if they neglect the Secure Software Development Life Cycle (S-SDLC)?
- RQ2: What Secure Software Development Lifecycle practices should be implemented during requirement engineering and coding stages to mitigate the security threat?

2.1.2 Study Sources.

In this study, the paper is gathered by manual search, there are total of six digital repositories were chosen, the following are scholarly digital sources that were chosen:

- 1. MDPI
- 2. Google Scholar
- 3. Science Direct
- 4. Springer Link
- 5. Wiley Online Library
- 6. ACM Digital Library

2.1.3 Search String. In this study the paper using search strings for searching in scholarly database as follows:

- 1. Secure Software Development
- 2. Software Development Lifecycle
- 3. Cyber Security Condition
- 4. Standard of Application System
- 5. Security Solution
- 6. Software Application
- 7. Global Software Development

2.1.4 AI Prompting String.

Generative Artificial Intelligence (GAI) has been transformed into Retrieval-Augmented Artificial Intelligence (RAG) which can perform a combination of operations like searching on the internet, thinking, and summaries. This RAG also showed potential in aiding systematic literature reviews according to

several current latest study in literature review (Ayemowa et al., 2024; Gwon et al., 2024).

For the objective of improving the quality of answering research questions the authors utilize this popular Retrieval Augmented Generative (RAG) to perform deep filtering, summarizing and gaining insight from primary and secondary study. The authors perform prompting string as follows:

- 1. "Make sure the information and reference are from popular journal or international conference indexed by Scopus"
- 2. "Can you reference the real example from popular open access journal?"
- 3. "Please give me the example of (keyword) from credible journal or sources?"
- 4. "Can you find and answer these (keyword) scientifically using references from popular and credible journal?"
- 5. "Search for me the 10-20 journal Scopus indexed related to (keyword)?"

2.2 Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria

2.2.1 Inclusion Criteria

For data Inclusion, we adopted the following guidelines-based parameters used by other researchers:

- 1. Papers must be written in English.
- 2. Papers were published between 2000 to 2024.
- Articles related to the domain of Secure Software Development or Threat to Software Application.
- 4. Articles related to Cyber Security.
- 5. Articles related to Cyber Attack.

2.2.2 Exclusion Criteria

The authors followed the guidelines based on parameters used by other researchers:

- 1. Papers that don't deal with secure software development lifecycles.
- 2. Papers that don't mention any secure or software risk keywords
- 3. Publications are not peer-reviewed and do not conform to a complete book's abstract, an editorial, or a letter.
- 4. Paper is not written in English
- 5. Duplicate papers were not considered.

2.2.3 Conducting Phase

In the conducting phase we utilize several tools such as Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta Analyses (PRISMA) and Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) Searching and Filtering. PRISMA methodology is valuable tool to conduct systematic review and meta-analysis or SLR in different fields, including the computer science study and its branch knowledge (Javed et al., 2023).

Figure 1 shows the PRISMA process that authors perform there are four phases as follows:

- A. Phase 1 : using search string and prompting string to find related articles.
- B. Phase 2: Perform Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria based on articles abstract and articles full-body.
- C. Phase 3 : Perform full-abstract and skim reading on the articles body.
- D. Phase 4: Final collection of primaries study and Systematic Literature Review studies.




Figure 1. The PRISMA Process of relevant literature Review

Thanks to the advancement of Generative AI, the author is possible to perform phase 1 and 2 which consist of performing inclusion and exclusion criteria on the body because we have power of quick summarative to assist the author perform deep inclusion and exclusion criteria to find good quality of articles that match our research questions.

2.3 Answering Phase

In answering phase, the authors utilize the source from reputable international journal articles, international conference Scopus indexed and S-SDLC reputable security guidelines to provide information and insight for the author to answer research questions. in RQ 1 author's make a list of tables that cyber threat may occur to organizations if neglecting the S-SDLC, in RQ 2 the author utilizes many guideline and journal articles and translate it into actionable checklist table for requirement and coding stages. This research questions review isn't limited to S-SDLC within specific industries as a result, the insights derived are

more generalized and may apply to any organizations, firms and vendors.

III. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

RQ 1: What threat do organizations, firms, or vendors face if they neglect the Secure Software Development Life Cycle (S-SDLC)?

Ignoring Secure Software Development Lifecycle (S-SDLC) can expose companies to various threats, including data breaches, financial losses, operational disruptions and reputational damage. failure to compose SDLC with security concern can lead to several issues unpredicted problem, many organizations prioritize security as an afterthought using motto "patch and penetrate" strategy, resulting in increased cost and unpredictable timeline or even launch before it's ready (Humayun et al., 2022).

These various threats are categorized into issues by previous research (A. W. Khan et al., 2022), that claims there are 13 main cyber security issues and challenges faced by vendors and organizations from 67 research studies, the most common issues/challenges were related to 1) cyberattacks, 2) lack of right knowledge and 3) lack of management. In Table 2, it shows the three potential issues and its sub issues that organization will face if neglecting the secure software development lifecycle (S-SDLC) according to Khan et al. (2022) study. The author performs in-depth reviews with the potential impact to organization, firms and vendors.

The main issue / challenges faces is access of cyberattacks. The most sub issues of cyberattack frequent is injection type of attack such as SQL Injection surveyed by OWASP. It's the third ranked attack in 2021 and the number one cyberattack in 2020. When Software application gets SQL Injection, the impact of application is unpredictable.

Table 2. Top Ranking Cyber Security Issues

No	Issues	Sub-Issues
1	Cyber Attacks (Khan et al, 2022)	SQL InjectionBroken Access ControlDistributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
2.	Lack of Knowledge (Khan et al, 2022)	 Third Party Integrating Vulnerabilities Easier Reverse Engineering Hardening Forensics/ Monitoring Failures Cryptographic Failure and Encryption at rest Failure
3.	Lack of Management	Insider AttackSocial EngineeringMisconfiguration Security

The hackers are able to retrieve all user data or even whole database, resulting in a data breach, which can be exacerbated by severe injection vulnerabilities. Additionally, the attacker may execute arbitrary changes using queries such as Insert, Alter, or even Drop query. If these actions occur, the potential financial losses for the company become highly unpredictable. Attackers could delete data, steal information, damage systems, and execute malicious commands. leading to significant financial, operational, or reputational damage to the company. several cyber-attacks that may occur to firms and organizations are Broken Access Control (Anas et al., 2024) dan Distributed Denial of Service (Karthikeyani & Karthikeyan, 2023; Singh & Gupta, 2022; Yuryna Connolly et al., 2020). and this cyber-attack is in line with OWASP 2021 report.

Broken Access Control (BAC) is a serious software application vulnerability stated by the previous research. BAC allows unauthorized users to bypass permissions and perform unauthorized actions leading to data breaches, breaking data integrity and privacy concerns. BAC enables user to be authenticated as another user or higher access user. lack of concern S-SDLC affecting software application has vulnerability in code or the weakness on user process causing user able to perform such actions (Anas et al., 2024). The Distributed Denial of Services (DDoS) technically cannot be eliminated, however it can be mitigated and reduced through various strategies that will be discussed in RQ2.

The second main issues of not implementing the Secure Software Development Life Cycle (S-SDLC): Lack of Knowledge, this is refers to a deficiency in understanding various aspect such as intellectual property rights, software products and third party application development domain which impacted to Unauthorized Access, Easier Reverse Engineering and Hardening Forensics / Monitoring Failures and Cryptographic Failure which reducing significant integrity of whole software products and it's organization.

open-source The emerging of libraries, components, software and application led some organizations, firms and vendors to rely on these services to build their software application efficiently and effectively. They also connect their software application to the service like online storage services, payment gateway services, and other services. These services are known as software, platform or code as services. However, they are unaware that the services they are integrating have security vulnerabilities in the integrating process that makes cyberattack scenario awaiting them. This security issue the authors refers to as Third Party Integrating Vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities are sometimes fatal because unexperienced hacker can land cyber-attack without the organization knowing it and this becomes concern of some previous research in academia, technologies founders and leading technology industry (Li et al., 2019; Zhan et al., 2021). Implementing S-SDLC may significantly reduce this Third-Party Integrating Vulnerabilities.

Reverse Engineering in context of software application, reverse engineering is a process of reconstruct and analysis an existing software application. This process is able to reconstruct the software structure, components, decoding source code, understanding the algorithms and documenting software key functions, therefore this technique could threaten an organization, firms and vendors that benefit their competitor to re-produce the software or crack the software which impacted to financial losses and integrity of respected organizations. Due to lack of knowledge, software applications become easier to perform reverse engineering, and the software application appears exposed to competitors and hackers. Reverse engineering with combination of security misconfiguration and S-SDLC may land fatal damage to an organization (Canavese et al., 2022).

Forensics in software engineering involves ensuring that software systems are capable of supporting digital investigations or in general forensics is a science process to investigate and verify claims to uphold the justice with non-repudation characteristics. Forensics activity in the context of software applications is performing logging, monitoring activities, ensuring data integrity and maintaining clear audit of spesific action in software application. These forensics in software application environment play a significant role to cyber-crime investigation, due to lack of knowledge, monitoring system and logging has become chaotic and hard for people to analyze and investigate the perpetrator and what kind of attack that prepetrator landing to organizations, firm and vendors, this investigation is essential for mitigating the issues occured. Some organizations are not even aware of this logging standardization in context of where, what kind of format and how long the logging is stored. worse than that this logging system doesn't even exist in software application which impacted to Hardening Forensics Process and Monitoring Failure or even worse, the attacker maintaining sustainable access to specific organization (Pasquale et al., 2018).

Cryptographic Failures, as mentioned by the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) refer to issues related to incorrect implementation or use of cryptographic systems that can lead to security vulnerabilities. These issues are included in the OWASP Top 10 list, which identifies the most critical and common security risks to software application. Cryptographic failures are caused by several events such as Insecure Cryptographic Storage, Outdated Algorithms, Improper Key Management, Encryption at Rest Failure, Insecure Transmission Protocol (Hazhirpasand & Ghafari, 2021). A previous study defines cryptographic failures as the incorrect usage of cryptography which can leave sensitive data vulnerable

to exposure. The paper discusses instances such as the use of outdated cryptographic algorithms such as MD5 and SHA-1 which are known to be susceptible to attacks and highlights the need for using stronger alternatives like SHA-256 (Prasanna & Premananda, 2021). See Table 3 to prevent cryptographic failure issues.

Table 3. Cryptographic Failure Issues with its

Prevention			
Issues	Prevention		
	Encrypt Sensitive Data		
	Proper Key Management		
	Use Storing Hashing		
	Functions such as bcrypt,		
	scrypt and Argon2		
Cryptographic Failure	Avoid Deprecated		
	Algorithms such as MD5		
	and SHA1		
	Authenticated Encryption		
	Disable Caching for		
	Sensitive Data		

Lack of Management refers to a critical challenge identified in Khan et al (2022) research indicating a deficiency in focusing requirements, managing issues, careless behavior of developers which related to insider threat.

Business Processes (BP) are considered cornerstone of organization and lack of management refers to a critical challenge identified in study by Khan et al (2022). These processes are often translated into software applications, and they are non-risk-free in terms of software security. An example is the attack of compromise of a business process, which takes advantage of system loopholes what is commonly known in cyber security Insider Attack, this loophole instead of being reported, however it's exploited.

In the study of Khan et al, they are analyze 121 studies and found 424 best practices that may help organization for developing a secure software application, one of the essential phase that may define a sofware application for organization is Requirement Engineering, therefore the authors filter the Secure Requirement Engineering Practice (SREP) from Khan systematic literature review study based on the most top frequency used in 121 primary study, which is identified as SREP1 ranked first, SREP2 ranked 2 and SREP 4 ranked 3 (R. A. Khan et al., 2022).

Table 4. Secure Requirement Engineering Practices.

SREP1	Develop Threat Modelling (Freq: 25)		
SREP1.1	Perform STRIDE		
SREP1.2	Include security requirements as part of defining functional requirements		
SREP 1.3	Perform DREAD		
SREP 1.4	Understand and Incorporate Compliance and Regulatory requirements		
SREP2	Security Requirement Elication Practices (Feq: 31)		
SREP2.1	Elicit and categorize safety and security requirements		

SREP2.2	Take into consideration organizational and political issues			
SREP2.3	Use scenarios to elicit sensitive data and communication in terms authentication, authorization, privacy, system maintenance			
SREP2.4	Identifty Stakeholders.			
SREP2.5	Identify the operationg environment of system.			
SREP11	Methods used in Security RE (Freq: 42)			
SREP11.1	UMLSec, SecureUML			
SREP11.2	Secure Troops			
SREP11.3	Abuse Cases			
SREP11.4	Structure Object Oriented Formal Language			
SREP11.5	Machine Learning Techniques			
SREP11.6	Fuzz-Analytic Hierarchy Process			
SREP11.7	Security Requirement Engineering Approach			
SREP11.8	Problem Frames			
SREP11.9	Tropos (i' framework)			
SREP11.10	Create and describe Misuse Cases			

In Table 4 there are SREP that the authors filter it by top frequency and select to retrieve the keyword STRIDE, DREAD, Identification and Threat, in reason that the authors want to convert SREP to actionable checklist that must be employed within SSDLC from SREP 1.1 to SREP 1.4 and Practice List (PL) and make an checklist shown in Table 5 and after that summarize and categorize it into Table 6 for easier implementation purpose.

Table 5. Secure Requirement Practice Checklist

No.	Checklist
PL1 SREP1. 1-1.4	Have the organization's components/services been conceptually mapped along with other connected applications?
PL2 SREP1. 1-1.4	Have all organizational assets or resources connected to the software application been identified and listed?
PL3 SREP1. 1-1.4	Has threat modeling, including specific cyber-attack scenarios, been defined for the software application?
PL4 SREP2.	Is the Security QA team aware of the system's security requirements?
PL5 SREP2.	Is the product manager aware of the system's security requirements?
PL6 SREP2. 2	Have the Security QA and Product Manager listed the types of risks, severity levels, nature, security priorities, etc.?
PL7 SREP2.	Have all security requirements been defined and categorized?
PL8 SREP2. 2, SREP2. 4	Have the Security Quality Assurance and Product Manager prepared a report on potential cyber-attack scenarios and their consequences if security requirements are neglected?
PL9	Has stakeholder analysis (using a Power- Interest chart) been conducted to facilitate

SREP2.	the implementation of security
2	requirements?
SREP2.	
4	
PL10	Has the Product Owner been informed of
1 L10	the reports?
PL11	Have high-influence stakeholders been
FLII	informed about the reports?
PL12	Have security requirements been revised to
PLIZ	mitigate the identified risks?
	Have the revised security requirements
PL13	been incorporated into the functional
PLIS	requirements, including Security
	Acceptance Criteria?
PL14	Are personnel responsible for modeling and
SREP1	design implementing UMLSec, Secure
1.1	UML, or SecureTroops?
SREP1	•
1.10	
PL15	Are personnel involved in modeling and
SREP1	coding aware of common AI/ML
1.5	implementations to address cyber-attack
SREP1	scenarios?
1.16	
PL16	Have security requirements been defined as
SREP	functional requirements?
11.17	•
PL17	Have the Security Quality Assurance and
SREP	Product Manager finalized the report on
11.10	potential cyber-attack scenarios and the
SREP1	consequences of neglecting each
1.13	requirement?
SREP2.	
2	
SREP2.	
4	
PL18	Does the report include misuse cases and
SREP1	abuse cases?
1.10	
11.3	

Table 6. Summary of Secure Requirement Checklist

	77 40 4
l	Identification
SREC 1	Have the components/services of the organization been conceptually mapped along with other connected applications?
SREC 2	Have all organizational assets or resources connected to the software application been identified and listed?
2	Reports
SREC 3	Has threat modeling and its specific cyber- attack scenarios been defined for the software application?
SREC 4	Have the Security QA and Product Manager completed the listing of risks, including their type, severity level, nature, security priority, etc.?
SREC 5	Have the Security QA and Product Manager created a report on potential cyber-attack scenarios and the consequences of neglecting each defined security requirement?
SREC 6	Have the Security QA and Product Manager finalized the report on potential cyber-attack scenarios, along with the consequences of neglecting each defined requirement?

SREC	Does the report include misuse cases and abuse
7	cases?
3	Awareness and Informed
SREC	Is the Security QA aware of the security
8	requirements for the system?
SREC	Is the Product Manager aware of the security
9	requirements for the system?
SREC	Has stakeholder analysis with a Power-Interest
10	chart been performed to support the
	implementation of security requirements?
SREC	Has the Product Owner been informed about
11	the reports?
SREC	Have high-influence stakeholders been
12	informed about the reports?
SREC	Do the reports include frameworks such as
13	UMLSec, SecureUML, or Secure Tropos?
	Are individuals involved in modeling and
SREC	coding aware of common AI/ML
14	implementations to handle cyber-attack
	scenarios?
4	Requirements
SREC	Have all security pre-requirements been
15	defined and categorized?
SREC	Have the security requirements been
16	restructured to mitigate the identified risks?
	Have the security requirements been
SREC	incorporated into the overall requirements with
17	Security Acceptance Criteria as the final
	functional requirement?
SREC	Have the security requirements been defined
18	alongside functional requirements?

To answer the research question in Secure Coding Practice to avoid cyber-attack security we utilize Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) guidelines in Secure Coding Practices.

In OWASP Secure Coding Practice there are 14 Section. 1) Input Validation, 2) Output Encoding, 3) Authentication and Password Management, 4) Session Management, 5) Access Control, 6) Cryptographic Practices, 7) Error Handling and Logging, 8) Data Protection, 9) Communication Security, 10) System Configuration, 11) Database Security, 12) File Management, 13) Memory, 14) General Coding Practices. From these 14 sections the authors determine to make checklist from Input Validation Secure Coding Checklist in Table 7, Output Encoding (OE) in Table 8, Authentication and Password Management Secure Coding Checklist in Table 9, Access Control Secure Coding Checklist Table 10, Cryptographic Secure Coding Checklist in Table 11.

Table 7. Input Validation Secure Coding Checklist

Sources	No.	Checklist
OSCP IV 1&2	1	Are all input fields in the web application's form tags validated on the front end?
OSCP IV 1&2	2	Is the web application's API hosted on a trusted server?
OSCP IV 1 & 2	3	Is the web application's API validated for each input submitted through form tags?

OSCP IV 1 & 2	4	Are all file upload forms in HTML strictly validated to permit only allowed file types and formats?
OSCP IV	5	Does the web application have a centralized file location to handle acceptable input formats?
OSCP IV 4, 5, 8	6	Are all input and output data in both the web API and front-end interface properly encoded in UTF-8?
OSCP 7	7	Is the input and output from the web application's API and interface encoded in UTF-8?
OSCP 6	8	Does the web API application use a centralized template for handling input rejection, complete with standardized messages (e.g., middleware or centralized file)?
OSCP IV 8	9	Are HTTP headers, such as Cookies, User-Agent, Referer, and others, validated and sanitized?
OSCP IV 8	10	Are URLs and parameters sanitized before being sent to the web API?
OSCP IV 8	11	Are URLs and parameters validated and sanitized upon receipt by the web API?
OSCP IV	12	Are all HTTP header responses to the API validated and restricted to the ASCII character set?
OSCP IV 10	13	Is redirect URL data validated before being processed or executed?
OSCP IV 11, 12, 13	14	Are all HTML form inputs validated for data type, range, and length prior to submission?
OSCP IV 14	15	Does the front end enforce correct input types using appropriate HTML form elements?
OSCP IV 15 & 16	16	If special or hazardous characters must be used as input, is there a specific function in a centralized file to handle them?

Table 8. Output Encoding (OE) Secure Coding Checklist

		Checklist
Sources	No.	Checklist
OSCP OE 1	18	Is all output encoding performed on the server side, ensuring that no encoding logic is delegated to the client side?
OSCP OE 2	19	Is there a standardized and well- tested encoding library used for all web application output encoding operations?
OSCP OE 3,5	20	Are encoding and decoding operations for both the web application's API and interface set to UTF-8?
OSCP OE 6	21	Have all inputs to database queries been properly sanitized?
OSCP OE 4, 5, 7	22	Have all inputs and outputs connecting the web application system to third-party applications been sanitized?

Table 9. Authentication & Password Management Secure Coding Checklist

	Secu	re Coding Checklist
Sources	No.	Checklist
OSCP		Are all authorized pages protected
APM 23,	23	using a middleware-based strong
26, 27		authentication system?
		Does the authentication system in
OSCP	24	the middleware comply with
APM 23	2.	security standards?
OSCP		Is the authentication API system
APM 23	25	hosted on a trusted server?
& 24	23	nosted on a trusted server:
OSCP		Is your someon marridge using
	26	Is your server provider using
APM 23&	26	secure communication protocols
24		(e.g., HTTPS)?
OSCP	27	Is your server accessible?
APM 23		
OSCP		Does the web application API
APM 28,	28	ensure that authentication failure
OSCP33	20	messages do not reveal specific
050133		failure details?
OSCP	29	Does your web API properly clear
APM 28	29	all session data upon logout?
OSCP	-	Does your web API enforce an
APM 28,	30	entry rate limitation for
OSCP41		authentication attempts?
		Does the web API use strong
OSCP		hashing functions with a write-
APM 30	31	only method for storing sensitive
& 31		data?
		Does the web API sequentially
OSCP	32	process all authentication inputs it
APM 32	32	receives?
-		If your web API is connected to
OSCP		external systems, is there an
APM 34	33	authentication system in place for
A1 IVI 34		those connections?
		Are HTTPS POST requests used
OSCP	2.4	
APM 36	34	to transmit authentication
		credentials?
		If your system transmits
OSCP	2.5	temporary passwords, are they
APM 37	35	encrypted, transmitted over
- 11 1.1 0 /		HTTPS, and accessible only to
		authorized users?
OSCP		Does your web API enforce
APM 38	36	specific password complexity
& 39		requirements?
OSCP		Does your web interface obscure
APM 40	37	password entries on the user
ArW 40		screen?
OCCD		Are user login and logout events
OSCP	38	logged into a temporary database
APM 53		system?
OSCP 20		Are user login and logout events
		logged with details such as a
APM 53	39	timestamp, user ID, IP address,
111 171 55		and location?

Table 10. Access Control Secure Coding Checklist.

Sources	No.	Checklist
OSCP AC 1	40	Does your web application system rely on server-side objects or tokens to make access control decisions?

OGGD		Does your web application system
OSCP AC 1	41	sanitize all inputs used in authorization decisions at both the
AC I		front-end and back-end?
		Is the web application framework
OSCP	42	utilizing built-in session
AC 1	12	management to ensure sessions are
		securely stored and transmitted?
OSCP	43	Is your web application system using a trusted and authorized built-
AC 1	13	in session management library?
OSCD		Does your web application system
OSCP AC 3	44	implement a "deny by default"
		policy?
OSCP	15	Does your web application log
AC 3	45	access control failures for monitoring and auditing purposes?
		Does your web application access
OSCP	4.6	control use exception handling to
AC 4	46	manage errors and prevent
		exposure of internal system details?
OSCP	4.5	Is there a monitoring system in
AC 4	47	place to detect configuration access failures?
		Does your web application prevent
OSCP	48	Path Traversal Attacks by properly
AC 7		validating and sanitizing file paths?
OSCP		Are file access restrictions enforced
AC 7	49	to protect sensitive files (e.g., .env,
-		.git, config.php, package.json)?
OSCP		Does your web application follow the principle of least privilege,
AC 11	50	ensuring users and services only
		have the necessary access?
OSCP		Is sensitive data securely encrypted
AC 12	51	using AES for storage and bcrypt
		for password hashing? Does your web application
OSCP	52	implement secure data retention
AC 13	32	policies?
		Is your web application
OSCP	53	environment restricted to allowing
AC 14		admin panel and server access only
		to authorized personnel? Does your web application code
OSCP		enforce consistent access control
AC 15	54	between the back end and front
		end?
OSCP		Are critical user interface security
AC 15	55	actions enforced by server-side
		code? Is your access control logic
OSCP	56	centralized in a single, consistent
AC 15		logic file, avoiding duplication?
		Does your web application enforce
OSCP	57	rate limits for sensitive operations
AC 18		such as login attempts, financial transactions, or crucial API calls?
		Does your web application
OSCP	50	implement CAPTCHA or MFA for
AC 18	58	high-risk actions to prevent
		automated attacks?
OGGR		Does your web application include
OSCP AC 18	59	logging and analytics to detect abnormal patterns, transactions, or
110 10		activities?

OSCP AC 19	60	Does your web application use supplemental headers for authorization, such as CSRF protection and session validation?
OSCP AC 20	61	Does the web application system have a mechanism to force users to re-authenticate when their privileges change?
OSCP AC 20	62	Does your web application automatically log out users after a period of inactivity?
OSCP AC 22	63	Does your web application enforce session termination when an account is deactivated?
OSCP AC 22	64	Does your web application's logout feature properly invalidate session tokens to prevent reuse?

Table 11. Cryptographic Failures Secure Coding
Checklist

Checklist		
Sources	No.	Checklist
OSCP CP 1	65	Should cryptographic operations be performed on a secure, trusted server rather than on the web application client side?
OSCP CP 1	66	Are cryptographic keys securely stored in a dedicated key management system instead of being embedded within application code or configuration files?
OSCP CP 2	67	Are your web application secrets stored securely and never hardcoded in the source code?
OSCP CP 2	68	Are secrets encrypted at rest using strong encryption algorithms such as AES-256?
OSCP CP 2	69	Are secrets encrypted during transit using TLS 1.2 or higher, including TLS 1.3?
OSCP CP 3	70	Does the web application implement secure error handling to prevent sensitive cryptographic errors from being exposed?
OSCP CP 3	71	Are system logs configured to capture cryptographic failures without exposing sensitive information?
OSCP CP 4	72	Are all random values (e.g., random numbers, GUIDs, filenames, session tokens) generated using a cryptographically secure random number generator (CSPRNG) rather than non-secure functions such as rand() in PHP or Math.random() in JavaScript?

IV. CONCLUSION

Recently organizations, government and vendors are evolving their information technology (IT) infrastructure and trying to utilize digital platform such as applications, artificial intelligence or automation process where this rapid development is a great things, however, this rapid development is not linearly followed by protection in IT application security, in

this study the authors encourage utilization of secure software development where the authors emphasize security requirement practices (SREP) and security coding practices (SCP) that has been compose by author from international journal articles and international standard (Open Web Application Project), the authors also provide practical contribution by combining and summarizing the practices into actionable checklist. However, this study has certain limitations such as limitation applicability to specific regional area context, the actionable checklist hasn't been validated in real-world scenarios leaving room for further refinement and testing.

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